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PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF WEARING A MASK 
SUMMARY 
A review of the literature shows that the wearing of a 
mask has been hypothesised to bring about four main 
psychological effects: disinhibition, transformation, 
facilitation of the expression of aspects of the wearer’s 
Self, and various psycho-somatic changes. Several 
different explanations have been proposed as to why each 
of these effects come about. 
 
Using theoretical and empirical research, the thesis 
explores in detail the hypothesis that a mask can 
disinhibit its wearer, and that this disinhibition comes 
about because the mask-wearer feels less identifiable. 
The findings show that a mask can significantly reduces 
its wearer’s feelings of identifiability, and that it can 
also significantly reduce its wearer’s public self-
awareness as a consequence of changes in attentional 
focus. However, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
mask’s disinhibiting effect is limited to situations in 
which an individual wants to behave in a particular way, 
but inhibits that behaviour out of a concern with ‘mask-
able’ facets of their public self. Concomitantly, the 
findings suggest that, if an individual wants to behave 
in a way for which they require ‘mask-able’ facets of the 
public self, then the wearing of a mask may be 
experienced as inhibiting.  
 
This thesis also examines the hypothesis that a mask can 
transform its wearer, and that this occurs through the 
self-attribution process outlined by Kellerman and Laird 
(1982). The thesis provides strong empirical support for 
both these hypotheses, showing that the wearing of a mask 
can make individuals feel less like their usual self and 
more like the character represented in the mask. However, 
the empirical evidence suggests that this latter effect 
only occurs under conditions in which an individual is 
specifically focused on their masked appearance.  
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A final chapter discusses the theoretical and applied 
implications of these findings, with specific reference 
to the use of masks in therapeutic practice. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
What is the psychological effect of wearing a mask? This 
is the question that will be addressed in this thesis. 
This introduction will define the key terms, discuss the 
rationale for this study, and present an outline of the 
thesis. 
1.1  DEFINITIONS 
1.1.1 ‘Psychological’ 
Reber’s (1985) Dictionary of Psychology defines 
‘psychological’ as ‘Pertaining to psychology...’ (p. 
591), but goes on to state that ‘psychology’ ‘simply 
cannot be defined’ (p. 593) as it is not one specific 
‘thing’. For Reber as for Gleitman (1991), however, 
‘psychology’ is primarily understood as a field of 
inquiry concerned with mental and behavioural phenomena, 
and such a definition is sufficient for the purposes of 
this study. 
 
Hence, the theory and research presented in this thesis 
will be looking at the effects of wearing a mask on an 
individual’s mental state or behaviour. Whilst this does 
not deny the possibility that the wearing of a mask may 
have other effects on an individual --- for instance, it 
may make an individual feel hotter, or it may limit her
1
 
vision --- these non-psychological effects will not 
specifically be looked at. The only exception to this is 
in cases where the non-psychological effects have 
specific psychological consequences. If, for instance, an 
individual feels more vulnerable when wearing a mask 
because her vision is limited, then this process would be 
considered an appropriate area of inquiry. 
1.1.2 ‘Mask’ 
As Tooker (1983) notes, the term ‘mask’ has been used by 
writers for a number of different referents. Whilst 
Brigham (1970), for instance, states that ‘masks’ refer 
to facial coverings only, Baptiste (1989) argues that the 
face can be a mask as well, and Lévi-Strauss (1961) 
proposes that make-up and tattooing should be included 
                     
1
 Throughout this thesis, the feminine pronoun will be 
used to refer to both men and women.  
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under the definition of ‘masks’. There are also 
significant cultural differences in what is considered a 
‘mask’. In the U. K., for instance, a mask (as a covering 
for the face) is generally distinguished from a costume 
(as a covering for the body); in Africa, ‘a mask is the 
sum total of a costume with all its special trappings and 
it covers the wearer’s whole body’ (Lommel, 1972, p.42). 
It is clear, therefore, that there is no one 
transcendental signified that can be labelled ‘a mask’. 
Rather, what is considered a mask is dependent on how the 
term ‘mask’ is defined within a particular culture, 
historical epoch, or by a particular individual.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of a mask 
that will be used comes from The New Collins Dictionary 
and Thesaurus (1987), and is as follows: ‘any covering 
for the whole or a part of the face worn for amusement, 
protection, disguise, etc.’ (p.614). This is similar to a 
definition provided in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Macropedia (1995): ‘a form of disguise. It is an object 
that is frequently worn over or in front of the face to 
hide the identity of a person and by its own features to 
establish another being’ (p.544). It is also similar to a 
definition provided in The Oxford English Dictionary: ‘A 
covering for the face, worn either as a disguise or for 
protection’ (1995, p.200). However, the definition from 
The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus is slightly 
preferable in that it allows a little more flexibility as 
to the specific function of those objects that come under 
the definition of ‘a mask’ (see below). 
 
All three definitions share two necessary components: one 
structural, the other, functional. Structurally, a mask 
is considered an object which, firstly, covers the face. 
Hence, by this definition, a birth mark would not be 
considered a mask as it does not cover the face but is 
part of the facial tissue. Make-up would also not be 
considered a mask as it is applied directly to the facial 
tissue rather than covering over it. Second, a mask is 
defined as an object which covers the whole, or a 
(substantial) part, of the face. Hence, an eye patch 
would not come under this definition of ‘a mask’ because 
only a small amount of the face is actually covered. 
Clearly, there is no exact cut-off point when a facial 
covering becomes a ‘mask’, but, intuitively, one might 
suggest that around a third or a half of an individual’s 
face needs to be covered before a ‘covering’ becomes a 
‘mask’. Intuitively, however, whether or not a ‘covering’ 
becomes a ‘mask’ would also seem to depend on which parts 
of the face are covered. A covering, for instance, which 
covers just a small part of the ocular regions seems more 
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likely to be considered a ‘mask’ than a covering which 
covers just a small part of the ears or chin. Third, a 
mask is defined as a structure which covers the face as 
opposed to other parts of the body. Hence, by this 
definition, clothing or costumes would not be considered 
masks in themselves; rather, the part of them that 
covered the face would be considered the mask.  
 
The second necessary component, according to all three 
definitions, is that a facial covering is only a mask if 
it serves a particular range of functions. The Oxford 
English Dictionary (1995) defines these functions as to 
‘protect’ or ‘disguise’ its wearer; whilst The New 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropedia (1995) writes that 
the function of a ‘mask’ is to hide an individual’s 
identity or establish the existence of another identity. 
The Collins’ (1987) definition also provides a range of 
possible functions for a ‘mask’ --- ‘amusement’, 
‘protection’ and ‘disguise’ --- but, in adding an ‘etc.’, 
does not entirely foreclose what those possible functions 
might be. This is advantageous for the present study, 
where it would seem premature to define what the function 
of a mask is when this is partly the empirical question 
under investigation. However, from the three definitions 
above, ‘protection’, ‘disguise’ and ‘transformation’ 
would seem to be the three prototypical functions that 
make a facial covering a ‘mask’.  
1.1.3 ‘Wearing’ 
This thesis limits itself to an interest in the 
psychological effects of wearing a mask, where ‘to wear’ 
is defined as: ‘1. to carry or have (a garment, etc.) on 
one’s person as clothing, ornament, etc.’ (The New 
Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1987, p.1137). Because 
of this, this thesis will not be looking at the 
psychological effects of looking at, visualising, or 
making a mask. This thesis will also not be looking at 
the psychological effects of particular mask-work 
practices or particular masks. However, as with the 
question of the non-psychological effects of wearing a 
mask, where these non-wearing effects have implications 
for the psychological effects, then they will be 
considered appropriate areas of inquiry. 
1.2  RATIONALE 
What is the value of empirically examining the 
psychological effect of wearing a mask? Aside from the 
fact that this is a phenomenon which has yet to be 
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explored in any systematic or rigorous way (see chapter 
two), two further reasons can be proposed. 
 
First, there is an applied value, particularly in terms 
of the mask’s application within a clinical setting. In 
recent years, a growing number of psychotherapists (e.g. 
Jennings and Minde, 1993) have begun to use masks as a 
central component of their therapeutic practice. 
Exploring the psychological effects of wearing a mask, 
therefore, may serve as an important means of developing 
an understanding of the mask’s efficacy within this 
environment. If it is found, for instance, that an 
individual feels less inhibited when she wears a mask, 
then this could have significant implications for the 
mask’s use as a therapeutic tool. 
 
Aside from psychotherapy, however, the wearing of a mask 
occurs within a wide variety of other activities. This 
includes the training of drama students, theatrical 
performances, professional activities such as surgery or 
welding, criminal activities, recreational activities 
such as carnival or ‘fancy dress’ parties, and sporting 
activities such as fencing. Findings from this thesis, 
therefore, could also be of substantial relevance to some 
or all of these fields. If it is found, for instance, 
that an individual feels more vulnerable when she is 
wearing a mask, then this could raise important concerns 
as to the mask’s use in surgery or welding.  
 
A second rationale for studying the psychological effects 
of wearing a mask is that it may shed some important 
light on related psychological processes and theories. 
Wearing a mask is an activity that is not entirely 
dissimilar from a whole range of other activities: such 
as dressing up in different clothes, putting on make-up, 
or wearing a disguise. Hence, it may be possible to 
generalise the findings from this study across to related 
phenomenon. Also, in understanding the psychological 
effects of wearing a mask, it may be possible to evaluate 
the validity of ‘deeper’ and more universal theories of 
human psychological functioning: for instance, the 
question of whether an individual’s physical appearance 
can affect their psychological state of mind.  
1.3  OUTLINE 
This thesis begins by mapping out the different 
hypotheses that have been proposed regarding the 
psychological effects of wearing a mask. Based on this 
‘map’, the thesis then goes on to explore one particular 
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effect in more detail: the hypothesis that the mask 
disinhibits its wearer. General empirical support for 
this hypothesis is reviewed, and then the thesis goes on 
to look in detail at one particular explanation for this 
disinhibiting effect: that the wearing of a mask invokes 
a state of anonymity. Empirical support for this 
hypothesised link between mask-wearing, anonymity and 
disinhibition is reviewed, and, from this, a series of 
working hypotheses are proposed. These hypotheses are 
then tested through two empirical studies. 
 
The thesis then goes on to look at the hypothesis that 
the mask transforms its wearer, and reviews the general 
empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. Again, 
one specific explanation for this effect is explored in 
more detail --- that the mask transforms its wearer 
through a process of ‘self-attribution’ --- and a series 
of working hypotheses are then proposed. Three empirical 
studies are conducted to test these hypotheses. 
 
The discussion to the thesis summarises the findings, and 
discusses their implications with respect to the applied 
and theoretical rationale for conducting the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF WEARING A MASK: 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
In investigating the psychological effects of wearing a 
mask, it would seem useful to begin by reviewing those 
hypotheses that have, to the present date, been proposed. 
Before doing so, however, a number of preliminary points 
should be noted.  
 
First, whilst such hypotheses come from a number of 
different disciplines --- most notably anthropology and 
ethnography (e.g. Ottenberg, 1985), but also drama and 
theatrical studies (e.g. Johnson, 1980), dramatherapy 
(e.g. Jennings, 1991), psychotherapy (e.g. Saigre, 1989), 
and history (e.g. Castle, 1981) --- psychologists, 
themselves, have yet to address the question of what 
happens to an individual, psychologically, when they wear 
a mask.  
 
Furthermore, of those books, chapters and papers which 
have been written on the mask, in only two of these is 
the question of the mask’s psychological effect on its 
wearer the primary concern (Honigman, 1979; Webbers, 
Stephens and Laughlin, 1983). In the other texts, the 
hypothesised effects of wearing a mask is either one of 
several central concerns (e.g. Caillois, 1961); or, more 
commonly, a supplementary comment or aside to the main, 
non-psychological, thrust of the text (e.g. Appel, 1982). 
 
There are a number of consequences of these two facts. 
First, the majority of hypotheses proposed in the 
literature tend to lack a detailed, critical exposition 
of the psychological mechanisms outlined. Related to this 
is a second point: that the hypotheses are rarely 
embedded within contemporary psychological theorising, 
but tend to consist of an amalgam of ‘intuitive’ 
psychological ideas and premises. Third, the hypotheses 
are often implicit rather than explicit, and, in some 
cases, require a substantial degree of interpretation 
before any meaningful hypotheses emerge. Hence, it is not 
always possible to identify exactly what it is that a 
particular author is trying to say. Fourth, as will be 
seen in chapters three and six, the empirical evidence in 
support of the various hypotheses tends to be either 
vague, unreliable, difficult to generalise from, or 
simply absent. Fifth, there is very little cross-
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referencing between the different authors --- again, 
leading to an amalgam of untested, ‘intuitive’ ideas 
about the psychological effects of wearing a mask rather 
than an in depth body of critical knowledge.  
 
What emerges from this review, therefore, is not a series 
of well-founded psychological hypotheses that have been 
subjected to rigorous psychological testing. Rather, what 
emerges is a pastiche of sometimes-overlapping, 
sometimes-unrelated ideas about the mask’s psychological 
effect. Such a review, therefore, tells us little about 
what might ‘actually’ happen when an individual wears a 
mask. What it does do, however, is to identify a whole 
range of hypothesised effects, some of which can then be 
subjected to a much more rigorous psychological 
examination. This review, then, serves as a very useful 
starting point for this thesis, as well as for other 
researchers who would be interested in examining the 
psychological effects of wearing a mask.  
 
In attempting to map out the different ideas about the 
mask’s psychological effect, what seems to emerge are 
four relatively distinct groups of hypotheses, each 
constellated around a particular hypothesised effect. The 
first of these hypothesised effects is that the mask 
disinhibits its wearer, the second that it transforms its 
wearer, the third that it facilitates the expression of 
aspects of the wearer’s Self, and the fourth that it 
brings about various psycho-somatic changes in the 
wearer’s state of being. Within each group, however, 
different authors have proposed different reasons as to 
why these effects might come about. The structure of this 
review, therefore, will be to outline the four main 
hypotheses, and to look at the different explanations 
that have been proposed to account for each of them. 
2.1  DISINHIBITION 
One of the most commonly hypothesised consequences of 
wearing a mask is that it reduces the extent to which an 
individual inhibits themself. ‘Inhibition’ is here 
defined as: ‘a restraint on the direct expression of an 
instinct’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995, p.700) 
(rather than as a feeling of shame or embarrassment), and 
‘instinct’ is defined as: ‘to act without conscious 
intent’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1975, p.705) (rather 
than in the more biological sense). In other words, those 
theorists under the heading of ‘disinhibition’ are 
proposing that, when an individual wears a mask, they 
tend to express themselves in a way that is less 
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restrained by conscious intentions. MacGowan and Rosse 
(1924), for instance, write, ‘When a man puts on a mask 
he experiences a kind of release from his inhibited and 
bashful and circumscribed soul’ (xii). This hypothesis 
has been proposed by over twenty-five different authors, 
including anthropologists and ethnologists (e.g. Gell, 
1975), psychotherapists (e.g. Baptiste, 1989), historians 
(Castle, 1986), specialists in drama and theatrical 
studies (e.g. Brook, 1981) and eighteenth century social 
commentators (e.g. Downing, 1726). Exactly how this 
disinhibition is conceptualised, however, varies from 
author to author, depending on the author’s particular 
epistemological framework. 
 
For eighteenth century social critics like Downing (1726) 
and Owen (1750), for instance, embedded within a 
moralistic theological discourse, this process of 
disinhibition is primarily described in terms of the 
disregarding of ‘Christian’ inhibitions. Consequently, 
the mask is seen as facilitating the expression of 
‘Whate’er the Devil and the flesh suggest’ (Downing, p.6) 
--- promiscuity, sodomy, adultery, prostitution and 
gambling being amongst the ‘barefaced Impieties’ and 
‘wickednesses’ (Owen, p.18) that the wearing of a mask is 
considered to elicit. 
 
For those from a more contemporary, psychodynamic 
perspective, on the other hand, the disinhibiting effect 
of wearing a mask is described primarily in terms of a 
suspension of the control mechanisms of the superego, 
with a subsequent cathexis of the Id (e.g. Castle, 1986). 
Saigre (1989), for instance, writes that the mask brings 
about a remarkable short-cut in the client’s normal 
defense systems, encouraging ‘massive regression’, and 
putting the wearer directly and almost immediately in 
touch with the psychotic part of herself.  
 
Castle (1986), on the other hand, describes this masked-
cathexis in more libidinal terms. He writes that the 
eighteenth century masquerades offered its participants a 
spielraum in which repressed impulses --- such as the 
desire for pleasure and sexual arousal --- could be acted 
out safely. Caillois (1962) makes a similar point 
regarding the European tradition of masked carnivals, 
which he states involved such libidinal activities as 
‘indecencies, jostling, provocative laughter, exposed 
breasts, mimicking buffoonery, a permanent incitement to 
riot, feasting and excessive talk, noise and movement’ 
(p.131). Like Castle (1986), he argues that these 
activities served as a ‘vital source of release’ for the 
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‘decency and prudency that must be observed for the rest 
of the year’ (p.131). 
 
In contrast, for those authors coming from a more 
humanistic perspective, the mask’s disinhibiting effect 
is described primarily in terms of a liberation of the 
‘real self’ from the socially-constructed ‘false self’ 
(e.g. Frost and Yarrow, 1990). This viewpoint has been 
most famously expressed by Wilde (quoted in Sorrell, 
1973) who quipped: ‘Man is least himself when he talks in 
his own person, give him a mask and he will tell the 
truth’ (p.15). Similarly, Fourneret (quoted in Iteanu, 
1981) writes: ‘At carnival time the man puts a cardboard 
face on his mask’ (p.26). 
 
Along with conceptualising this process of disinhibition 
in different ways, different authors have provided 
different explanations as to how this disinhibiting 
effect comes about.   
2.1.1 Anonymity 
The most commonly cited explanation for why the mask 
disinhibits its wearer is related to the reduction in 
identifiability that the wearing of a mask is thought to 
bring about (e.g. Emunah, 1994). The basis of this line 
of thinking is that, in everyday life, individuals tend 
to inhibit certain behaviours ‘Lest it bring Obloquy2 upon 
their Name’ (Downing, 1726, p.5). When ‘cover’d with a 
Mask from Human View’ (Downing, p.5), however, the 
individual feels less identifiable. Consequently, she 
feels that there is less likelihood that she will be 
judged, shamed, ridiculed, spoken ill of, or punished in 
any other way for her behaviours --- because others do 
not know that it is she who is performing them. The 
result of this is that she feels less of a need to stop 
herself from behaving in ways that she might otherwise 
inhibit.  
 
With respect to this hypothesis, it should be noted that 
there is a subtle but significant distinction between 
those authors who state that the mask disinhibits its 
wearer because she is less identifiable (e.g. Betson, 
1751), and those that state that the mask disinhibits its 
wearer because she feels less identifiable (Saigre, 1989; 
Baptiste, 1989). The difference here is that, whilst the 
former refers to ‘actual’ levels of identifiability 
(i.e., how identifiable the mask-wearer is to others), 
                     
2
 1 ‘The state of being generally ill spoken of’ (Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, 1995, p.939). 
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the latter refers to identifiability as subjectively-
experienced. The implications of this distinction will be 
discussed more fully in section 3.2.1. 
 
The hypothesis that the mask disinhibits its wearer by 
reducing her identifiability is one of the few theories 
of the mask to be explicitly critiqued within the 
literature. Crocker (1983), Honigman (1977), Gell (1975) 
and Ottenberg (1975) all argue that the disinhibited 
behaviour observed at traditional masked rituals can not 
be accounted for by the mask-wearer’s anonymity, as, ‘in 
a small community where masking occurs with troublesome 
behaviour, the identity of the maskers is generally 
known, or will eventually be revealed, to others’ 
(Honigman, p.275). Furthermore, Ottenberg and Gell argue 
that, whilst the masquerades’ (primarily female) audience 
may express ignorance as to the mask-wearer’s identities, 
this is primarily a feint to ‘play along’ with the 
performance, rather than a case of the women actually 
being deceived. It should be noted, however, that this 
critique is primarily relevant to the hypothesis that the 
mask disinhibits its wearer through reducing her ‘actual’ 
levels of identifiability, rather than her 
phenomenologically-experienced levels of identifiability. 
Again, this will be discussed more fully in section 
3.2.1. 
2.1.2 ‘Dramatic License’ 
A second explanation of the disinhibiting effects of 
wearing a mask, as proposed by several theorists across 
the various disciplines (e.g. Gell, 1975), is that the 
mask confers on its wearer a degree of ‘dramatic 
license’. The basis of this hypothesis is that the mask 
disinhibits its wearer, not because she believes she is 
unidentifiable behind her mask, but because she believes 
that her audience will attribute her behaviour to the 
mask or the mask-character rather than to herself. In 
other words, what is being proposed is that the mask-
wearer knows that her audience know who she is, but 
believes that her audience will believe that she has 
‘become’ the character represented in the mask. The 
consequence of this is that she will feel that she is 
less likely to be punished, ridiculed, etc. for 
behaviours that might otherwise invite negative 
judgements, and is thus more likely to enact those 
behaviours. As Brook (1981) states, ‘you can come right 
out of your shell’ when you are wearing a mask because, 
‘you know that the person who is looking at you doesn’t 
think it’s you’ (p.72). 
 
  
22 
 
This is the explanation for masked-disinhibition which 
seems to be most frequent in the anthropological and 
ethnographic literature. Segy (1952), for example, argues 
that certain African masks facilitate their wearers’ 
ability to ‘confidently’ pass laws and enforce rulings, 
since the judgements they make will be attributed to the 
ancestral spirits residing in the mask, rather than to 
themselves. Hence, they need not fear retributions from 
those that have been ‘wronged’. Makarius (1983) makes the 
same point with regard to masked African executioners: 
that by ‘no longer being themselves’ when they perform 
their act, they can not be retaliated against by the 
families or supporters of the deceased.  
 
The same line of argument is used to explain disinhibited 
behaviour during masquerade and carnival. Gell (1975), 
for instance, argues that the masked ‘Cassowary’ dancers 
at the rites of the New Guinean Umeda people can behave 
in ways that are counter to the culture’s norms because 
the dancer is, ‘officially...no longer himself’ (p.193). 
Similarly, Ottenberg (1982) argues that the Afipko 
masqueraders have license to express their unconscious, 
Oedipal wishes because, within the Afipko belief-system, 
they have turned into a spirit, and are therefore not 
responsible for what they are expressing. 
 
Apart from Brook (1981), however, it is not clear whether 
these authors are suggesting that the wearing of a mask 
brings about a state of dramatic license, per se, or 
whether they are only talking about the effects of very 
specific masks within very specific cultural contexts. 
Anthropologists like Segy (1952) and Makarius (1983), for 
instance, are writing about masks that are worn within a 
very particular belief system: one in which it is 
believed that the mask-wearer takes on the spirit of her 
mask. Hence, it is not clear whether they are saying that 
there is something intrinsic to the act of wearing a mask 
which means that the mask-wearer will tend to believe 
that others will attribute her behaviour to the mask or 
mask-character; or that, in a culture which believes a 
mask-wearer is no longer himself, the mask-wearer can 
take advantage of this and behave in ways that he might 
otherwise inhibit. Given the limitations of this thesis 
discussed in section 1.1.3, it is only the former 
hypothesis that is of immediate interest.  
2.1.3 ‘Dramatic Distance’ 
The theory of dramatic license leads on to a third 
explanation for the disinhibiting effect of wearing a 
mask. This is similar to the above in terms of a dis-
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identification with one’s behaviours, but is based on 
internal rather than external regulators of behaviour. 
The basis of this approach, which in the dramatherapeutic 
literature is sometimes termed ‘dramatic distancing’, is 
the hypothesis that the mask disinhibits its wearer 
because she feels less personally identified with her 
behaviour when she is wearing it (e.g. Hiltunen, 1988). 
That is, when wearing a mask, she feels that her 
behaviours are the behaviours of an other. The 
consequence of this is that the mask-wearer feels less 
need to inhibit the expression of those behaviours that, 
if fully identified with, she would normally inhibit. 
This inhibition might normally occur either because the 
behaviours transgress the standards of the mask-wearer’s 
superego (e.g. Pollaczek and Homefield, 1954); or else, 
because the mask-wearer is afraid that these behaviours 
or feelings would be too overwhelming (Landy, 1985), 
dangerous (Jennings, 1990), or depressing (Jennings) if 
externalised. In other words, whilst the theory of 
dramatic license proposes that a masked individual 
becomes less inhibited because she can say to others, 
‘it’s not me’; the theory of dramatic distance proposes 
that a disinhibition arises because the individual can 
say ‘it’s not me’ to herself. 
 
How is it that the mask is hypothesised to bring about 
this dramatic distance? In the literature, this is not 
exactly made clear. However, the argument would seem to 
be along the lines that the mask-wearer experiences the 
mask as an object which is physically separate from 
herself: something which is ‘not-me’ (e.g. Landy, 1984). 
Hence, behaviours which are performed under the guise of 
this not-me object tend to be partially associated with 
it. Physical distance thus becomes psychological 
distance. This is implicit in the argument by both Landy 
and Jennings (1993) that the more physically ‘not me’ an 
object is --- for instance, a mask held away from the 
face rather than a close-fitting mask --- the more it is 
hypothesised to create a ‘margin of safety’ (Landy) 
between the individual and that which they are 
expressing. Napier (1986) also points out that the mask 
creates a temporal distance between mask-wearer and mask, 
in that the mask-wearer knows that at some point they can 
take the mask off from their face.  
 
Whilst Jennings (1990) and other dramatherapists focus on 
the association of behaviour with a not-self, Pollackzek 
and Homefield (1954) focus on the other side of this 
coin: the dis-association of behaviour with a ‘self’. 
They write: ‘Hidden behind a false face somehow gives the 
wearer an illusion that he himself is covered and, 
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therefore, that his ego is not responsible for the antics 
of the new character’ (p.299). Here, they seem to be 
suggesting that the individual associates, to some degree 
at least, aspects of her-self with her face (an argument 
that will re-emerge throughout this thesis). Hence, when 
the individual’s face is hidden, she feels that she, too, 
has ‘stepped back’ from the world, and that her 
behaviours are therefore not associated with who she 
really is.  
2.1.4 ‘Container’ 
A fourth explanation for the disinhibiting effects of the 
mask is that it acts as a ‘container’ (e.g. Ives, 1994). 
Jennings and Minde (1993), for instance, write that the 
mask is, ‘especially a safe container of the “self that 
is dangerous” or the “self that feels dangerous”’ (pp. 
189-190); whilst Saigre (1989) writes that the mask acts 
as a ‘container’ for the psychotic and regressed parts of 
the self. Unfortunately, neither of these authors specify 
more precisely what they mean by the term ‘container’, 
though Jennings and Minde relate it to the work of 
Winnicott, as does Ives, who seems to use the terms 
‘container’ and ‘transitional object’ interchangeably. 
Winnicott (1971) defines the latter as: ‘an intermediate 
area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external 
life both contribute’ (p.3). In this respect, the 
argument that the mask functions as a container is not 
altogether different from the argument that it creates a 
dramatic distance between the mask-wearer and their mask. 
That is, a ‘third space’ in which the mask-wearer can 
express aspects of themselves in a way that is also ‘not 
themselves’.  
 
However, implicit within the concept of a ‘container’, 
particularly at a metaphorical level, is also the idea of 
‘boundaries’ and ‘borders’: that a container is a vessel 
which can ‘hold’ something safely. In this respect, the 
argument that the mask allows the individual to express 
more ‘dangerous’ material because of its ability to 
‘contain’ approximates the argument by Frost and Yarrow 
(1990) that the mask creates a sense of safety by 
providing a ‘format’ into which a character can emerge. 
In both cases, what seems to be being proposed is that 
the mask allows its wearer to behave in a less inhibited 
manner because it provides her with well-defined 
(character) boundaries, such that she is less afraid that 
the behaviours she enacts will become chaotic and out-of-
control, as they might do if she enacted them in a more 
form-less, unmasked state. 
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2.1.5 Increase in Facial Expressiveness 
A fifth hypothesis as to why the mask disinhibits its 
wearer, proposed independently by both Brook (1981) and 
Sturtevant (1983), is based on the assumption that, in 
everyday life, individuals tend to inhibit their levels 
of facial expressions for fear of ridicule or 
embarrassment. With their facial expressions hidden 
behind a mask, however, Brook and Sturtevant argue that 
individuals will feel less concerned with how others 
judge their facial expressions, and hence will be able to 
break out of their narrow physiognomic repertoire. 
Sturtevant thus concludes that the ‘mask frees the wearer 
to behave in an unusual manner’ (p.44). However, it is 
not clear whether this ‘unusual manner’ is just unusual 
facial expressions, or whether Brook or Sturtevant see 
this physiognomic liberation as having a more generalised 
disinhibitory effect. 
2.1.6 Reduction in Concern About Facial Vulnerability 
A sixth, and somewhat related explanation for the 
disinhibiting effects of wearing a mask is proposed by 
MacGowan and Rosse (1924). They put forward the following 
argument: human beings, in their natural, unmasked state, 
are aware that others can see their ‘sensitivities’ 
‘betrayed’ by their facial expressions, and this leads to 
a certain anxiety about appearing vulnerable. MacGowan 
and Rosse are not exactly clear what these 
‘sensitivities’ are, but it would seem that they are 
referring to the sort of moments when one’s face ‘looks’ 
nervous or uncomfortable, or when one’s blushing or 
unsteady gaze betrays one’s embarrassment.  
 
In wearing a mask, however, MacGowan and Rosse (1924) 
assert that, ‘The sensitive jelly of his [the mask 
wearer’s] face is no longer exposed to rude and galling 
estimate. He is suddenly free of self, hesitant, weak or 
blustering’ (p.55). In this, MacGowan and Rosse seem to 
be arguing that, in covering her face, the mask-wearer is 
relieved of her anxiety that her facial expressions will 
betray her ‘true’ state of being: her ‘hesitancy’, 
‘weaknesses’, or ‘blusteringness’. Hence, those 
behaviours that the individual might normally inhibit for 
fear of appearing hesitant, weak, etc., no longer require 
inhibiting, and the individual thus behaves in a more 
disinhibited way.  
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2.1.7 Pre-civilised appearance 
A seventh explanation for the disinhibiting effect of 
wearing a mask, as proposed independently by both 
Bihalji-Merin (1971) and Saigre (1989), is based on the 
premise that the mask has a primitive and pre-civilised 
appearance. Saigre refers to the mask as one of 
humankind’s earliest attempts to relate to their origins. 
Hence, in wearing a mask, both authors propose that the 
individual is liberated from her inhibitions because she 
is returned (presumably through a process of 
associations) to a pre-civilised and pre-inhibited 
‘deeper strata of existence’ (Bihalji-Merin). 
 
As with the theory of dramatic license, however, it is 
not clear whether what is being proposed here is a 
process that is relevant to all masks --- i.e. that 
masks, per se, are primitive in nature --- or whether it 
is only referring to the psychological effects of 
specific masks: i.e. those which are ‘primitive’ or ‘pre-
civilized’ in appearance. Would these authors, for 
instance, predict that a futuristic mask would have the 
same pre-civlizing effect? 
2.1.8 Protection 
An eighth explanation for the disinhibiting effect of 
wearing a mask, as proposed by Saigre (1989), is that the 
physical protection afforded by the mask gives the wearer 
an illusion that she is also psychologically protected. 
In other words, because she feels that her face can not 
be physically hurt by the external world, she also feels 
that she can not be psychologically hurt by others, and 
is hence less concerned with inhibiting her behaviour 
such that she will earn the approval --- and avoid the 
condemnation --- of others. 
2.1.9 Transformation 
A final explanation for the disinhibiting effect of the 
mask is based on the second of the four superordinate 
hypotheses: that the mask transforms its wearer, 
specifically, her sense of personal identity. Honigman 
(1977) proposes that a sense of ‘responsibility for acts’ 
and social morality is integral to an individual’s 
concept of self. Hence, when an individual loses their 
self-identity through wearing a mask, they also lose, 
according to Honigman, their sense of personal 
responsibility and concern with behavioural conventions. 
Hence, he argues that they are more likely to behave in a 
disinhibited manner. 
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2.2  TRANSFORMATION 
A second group of hypotheses regarding the psychological 
effects of wearing a mask have been constellated under 
the superordinate term ‘transformation’, where ‘to 
transform’ is defined as to ‘make a thorough or dramatic 
change in the form, outward appearance, character, etc. 
of’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995, p.1481). In other 
words, what the authors grouped under this heading are 
proposing is that the wearing of a mask alters the 
distinguishing qualities or characteristics of the mask-
wearer, such as her sense of identity, behavioural 
patterns or affective state.  
 
The defining terms ‘thorough’ and ‘dramatic’ are of 
importance here, because what these authors are 
suggesting is not simply that the mask brings about 
superficial changes, such as minor behavioural 
modifications or the playing-out of a different role. 
Rather, what is being proposed is that the wearing of a 
mask brings about substantial changes in the mask-
wearer’s behaviour, cognitions, affect, or 
phenomenological-experiencing. Frost and Yarrow (1990), 
for instance, write that the mask ‘annihilates’ its 
wearer’s sense of self; whilst Kerényi (1948) states that 
a mask ‘penetrates’ down into its wearer’s very soul.  
 
As with the hypothesis that the mask disinhibits its 
wearer, the hypothesis that the mask transforms its 
wearer has been advocated by over 25 different theorists, 
from a wide variety of disciplines. This includes 
anthropologists and ethnographists (e.g. Lévi-Strauss, 
1961), writers on drama and theatrical studies (e.g. 
Copeau, quoted in Sorrell, 1973), and psychotherapists 
(e.g. Brigham, 1970).  
 
The hypothesis that the mask transforms its wearer is not 
mutually exclusive from the hypothesis that the mask 
disinhibits its wearer. Indeed, as discussed in section 
2.1.9, it has been argued that masked-transformation is 
one of the precursors to masked-disinhibition. Also, many 
of the authors who hypothesise that a mask disinhibits 
its wearer also propose that the mask transforms its 
wearer (e.g. Segy, 1952). Indeed, to some extent, the 
former can be understood as a subset of the latter: to 
become disinhibited is to experience some form of change. 
Yet the reverse is not equally true: that to be 
transformed is necessarily to become less inhibited. An 
individual, for instance, might transform into a person 
who acts in a more inhibited and self-conscious manner. 
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Furthermore, as the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995) 
definition suggests, when one talks about transformation, 
one tends to be talking about a change in the distinctive 
qualities or characteristics of something. Hence, if one 
talks about an individual ‘transforming’, there is the 
implication that their distinctive ‘personality’ is 
changing, or that their characteristic behavioural, 
affective, or cognitive styles are undergoing an 
alteration. Disinhibition is somewhat different to this, 
because here there is no implication of something 
distinctive or characteristic being changed. When an 
individual experiences a reduction in levels of 
inhibition, they are no less the distinctive individual 
that they were before. They are simply the same person 
with the same characteristic qualities, but with more 
scope to express themselves. In this sense, the concept 
of transformation can, perhaps, be seen as involving a 
more holistic change, whilst the change involved in 
disinhibition is more uni-dimensional and linear in 
nature. 
 
In terms of distinguishing between these two 
superordinate theories, it should also be noted that some 
advocates of the mask-as-transformer hypothesis have been 
critical of the assumption that the mask disguises its 
wearer and thus disinhibits her. Kerényi (1948) was 
perhaps the most notable of these, arguing that self-
concealment was a ‘secondary’ and historically 
‘degenerative’ function of the mask --- in contrast to 
its transformative function. Larsen and Larsen (1981) as 
well as Lommel (1972) also criticise what they consider 
the ‘modern attitude’ of the ‘mask-as-concealer’.  
 
As with disinhibition, there are two sides to the process 
of transformation: the loss of what was, and the 
acquisition of something new. Hence, it has been 
hypothesised that the wearing of a mask brings about an 
attenuation of one’s previous self/identity (e.g. 
Honigman, 1977), social identity (Lévi-Strauss, 1961), 
ego (e.g. Jennings, 1993), personality (e.g. Johnson, 
1981), ‘subjectivity’ (Brook, 1981), and behaviour 
(Benda, 1944). On the other side of the coin, it has been 
hypothesised that the wearing of a mask leads to the 
acquisition of new identities (e.g. Brigham, 1970), 
subjective feelings (e.g. Caillois, 1962), personalities 
(Copeau, quoted in Sorrell, 1973), ‘whole psychologies’ 
(Stanislawski, 1968) ‘voices’ (Copeau), behaviours (e.g. 
Pollaczek and Homefield, 1954), and metaphysical entities 
(e.g. Eliade, 1964). This latter belief --- that the 
mask-wearer acquires the spiritual identity or ‘energy’ 
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of the mask --- is also held by numerous traditional 
cultures (see, for instance, Blau, 1966).  
 
The distinction, between transformation as a loss of what 
was, and transformation as an acquisition of something 
new, is an important one, as the existence of one of 
these processes does not necessarily imply the existence 
of the other. Honigman (1977) and Lévi-Strauss (1961), 
for instance, hypothesise that an individual may lose 
their sense of self or identity, but they do not go on 
from this to suggest that the mask-wearer will therefore 
adopt the characteristics of the mask. Lévi-Strauss 
simply states that the mask-wearer will become an 
‘anonymous being’ --- though one might argue that this is 
a form of identity in itself.  
 
Furthermore, several authors have argued that the mask 
can facilitate the emergence of something ‘new’ without 
necessarily eliminating that which previously existed. In 
this respect, Kerényi (1946) and others have argued that 
the mask is capable of bringing about a state of ‘co-
existence’, or what Cole (1985) terms ‘dissociation’. 
This hypothesised state is one in which the pre-masked 
self or ego has an opportunity to encounter and engage 
with the ‘being’ that has emerged through the wearing of 
a mask.  
 
Kerényi (1948) was the first theorist to put forward this 
hypothesis. He argued that the primary function of the 
mask was not just as an instrument of transformation, but 
as an instrument of unifying transformation. He believed 
that it ‘nullified’ the boundaries between self and not-
self, and ‘fused’ the wearer with aspects of both the 
extra- and intra-psychological life-world that have been, 
‘hidden, forgotten and disregarded’ (p.153).  
 
In recent years, dramatherapists have also emphasised the 
mask’s capacity to achieve this ‘balance of distance’ 
(e.g. Jennings, 1993), in which a client can express new 
behaviour patterns or new ‘selves’ through the mask, but 
in such a way that their original self is not entirely 
annihilated. In other words, it is hypothesised that the 
mask can bring about a ‘partial’ or ‘controlled’ 
transformation. This is related to the hypothesis 
outlined in section 2.1.3, that the mask disinhibits its 
wearer through providing the mask-wearer with some 
dramatic distance from their behaviours. However, what 
dramatherapists like Jennings go on to argue is that, 
although the mask-wearer may experience their transformed 
masked behaviour as that of an other, in fact the 
behaviour and emotions expressed through the mask are 
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projections of the mask-wearer’s own self. Hence, the 
mask allows the wearer to witness and reflect on 
projected aspects of their Being.  
 
Landy (1984) conceptualises this ‘self-witnessing’ in a 
somewhat different direction. He writes that a mask-
wearer has an opportunity to adopt the more ‘distanced, 
elevated, and aestheticized’ (p.86) position of a masked 
being. Hence, she has an opportunity to stand back, and 
witness the behaviour and characteristics of the unmasked 
self. 
 
As with the question of what it is that is expressed 
through the process of disinhibition, the question of 
what it is that is expressed through the process of 
transformation is answered in many different ways, 
depending on the theorists’ particular epistemological, 
ontic and theological assumptions. For those theorists 
whose belief systems are primarily metaphysical, or open 
to metaphysics --- and this includes virtually all 
traditional cultures that use masks --- the mask is seen 
as transforming its wearer into something which is 
entirely outside of her everyday self-system (e.g. 
Johnson, 1980). Rudlin (1994), for instance, writes of ‘a 
possessing spirit’ arriving through the mask which has 
needs of its own, such as wanting to be kept on rather 
than returned to the ‘limbo of suspended animation’ 
(p.40). 
 
As with Jennings (1993) and Landy (1984), however, for 
many others authors (e.g. Larsen and Larsen, 1981) the 
transformation that the mask is hypothesised to bring 
about is not so much from self to other, as from the 
everyday self to the more hidden aspects of the Self (in 
the Jungian sense of the word). Much of this, indeed, 
does come from a Jungian perspective, and Jenkins (1983), 
amongst others, writes that the transformation invoked by 
a mask facilitates the expression of archetypal elements 
of the collective unconscious. Several other authors 
(e.g. Taylor, 1983) talk of the transformation bringing 
out less collective elements of the personal unconscious: 
such as subpersonalities, alternate identities and ego-
states. 
 
It should be noted, however, that what is being proposed 
at this point is not necessarily that the wearing of a 
mask directly facilitates the expression of these extra-
psychic, intra-psychic or temporal aspect of Being. 
Rather, what is being proposed is that the mask 
transforms its wearer, and that in this process of 
transformation, certain aspects of Being are expressed. 
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Those authors who specifically draw a link between the 
wearing of a mask and the expression of particular 
aspects of the Self will be discussed separately in 
section 2.3.  
 
Along with different ideas regarding what it is that is 
transformed when an individual wears a mask, there are 
also different ideas about the extent to which a mask 
transforms its wearer.  
 
At one end of the spectrum, there are those authors who 
conceptualise the wearing of a mask as sufficient, in 
itself, to bring about an immediate and dramatic 
transformation. Copeau (quoted in Sorrell, 1973), for 
instance, states that:  
The actor who performs under a mask receives from 
this papier-mâché object the reality of his part. He 
is controlled by it and has to obey it unreservedly. 
Hardly has he put it on when he feels a new being 
flowing into himself, a being the existence of which 
he had before never even suspected. It is not only 
his face that has changed, it is all his personality, 
it is the very nature of his reactions, so that he 
experiences emotions he could never have felt nor 
feigned without its aid. If he is a dancer, the whole 
style of his dance, if he is an actor, the very tone 
of his voice, will be dictated by this mask...a 
being, without life till he adopts it, which comes 
from without to seize upon him and proceeds to 
substitute itself for him. (pp.64-5) 
 
Similarly, Brook (1981) states that the mask ‘absolutely’ 
(p.68) acts as a transforming agent, giving the example 
of a ferocious Balinese demon mask, which, when used in 
rehearsals, let loose on those who had just tried it on a 
feeling of ‘incredible forces’.  
 
More to the middle of the spectrum are those authors who, 
in describing specific mechanisms whereby the mask 
transforms its wearer, would also seem to be suggesting 
that the wearing of a mask has the capacity to bring 
about a transformation (e.g. Stanislawski, 1968). 
However, in contrast to authors such as Benda (1944) or 
Copeau (quoted in Sorrell, 1973), these authors describe 
the mask’s power to transform in more qualified terms, 
and there is less emphasis on the extremity or the 
immediacy of the changes that the wearing of a mask 
brings about. Also, these authors tend to describe the 
transformative effect of wearing a mask within the 
context of many related factors, some of which are seen 
as being necessary for a masked transformation to occur.  
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Johnson’s (1981) writings are a good example of this 
middle position. Johnson states that the mask is a device 
for ‘driving’ the mask-wearer’s personality out of her 
body, and provides an explanation for why this might be 
the case (see section 2.3.1). In this, it would seem that 
he is hypothesising that the wearing of a mask makes a 
very specific contribution to the transformative process. 
Yet in also talking about times when the mask is 
‘switched on’ and ‘switched off’, it would seem that he 
is not taking the position that a mask will always 
transform its wearer whatever the context. Rather, in 
talking about mask-wearing in the context of different 
mask-work techniques (e.g. looking at one’s masked face 
in a mirror), it would seem that he is saying that there 
are a number of different factors which contribute to the 
transformative effect of wearing a mask. Wearing a mask, 
on its own, does not seem to be considered sufficient to 
bring this effect about.  
 
At the furthest end of the spectrum are those authors 
who, again, outline a specific mechanism by which the 
mask may transform its wearer. However, the 
contextualised nature of this effect is increasingly 
emphasised; or else there is an implicit or explicit 
challenge to the hypothesis that the wearing of a mask, 
alone, is sufficient to bring about an immediate and 
dramatic transformation. Cole (1985), for instance, makes 
the point that, for the mask to transform its wearer in a 
ritual context, appropriate ritual preparation and 
costuming are also required. Similarly, Frost and Yarrow 
(1990) state that the ‘power to change is not in the 
mask’ (p.125), but derives from a complex interaction 
between the mask, the mask-wearer, and the audience to 
whom they are performing.  
 
Caillois (1962) also views the transformative effect of 
mask-wearing within the context of a complex dialectical 
process that takes in many non-mask factors. He writes 
that the mask ‘permits’ the wearer to transform, 
indicating that he sees it as playing some role in 
facilitating the transformational process (see section 
2.2.6). Yet at the same time, in direct contrast to the 
views of Benda (1944) or Copeau (quoted in Sorrell, 
1973), Caillois states that ‘No doubt the wearer of the 
mask is not deceived at the beginning’ (p.95): i.e. she 
does not immediately transform into the character of the 
mask. Rather, Caillois argues that the transformation 
develops as the mask-wearer becomes increasingly 
‘enthralled’ and ‘abandoned’ to his own mimicry, 
believing more and more fervently that he is indeed the 
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god as whom he has disguised himself. In this respect, 
Caillois is not arguing that the wearing of a mask is 
sufficient to transform its wearer. Rather, he seems to 
be arguing that it is the mimicry which is responsible 
for this transformation. The mask only serves to permit 
this transformation to occur --- it does not cause it. 
 
Ottenberg (1975) also challenges the notion of a direct 
causal relationship from mask-wearing to transformation. 
He states that ‘if one puts on a certain type of mask, 
one is not usually expected to wear a certain form of 
costume and behave in certain ways; rather, if one wishes 
to act in a particular way, then a specific costume and 
mask are appropriate’ (1975, p.12). In this respect, 
Ottenberg would seem to be suggesting that it is not the 
wearing of a mask that leads an individual to transform. 
Rather, it is the desire to transform which leads an 
individual to wear a particular mask, an activity that 
may then facilitate the transformational process. 
 
Finally, there are those writers who, whilst talking 
about a relationship between transformation and mask-
wearing, are difficult to place anywhere on this 
spectrum, and, indeed, may not be located on it at all 
(e.g. Lommel, 1972). This is because, though they write 
about masks bringing about a transformative effect, they 
do so in relation to specific masks, specific practices 
or specific contexts. And, because they do not specify a 
mechanism whereby a mask, in general, might transform its 
wearer, it is not clear what they see as the role of 
mask-wearing, per se, in this transformative process.  
 
With respect to the degree of transformation, a number of 
authors have also suggested a relationship between 
masking and the invocation of altered states of 
consciousness. This includes trance (e.g. Johnson, 1981), 
hypnosis (Frost and Yarrow, 1990), possession (e.g. Cole, 
1985), or channelling (Maude-Roxby, 1994). In this 
altered state, it has been suggested by Johnson, Caillois 
(1962) and Osbourne (1971) that the mask-wearer may 
experience amnesia, heightened and altered visual 
perceptions (such as brighter and more intense colours), 
hallucinations, mental anaesthesia, vivid dreams and 
somnambulism, ‘seizures’, ‘paroxysms’, compulsive 
behaviour, and heightened or altered physical sensations 
(such as the ability to withstand extremely cold 
temperatures).  
 
It is only really Copeau (quoted in Sorrell, 1973), 
however, who talks about the wearing of a mask as 
sufficient, in itself, to bring about an altered state of 
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consciousness. Writers like Osbourne (1971) or Caillois 
(1962), on the other hand, write about mask-wearing as 
just one amongst a number of factors, such as behavioural 
mimicry or particular mask-work practices, which can, 
over time, lead to a state of being akin to that of 
trance or possession. It should be noted, however, that 
for writers like Johnson (1980) and Rudlin (1994), what 
is necessary for the wearing of a mask to induce an 
altered state of consciousness is not so much the 
presence of something, as the absence of something: 
conscious, deliberate control. 
 
With respect to the question of ‘how much’ a mask 
transforms its wearer, Jennings (1993) introduces a 
number of intervening variables. First, is the type of 
mask worn. She argues that individuals are more likely to 
become immersed in a mask-character if they are wearing a 
‘second skin’ mask rather than a physically distanced 
one, such as a mask held over the face on a stick. 
(Given, however, that Jennings hypothesises that the 
latter will provide its wearer with more dramatic 
distance [see section 2.1.3], this would seem to 
challenge Honigman’s (1977) assertion that there is a 
positive relationship between degrees of disinhibition 
and degrees of transformation [see section 2.1.9]). 
Second, Jennings suggests that different individuals will 
be transformed by wearing a mask to different extents. 
More specifically, she argues that individuals with a 
clear sense of their own ego are more likely to allow 
themselves to be transformed by the mask than those with 
a less certain sense of self.  
 
As with disinhibition, a number of different explanations 
have been proposed for why a mask might transform its 
wearer. 
2.2.1 Non-physiological Transformations of the ‘Face’ 
The most frequent explanation relates to the fact that a 
mask changes its wearer’s ‘facial’3 appearance (e.g. 
                     
3
 As a convention, the terms ‘face’ or ‘facial’, in 
quotation marks, will be used throughout this thesis to 
denote the visual appearance of the facial region (as 
viewed from the vantage point of an observer). This 
should be contrasted with face or facial appearance, 
without quotation marks, which will be used to denote the 
actual physiognomic constitution or appearance of an 
individual’s face. Hence, the wearing of a mask will 
alter an individual’s ‘facial’ appearance, but it will 
not necessarily alter an individual’s facial appearance. 
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Honigman, 1977). This is not an actual, physiological 
changes in the wearer’s face: e.g. increased smiling in 
mimicry of a smiling mask. Rather, it is a change in how 
the ‘face’ looks or appears from the vantage point of an 
observer. In other words, what is being proposed is that, 
when an individual wear a mask, they start to see their 
mask as their ‘face’. This transformation in physical 
self-perception then brings about a transformation in 
psychological self-perception.  
 
The argument that changes in ‘facial’ appearance can 
bring about psychological changes is based on the 
assumption that the face is the personality’s ‘most 
immediate mise-en-scène’ (Tonkin, 1979, p.241). Honigman 
(1977) writes: ‘human individuality is felt to be centred 
in the face’, and that ‘the face constitutes an anchorage 
point of identity, especially personal identity’ (p.277). 
Hence, when an individual’s face is concealed by a mask, 
it is argued that this brings about a ‘little death’ 
(Tonkin) of the wearer’s personality, or her personal 
identity. Because the central symbol of who she is has 
been hidden, the mask-wearer feels that she is no longer 
her-self. 
 
Brook (1981) presents a slight variation of this 
argument, focusing more on the loss of facial expressions 
than facial identity. He writes that, when an individual 
is masked, she loses her ability to communicate and 
‘defend’ herself with her everyday facial expressions. 
Hence, she loses her ‘subjectivity’. Unfortunately, Brook 
does not specify more precisely what he means by this 
‘subjectivity’.  
 
Concomitantly, Johnson (1981) argues that once the 
individual acquires a new ‘face’, so the ‘spirit’ 
associated with that ‘face’ takes possession of the body. 
Based on this principle, Johnson encourages his students 
to look at their masked selves in a mirror when their 
character begins to fade, as a means of ‘recharging’ 
their new identity.  
 
Clearly, there are parallels between the argument 
presented here and the arguments presented in section 
2.1.3 regarding dramatic distancing. Both emphasise a 
disjoining between the individual’s behaviour and their 
everyday ego or self-construct, and both emphasise the 
relationship between facial appearance and sense of self. 
The primary difference, however, is that the hypothesis 
discussed here postulates a transformation that is 
primarily diachronic, whilst the dramatic distancing 
hypothesis postulates a transformation that is primarily 
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synchronic. In other words, with dramatic distance --- 
particularly where the mask is a physically distanced one 
rather than a close fitting one --- it is argued that the 
mask-wearer feels that they are themselves, but their 
behaviour is that of an other. By contrast, in the theory 
of ‘facial transformation’, not only the behaviour but 
also the sense of self becomes temporarily disconnected 
or transformed from the initial sense of self. 
 
This would explain both the difference between Jennings’ 
(1993) and Honigman’s (1977) view of the relationship 
between disinhibition and transformation, and the reason 
why these two hypotheses are not necessarily 
incompatible. In the Jennings model, the sense of ‘I’ is 
synchronically split from the behaviour, and therefore 
the individual feels free to behave in a disinhibited 
way. In the Honigman model, on the other hand, the sense 
of ‘I’ is diachronically split from previous concepts of 
‘I’, and therefore the individual experiences a freedom 
to behave in a way that is unconstrained by previous 
moralities. Both forms of transformation, therefore, may 
have the possibility of reducing the wearer’s levels of 
inhibitions. Indeed, perhaps one could suggest that the 
relationship between transformation and disinhibition is 
somewhat ‘U’-shaped, with high degrees of disinhibition 
at both very high levels and very low levels of masked-
transformation. 
2.2.2 Physiological Transformations of the Face 
Another explanation for masked-transformation, based on 
physiological changes in the face rather than non-
physiological changes in the ‘face’, is implicit in an 
observation made by Sturtevant (1983). He relates a 
story, told to him by one of his Iroquois informants, 
about a man whose False Face mask fell off whilst he was 
dancing. Reports the informant, ‘He was making the 
awfullest face behind there. I guess he was thinking 
about how he was looking or something’ (p.44). From this 
anecdote, one might hypothesise the following: that when 
an individual wears a mask, they mimic the ‘face’ of the 
mask with their own face. This might then be hypothesised 
to bring about a more general psychological 
transformation. 
2.2.3 ‘Unconscious’ Transformation 
Benda (1944) proposes a third hypothesis as to why a mask 
might transform its wearer. He writes that the mask-
wearer is ‘automatically’ and ‘unconsciously’ drawn to 
behave in a way that emulates the being in his mask. 
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Unfortunately, Benda does not specify more precisely the 
nature of this process, or how the wearing of a mask 
might bring it about.  
2.2.4 ‘Motors’ of the Mask 
Frost and Yarrow (1990) and Maude-Roxby (1994) propose a 
fourth reason why an individual might feel transformed by 
wearing a mask. They argue that the physical presence of 
a mask requires the wearer to change their behaviour. 
Having to look through the small space of the eye-holes, 
for instance, may mean that the mask-wearer has to move 
her head differently. Alternatively, the pressure from 
the nose or mouth of the mask may have an effect on the 
wearer’s voice. Maude-Roxby refers to these changes as 
the ‘motors’ of the mask, because these initial 
transformations in behaviour may then lead on to other 
psychological changes. If an individual has to constantly 
dart her head around to see, for instance, then she may 
start feeling like a ‘bird-like’, ‘beaky’ character.  
2.2.5 Observer Feedback 
A fifth argument, as proposed by Maude-Roxby (1994) (and 
implicit in the writings of Frost and Yarrow, 1990), is 
that the mask transforms its wearer through the feedback 
that she receives from her audience. Maude-Roxby states 
that ‘something else’ takes hold of the mask-wearer 
because the audience sees them differently. That is, an 
audience responds to a mask-wearer in a particular way, 
and the feedback that they give her --- e.g. laughter, 
surprise, cheers, horror --- will have a shaping effect 
on her behaviour.  
 
Maude-Roxby (1994), however, does not specify the exact 
process by which the mask-wearer is transformed as a 
consequence of her audiences’ responses. Also, such an 
explanation for the process of transformation would only 
be applicable to those contexts in which an audience was 
actually present. Furthermore, such a process would only 
occur to the extent that an audience actually perceived 
and responded to someone in a different way as a 
consequence of that person wearing a mask.  
2.2.6 Disinhibition 
A final explanation for the mask’s ability to transform 
its wearer is based on the hypothesis of the previous 
section: that the mask disinhibits its wearer. This 
argument is most clearly put forward by Pollaczek and 
Homefield (1954). They state that, because the mask-
wearer feels less inhibited, they will feel more able to 
  
38 
 
try out new roles. These are roles that, without the mask 
on, they might feel too inhibited to act out. Caillois 
(1962) puts forward a similar argument when he suggests 
that masked-anonymity allows an individual to ‘let go’ 
and ‘become’ a God-like character without fear of social 
castigation.  
2.3  FACILITATING THE EXPRESSION OF ‘ASPECTS OF THE 
SELF’ 
A third cluster of hypotheses revolve around the 
proposition that the mask is capable of directly 
eliciting --- or facilitating the expression of --- 
‘aspects of the Self’. ‘Self’ is used here is the wider, 
Jungian sense, defined as, ‘the psychic totality of the 
human being which transcends consciousness’ (Jung and Von 
Franz, 1980, p98). These aspects include archetypes (e.g. 
Webber, Stephens and Laughlin, 1983); subpersonalities 
(e.g. Larsen, 1990); private personas, fantasies, 
attitudes and personal dynamics (Fryrear and Stephens, 
1988); transferential material (Saigre, 1989); or 
particular modes of relating to the world (Gersie, 1994).  
2.3.1 Projection 
The most frequent explanation as to why the wearing of a 
mask facilitates this process is based on the notion of 
‘projection’ (e.g. Landy, 1984). Rycroft (1995) defines 
projection as ‘the process by which specific impulses, 
wishes, aspects of the self or internal objects are 
imagined to be located in some object external to 
oneself’ (p.139). Hence, the hypothesis that an 
individual projects aspects of her Self on to a mask, as 
a constitutive activity, is similar to the basic premise 
underlying the use of projective tests. Indeed, Fryrear 
and Stephens (1988) state that: ‘Just as one projects 
one’s fantasies, attitudes, and personal dynamics into 
such stimuli as Rorschach ink blots and Thematic 
Apperception plates, so too does one project onto a mask’ 
(p.227). However, Fryrear and Stephens seems to be 
talking here primarily about the making of masks, and it 
is only Hiltunen (1988) who specifically writes that this 
projection occurs during the wearing component of 
therapeutic mask-work: when the individual first 
confronts her masked image in the mirror. 
2.3.2 Mask as Symbol 
A second series of explanations as to why the mask might 
specifically facilitate the expression of ‘aspects of the 
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Self’ are grouped around its symbolic potential. Larsen 
and Larsen (1981) argue that the mask, as an image 
reminiscent of one of the most evocative and primary of 
human images --- the face --- has the ability to elicit 
archetypal forces that are beyond the reach of the spoken 
word.  
 
Webber et al (1983) also argue that the mask can access 
‘specific archaic modes of behaviour and experience’ 
(p.212), basing their analysis on MacLean’s (1973) 
concept of the ‘triune brain’: consisting of neo-cortex, 
limbic systems and reptilian core. The authors argue that 
masks, as external symbols that may have acquired an 
‘extensive evocative field’ (‘outer SYMBOLS’ [capitals as 
per original]), are not only duplicated within the psyche 
at a phenomenologically salient, neo-cortex level (‘inner 
SYMBOLS’), but also have a capacity to penetrate deep 
into the more genetically primitive parts of the brain --
- the limbic and reptilian core --- evoking ‘core 
SYMBOLS’ or archetypes. Thus, through this process of 
‘symbolic penetration’, they argue that the mask links 
together both the recent and archaic parts of the brain, 
‘resulting in changes of psycho-physiological balance, 
leading to alterations in understanding and behaviour’ 
(p.211). However, Webber et al do not make it clear 
whether they are referring to masks per se, or only those 
masks which have, ‘universal cognizance and are 
recognised in ritually delineated clusters’ (p.211). If 
it is primarily the latter, then it is the universal 
cognizance of an object that determines its symbolic 
penetrative potential rather than its ‘mask-ness’. 
 
Like Larsen and Larsen (1981), however, Cooper and 
Cruthers (1999) do argue that there are certain features 
inherent to the mask which makes it particularly 
effective at facilitating the expression of aspects of 
the Self --- in this case, subpersonalities. Their 
argument is based on the assertion that there are a 
number of shared features between masks and 
subpersonalities, such that the former may be a 
particularly effective starting point around which 
related aspects of a subpersonality-complex can be 
constellated. First, they argue that a mask lacks the 
multidimensionality of the human face, just as 
subpersonalities lack the multidimensionality of the 
human personality. Second, they argue that the mask is 
fixed, and hence parallels the fixedness of 
subpersonalities. Third, they argue that the mask covers 
the real face in the same way that some psychotherapies 
(e.g. psychosynthesis) believe that the subpersonalities 
serve to cover the ‘real self’. 
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For Gersie (1994), the symbolic potential of the mask is 
derived from the fact that it ‘freezes’ the face. Hence, 
she argues that the wearing of a mask triggers the 
expression of ‘frozen’, ‘stultified’, ‘unified’ ways of 
relating to the world. Gersie refers to these modes of 
being as ‘intensification experience’, in which the 
individual is engulfed in an emotional state with little 
or no ability to stand back from and reflect on that 
feeling. Gersie goes on to suggest that this 
intensificatory experience is not just unique to the 
moment, but is related to particular, previously 
experienced intensification experiences, in which the 
memories, sensations and feelings associated with that 
moment are activated.  
2.4   PSYCHO-SOMATIC CHANGES 
A final body of hypotheses can be clustered under the 
term ‘psycho-somatic’. These are hypotheses of a less 
psychological and more physiological nature, which 
propose certain psychological changes as a consequence of 
the mask’s effect on its wearer’s physicality or means of 
communication.  
2.4.1 Reduction in Facial Expression 
The first cluster of psycho-somatic hypotheses are based 
on the fact that the mask occludes the face, and hence 
decreases --- to the point where it may entirely disrupt 
--- the individual’s ability to communicate facially. 
Some authors have suggested that this will augment the 
individual’s awareness of their body (Brook, 1981), 
increase their physical expressivity (e.g. Emunah, 1994), 
or change their physicality in some unspecified way (e.g. 
Gersie, 1994). Others have been more specific. Ottenberg 
(1982), for instance, hypothesises that this facial 
occlusion reduces the individual’s ability to communicate 
emotions, whilst Goldoni (quoted in Sorrell, 1973) 
extends this to a reduced ability to communicate the 
‘soul’ and ‘passions’.  
 
Ottenberg (1982) discusses this reduction in facial 
expressivity with respect to the work of Ekman and 
Friesen (1969). He argues that the mask serves to 
severely impede those forms of non-verbal communication 
that are primarily generated by the face, such as 
‘affect’, ‘regulators’ of back-and-forward speech, and 
‘illustrators’ of verbal speech. At the same time, the 
mask shifts the wearer’s attempts at communication 
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towards more non-facially generated forms: ‘emblems’ 
(which roughly equate as gestures), and adaptive 
behaviours.  
2.4.2 ‘Body-image’ Stress 
Turner (1981) argues that an increased body-awareness 
does not just arise when an individual is wearing a mask 
through having to express herself through different 
channels. He argues that it arises through an 
intersubjective process, by which the mask-wearer, 
sensing that she can not communicate facially, comes to 
believe that her observers will be more focused on her 
bodily movements. According to Turner, this leads her, 
too, to focus more extensively on her body. Turner labels 
this state of high body self-awareness ‘body-image 
stress’, and proposes that it can lead to a variety of 
symptoms: such as a displacement of body feelings, 
internal confusion about the body, and difficulties with 
breathing. 
2.4.3 Miscellaneous Psycho-somatic Changes 
Finally, a number of writers have suggested very 
particular physical consequences of wearing a mask. 
Eliade (1964), for instance, writes that the small eye-
holes in the mask may aid the wearer’s concentration 
because she has less visual distractions. Otteberg 
(1982), on the other hand, suggests that the small eye-
holes may make the wearer less concerned about staring, 
because she feels that others can not see her eyes. Frost 
and Yarrow (1990) write that a mask-wearer may need to 
look down to see through a mask, a bowed posture which 
might then lead them to feel less self-worth. All these 
features, however, are only relevant to some or most 
masks, and can not be proposed as more generalised 
statements about the psychological effects of masks, per 
se.  
2.5  SUMMARY 
For the first time in the literature, this chapter has 
brought together and organised a wide body of hypotheses 
regarding the psychological effects of wearing a mask. A 
diagrammatic summary of these hypotheses --- in the form 
of a ‘causal network’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) --- is 
presented in appendix 2a, which shows something of how 
these different hypotheses link together. 
 
From this review, it seems evident that the question of 
the mask’s psychological effect is an extremely complex 
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one, with many different inter-related hypotheses related 
to many different inter-related qualities of the mask. 
Clearly, then, for the purposes of this thesis, it would 
not be possible to explore every hypothesis regarding the 
mask’s psychological effect at the necessary level of 
empirical and theoretical depth. However, the ‘map’ 
developed in this chapter provides an extremely useful 
starting point for this thesis, and will also be a useful 
starting point for furture researchers to explore the 
psychological effects of mask-wearing. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis I have decided to focus 
on the two most frequently advocated hypotheses: that the 
mask disinhibits its wearer, and that the mask transforms 
its wearer. Along with this, for each of these 
hypotheses, I have decided to explore in detail the most 
frequently advocated reason for why this effect might 
come about. In the case of disinhibition, this is the 
anonymity hypothesis; and in the case of transformation, 
this is the hypothesis that the mask transforms its 
wearer through transforming her non-physiological 
‘facial’ appearance. In focusing on these specific areas 
of the causal network, I am not ruling out the 
possibility that data relevant to other hypotheses will 
emerge. Indeed, because of the relatively open-ended 
methodology used in this study, this would seem almost 
inevitable. However, for the purposes of reviewing the 
relevant literature and designing the studies, I will be 
focusing specifically on these chosen areas of inquiry.  
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CHAPTER THREE. DISINHIBITION AND THE ANONYMITY-
HYPOTHESIS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
From the previous review, it would seem that many authors 
believe that a mask will disinhibit its wearer. The aim 
of this chapter is to critically assess this hypothesis, 
with specific reference to the argument that the mask 
disinhibits its wearer by making her feel less 
identifiable. This chapter begins with a general review 
of empirical research regarding the hypothesis that the 
mask disinhibits its wearer. It then goes on to look more 
specifically at the relationship between mask-wearing, 
anonymity, and disinhibition, through a discussion of 
relevant psychological theory and empirical research. The 
chapter concludes by outlining a series of hypotheses 
that will be subjected to empirical testing.  
3.1 THE DISINHIBITION HYPOTHESIS 
In support of the disinhibition hypothesis, theorists 
have tended to point to two forms of evidence. The first 
of these is historical: that legislative officials in 
various cultures at various times have attempted to ‘re-
inhibit’ individuals by restricting the wearing of mask. 
MacGowan and Rosse (1924), for instance, note that Pope 
Innocent III, in attempting to control outlandish 
behaviour, forbade the clergy to wear masks. Similarly, 
Caillois (1962) writes that authorities in Rio de Janeiro 
were quite content merely to ban the masks, alone, when 
the general frenzy at the Carnival threatened to get out 
of hand. 
 
Such ‘evidence’, however, is clearly limited by the fact 
that there may be a substantial difference between what 
legislative officials perceived as the psychological 
effects of wearing a mask, and what those effects 
actually were. Such perceptions may have arisen as a 
consequence of many different reasons --- for instance, 
historical, cultural, or political factors --- and may 
have very little to do with the actual lived-experience 
of wearing a mask. What this historical evidence tells 
us, then, is something of the ‘social representations’ 
(Moscovici, 1984) that existed regarding the mask’s 
psychological effect, but it tells us very little beyond 
that.  
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As a second body of evidence in support of the 
disinhibition hypothesis, a number of authors have cited 
examples of mask-wearing individuals who behave in ways 
that appear socially transgressive. MacGowan and Rosse 
(1924), for example, point to such examples as the New 
Guinean Duk-Duk policeman/judge/executioner maskers, who 
burn or break the houses of those who do not comply to 
their ‘justice’. Similarly, Honigman (1977) points to the 
intimidating, menacing and aggressive behaviour of men 
and boys masked as Krampus, a red-tongued, horned devil, 
who appears during the feast of St. Nicholas in Upper 
Austria. Honigman goes on to claim that this 
‘troublesome’, ‘uninhibited’ and ‘unconventional’ 
behaviour --- in which the maskers often get ‘carried 
away by their role’ (p.268) --- is not unique to Krampus 
maskers, but has been reported in observations of other 
masked characters around the globe.  
 
From a review of the ethnographic (and historical) 
literature, there would seem to be some truth to 
Honigman’s (1977) claim. Throughout this body of 
research, one finds numerous examples of mask-wearing 
individuals who appear to behave in ways that are 
aggressive, sexual, or directly contrary to the 
established norms. Flickinger (1968) reports, for 
instance, that the masked Dionysian revellers of ancient 
Greece were notorious for behaving in boisterous, 
mischievous and lustful ways. Similarly, in Mexico today, 
Lutes (1983) describes how the masked Yaqui Paskola 
clowns act like crazed fools, engage in debauched sex, 
play among themselves and with the deer, symbolically 
play with and eat faeces, mock the divinities, do the 
sign of the cross backwards, and betray each other’s 
confidence. 
 
As with the historical evidence, however, there are 
substantial problems in attempting to infer psychological 
processes from these ethnographic observations.   
 
First, any such attempts are based on universalist 
assumptions, which would be vulnerable to a charge of 
epistemological ethnocentrism. In the first place, there 
is the question of whether it is legitimate to understand 
non-western behaviours and experiences through 
contemporary western psychological constructs, such as 
‘disinhibition’. Furthermore, even if one concludes that 
it is legitimate, there is still the danger of assuming 
that what is transgressive within an contemporary western 
culture is also transgressive within a non-western 
culture. From a contemporary western perspective, for 
instance, eating excrement may be seen as a highly 
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disinhibited behaviour. But for those who are taking part 
in a non-western rite, in which, for instance, an 
individual wearing a particular mask was expected to eat 
excrement, then it might actually be more uninhibited not 
to eat excrement rather than to eat it. Hence, any 
attempt to label a behaviour as disinhibited would need 
to show very clearly what the inhibitions are within a 
particular cultural context at a particular point in 
time, and this is something which the ethnographic data 
generally fails to do.  
 
Even if one could show, however, that within a particular 
cultural framework individuals do behave in a more 
disinhibited manner when they wear a mask, such evidence 
could not be taken to show that the wearing of a mask 
causes disinhibition. For a start, such an effect may 
only be limited to specific masks or types of masks, 
rather than masks in general. There is also the problem 
that correlation does not imply causation. It may be that 
there is a third factor --- such as a particular ritual 
context, or the act of performing or dancing --- which 
leads individuals to wear masks, and at the same time to 
behave in a disinhibited manner. It may also be the case, 
as suggested by Ottenberg (1975), that the direction of 
causation is not from the wearing of a mask to 
disinhibition, but from disinhibited behaviour to the 
decision to put on a mask.   
 
Whilst the ethnographic data, therefore, shows that many 
masked individuals behave in ways which appear 
disinhibited to western eyes, it provides no firm support 
for the hypothesis that the wearing of a mask has a 
disinhibiting effect.  
 
There is, however, a third body of data that has some 
relevance to the question of whether or not a mask 
disinhibits its wearer, and comes from a specifically 
contemporary western source. This is data from 
experimental investigations into ‘deindividuation’ and 
related areas (see section 3.2.1), which have used masks 
(e.g. Miller and Rowold, 1979), or mask-like hoods (e.g. 
Reicher, 1984), as part of the independent variable 
manipulation.  
 
Perhaps the most relevant of these studies is a within-
participants experiment conducted by Mathes and Guest 
(1976). They looked at how willing participants would be 
to engage in a ‘disinhibited’ behaviour --- carrying a 
sign around the campus cafeteria reading ‘masturbation is 
fun’ --- under conditions of identifiability and 
anonymity. This latter condition consisting of wearing 
  
46 
 
coveralls and a knitted ski mask that covered the whole 
head except for the eyes. Mathes and Guest (1976) found 
that participants were significantly more willing to 
carry the sign around campus in the anonymous condition, 
and also required less money to do so (M = $29.98 
compared with M = $47.92).  
 
What this study shows is that individuals may be more 
prepared to behave in a way that would normally invite 
embarrassment or ridicule if they believe that they will 
not be identified. However, there are a number of reasons 
why it can not be concluded from this study that 
individuals feel more disinhibited when they wear a mask. 
First, this study was looking at how individuals thought 
they would feel behind a mask, rather than the feelings 
themselves. Also, the effects of wearing a mask can not 
be distinguished from the effects of wearing coveralls. 
There is also the problem that the particular type of 
mask that the participants were asked to wear --- not 
unlike a ‘bank-robber’ mask --- may have been responsible 
for the greater willingness to behave in an ‘anti-social’ 
way. 
 
The only other study that looked at the effects of 
wearing a mask, as opposed to a quasi-mask hood, is by 
Miller and Rowold (1979). Their field experiment compared 
the behaviour of masked and non-masked Halloween trick-
or-treaters when greeted by a female experimenter who 
presented the children with a bowl of candies, told them 
that they were allowed to take two candies from the bowl, 
and then exited. Recordings from an unseen observer found 
that 62% of the masked children violated the ‘only take 
two candies’ rule, compared with 37% of the non-masked 
children. Using a significance level of 0.1, Miller and 
Rowold claim that this is a significant finding and 
conclude that ‘costume masks...lead to lower restraints 
on behaviour in young children’ (p.422). 
 
Unfortunately, there are problems with this experimental 
design that make this conclusion highly premature. Aside 
from the question of whether it is valid to use a 
significance level of 0.1, there is also the problem 
that, is using a non-randomised sample, the finding from 
this study is essentially correlational. That is, it is 
not possible to say whether masks lead to lower 
restraints on behaviour, or whether those children who 
have lower restraints of behaviour choose to wear masks. 
It may also be that there is a third variable (such as 
intelligence or courageousness) which leads children to 
both wear Halloween masks and steal sweets. Furthermore, 
there is also the possibility, again, that it was the 
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type of mask, rather than wearing of a mask, per se, that 
led to the transgressive behaviour. This is likely to be 
an even more significant confounding variable than in the 
Mathes and Guest (1976) study, as the trick-or-treaters 
are likely to have been wearing masks of socially 
transgressive characters as such witches, ghouls and 
monsters. 
 
There are other studies, such as Zimbardo (1969) and 
Rogers and Ketchen (1979), that have also used masks or 
mask-like hoods as part of the independent variable 
manipulation. However, in these studies, there are so 
many other aspects to the experimental manipulation (such 
as wearing large lab-coats, or being addressed by one’s 
name) that it is really not possible to isolate the 
effect of wearing a mask, per se. Also, as with the 
Miller and Rowold (1979) and Mathes and Guest (1976) 
studies, the psychological effects of wearing a mask is 
confounded with the psychological effects of wearing a 
mask of a particular appearance. 
 
It should also be noted that there are findings from 
these studies that fail to support the hypothesis that 
masked-anonymous individuals will behave in a less 
inhibited manner --- or, at least, suggest that this 
outcome is mediated by a number of other variables. For 
instance, Zimbardo (1969) found that hooded Belgian 
soldiers ‘delivered shocks’ for a shorter period of time 
than did non-hooded soldiers; as did female participants 
who ‘administered shocks’ alone rather than in groups. 
These findings will be explored in more detail in section 
3.2.2.1. 
 
Despite the numerous claims, therefore, that a mask 
disinhibits its wearer, it would seem that there is 
actually very little evidence on which to base this 
claim. At best, what can be said so far is that people 
seem to believe that they will feel less inhibited when 
they are wearing a mask, and that individuals who wear a 
mask do sometimes behave in a relatively uninhibited 
manner. Whether or not this is because the mask actually 
disinhibits them, however, is entirely unclear. 
Furthermore, the fact that there are some studies which 
show that some hooded individuals behave in a more 
inhibited manner would suggest that the relationship 
between mask-wearing and disinhibition is more complex 
than has been hypothesised in section 2.2. 
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3.2 THE ANONYMITY HYPOTHESIS 
To examine the hypothesis that the mask disinhibits its 
wearer by making her less identifiable, it would seem 
useful to break this hypothesised process down into its 
two component parts. First, there is the hypothesis that 
a mask reduces its wearer’s identifiability. Second, 
there is the hypothesis that a reduction in 
identifiability leads to a reduction in inhibitions.  
3.2.1 Mask-wearing and Anonymity 
It is often taken for granted in the literature that an 
individual is less identifiable when they wear a mask. 
However, as Gell (1975) and others have pointed out, this 
may not always be the case. If, for instance, a ritual 
performer can be easily identified by their clothes or 
gait, then putting a mask on is not likely to make them 
any less identifiable. Indeed, there are many other 
examples in which a mask would not make its wearer any 
less identifiable. An American Football player, for 
instance, may have his face ‘masked’, yet may be easily 
recognisable by the name and number on his back. Equally, 
if an individual talking on the telephone were to put on 
a mask, then she would become no less identifiable.  
 
Hence, to assert that a mask always reduces its wearer’s 
identifiability is not tenable. Rather, what it would be 
more accurate to state is that a mask covers up one 
particular channel through which an individual might be 
identified --- the face --- at one particular moment. In 
this respect, it can be predicted that a mask will reduce 
an individual’s identifiability to the extent that that 
identifiability is dependent on facial recognition at 
that ‘immediate’ point in time.   
 
Hence, in situations where an individual’s 
identifiability is not based on their immediate facial 
recognition, it can be predicted that the mask will have 
little effect. This might be a situation in which the 
individual is easily identifiable through non-facial 
channels, as in the example of the American football 
player. Alternatively, it might be a situation in which 
there is no possibility of immediate facial recognition 
anyway, such as when someone is speaking on the 
telephone. It might also be a situation in which the 
mask-wearer has been recognised prior to putting on her 
mask, such that the observer is not dependent on seeing 
the mask-wearer’s face at that particular point in time. 
However, in contexts in which an individual’s 
  
49 
 
identifiability is based on being facially recognised at 
one particular point in time --- for instance, a bank-
robber --- then it can be hypothesised that the mask will 
serve to reduce the mask-wearer’s level of 
identifiability.  
 
Furthermore, different types of masks are likely to 
reduce levels of identifiability by different amounts, 
depending on the parts of the face they cover, and how 
important those parts are for the purpose of 
identification. A mask which almost entirely covers its 
wearer’s eyes, for instance, is more likely to reduce 
levels of identifiability than a mask which almost 
entirely covers its wearer’s chin, on the grounds that 
the former is likely to be more important for the 
purposes of identification than the latter. This point 
may be a particularly important one when considering the 
different degrees to which full and half masks might 
reduce the levels of an individual’s identifiability. 
 
In exploring the relationship between mask-wearing and 
identifiability, it would also seem important to return 
to the distinction made in section 2.1.1 between ‘actual’ 
identifiability (i.e. how objectively identifiable one is 
to an observer) and ‘felt’ identifiability (i.e. how 
subjectively identifiable one feels at a phenomenological 
level). This distinction is not discussed in the 
psychological literature on anonymity, but it would seem 
an important one in understanding the possible 
psychological effects of wearing a mask. This is because, 
unless one takes a radically behaviourist perspective, 
the psychological effects of objective anonymity are 
likely to be entirely mediated by how anonymous an 
individual subjectively feels. 
 
Most likely, ‘actual’ levels of anonymity will be an 
important input variable to the mask-wearer’s felt-
anonymity --- an individual will probably have some sense 
of how objectively identifiable they are. However, it 
seems extremely unlikely that there will be an exact 
correlation between these two variables: i.e. that no 
other input variables will affect the degree of 
experienced anonymity. A masked individual, for instance, 
may be entirely anonymous to those her around her, yet 
due to high levels of self-consciousness, experience 
herself as highly identifiable. Alternatively, as Saigre 
(1989) and Baptiste (1989) have suggested, an individual 
may be quite identifiable behind her mask; and yet, 
perhaps due to the protection afforded by the mask or 
because the mask limits her vision outwards, she may feel 
that she is less identifiable than she actually is. 
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Expectations of future identifiability may also be 
another factor in mediating between levels of actual-
identifiability and felt-identifiability. If, for 
instance, a masked, anonymous individual feels that she 
will soon be identified, then her feelings of anonymity 
may be substantially attenuated.  
 
Within the literature, there is no empirical evidence 
that individuals are actually less identifiable when 
wearing a mask or mask-like hood. However, there is some 
evidence to show that these facial coverings can reduce 
subjective feelings of identifiability. Solomon, Solomon 
and Maiorca (1982) found that 16 pre-test participants 
rated themselves as both significantly less identifiable 
and significantly more anonymous in a hooded condition as 
opposed to a non-hooded condition. Because participants 
in the hooded condition were also wearing sack-cloths and 
gloves, this reduction in identifiability can not be 
entirely attributed to the wearing of a hood. However, it 
seems extremely unlikely that the sack-cloths and gloves 
would have brought about a feeling of anonymity without 
the hood contributing to this feeling to some extent. 
 
To summarise this section, then, what seems to emerge is 
that the mask does have the potential to reduce its 
wearer’s feelings of identifiability. However, it would 
appear far too simplistic to suggest that there is a 
direct causal relationship from former to latter. Rather, 
what might be predicted is that the wearing of a mask --- 
under conditions in which an individual’s identifiability 
is dependent on immediate facial recognition --- reduces 
an individual’s actual identifiability. This is then one 
amongst a number of other unspecified factors that may 
lead an individual to feel less identifiable. However, 
what is really required at this point is some attempt to 
empirically verify this hypothesis. 
3.2.2 Anonymity and Disinhibition 
Assuming, then, that under certain conditions the wearing 
of a mask may contribute to a subjectively-felt 
experience of anonymity, To what extent might this lead 
to the kind of disinhibition that the mask has been 
hypothesised to bring about?  
3.2.2.1 Deindividuation 
In exploring this hypothesis, it would seem useful to 
turn to an area of social psychology in which this 
relationship between anonymity and disinhibition has been 
explored in substantial theoretical and empirical detail: 
that of ‘deindividuation’. This term was first used by 
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Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb (1952) to describe a 
state in which ‘individuals are not seen or paid 
attention to as individuals’ (p.382). Zimbardo (1969) 
developed this understanding further, and hypothesised 
that anonymity was one amongst a number of ‘input 
variables’ that could lead to a reduced concern with 
social evaluation, thus weakening the individual’s 
‘controls based upon guilt, shame, fear and commitment’ 
(p.253). The consequence of this, according to Zimbardo, 
was a lowering of the individual’s ‘threshold for 
expressing inhibited behaviours’ (p.253), with the 
subsequent expression of ‘output behaviours’ that were, 
‘emotional, impulsive, irrational, regressive, with high 
intensity’ along with, ‘possible memory impairments, some 
amnesia for act’ and perceptual distortions (p.253). 
 
To test his theory of deindividuation, Zimbardo (1969) 
compared the behaviour of anonymous and identifiable 
female students in a Milgram-like learning experiment. In 
the first of his four studies, he found that anonymous 
women displayed greater levels of aggression and were 
less discriminating with respect to their victims (the 
latter he took as evidence that they were behaving in a 
less rational way). Several subsequent studies have 
confirmed Zimbardo’s findings (e.g. Rogers and Ketchen, 
1979). Naturalistic studies (e.g. Watson, 1973) and 
experiments using manipulations other than hoods or masks 
to invoke a state of anonymity (e.g. Mann, Newton and 
Innes, 1982) have also shown that decreases in 
identifiability increase the expression of emotional, 
impulsive or destructive behaviours.  
 
However, whilst some studies have supported Zimbardo’s 
(1969) finding, others have not (e.g. Beaman, Klentz, 
Diener and Svanum, 1979). As Diener (1980) summarises: 
‘Sometimes anonymity increases transgressions, sometimes 
it decreases them, and at other times anonymity interacts 
in relatively unpredictable ways with other variables’ 
(p.221). Indeed, of Zimbardo’s four studies on 
deindividuation only the initial one showed that 
anonymity increased aggression, whilst the other three 
suggested that aggression was decreased under conditions 
of hooded-anonymity. Similarly, Gergen, Gergen and Barton 
(1973) found that anonymity increased levels of prosocial 
activity rather than levels of antisocial activity.   
 
How, then, can these anomalies in the deindividuation 
research be accounted for? First, Diener (1980) suggests 
that ‘manipulations of anonymity may...heighten self 
awareness’ (p.222). Diener gives the example of a bank 
robber in a ski mask who may be objectively anonymous 
  
52 
 
(and experience himself as anonymous), but concurrently 
feel highly individuated and self-conscious. That the 
mask may increase, rather than decrease, levels of self-
awareness is the explanation used by Zimbardo (1969) in 
attempting to account for the reduction of levels of 
aggression in his supposedly ‘deindividuated’ Belgian 
soldiers. Zimbardo argued that uniformed army soldiers 
were already in a state of natural anonymity, and 
therefore the hoods and anonymity manipulation had 
actually served to increase a sense of isolation and 
uniqueness.  
 
Also, Zimbardo (1969) has argued that anonymity-
manipulations are more likely to increase levels of self-
awareness, and hence decrease levels of deindividuation, 
when the individual is masked alone rather than in a 
group setting. This is because the masked-alone 
individual, ‘has no group support and is made to feel 
self-conscious by obvious cues of difference from those 
observing him’ (p.279). Findings from both Zimardo’s 
third study and from Diener, Fraser, Beaman and Kelem, 
(1976) support this hypothesis.  
 
A third explanation for the anomalies found in the 
deindividuation research is similar to a criticism made 
of the Mathes and Guest (1976) and Miller and Rowold 
(1979) studies. That is, it may be that the 
‘disinhibited’ behaviour that emerges in some of the 
deindividuation research is more a consequence of the 
cues implicit in the types of hoods or uniforms used (for 
instance, Ku Klux Klan-like hoods) rather than the 
anonymity itself (Diener, 1980). Johnson and Downing 
(1979) tested this possibility by replicating Zimbardo’s 
‘learning experiment’, but this time adding a condition 
in which participants were asked to deliver shocks whilst 
wearing a nurses’ uniform. As predicted, whilst anonymous 
participants in the Ku Klux Klan-like uniforms delivered 
more shocks, the reverse was true for participants 
wearing the nurse’s uniform.  
 
Johnson and Downing (1979) also explored the relationship 
between cue-manipulations and anonymity. They crossed the 
former independent variable (Ku Klux Klan outfit vs. 
nurses’ uniform) with the latter (labelled consoles and 
name tags vs. no means of identification) to produce four 
separate conditions. The authors found no overall effect 
for the anonymity variable, but a highly significant cues 
 anonymity interaction, such that increased anonymity 
increased the effect of the cues on behaviour. That is, 
those dressed in nurses’ uniforms became less aggressive 
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when they were anonymous and those dressed in Ku Klux 
Klan outfits more so.  
3.2.2.2 Self-awareness as mediating variable 
Johnson and Downing (1979) concluded from their findings, 
along with those of Gergen et al (1973), that anonymity 
did not lead to a decrease in inhibitions. Rather, they 
argued that it decreased the influence of internalised 
standards of behaviour, and concomitantly increased the 
influence of external cues. In this respect, they 
suggested that the effects of anonymity could be 
understood in terms of a reduction in objective self-
awareness (Duval and Wicklund, 1972), and that it was 
self-awareness which mediated between the input variable 
of anonymity and the various output behaviours. The fact 
that anonymous-alone individuals seemed to become more 
inhibited as a consequence of heightened self-awareness 
pointed to a similar conclusion.  
 
Wicklund (1975) defined the state of objective self-
awareness as one in which the person ‘takes’ herself as 
an object. This is contrasted with the state of 
subjective self-awareness, in which the concept of self 
is background rather than figure in the individual’s 
field of awareness. According to Duval and Wicklund 
(1972), the state of objective self-awareness is 
primarily an aversive affective state, as the individual 
recognises the discrepancies between their actual selves 
and ideal selves. According to Wicklund (1975), if the 
individual can not reduce this discomfort by avoiding the 
self-focusing stimuli, they will attempt to reduce the 
discomfort by trying to reduce the discrepancy: aligning 
their real self with their ideal self by acting more in 
accord with their cognitive, moral and ideological 
standards. In support of this hypothesis, numerous 
studies have shown that increased self-attention reduces 
behaviour which contravenes salient behavioural standards 
(e.g. Scheier, Fenigstein and Buss, 1974).  
 
Methodologically, these studies have worked on the 
assumption that stimuli that remind the person of her 
self --- such as a mirror --- will increase her objective 
self-awareness. The other side of this assumption is that 
stimuli that draw the individual’s attention away from 
her-self --- such as simple distractors --- will tend to 
reduce her objective self-awareness. Based on this 
thinking, Wicklund (1975) has argued that Zimbardo’s 
(1969) deindividuating input variables --- including 
anonymity --- could also serve to draw the person’s 
attention outwards, thus reducing levels of objective 
self-awareness. 
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Like Johnson and Downing (1979), therefore, Duval and 
Wicklund (1972), Wicklund (1975) and Diener (1980) have 
all re-interpreted deindividuation theory and research 
findings in terms of objective self-awareness theory. 
Each of them have argued that anonymity reduces objective 
self-awareness, thus leading to the reduction of an 
aversive affective state, and hence to a reduced concern 
for the discrepancy between behaviour and standards. The 
consequence of this is that the individual is therefore 
less likely to behave in accord with their own 
behavioural standard. However, as Johnson and Downing 
have shown, this does not mean that the output behaviour 
is no longer regulated. Rather, it means that the output 
behaviour will be regulated with respect to external cues 
as opposed to internal ones.  
 
Such an understanding of the possible effects of masked-
anonymity, however, has been further refined with the 
introduction of Carver and Scheier’s (1981) hierarchical 
control-theory approach to self-regulation. Based on 
Powers’ (1973) control-system model of behavioural 
organisation, Carver and Scheier hypothesise that 
increased self-attention increases the frequency of the 
testing phase -- between actual and ideal behaviour --- 
primarily at the ‘Program’ level of behavioural 
regulation. Hence, the individual is more likely to 
behave in accord with their moral and cognitive 
standards. Similarly, reduced self-attention --- for 
instance, through anonymity --- will reduce the frequency 
of the testing at this level. Hence, the individual will 
be less likely to regulate their behaviour in accord with 
moral or cognitive standards. However, this does not mean 
they will be regulation-less. Rather, according to the 
Carver and Scheier model, the ‘temporary disconnection’ 
of the higher levels of this system will mean that the 
lower, sensori-motor levels of control will be 
temporarily superordinate. 
 
Carver and Scheier’s (1981) model also distinguishes 
between public and private aspects of the self. This is a 
distinction that goes back to James (1890/1981), but has 
recently come to prominence through the work of Buss 
(1980). Buss defines private aspects of the self as those 
that, ‘can be observed only by the experiencing person’ 
(p.5): e.g. internal states, phenomenological 
experiences. Public aspects of the self, on the other 
hand, are defined as those elements that are entirely 
overt: e.g. physical appearance, behaviours. 
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Given this conceptual division of the self, it follows 
that self-awareness can be either directed to the private 
self or the public self. Hence, in contrast to earlier 
researchers, Carver and Scheier (1981) emphasise a 
distinction between ‘private self-awareness’ (attending 
to one’s thoughts, ideals, emotions, etc.) (PRSA) and 
‘public self-awareness’ (attending to one’s immediate 
self-presentation, roles, etc.) (PBSA). Furthermore, as a 
corollary of this distinction, Carver and Scheier 
hypothesise that certain stimuli will increase private 
self-awareness (e.g. diary writing) and decrease private 
self-awareness (e.g. group cohesion), and others will 
increase public self-awareness (e.g. full length mirrors) 
or decrease public self-awareness (e.g. anonymity).  
 
Buss (1980) identifies a number of studies that support 
this conceptual distinction. Prentice-Dunn and Rogers 
(1982), for instance, found that attentional cues 
(internal vs. external focus of attention) affected 
private self-awareness but not public self-awareness; 
whilst accountability cues (accountability to authority 
figures and victims) affected public self-awareness but 
not private self-awareness. Reviewing the empirical 
research in this field, Buss claims that public self-
focusing stimuli have yet to be shown to induce effects 
associated with private self-awareness, and vice versa.  
 
The implication here is that masked-anonymity will reduce 
the extent to which an individual behaves in accordance 
with their public self-standard, but it will not reduce 
the extent to which an individual behaves in accordance 
with their private self-standard. Hence, if an individual 
does not want to be seen by others as aggressive, then 
masked-anonymity may reduce the extent to which the 
individual inhibits this behaviour. However, if the 
desire to be non-aggressive is based on a personal, 
‘internal’ standard, then masked-anonymity would be 
predicted to have little effect on this behaviour.  
 
On the basis of this public/private distinction, 
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) and Diener (1976) have 
also challenged Zimbardo’s (1969) hypothesis that the 
input variable of anonymity can lead to such subjectively 
experienced changes as amnesia and perceptual 
distortions. Rather, they argue that these changes at the 
level of the private self can only come about through 
reduced private self-awareness, not reduced public self-
awareness. In support of this hypothesis, Diener found 
that anonymous conditions had no significant effect on 
participants’ self-ratings of ‘internal’, subjective 
experiences: for instance, distorted time perceptions. 
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The only effect that anonymity had was to reduce 
participants’ concerns over what other group members 
thought about them. Furthermore, factor analyses of 
‘internal states’ by both Prentice-Dunn and Rogers and 
Diener found that feelings of anonymity did not load 
significantly on either of the main factors. 
 
Based on these findings, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1989) 
have proposed a theory of ‘differential self-awareness’. 
The basis of this theory is a distinction between 
disinhibition as a consequence of reduced private self-
awareness (for which they retain the term 
‘deindividuation’), and disinhibition as a consequence of 
reduced public self-awareness, which they exclude from a 
definition of deindividuation. With respect to this 
latter process, they state 
 
anonymity and diffused responsibility reduce 
individual accountability for acts by making 
individuals less aware of the public aspects of 
himself. That is, he is less concerned with others’ 
evaluation of him and has decreased expectations of 
reprisals, censure, or embarrassment for any actions. 
The resultant behaviour may be explained in terms of 
expectancy-value theory: The individual is quite 
aware of what he is doing, he simply does not expect 
to suffer negative consequences for his conduct. 
(Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1989, p.94) 
 
The implication of differential self-awareness theory is 
that the wearing of a mask --- under conditions in which 
the wearer feels less identifiable --- will not lead to 
any substantial changes in the wearer’s subjective 
experiencing. It will not, as Saigre (1989) suggests, 
help her feel more in touch with her ‘psychotic part’; 
nor will it, as Zimbardo (1969) outlines, lead to 
perceptual distortions or emotional impulsivity. What 
masked-anonymity will do, according to differential self-
awareness theory, is simply reduce the extent to which 
the wearer is concerned with what others think of her. 
The result is that she may then behave in ways that she 
would normally inhibit for fear of public censure. 
3.2.2.3 Criticisms of differential self-awareness 
theory 
Differential self-awareness theory seems to be the last 
statement within the social psychological literature on 
the psychological effects of anonymity. However, because 
the theory is primarily concerned with the effects of 
reduced private self-awareness, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers’ 
(1989) analysis of the effects of reduced public self-
  
57 
 
awareness is not so carefully constructed. Hence, there 
are four areas of particular weakness in their theory. 
3.2.2.3.1 Public self-awareness as focus of attention 
In superimposing an expectancy-based theory on to a 
theory of self-awareness, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1989) 
are in danger of reducing a theory of attentional focus 
down to a more specific theory of motivation. Certainly, 
as Prentice-Dunn and Rogers contend, there is the 
possibility that an individual will feel less concerned 
with how she presents herself because she is less 
concerned about being punished. However, for both Carver 
and Scheier (1981) and Buss (1980) --- on whose work 
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers base their theory --- this is 
not the only means by which a reduction in public self-
awareness is hypothesised to come about. Indeed, both 
Carver and Scheier and Buss as well as Duval (1975) are 
primarily concerned with the way in which public self-
awareness can be increased or reduced as a consequence of 
attentional cues: such as the presence or absence of a 
full length mirror. Furthermore, if a reduced concern 
with meeting one’s public self ideal came about simply 
because one was less concerned with being punished, then 
the findings of such studies as Johnson and Downing 
(1979) and Zimbardo (1969) --- that manipulations of 
anonymity can sometimes heighten levels of inhibition --- 
would once more become inexplicable.  
 
Whilst masked-anonymity, therefore, may reduce an 
individual’s public self-awareness because she feels less 
open to reprisals, it may also reduce an individual’s 
public self-awareness for less motivational --- and more 
attentional --- reasons. As Duval and Wicklund (1972), 
for instance, suggest, it may be that if an anonymous 
individual feels that others are less focused on her 
appearance, she, too, may become less focused on how she 
looks. But this is not due to a reduced concern with 
being identified. Rather, it may be that the diverted 
gaze of others also leads her focus of attention away 
from her public self.  
 
Also, the mask may bring about increases or decreases in 
public self-awareness that are not specifically related 
to levels of identifiability. For instance, a highly 
conspicuous or ostentatious mask may increase the mask-
wearer’s attention on how she look, whilst a mask that is 
very similar to the masks that other individuals are 
wearing may further reduce the individual’s public self-
awareness. 
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3.2.2.3.2 Is the public self ideal and identifiability 
always inhibiting? 
Differential self-awareness theory is based on the 
implicit --- and, to a great extent, unquestioned --- 
assumption, that an individual’s ‘instinct’ is to behave 
in a way that is contrary to their public self ideal. 
Hence, the disconnection of the public self ideal will 
lead to an expression of previously inhibited instincts. 
This assumption can be traced back to the work of 
Zimbardo (1969) --- who entitled his seminal paper ‘The 
human choice: individuation, reason and order versus 
deindividuation, impulse and chaos’ (p.237) --- and 
beyond that to Freud’s (1923) theory of the conflict 
between superego and id. 
 
What such a set of assumptions does not allow for, 
however, is the possibility that the individual’s 
‘instincts’ may be to behave in ways that are compatible 
with the public self ideal; or, indeed, that the creation 
and maintenance of the public self is part of the 
individual’s ‘instinctual’ behaviour. For instance, along 
the lines of Bowlby (1953), an individual may have an 
‘instinct’ to form close attachment with people, and she 
may also be concerned that others see her as wanting to 
form close relationships. If this is the case, then a 
reduced concern with how she presents herself will not 
serve to disinhibit this instinct. Indeed, to some 
extent, a temporary disengagement of the public self may 
actually reduce the extent to which the individual 
attempts to meet this ideal. In this respect, then, one 
can not conclude, as Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1989) and 
Zimbardo (1969) do, that a reduction in public self-
awareness will lead to a disinhibition of behaviour. 
Rather, what would be more veridical to conclude is that 
a reduction in public self awareness will be 
disinhibiting to the extent that an individual’s 
‘instinct’ is to behave in ways that are contrary to the 
public self ideal.  
 
This line of reasoning can be taken one step back, to the 
question of how an individual will respond if she feels 
that others can not identify her. Based on the assumption 
that an individual’s instinct is to behave in ways that 
others would normally censure or castigate, Prentice-Dunn 
and Rogers (1989) simply assume that an anonymous 
individual will take advantage of this situation to 
behave in less inhibited ways. But what if the 
individual’s ‘instinct’ is to be identified by others, or 
to be seen for who she is? An example of this might be a 
street performer who is very proud of her work, and 
therefore wants others to know that it is she who is 
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performing in this way. Under these conditions, masked-
anonymity may be experienced as a condition which 
inhibits her desire to be identified.  
 
This is similar to the critique of deindividuation theory 
put forward by Maslach (1974), Dipboye (1977) and others: 
that an individual may have a desire to ‘individuate’ 
herself --- i.e. establish herself as a differentiated 
and unique being --- as well as a desire to fall in to a 
state of de-individuation. On the basis of this theory, 
Dipboye re-interprets the findings of the classic 
deindividuation studies, arguing that the counter-
normative behaviour evoked by conditions of anonymity did 
not arise because the participants felt deindividuated, 
but because they wanted to re-establish their own 
individuality and uniqueness. Such an explanation could 
also be used to account for the boisterous and anarchic 
behaviour that mask-wearers around the globe have also 
been observed to display. More direct empirical support 
for the individuation hypothesis comes from studies which 
show that participants who were made to feel similar to 
others subsequently made greater attempts to re-
individuate themselves: for instance, by conforming less 
to peer judgements (Duval, 1976). 
 
Maslach (1974) argues that whether individuals try to 
individuate or deindividuate themselves depends on 
whether positive or negative external events are 
forthcoming, respectively. In support of this hypothesis, 
Maslach found that participants who were told that they 
would win extra money for ‘designing’ a city well were 
keener to individuate themselves than participants who 
were told that they would receive electric shocks if they 
‘designed’ the city badly. 
 
This issue of individuation, then, suggests two things. 
First, that the state of anonymity, in itself, may be 
experienced as inhibiting rather than leading to a state 
of disinhibition. Second, under conditions where positive 
external events are forthcoming, an anonymous individual 
may attempt to re-individuate themselves. If this occurs, 
then an anonymous individual may actually become more 
concerned with how they present themselves rather than 
less.  
3.2.2.3.3 Social identity theory 
A third criticism of differential self-awareness theory 
is that the disinhibited behaviour which conditions of 
anonymity sometimes evoke may be more to do with an 
increased salience of social identity as opposed to a 
decreased awareness of the public self. Based on Turner’s 
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(1982) ‘social identity theory’, Reicher (1984, 1987) 
proposes that visual anonymity may be one of several 
conditions that removes the individual’s attention from 
personal aspects of the self and re-focuses it on social 
aspects of the self. The consequence of this is that the 
individual may then attempt to match her behaviour to the 
perceived in-group standard.  
 
However, Reicher (1987) goes on to suggest that the 
effects of anonymity will be dependent on the context in 
which it occurs. Anonymity in a situation where one group 
is spatially separated from another will decrease the 
visual differences between members of the in-group and 
heighten their differences from an out-group. ‘The 
consequence is an accentuation of group boundary and 
therefore increased salience of group identity and 
identity-based behaviour’ (p.186). An example of this 
might be a procession of masked revellers who are being 
observed by a group of authority figures, such as the 
police. Knowing that they are all anonymous together, and 
that this anonymity distinguishes them from the 
identifiable police, the mask-wearers may experience a 
heightened sense of being part of the revelrous group, 
and hence behave more in accordance with the group norms: 
e.g. extroverted, ostentatious, ‘uninhibited’ behaviour. 
On the other hand, Reicher (1984, 1987) suggests that if 
two groups are split and intermingled, then anonymity 
would further destroy the group boundaries --- hence 
decreasing social identity and the referent informational 
influence.  
 
Reicher’s (1984) account of the relationship between 
anonymity and behaviour goes some way to explaining why 
hooded-anonymity may increase disinhibited behaviour when 
the individual is part of a distinctively masked or 
hooded group, but not when she is masked or hooded alone. 
In support of this account, Reicher found that masked and 
baggy-clothed science students, who were told that 
science students were normally pro-vivisection, moved 
closer to this group norm when they were in a group, and 
further away from it when they were spatially integrated 
with a group of social science students. 
 
Along similar lines, there may also be other intervening 
variables that will affect the relationship between the 
wearing of a mask and the relative salience of social or 
personal identity. If all individuals in a group, for 
instance, are wearing a similar mask, then the 
individuals’ sense of group membership and social 
identity may be substantially augmented. If, on the other 
hand, an individual is wearing a mask that stands out 
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from the rest of the group, then the mask may serve to 
heighten the individual’s sense of isolation and personal 
identity rather than social identity. As with Reicher and 
Levine’s (1994) study, too, the masked or non-masked 
nature of the out-group is likely to influence the effect 
of the in-group’s mask. If, for instance, the out-group 
are not masked, or if they are wearing masks that are 
different to the in-group’s masks, then one can predict 
that the salience of the in-group members’ social 
identity may be heightened. An out-group that is masked 
in a similar way to the in-group, however, may reduce the 
in-group members’ sense of distinctiveness and hence the 
relative salience of their social identity. 
 
Reicher (1984, 1987), then, highlights the possibility 
that the wearing of a mask may actually heighten 
adherence to group norms, rather than taking the mask-
wearer’s attention away from her public self. As Abrams 
(1990) argues, however, these two approaches are not 
necessarily contradictory, as the personal/social 
identity dimension is by no means veridical to the 
private/public self dimension. An individual’s public 
self-standard, for instance, may contain elements that 
are related to both personal and social norms; just as an 
individual’s private self-standard may include both 
individual definitions of who she should be, and 
definitions that are related to particular social groups. 
Hence, Reicher’s analysis does not dismiss the claims 
made by Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1989). Rather, it 
suggests that the wearing of a mask may bring about a 
highly complex interaction between an individual’s 
awareness of their public and private self, and the 
relative salience of the social and personal facets of 
these selves.  
3.2.2.3.4 Individual differences 
A final limitation of differential self-awareness theory 
is that it does not discuss the possibility that 
different individuals will respond to conditions of 
anonymity in different ways.  
 
One individual difference of particular significance may 
be that of ‘public self-consciousness’. In contrast to 
the transient state of public self-awareness, ‘public 
self-consciousness’ refers to a consistent tendency of 
persons to direct their attention to their public self 
(Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss, 1975). The individual high 
in public self-conscious is characterised as being, 
‘concerned about their appearance, style of behaviour, 
and in general about the impression they make on others’ 
(Buss, 1980, p.44). This is not to suggest, however, that 
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an individual high in public self-consciousness is 
consistently more focused on her public self. Rather, 
Buss writes that an individual who is high in public 
self-consciousness is someone who is more susceptible to 
public self-awareness manipulators. 
 
The significance of this individual difference variable 
lies in the fact that anonymity --- masked or otherwise -
-- can not ‘make’ an individual less aware of their 
public self. This is because, if an individual is not 
aware of their public self in the first place, then the 
wearing of a mask will have no effect. Rather, the 
prediction is that mask-anonymity may be able to reduce 
levels of public self-awareness that are already present. 
This means that the wearing of a mask is likely to bring 
about a greater reduction in public self-awareness for 
those individuals high in public self-consciousness as 
opposed to those individuals who are low in public self-
consciousness. This is because the former group are 
likely to experience much greater rises of public self-
awareness that the mask can then lessen, as compared with 
those in the latter group, who may experience something 
of a ‘floor effect’.   
 
There is the possibility, however, that this effect may 
be counterbalanced by an effect discussed earlier in the 
chapter: that individuals are likely to differ in the 
extent to which they feel self-conscious about wearing a 
mask. Hence, an individual high in public self-
consciousness, compared with someone low in public self-
consciousness, may experience more self-consciousness to 
be attenuated by masked-anonymity, but she may also 
experience a greater increase in self-consciousness as a 
result of wearing the mask itself. Thus, it is uncertain 
exactly how masking and self-consciousness are likely to 
interact --- but it is a question that would seem of 
considerable significance in understanding the 
psychological effects of wearing a mask. 
 
Another significant individual difference variable may be 
the extent to which individuals wish to individuate 
themselves. According to Maslach et al (1985), some 
people may be more willing to engage in behaviours that 
publicly differentiate themselves from those around them 
than others. If this is the case, then individuals with a 
greater desire for individuation may experience the 
wearing of a mask as more inhibiting, because they have a 
greater need to be seen for who they are.  
 
Finally, another individual difference that may affect 
how individuals respond to masked-anonymity is that of 
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self-esteem. As Gibbons (1990) states, ‘persons who are 
low in self-esteem find self-focus to be more aversive’ 
(p.275). Hence, it may be that individuals with low self-
esteem may find masked-anonymity more comfortable than 
those high in self-esteem, because the former group may 
experience more ‘relief’ in not being focused on 
themselves. Individuals with high self-esteem, on the 
other hand, who have little real–ideal self-discrepancy, 
may not be particularly bothered by being aware of 
themselves. Indeed, if individuals high in self-esteem 
actually take pleasure in self-focused attention, then 
they may experience masked-anonymity as somewhat 
inhibiting.  
3.3  SUMMARY 
On the basis of this review, three main hypotheses can be 
established regarding the relationship between mask-
wearing, anonymity, public self-awareness and 
disinhibition. 
 
1. The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which an 
individual’s identifiability is dependent on ‘immediate’ 
facial recognition, will lead to a reduction in feelings 
of identifiability. 
 
2. The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which it 
reduces an individual’s identifiability, and under 
conditions in which positive external events are not 
forthcoming, will contribute to a reduction in feelings 
of public self-awareness. 
 
3. The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which it 
reduces an individual’s public self-awareness, and under 
conditions in which an individual wishes to behave in a 
way that is contrary to their public self-standard, will 
have a disinhibiting effect. 
 
Alongside these three main hypotheses, there are also a 
number of other tentative hypotheses that emerge from 
this review.  
 
First, the wearing of a mask, under conditions in which 
an individual is alone or highly conspicuous, will 
contribute to an increased feeling of public self-
awareness.  
 
Second, masked-anonymity will not reduce an individual’s 
awareness of their private selves, nor will it affect an 
individual’s other ‘internal’ experiences.  
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Third, masked-anonymous individuals, under conditions in 
which positive external events are forthcoming, will 
experience a greater desire to re-individuate themselves.  
 
Fourth, masked-anonymous individuals, under conditions in 
which they are within an in-group and spatially 
distinguished from an out-group, will become less aware 
of their personal identity and more aware of their social 
identity.  
 
Fifth, individuals high in public self-awareness will 
experience a greater reduction in public self-awareness 
than individuals low in public self-awareness as a 
consequence of masked-anonymity.  
 
Sixth, individuals with a high desire to individuate 
themselves will experience masked-anonymity as more 
inhibiting than individuals with a low desire to 
individuate themselves.  
 
Seventh, individuals high in self-esteem will experience 
masked-anonymity as less pleasurable and more inhibiting 
than individuals low in self-esteem. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECT 
OF WEARING A MASK ON FEELINGS OF IDENTIFIABILITY, PUBLIC 
SELF-AWARENESS AND INHIBITION 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 Aims 
The aim of this chapter is to empirically investigate the 
three main hypotheses that were established at the end of 
chapter three. Along with this, this study aims to 
initiate an exploration of the more tentative hypotheses 
that emerged from that chapter.  
4.1.2  Methodological Issues 
4.1.2.1 Experimental or non-experimental design? 
One of the first questions that arises in attempting to 
test these hypotheses is whether it would be more 
appropriate to use an experimental or non-experimental 
design. The latter, for instance, could include semi-
structured interviews with individuals who have worn 
masks at masquerade parties, or a questionnaire study 
with drama students who have worked with masks. 
 
Adopting a non-experimental design would have a number of 
advantages. First, and most significantly, such a study 
would be likely to have a high ecological validity, as it 
would be looking at the effects of wearing a mask in the 
actual contexts in which this wearing occurs. Second, a 
non-experimental design would be able to draw data from 
the whole spectrum of environments in which masks are 
worn --- for instance, in professions like welding --- 
many of which would not be amenable to experimental 
manipulation. 
 
However, the main disadvantage of most non-experimental 
designs is that the data which they produce is 
essentially correlational. Even if it were found, 
therefore, that individuals felt less inhibited when they 
were wearing a mask, there would be no way of 
establishing that the wearing of a mask had led to this 
disinhibition. First, there is the ‘third variable 
problem’. When drama school students wear masks, for 
instance, they also tend to engage in a series of other 
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activities which are considered part of ‘mask-work’, such 
as making their faces and bodies into the ‘shape’ of the 
mask-character. Hence, if drama school students said that 
they felt less inhibited when wearing a mask, there is no 
way of showing that this is due to the actual wearing of 
the mask and not to the re-shaping of their bodies. There 
is also the problem of ‘direction of causation’. That is, 
drama students may feel less inhibited when they wear a 
mask because the teacher asks them to wear masks when 
they are about to perform a ‘disinhibited’ activity, 
rather than because the mask disinhibits them.  
 
One way around this problem might be to avoid a more 
descriptive line of questioning, and instead to ask 
informants to comment on the particular hypothesis under 
inquiry. For instance, one might directly ask, ‘What did 
you experience as the psychological effects of wearing a 
mask?’ There is a real advantage in this line of 
questioning, as it both invites the respondent to comment 
only on the hypotheses under question, and it also 
involves the informant as an active co-researcher (Rowan 
and Reason, 1981) rather than as a passive respondent. 
The disadvantage, however, is that the informant may 
still find it difficult to disentangle the relationship 
in question from other co-variables. 
 
In the context of a non-experimental study, such a line 
of questioning would also encounter the problem that the 
hypotheses being proposed are actually fairly complex. 
What is not being hypothesised, for instance, is simply 
that the mask disinhibits its wearer. What is being 
proposed is that the wearing of a mask, within a 
particular context, and when its wearer has particular 
motivations (and possibly also a particular disposition), 
has a disinhibiting effect. Hence, if one were to 
directly test the present hypotheses, one would really 
need to ask: ‘Do you think that the wearing of a mask, 
under conditions in which it has reduced your levels of 
identifiability and your awareness of how you present 
yourself, reduces your level of inhibitedness?’ Clearly, 
such questions would be far too unwieldy and complicated, 
particularly for a questionnaire study. Furthermore, 
there would be no guarantee that informants had worn 
masks in the specified contexts, and one might therefore 
end up asking a lot of questions which participants 
simply couldn’t answer. Whilst one could attempt to get 
around this problem of contextualisation by asking, ‘Did 
you feel more identifiable when wearing the mask?’ ‘Did 
you feel more aware of your public self?’ etc. and then 
looking for correlations, one would then be faced with 
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all the limitations that are inherent to correlational 
data (see section 3.1).  
 
Given these difficulties, the most appropriate non-
experimental method for exploring these hypotheses would 
probably be one of in depth, intensive, qualitative 
interviews (e.g. Kvale, 1994). This is because a 
qualitative interview would give the interviewer an, 
‘opportunity to cast questions in terms that are clear to 
a specific respondent and to ask the same question in a 
variety of different ways if there is any doubt as to the 
respondent’s comprehension’ (Williamson, Karp, Dalphin 
and Gray, 1982, p.183). The dialogical nature of a 
qualitative interview would also allow the interviewee to 
say when she did not understand a question, and ask for 
clarification --- something that would not be possible in 
a questionnaire study. Questions within a qualitative 
interview can also be tailored to fit the respondent’s 
particular experiences. Hence, there would be less chance 
of asking informants questions that were irrelevant to 
their actual experiences of wearing a mask, and more of 
an opportunity to explore in detail those experiences 
that the informant had actually had of mask-wearing.  
 
Even with such a non-experimental approach, however, it 
is uncertain how easy informants would find it to respond 
to the specific hypotheses under question. There is also 
the problem that, because qualitative interviews are 
intensely time-consuming --- not only in terms of 
interviewing, but also in terms of transcription and 
analysis --- it would be difficult to work with more than 
a relatively small sample size. This, then, substantially 
limits the population validity of the findings. This 
population validity is further limited by the fact that, 
with non-experimental qualitative interview studies, one 
tends to sample on the basis of such criteria as 
‘experience with the investigated topic’ and 
‘articulateness’ (e.g. Colaizzi, 1978) rather than on a 
random basis. A non-experimental, qualitative interview 
study, therefore, would not seem quite the right tool to 
build up an understanding of the mask’s psychological 
effects that had some degree of generalisability. This 
does not preclude the possibility, however, that there 
would be a value in using a qualitative interviewing 
methodology in a more experimental context (see section 
4.1.2.3).  
 
In turning towards more experimental methodologies, there 
are clearly substantial limitations here too. The most 
significant of these is the low ecological validity that 
the findings from such a study are likely to have. 
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Individuals do not tend to wear masks in strictly 
controlled situations where one or more factors are 
varied and the others are kept constant. Hence, it could 
be argued that ‘the results obtained therein may hardly 
be expected to generalise to “real-life” settings’ 
(Kruglanski, 1975, p.104). Furthermore, an experimental 
design inevitably introduces a whole series of artefacts 
--- demand characteristics, evaluation apprehension, 
experimenter effects, etc. (see sections 4.1.2.6 and 
4.1.2.7) --- which are less present in ‘real life’ 
contexts.  
 
Because of its inherently manipulative nature, there is 
also the possibility that participants in an experimental 
study may find the experience demeaning and 
infantalising. Not only would this then throw up ethical 
questions and the issue of catalytic validity
4
, but it 
might also mean that participants would ‘react’ 
(Kruglanski, 1975) against the experimental design. For 
instance, they might deliberately give false answers or 
refuse to take the experiment seriously.  
 
Nevertheless, in attempting to empirically examine the 
hypotheses developed in chapter three, there are some 
clear advantages of using an experimental design. Because 
it is possible to manipulate just the variable of mask-
wearing whilst holding all other variables constant, an 
experimental design should make it possible to identify 
the specific effects of wearing a mask. The constructed 
nature of an experimental design should also make it 
possible to create a situation in which the very specific 
hypotheses under inquiry can be tested. With an 
experimental design, there is also the advantage that 
more participants can be ‘run’, and therefore the study 
has greater population validity. These advantages do not 
take away from the fact that any experimental findings 
are likely to lack ecological validity. However, if it 
can be shown that the wearing of a mask has particular 
effects within an experimental context, then this would 
serve as a very useful basis from which to explore its 
effect in a more ecologically valid setting. For these 
reasons, then, it would seem appropriate to adopt an 
experimental means of investigation. 
4.1.2.2 Laboratory- or Field-experiment? 
Having decided to pursue an experimental line of 
research, the next question is whether such an experiment 
                     
4
 ‘The degree to which the research process reorients, 
focuses, and energises the participants’ (McLeod, 1994, 
p.100). 
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should be carried out in a laboratory or field setting. A 
field experiment, for instance, might involve asking 
drama students to try out an identical exercise, 
sometimes masked and sometimes non-masked; or it could 
involve asking one group of individuals to go to a party 
masked, and a control group non-masked. 
 
Given that an experimental design already involves a 
substantial loss of ecological validity it would seem 
ideal to try and make an experiment as naturalistic as 
possible. A naturalistic design might also help to get 
around the problem of ‘volunteer bias’ that would be 
inevitable in a laboratory-based study.  
 
However, there are two main problems with a naturalistic 
study. First, it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure 
that it is only the independent variable(s) that are 
varied from condition to condition. Guests at a party, 
for instance, might respond to masked participants in a 
very different way to unmasked participants. Hence, if it 
were found that masked participants behaved in a less 
inhibited way than unmasked participants, this may be 
more to do with the guests’ responses that the fact that 
the participants felt anonymous behind the masks. 
 
A second problem with a more naturalistic experimental 
design is a much more practical one: that of actually 
trying to set up such a study. There are unlikely to be 
many drama teachers, for instance, who would be willing 
to alter their teaching curriculum to accommodate a 
psychological experiment; just as it might prove 
difficult to assemble a group of individuals who would be 
willing to attend masked parties. 
 
For these two reasons, it was decided to develop an 
experiment that would be laboratory-based. Such an 
experiment is undoubtedly limited in its ecological 
validity, but it does provide the greatest opportunity to 
specifically isolate the variable of mask-wearing, and to 
ensure that the study actually tests the hypotheses that 
are being proposed.  
 
To test the first hypothesis, that the wearing of a mask 
would reduce feelings of identifiability under conditions 
in which identifiability was based on ‘immediate’ facial 
recognition, the present study was based around the 
following task. Open University undergraduate students 
were asked to talk to Sussex University students ‘via’ a 
video camera. That is, they were asked to talk to a video 
camera and told that the video footage that these cameras 
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recorded would be watched (at an unspecified time later) 
by groups of Sussex undergraduate students. 
 
With respect to generating in participants a belief that 
they could be identified by their faces, such a design 
was not ideal. The Open University students, sitting in a 
room on their own, may have found it difficult to retain 
the idea that they were actually talking to --- and hence 
identifiable by --- someone. However, gathering together 
actual students to whom the participants could have 
talked would not have been economically or practically 
feasible. Hence, talking to a video camera was considered 
the most effective means of invoking a sense of immediate 
identifiability within practical limitations.  
 
In terms of invoking a sense of felt-identifiability, it 
was also uncertain as to the effectiveness of having Open 
University students talk to Sussex University students. 
The concern here was that the Open University 
undergraduates --- not knowing, and being unlikely to 
ever know, the Sussex undergraduate students --- may have 
felt entirely unidentifiable in the first place. Hence, 
they might not feel any less identifiable wearing a mask. 
However, the alternative, to have Open University 
undergraduates ‘talk’ to Open University undergraduates 
or Sussex University undergraduates ‘talk’ to Sussex 
University undergraduates, may have been no less 
problematic --- though in the opposite direction. Here, 
students may have felt so identifiable by those watching 
them that they might have become much more concerned with 
being identified by other cues --- for instance, voice, 
clothes, or physical characteristics --- such that 
immediate facial recognition would be seen as adding 
little to one’s already high identifiability.  
 
As well as being very practical, a second advantage of 
using a video camera as part of the experimental design 
is that it has been shown to increase levels of public 
self-awareness (Buss, 1980). This is essential to test 
the second main hypothesis, that the mask will reduce 
feelings of public self-awareness, under conditions in 
which some degree of public self-awareness is already 
present. Also, because the participants were talking to a 
video camera rather than actual people, it seems less 
likely that they would be expecting positive external 
events to be forthcoming. Hence, participants were not 
expected to experience a strong desire to enhance their 
public self-awareness. 
 
Designing the study such that it could test the third 
main, disinhibition hypothesis proved the most difficult 
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to achieve. This was primarily due to ethical reasons: by 
definition, what one has to try and do here is to create 
a situation in which participants would want to behave in 
ways that contravene their own public self ideals. 
Previous ‘deindividuation’ studies have achieved this 
through a variety of manipulations: for instance, 
‘informing’ participants that 87% of students possessed, 
‘a strong, deep-seated hatred of one or both parents, 
ranging from generalised feelings of hostility to 
consistent fantasies of violence and murder’ (Festinger 
et al, 1952, p.384). Such approaches, however, raise some 
serious ethical concerns, because they specifically 
encourage participants to behave in ways that those 
participants would normally inhibit.  
 
Hence, in the present study, no attempt was made to 
actively encourage participants to behave in ways that 
contravened their public self ideals. Rather, the aim was 
to create a situation in which, if participants did have 
feelings that contravened their public self ideals, they 
might take the opportunity to express them. Thus, the 
Open University students were asked to talk directly to 
the Sussex University students about aspects of the 
Sussex University students’ lives. It was predicted that, 
amongst other feelings, the Open University students 
might have some feelings of resentment or antipathy 
towards the full-time Sussex undergraduates, the 
expression of which would be inhibited under conditions 
of high public self-awareness, because of a discrepancy 
with the ideal public self. However, under conditions of 
reduced public self-awareness, it was predicted that the 
Open University students might feel less inhibited about 
expressing some of these feelings of hostility and 
resentment. 
 
As a second means of assessing levels of behavioural 
disinhibition, participants were asked to talk about 
themselves. Here, the assumption was that participants 
may have some desire to disclose personal information 
about themselves to others --- satisfying the 
individual’s expressive needs (Derlega and Grzelak, 1979) 
--- but that these disclosures would be inhibited for 
fear of judgment or ridicule. Hence, it was predicted 
that if participants were less concerned with how they 
presented themselves behind a mask, they might be more 
likely to disclose intimate information about themselves. 
4.1.2.3 Qualitative or quantitative measures? 
Having developed the basic experimental design, the next 
question was whether to take qualitative or quantitative 
measures. Whilst it is often assumed that an experimental 
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design necessitates the taking of quantitative measures, 
there is no reason why this need be the case. Indeed, in 
recent years, an increasing number of researchers have 
designed experimental studies in which the dependent 
measures are primarily qualitative, such as verbal 
protocol analysis (e.g. Barber and Roehling, 1993) or the 
phenomenological instructional intervention method 
(Hedegaard and Hakkarainen, 1986). Furthermore, in using 
qualitative measures as part of an experimental design, 
many of the problem endemic to non-experimental 
qualitative studies --- for instance, the correlational 
nature of the data (see section 4.1.2.1) --- are 
effectively overcome.   
 
Quantitative and qualitative measures both have their 
strengths. The great strength of quantitative measures is 
that a large body of data --- by virtue of its 
unidimensionality --- can be readily amalgamated, such 
that it can be subjected to a wide variety of statistical 
operations.  
 
Qualitative data, on the other hand, has a richness, 
‘thickness’ (Geertz, 1973) and multidimensionality that 
allows it to capture something of the texture, 
complexity, holism and uniqueness of human lived-
experiences. This is of particular importance if one 
moves beyond a positivistic world-view. ‘Philosophers of 
existence’ such as Heidegger (1926/1962) and Merleau-
Ponty (1962), for instance, have argued that human Being-
in-the-world can not be reduced down to a mathematically-
ordered, quantifiable form, for to do so would be to lose 
the interpenetrative, intersubjective, multidimensional 
complexity of human Da-sein. Qualitative data is also 
seen as having the capacity to express meanings, which, 
from an existential point of view, is the essence of 
human lived-experience (e.g. Merleau-Ponty). With the 
emergence of postmodern sensibilities (e.g. Lyotard, 
1984) --- in which text, narrative and discourses take 
precedence over individual human experiences --- the 
importance of using language to describe and analyse 
psychological phenomenon becomes even more marked. 
 
The value of qualitative data, however, is not only that 
it complements a contemporary, post-positivistic world-
view. For Miles and Huberman (1994), who continue to 
locate themselves within a modernist, deterministic 
framework, one of the main strengths of qualitative data 
is that it is a very powerful method for assessing 
causality. They write:  
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Qualitative analysis, with its closeup look, can 
identify mechanisms, going beyond sheer 
association.... It is well-equipped to cycle back and 
forth between variables and processes --- showing 
that stories are not capricious, but include 
underlying variables, and that variables are not 
disembodied, but have connections over time. (p.147) 
 
Putting the wider question of ‘causality’ to one side, 
Miles and Huberman’s (1994) point that qualitative data 
is effective in ‘making links’ between variables is of 
particular importance to the present hypotheses, where 
there is a desire to closely examine the link between a 
number of different experiences. Quantitative data, for 
instance, might be able show that the wearing of a mask 
reduced feelings of identifiability, but it would not be 
able to show the process through which that reduction 
comes about. By contrast, with qualitative data, one has 
the opportunity to actually ask a participant: ‘What was 
it about the wearing of a mask that reduced your feelings 
of identifiability?’ 
 
Another strength of qualitative measures is that they are 
more open to serendipity, and hence the development of 
new hypotheses and new lines of inquiry. With 
quantitative measures, the dimension along which 
responses will be given are pre-defined; hence, there is 
little chance of something new emerging. By contrast, 
qualitative measures --- particularly unstructured ones -
-- can be responded to along a variety of dimensions. 
Hence, there is more chance that participants will 
respond in a way that had not been predicted. 
 
A final strength of qualitative measures is in terms of 
their catalytic validity. In relating to participants in 
‘their own language’, qualitative measures may be more 
likely to communicate to participants a sense that their 
own experiences, understanding, and beliefs are of value 
and significance. This may then energise participants to 
think about the kinds of research questions being asked, 
and to take some learning away from the experiment 
themselves.  
 
In contrast to the choice between using an experimental 
or non-experimental design, however, there is no need to 
choose between using quantitative or qualitative 
measures, as they are by no means mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, whilst they tend to be rooted in somewhat 
contradictory philosophical positions, there is no ‘one-
to-one relationship between the quantity-quality 
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distinction and the empiricism/constructivism 
epistemological divide’ (Henwood and Nicolson, 1995, 
p.109). Just as qualitative data can be used within a 
primarily positivistic framework: for instance, 
Boyatzis’s (1998) ‘thematic analysis’; so quantitative 
data can be used within a primarily post-positivistic 
framework: for instance, Kuiken, Schopflocher and Wild’s 
(1989) ‘numerically-aided phenomenological method’.  
 
In recent years therefore, writers like Henwood and 
Nicolson (1995), McLeod (1994) and Miles and Huberman 
(1994) have highlighted the possibility of a pluralistic 
methodology, in which the ‘essentially unproductive’ 
(Miles and Huberman) argument between qualitative and 
quantitative measures is abandoned. Instead, a more 
pragmatic approach --- in which the strengths of both 
types of data can be combined --- is turned to. Miles and 
Huberman argue that one of the main strengths of such a 
mixed-method is that it enables the confirmation or 
corroboration of both sets of data via triangulation
5
. 
Furthermore, because each of the sources of data may be 
able to compensate for the limitations of the other --- 
for instance, quantitative data should be able to show 
the generalisability of specific findings, and therefore 
correct for the possibility that ‘monolithic judgements’ 
have been made on the basis of the qualitative data --- 
then this may be a particularly effective means of 
triangulation.  
 
Like Dey (1993) and Kvale (1994), however, Miles and 
Huberman (1994) take this argument one step forward by 
arguing that it is not only desirable to combine 
qualitative and quantitative measures, but that these 
measures will always be inextricably intertwined. Just as 
qualitative measures would be meaningless, therefore, if 
there was no sense of ‘how many’ or ‘how frequently’, so 
quantitative measures would be meaningless if they were 
not attached to some kind of qualitative data: such as 
the wording of an item in a scale. 
 
For the present study, therefore, there was an attempt to 
combine the strengths of both qualitative and 
quantitative data in the most constructive way. To 
identify the general extent to which the wearing of a 
mask might reduce levels of identifiability, public self-
awareness, and the other variables of interest within a 
population, quantitative measures were used. However, to 
                     
5
 Validating a finding by subjecting it to ‘the onslaught 
of a series of imperfect measures’ (Miles and Huberman, 
1994, p.267). 
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get some sense of how people actually experienced the 
wearing of a mask, and how this experience is related to 
the variables of interest --- if at all --- qualitative 
measures were used. Qualitative measures were also used 
to develop a more detailed and micro-level understanding 
of the processes by which the wearing of a mask might 
bring about these effects. 
4.1.2.4 Self-reports or observational measures? 
Given that the primary value of qualitative measures is 
their ability to capture something of the richness and 
complexity of human lived-experiences, there would seem 
to be little value in using qualitative measures in 
anything other than a self-report way. (The only 
exception to this might be where the observers are highly 
skilled clinicians with the ability to gain insight into 
a client’s lived-world on the basis of observation and 
dialogue). Because quantitative measures are not so 
intimately tied to individual experiences, however, there 
is the potential for using them to assess behaviour from 
the perspective of an external observer as well as in a 
self-report way. 
 
As with the qualitative/quantitative measures question, 
the question of self-report/observational measures is 
somewhat related to different epistemological positions. 
From a positivistic perspective, the great problem with 
self-report data is the fact that it is ‘biased’ by its 
subjectivity, and therefore there is often a desire to 
collect data from the more ‘objective’ position of an 
observer, whose measurements are open to external 
verification. From a post-positivistic, and particularly 
an existential-phenomenological perspective, on the other 
hand, subjective experiences are not a potential source 
of bias but the fundamental mode of Being-in-the-World 
which is prior to any ‘objective’ or scientific world 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Hence, from this perspective, if 
one wants to describe something of human Being-in-the-
World, even if it is ‘only’ a quantitative description, 
it is for the subjectively-experiencing individual to 
provide a description of that Being. 
 
As with the quantitative/qualitative question, however, 
there is no reason why the use of self-report and 
observational measures should be mutually exclusive, as 
there is also here no exact one-to-one divide between the 
use of self-report and observational measures and 
different epistemological stances. Numerous positivistic 
psychologists base their work on self-report measures 
(e.g. Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1982); and 
phenomenologists like Rogers have also turned towards 
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using more observational approaches (see, for instance, 
McLeod, 1994). The reason for this, of course, is that 
many positivistic psychologists are interested in how 
people experience their world, just as many existential-
phenomenological or humanistic psychologists do not 
discount the importance of non-subjectively experienced 
phenomenon, such as how other’s perceive ones behaviour 
(see, for instance, Laing [1969]).  
 
The question, therefore, is not so much of one’s 
epistemological starting point, as one’s psychological 
finishing point: that is, the area of human psychology 
that one is interested in. If one is interested in how 
people experience their world, then self-report measures 
would seem likely to give the most valid and reliable 
findings, as the experiencing-individual is almost 
certainly going to have the best vantage point from which 
to assess their own experiences. If, on the other hand, 
one is interested in individual’s behaviours, then it 
would seem to make more sense to use observer ratings, as 
here the behaving-individual may find it more difficult 
to stand ‘outside’ of themselves and rate their 
behaviours with any degree of accuracy.  
 
For the purposes of this study, then, self-report 
measures were used to assess those phenomenon which were 
primarily experienced at a subjective level: for 
instance, feelings of identifiability, awareness of one’s 
public self, desire for establishing one’s uniqueness. 
With inhibition and disinhibition, however, where the 
concern was primarily with changes at a behavioural 
level, observer ratings seemed more appropriate.  
4.1.2.5 Between-participant or within-participant 
design? 
As with the question of experimental or non-experimental 
design, this is again an either/or question. A between-
participant design has a number of advantages. Perhaps 
the most significant of these is that it avoids the most 
serious handicap of within-participant designs: that of 
sequencing effects (Christensen, 1997). Obviously, this 
can be counterbalanced for in a within-participants 
design, but one is still left with the problem of 
possible non-linear sequencing effects. One may also be 
left with the problem of having to try and interpret 
complex higher order interactions between ‘sequence’ and 
the variables of experimental interest. 
 
Another important advantage of a between-participants 
design is that demand characteristics are less likely to 
be prevalent. Along with sequencing effects, a major 
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limitation of a within-participants design is that, by 
asking participants to perform a task in both masked and 
non-masked conditions, and then to respond to particular 
self-report measures, the purpose of the study is likely 
to be fairly obvious to participants. This is both the 
fact that the study is looking at the effects of wearing 
a mask, and that the study is interested in a particular 
set of dependent variables.  
 
At the same time, a between-participants design would not 
entirely eliminate demand characteristics, as the 
participants would still be aware of the dependent 
measures of interest; and the participants in the masked 
condition could still be left wondering what the purpose 
of their wearing a mask was. Indeed, a between-
participants study could introduce a more systematic bias 
into the results in that participants in the masked 
condition might have very different expectations as to 
the aims of the study than participants in the non-masked 
condition. 
 
In the present study, a within-participants design was 
adopted. This was partly because there was no expectation 
of significant ‘carry-over’ effect: i.e. that wearing a 
mask after not wearing a mask would have a substantially 
different effect from wearing a mask prior to not wearing 
a mask. It was also partly for practical reasons: only a 
limited number of Open University students could be 
‘run’6, and therefore, a within-participants study, by 
taking out individual differences from the error term, 
would be more likely to arrive at significant findings.  
 
The main reason for using a within-participants design in 
this study, however, was so that detailed qualitative 
data could be obtained on how the experience of wearing a 
mask directly compared with the experience of not wearing 
a mask. Obtaining such comparative data would have been 
possible in a between-participants design, but because of 
the multi-dimensionality of qualitative data, it is 
relatively difficult to compare across conditions. For 
instance, if 40 percent of masked participants in a 
between-participants study said that they felt ‘rather 
uninhibited’ when wearing a mask, and 30 percent of non-
masked participants said that they felt ‘not that 
inhibited’, it would be very difficult to make any real 
comparison between these two findings. By contrast, if 25 
percent of participants in a within-participants design 
                     
6
 Because of the organisation of the Open University 
summer school, students were only available as 
experimental participants for three hours a week. 
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say that they felt ‘more inhibited’ when they were 
wearing a mask, then the effects of wearing a mask would 
be much clearer. Also, because participants in a within-
participants design have experienced exactly the same 
conditions both masked and unmasked, they should also 
find it easier to identify exactly what it is about 
wearing a mask --- or, indeed, whether it is the mask at 
all --- that has brought about a particular effect. 
 
There is another potential advantage of a within-
participants design that is rarely mentioned in the 
literature: greater catalytic validity. In a between-
participants design, only the experimenter is able to 
learn from the participants’ responses, as only she has 
access to the necessary comparative data from which to 
identify the effects of the independent variable. By 
contrast, in a within-participants design, the 
participant has experienced both conditions for herself. 
Hence, she has an opportunity to also learn what effects 
the independent variable might bring about. 
4.1.2.6 Demand characteristics and deception 
Given the design decisions that had been made up to this 
point --- particularly the choice of several self-report 
measures and a within-participants design --- there was 
clearly the possibility that the way in which 
participants responded could be influenced by demand 
characteristics. Orne (1970) defines these as, ‘the 
totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis 
to the subject’ (p.9). According to Orne, experimental 
volunteers hope and expect that the study they are 
participating in will contribute to the development of 
scientific knowledge and human welfare. Hence, they have 
a stake in ensuring that the study is successful. If, 
then, they are aware of the experimental hypothesis --- 
and, as active problem-solvers, Orne suggests they are 
likely to try to find out --- they may attempt to ensure 
the success of the study by responding in such a way as 
to validate the experimental hypothesis. There is also 
the possibility, as highlighted by Christensen (1997), 
that participants may respond in ways which validate the 
experimental hypothesis out of a desire to be positively 
evaluated by the experimenter. 
 
To counteract the problem of demand characteristics, the 
most commonly advocated approach within the experimental 
social psychological literature is to introduce some 
element of deception into the experimental design (e.g. 
Aronson, Brewer and Carlsmith, 1985). For instance, along 
the lines of Kellerman and Laird (1982), participants in 
the present study could have been told that they were 
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taking part in a ‘perception task’, and that the masks 
they were being asked to wear were fitted with particular 
lenses that may or may not affect the way they behaved.  
 
The use of deception, however, raises some significant 
ethical concerns. Aside from the general issues that 
Kelman (1970) raises --- the fact that deception would 
not be considered ethical outside of an experimental 
environment, that it contributes to a general ethic of 
mass systematisation, and that it reduces trust in 
psychologists --- there are some concerns which are of 
particular relevance for the present study.  
 
First, Kelman (1970) writes that deception ‘deprives the 
subject of the opportunity to choose whether or not he 
wishes to expose himself to the risks that might be 
entailed’ (p.89). This is of particular relevance to the 
current study, where a number of authors have highlighted 
the possible dangers of working with masks (e.g. Gersie, 
1994). Here, then, it feels particularly important that 
participants can make informed choices about whether or 
not they wish to continue taking part in a study. Even 
Christensen (1997), who argues that deception is usually 
more of a problem for the experimenter than the 
participant, does acknowledge that it raises special 
ethical concerns when it involves behaviours that may 
result in harm to the research participant. 
 
The ethical problems of using deception in the present 
study are further compounded by the degree of deception 
that would be required for it to be ‘effective’. Mask-
wearing is not an everyday activity. Hence, if 
participants were asked in a laboratory setting to put on 
a mask, they would almost certainly consider it as a 
significant part of the experimental design. To convince 
them otherwise would almost undoubtedly require numerous 
deceptions and false explanations. This would then 
further reduce the participants’ autonomy in deciding 
whether or not they wish to continue participating in the 
study.  
 
Along with ethical concerns, however, there are also 
methodological reasons why the use of deception might not 
be particularly appropriate in this study. Given that one 
of the aims of this study is to obtain detailed 
qualitative data regarding participants’ actual 
experiences of wearing a mask, it is unlikely that this 
is going to be forthcoming if the participants feel that 
the experimenter has deceived them. This is not only 
because they may feel resentful towards the researcher, 
but also because they may not feel particularly trusting 
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or open towards someone who has ‘deceived’ them into 
behaving in a particular way. If the desire, then, is for 
the participants to respond in an open, honest and self-
revealing way, it would seem important that this mode of 
relating is ‘modelled’ by the researcher.  
 
Furthermore, as Kelman (1970) argues, a highly ambiguous 
study with numerous hidden details and contradictory cues 
may well lead participants to spend more time trying to 
make sense of the study’s aims than they would do 
otherwise. Because of the ambiguity of the aims, the 
interpretations that the participants come up with are 
also more likely to be idiosyncratic, and therefore alter 
their responses in unpredictable ways. Finally, in the 
‘real world’, individuals are very rarely told that the 
mask they are about to wear will alter their perception 
or bring about some other highly improbable consequence. 
Hence, introducing a deceptive cover story may actually 
serve to lessen the ecological validity of the study.  
 
What, then, are the implications for the present study if 
its aims are not disguised, with the result that some of 
the participants may become aware of the experimental 
hypotheses? 
 
In support of Orne’s (1970) hypothesis, several studies 
have found that participants’ behaviour tends to conform 
to the particular experimental hypothesis ‘disclosed’ to 
them (e.g. Levy, 1967). However, there are also a number 
of studies which have found participants displaying 
reactance (Brehm, 1966) against the disclosed 
experimental hypothesis. Horowitz and Rothschild (1970), 
for instance, found that hypothesis-informed role-playing 
participants in a ‘conformity’ experiment tended to 
conform less than un-informed participants. There are 
also studies which show that being aware of the 
experimental hypothesis makes no difference to 
participants’ responses (e.g. Laird et al, 1994). 
 
Hence, whilst there is evidence that being informed about 
the purpose or hypothesis of an experiment may 
significantly affect a participant’s behaviour, there is 
no evidence that this will be in the direction of the 
experimental hypothesis. Indeed, as Berkowitz and 
Tróccoli (1986) conclude, the possibility of participants 
behaving in a disconfirmatory way ‘could generally be a 
more serious threat to the internal validity of the 
experiment than demand compliance’ (p.348). Furthermore, 
as Kruglanski (1975) argues, the deliberate disclosure of 
an experimental hypothesis is not the same as a 
participant coming to guess this hypothesis for herself. 
  
81 
 
Hence, the fact that the former has been shown to affect 
participant’s behaviour does not necessarily mean that 
the latter will too.  
 
Similarly, a number of studies have found a positive 
relationship between participants’ tendency to behave in 
accordance with the experimental hypothesis, and their 
awareness of the experimental hypothesis, as assessed by 
post-experimental inquiry (e.g. Page and Lumia, 1968). 
Indeed, Page and Lumia’s study went so far as to show 
that the moment at which participants tended to behave in 
accordance with the experimental hypothesis was also the 
point at which they tended to become aware of the 
experimental hypothesis. Again, however, there are 
studies which have not confirmed these findings (e.g. 
Page and Scheidt, 1971), and there are also studies which 
have found the inverse relationship (e.g. Berkowitz, 
1980, unpublished study reported in Berkowitz and 
Tróccoli, 1986). Furthermore, because this relationship 
is correlational, it is not possible to say whether an 
awareness of the experimental hypothesis leads to 
hypothesis-confirming behaviour, or whether individuals 
who behave in accordance with the experimental hypothesis 
then start to assume that this must be the point of the 
experiment. 
 
A third source of data in support of the demand 
characteristics hypothesis comes from role-playing 
simulations and non-experiments, which show that non-
experimental participants can simulate or guess how 
experimental participants would react (e.g. Orne, 1970). 
However, as Berkowitz and Tróccoli (1986) write, to 
conclude from this that the experimental participants’ 
behaviour is therefore an ‘act’ is illogical. They write 
that it would be like assuming that because many students 
would predict that male viewers will become aroused by 
sexually explicit material, any actual arousal must be a 
consequence of demand characteristics.  
 
The demand characteristics hypothesis has also been 
criticised on more theoretical grounds. Berkowitz and 
Troccóli (1986) challenge the assumption that many 
experimental participants feel motivated to serve science 
or human welfare; and argue that, if they were concerned 
with serving science, they might be more likely to 
inhibit untruthful responses rather than promulgating 
them. Second, they question the assumption that the 
participant is an actively curious ‘detective’, 
suggesting instead that many participants may be quite 
ready to accept the experimenters’ account of an 
experiment. Third, they propose that relatively few 
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participants are actually able to guess the hypothesis of 
most studies, even where the manipulations are fairly 
obvious, such as in the Velten mood induction procedure.  
 
From a more qualitative, post-positivistic perspective, 
there is also a problem with the philosophical grounds 
upon which the demand characteristics hypothesis stands. 
If it is argued that an awareness of the experimental 
hypothesis can ‘bias’ the participants’ response, then 
this is based on the assumption that there is some kind 
of assumption-free and un-biased way in which a 
participant can respond to a psychological experiment. 
From an existential or post-modern perspective, such an 
assumption is clearly untenable: a participant will 
always attribute meanings to a particular context, and 
there is no way of creating an experimental paradigm 
which is meaning-less.  
 
Furthermore, from these post-positivistic perspectives, 
the manner in which an individual ascribes meanings and 
expectations to their world is an essential, non-
peripheral, aspect of their being. Hence, the way in 
which a participant makes sense of a particular 
experimental context is not just an ‘artefact’ to be 
avoided or excluded, but a fundamental piece of 
information about how the participant engages with her 
world. If, therefore, a number of participants assume 
that the purpose of the present study is to see if they 
become less inhibited when wearing a mask, then this is 
not necessarily a source of experimental error. Rather, 
it may indicate something very relevant as to how 
participants will construe --- and respond to --- the act 
of wearing a mask in a ‘real world’ setting.  
 
Based on their review of the literature, Berkowitz and 
Tróccoli (1986) conclude that ‘the widespread concern 
over the supposedly biasing effects of demand 
characteristics is somewhat exaggerated’ (p.337). Whilst 
they do no not flatly refute the demand characteristics 
hypothesis --- suggesting that some participants may be 
motivated to confirm the experimenter’s hypothesis --- 
they write that it is likely to have ‘only a minor 
influence on the subject’s behaviour in experimental 
settings’ (p.347). Ten years later, Christensen (1997) 
presents a very similar conclusion.  
 
The implication of this conclusion is that participants’ 
awareness of the experimental hypothesis should not 
necessarily invalidate the research findings. 
Nevertheless, the approach used by Diener et al (1980) --
- to identify which participants are aware of the 
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experimental hypothesis and then see if this relates to 
their responses --- would seem a useful safeguard. If it 
transpires that a positive relationship does exist 
between awareness of the experimental hypothesis and a 
tendency to respond in accordance with it, then this 
would not necessarily suggest that the awareness has 
‘caused’ the hypothesised responses. However, it would 
suggest that this is one possible means of accounting for 
the findings.  
4.1.2.7 Experimenter-expectancy effects 
Another potentially serious source of ‘bias’ in the 
present study is experimenter-expectancy effects: ‘The 
influence of the experimenter’s expectations regarding 
the outcome of an experiment’ (Christensen, 1997, p.249). 
The veracity of this effect has been demonstrated in 
hundreds of studies (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991); and, in 
a meta-analysis of 345 studies, Rosenthal and Rubin 
(1978) calculated a mean effect size of expectancy bias 
of .33. However, there is still no clear understanding of 
exactly how or why this effect occurs, though it is 
thought that non-verbal cues from experimenter to 
participant may be one of the most important factors 
(Christensen, 1997). 
 
In attempting to minimise the possibility of 
experimenter-expectancy effects, Rosenthal and Rosnow 
(1991) have suggested three main strategies. The first of 
these is minimising experimenter-participant contact, 
through such procedures as automation. With respect to 
the present study, however, this is not desirable, 
primarily on ethical grounds. Given that it has been 
suggested that some individuals may have a negative 
reaction to the wearing of a mask, it would seem 
essential to have someone present in the room with the 
participant at all times, in the event that they do 
experience some negative reaction. Furthermore, as 
Aronson et al (1985) argue, the presence of an 
experimenter may actually reduce bias by ensuring that 
there is a standardised understanding of the 
instructions, and detecting any possible unanticipated 
phenomenon that may be biasing the participants’ 
responses.  
 
The second alternative suggested by Rosenthal and Rosnow 
(1991) is to have the study run by a ‘blind’ 
experimenter. Again, however, this is not really possible 
in the present study, as there would be no way of keeping 
an experimenter blind to the fact of whether or not the 
participant is wearing a mask. Furthermore, as Aronson et 
al (1985) argue, a blind experimenter is almost 
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inevitably going to be wondering what the study is about 
themselves, and will therefore have their own set of 
expectations. These may then also affect the 
participants’ responses, and in ways which are less easy 
to predict or interpret than the experimenter’s own 
expectancies (Kintz, Delprato, Mettee, Persons and 
Schappe, 1970). 
 
A third possibility proposed by Rosenthal and Rosnow 
(1991) is that of using a number of different 
experimenters, and then seeing whether there are any 
significant differences between the results from the 
different experimental groups. The problem here, however, 
is primarily a practical one: that of having two or three 
different experimenters ‘on call’ at any one time so that 
the experimenter can be randomly varied. 
 
The approach used in this study, therefore, is that 
recommended by Aronson et al (1985): the ‘partially blind 
technique’. The basic aim here is to try and reduce 
experimenter-expectancy effects as far as possible, 
without introducing the kind of empirical or practical 
difficulties outlined above that may end up further 
confounding the results. One of the main strategies in 
this technique is to assign participants to a particular 
condition or order as late as possible, so that the time 
in which expectancies can be conveyed to the participant 
is minimised. To reduce the possibility of conveying non-
verbal messages to the participants in the present study, 
eye-contact was also kept to a minimum, by ensuring that 
participants always talked directly to the cameras. 
 
Such an avoidance of eye-contact, or other forms of 
researcher-participant interaction, is clearly not 
possible in the qualitative interviews. However, the 
epistemological position from which such methodologies 
derive makes such interactions less problematic, as 
knowledge is considered fundamentally intersubjective 
(Kvale, 1994). Hence, the idea that it is possible to 
collect data in such a way that it is un-tainted by the 
subjectivism of the researcher or others would be 
considered something of a positivistic fantasy. 
 
At the same time, Kvale (1994) and other advocates of 
qualitative research (e.g. Moustakas, 1994) do not ignore 
the possibility that the researcher’s own perspective 
might limit the validity of the data that is collected. 
Instead of suggesting, however, that the researcher 
should be ‘taken out of the equation’, what they consider 
important is that the researcher develops an awareness of 
their own biases. Through such an awareness, it is argued 
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that the researcher then has the possibility of 
‘bracketing’ their own assumptions and expectations: both 
in the process of gathering the data and in the analysing 
it. This is what Kvale calls a ‘perspectival 
subjectivity’, and he contrasts it with a ‘biased 
subjectivity’ in which the researcher imposes their own 
assumption on the data in a pre-reflective way. 
4.2  METHOD 
4.2.1 Design 
This study used a repeated measures design with one 
independent variable of interest: masking (masked vs. 
non-masked conditions). The study used quantitative self-
report measures, quantitative behavioural measures and 
qualitative interview data to test the hypothesis 
outlined in section 3.3.  
 
It was hypothesised that, in the masked condition, 
participants would rate themselves as less identifiable 
and less aware of their public selves than in the non-
masked condition. However, it was predicted that masked 
participants would feel no more aware of their private 
selves, nor experience greater alterations in their 
experience, than participants in the non-masked 
conditions. It was also predicted that there would be a 
positive correlation between participants’ scores on the 
public self-consciousness scale, and the extent to which 
they experienced a reduction in public self-awareness 
when masked.  
 
With respect to disinhibition, it was predicted that 
participants would be more antipathetic to their 
observers, and disclose more intimate information to 
them, when wearing a mask. However, it was also predicted 
that individuals who scored high on a self-esteem 
inventory and a desire for individuation inventory would 
experience the wearing of a mask as more inhibiting as 
compared with participants who scored low on these 
inventories. It was also predicted that participants who 
scored high on self-esteem would find the wearing of a 
mask less pleasurable than those participants who scored 
low on this measure.  
 
Measures of desire for uniqueness, awareness of personal 
identity, and conspicuousness were also introduced as 
dependent measures as a preliminary means of seeing 
whether the wearing of a mask had any affect of these 
variables.  
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Finally, it was predicted that the qualitative data would 
provide empirical evidence in support of the above 
hypotheses. 
4.2.2 Participants 
Participants were Open University undergraduate students 
taking part in an ‘Introduction to Psychology’ summer 
school module at Sussex University. Thirty-five of these 
participants were women (79.5%) and nine (20.5%) were 
men. The age of the participants ranged from 23 to 56, 
with a mean of 36.8. The participants’ occupations varied 
broadly, with a predominance of ‘white collar’ 
professionals, including nurses, teachers, counsellors, 
management consultants and policemen. 
 
To recruit participants for the study, a short talk (of 
approximately one minute’s duration) was given to the 
Open University students at their initial course briefing 
(see appendix 4a). In this talk, students were told that 
the study was part of a thesis in psychology 
investigating the effects of mask-wearing and that the 
study would primarily involve, ‘talking to a video 
camera, once with a mask on, and once without a mask. The 
students were also told that they would be paid two 
pounds for attending, and that if they were interested 
they should sign up their names on a sheet which would be 
posted in the foyer of one of the residential buildings 
(see appendix 4b).  
 
Approximately fifty participants signed up over the eight 
weeks that the study was run. Approximately five of these 
did not turn up at the time they had chosen. One student 
began the study, but chose not to continue mid-way 
through her first, non-masked condition, as she said she 
felt uncomfortable talking to a video camera. All 
information and video tape from this participant was 
deleted. All other students who signed up to participate 
in the study did so and completed all parts of the task. 
4.2.3 Apparatus and Materials 
The study was conducted in a medium-sized classroom (able 
to comfortably accommodate a seminar group of around 
fifteen students). The room was organised such that the 
student sat at one end of a long table, facing two V.H.S. 
cameras, and the experimenter at the other end (see 
diagram 4.1). The camera to the left of the experimenter 
was clearly labelled ‘group "B”’, whilst the camera to 
the right of the experimenter was clearly labelled ‘group 
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"A”’. This was to ensure that students felt that they 
were talking to different groups of students in the two 
different experimental conditions. The reason for this 
was to minimise the possibility that participants would 
carry-over a sense of identifiability from the first 
condition to the second condition.  
 
 
DIAGRAM 4.1 
Layout of experimental room 
 
 
Post-experimental interviews were carried out with an 
Aiwa stereo cassette recorder and a standard table 
microphone.  
 
The mask used for the study was a plastic, white mask, 
around 24cm in height and 14.5cm in width (able to fit 
snugly over an average-sized face), bought from a 
theatrical/‘fancy dress’ shop (see illustration 4.1). 
Within dramatic circles, this type of mask is generally 
referred to as a ‘neutral’ or ‘universal’ mask. Drama 
improvisation teachers like Jacques Lecoq use this type 
of mask to help students ‘unlearn’ preconceived 
physicalities, and to attain a way of being that is 
‘unprejudiced’ whilst focused and alert (Frost and 
Yarrow, 1990). This is described as a condition in which 
the individual, ‘becomes a blank page.... Everything is 
erased so he can start from scratch, seeing things for 
the first time’ (Lecoq, quoted in Frost and Yarrow, 1990, 
p.117). 
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Illustration 4.1 
‘Neutral’ mask 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two types of questionnaires were used for this study. The 
first questionnaire (the ‘post-task questionnaire’) asked 
participants to indicate on ten-point Likert-type scales 
how ‘true’ or ‘false’ eleven randomly ordered statements 
were in describing how they had felt during the previous 
set of tasks (appendix 4c). This is similar to the 
questionnaire used by Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982).  
 
These eleven statements were used to measure two of the 
main dependent variables, and the additional dependent 
variables of interest.  
 
To measure levels of identifiability, two statements were 
used: ‘I’ve felt identifiable’ and ‘I’ve felt anonymous’. 
Assuming inter-item reliability, total identifiability 
scores would consist of identifiability scores plus 
anonymity scores reversed (i.e., anonymity scores 
subtracted from eleven), all divided by two. (This 
formula was used so that the combined scores would remain 
comparable with other dependent measures on ten-point 
scales.) 
 
To measure levels of public self-awareness, Prentice-Dunn 
and Rogers’ (1982) two items --- based on Fenigstein et 
al’s (1975) Public self-consciousness Scale --- were 
used, in a slightly modified form. These were as follows: 
‘I’ve been concerned about what the observers might think 
of me’, and ‘I’ve been somewhat concerned about the way 
I’ve presented myself to the observers’. The only 
differences between the items used in this study and the 
ones used by Prentice-Dunn and Rogers is that the terms 
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‘experimenter’ and ‘memory subjects’ in the original have 
been replaced by the term ‘observers’. Assuming inter-
item reliability, total public self-awareness scores 
would consist of averaged scores from both items.  
 
To measure the participants’ desire to individuate 
themselves, the following statement was used, ‘I’ve been 
concerned with emphasising my uniqueness.’ Similarly, to 
measure the participants’ awareness of their personal 
identity, the following item was used: ‘I’ve been aware 
of my personal, individual identity.’ Neither of these 
items have been used previously in the literature, but 
were both considered relatively direct means of assessing 
these two variables.  
 
To measure levels of private self-awareness, Prentice-
Dunn and Rogers’ (1982) two items --- based on Fenigstein 
et al’s (1975) Private self-consciousness Scale --- were 
again used. This time, however, it was in unmodified 
form. The two items were as follows: ‘Generally, I’ve 
been very aware of myself’, and ‘Rather than thinking 
about myself, my mind has been concentrated on what is 
going on around me.’ Assuming inter-item reliability, 
total private self-awareness scores would be calculated 
by adding the scores on the first item to the reversed 
scores on the second item, and dividing by two.  
 
To explore the hypothesis that the mask will also not 
increase an individual’s ‘altered experience’ --- the 
other component of the internal state of deindividuation 
according to Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) --- the 
following item was added: ‘My thinking has felt somewhat 
altered.’ This measure is not directly used by Prentice-
Dunn and Rogers, but is one of the items which has been 
consistently found to load most highly on the ‘altered 
experience’ factor. 
 
To assess whether participants felt more conspicuous in 
the mask-wearing condition, the following statement was 
used: ‘I’ve felt conspicuous.’ 
 
Finally, to assess whether levels of self-esteem were 
related to enjoyment of wearing the mask, the following 
item was devised: ‘I’ve found the task pleasurable.’  
 
The second questionnaire that was used (the ‘individual 
differences questionnaire’) was given to participants at 
the end of the study, and consisted of three personality 
inventories (see appendix 4d). 
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The first of these inventories was the revised self-
consciousness scale (Scheier and Carver, 1985) which 
consists of 22 items with a four-point response format. 
This scale consists of three sub-scales: public self-
consciousness (items 2, 5, 10, 13, 16, 18, 20), private 
self-consciousness (items 1, 4, 6, 8 [reversed], 12, 14, 
17, 19, 21) and social anxiety (items 3, 7, 9, 11 
[reversed], 15, 22). Only the data from the public self-
consciousness scale will be used for the present study. 
 
The second of these inventories was Maslach et al’s 
(1985) Individuation Scale, which is ‘designed to assess 
people’s willingness to engage in behaviours that 
publicly differentiate themselves from others’ (p.729). 
The scale consists of twelve items with a five point 
Likert-type response format.  
 
The final personality inventory was Rosenberg’s (1965) 
self-esteem scale, which was designed to measure how much 
an individual feels that she is a person of worth (p.31). 
This scale consists of ten items, with a four point 
response format. Scores from items one, two, four, six 
and seven are reversed on the final tallying, and 
positive scores indicate higher self-esteem. 
4.2.4 Procedure 
Volunteers were welcomed into the room, thanked for 
coming along, and then seated. Once comfortable, the 
basic design of the study was explained to them: (full 
instructions can be seen appendix 4e):  
 
Each of the two short videos you are about to make 
will be watched by a small group of Sussex University 
undergraduate students. The two different videos will 
be seen by two different sets of students: group A 
and group B [experimenter points to cameras]. 
 
When you are being videoed, please try and bear in 
mind the students who will be watching the video 
tapes, and try to talk directly to them.  
 
The participants were informed that there was no 
deception involved in the study. They were told that they 
would not be surreptitiously filmed by the cameras 
without their knowledge, that the video footage would be 
kept confidential within a confined group of people, and 
that they were absolutely free to withdraw from the study 
at any point. Finally, they were told that there were no 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers, and the more honest they 
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could be, the clearer sense it would give the researcher 
of what they might be experiencing or not experiencing.  
 
Participants were then given an opportunity to say 
whether or not they wished to continue. If they wished 
to, they were then randomly allocated to one of four 
orders. This was dependent on whether they were wearing a 
mask first or second, and whether they would first talk 
about students’ social lives, or students’ financial 
matters. These two different topics were used so that 
students did not have to talk about the same topic in 
both conditions, as it was felt that they might simply 
repeat themselves the second time around. The four 
different orders were therefore as follows:  
 
• non-masked (financial matters) followed by masked 
(social lives). 
 
• masked (financial matters) followed by non-masked 
(social lives). 
 
• non-masked (social lives) followed by masked 
(financial matters). 
 
• masked (social lives) followed by non-masked 
(financial matters). 
 
In order one, participants were first asked to face the 
‘group A’ camera and to tell the students who would be 
watching the videos something about themselves. As a 
means of standardising their responses, they were asked 
to make ten statements in the form of ‘I am...’. 
Participants were told that the statements could be as 
revealing or as non-revealing as they wanted and that 
they should take as little or as much time as they 
needed. They were also told that they should try not to 
refer to whether or not they were wearing a mask as one 
of their ‘I am’ statements (so that subsequent coders 
would be blind to the participants’ condition). If they 
did not have any questions, they were then told that the 
camera was being turned on, and that they should begin 
the task.  
 
When they had finished this, they were then asked to talk 
to group ‘A’ for a maximum of two minutes about their 
views on a particular topic. They were informed that it 
was not a problem if they ran out of things to say, but 
that the camera would run for the full two minutes. If 
they did not have any questions, they were then given the 
following topic: ‘How fortunate or unfortunate do you 
think full time University undergraduates --- like the 
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students you are talking to --- are, with respect to 
financial matters?’ 
 
Once they had completed this task, they were then asked 
to spend a few minutes filling in the first post-task 
questionnaire.  
 
To begin the second condition, participants in order one 
were then asked to put on the mask that was lying on the 
chair (out of view) next to them. Once they had 
comfortably secured it, they were then asked to face the 
group ‘B’ camera, and to repeat the ‘I am...’ exercise. 
Having done so, and keeping the mask on, they were then 
asked to repeat the ‘talking for two minutes...’ 
exercise. However, this time they were given the 
following topic: ‘How fortunate or unfortunate do you 
think full time University undergraduates --- like the 
students you are talking to --- are, with respect to 
their social lives?’ Participants were then asked to take 
the mask off and complete a second post-task 
questionnaire.  
 
Having done so, the participants were then asked if they 
minded talking about their experience of taking part in 
the study ‘at a more general level’. If they said they 
didn’t mind (and none of the participants declined this 
part of the study) a tape recorder was then turned on, 
and a brief (five to fifteen minutes) semi-structured 
qualitative interview was conducted with the 
participants. This interview also served as the post-
experimental debriefing, which aimed to clarify any 
misconceptions that the participants may have had about 
the nature of the study.  
 
This interview was concerned with two main research 
questions: what differences did the participants 
experience between the masked and non-masked conditions; 
and, what did they think the aims of the study might be. 
The interview guide thus consisted of the following three 
interview questions and one follow-up probe:  
 
• What did you think the aims of the study might be? 
 
• What did you expect it to be like, wearing a mask? 
 
• To what extent did your experience of wearing a 
mask match your expectations? 
 
• [probe] Were there any other ways in which the 
experience of wearing a mask was different from the 
experience of not wearing a mask?  
  
93 
 
 
This interview was conducted along the lines of a 
qualitative or phenomenological interview (Kvale, 1996; 
Moustakas, 1994). Here, the aim is to enter into a 
dialogical relationship with the interviewee, such that 
aspects of the interviewees’ phenomenologically-
experienced lived-world can emerge: ‘to let that which 
shows itself be seen from itself in the way in which it 
shows itself from itself’ (Heidegger, 1926/1962, p.58).  
 
To achieve this phenomenological goal, a qualitative 
interview requires that the interviewer attempt to 
‘bracket’, as far as possible, previous assumptions and 
expectations (Moustakas, 1994), and engage with the 
interviewees in an open and attentive way. The 
qualitative interviewer is also required to engage 
primarily at the descriptive level, continually 
attempting to clarify the interviewees’ lived-experiences 
and lived-meanings as they emerged through the dialogue. 
Along with the basic interview questions, therefore, 
empathetic reflections, probes, gentle challenges, 
requests for clarification, nods and ‘mmms’ were all used 
as a means of furthering an understanding of the 
interviewees’ lived-world (Kvale, 1996).  
 
Attempting to condense, interpret and summarise the 
meaning of what the interviewees said was also a central 
part of the qualitative interviewing process. This is to 
ensure high ‘respondent validity’ (Kvale, 1994): i.e. 
that what the respondent is interpreted as saying is what 
the respondent actually meant. This is because, by 
reflecting back to the respondent what she is understood 
to have said,  
 
the interviewee then has the opportunity to reply, 
for example, ‘I did not mean that’ or ‘That was 
precisely what I was trying to say’ or ‘No, that was 
not quite what I felt. It was more like...’ This 
dialogue ideally continues till there is only one 
possible interpretation left, or it is established 
that the subject has multiple, and possibly 
contradictory, understandings of a theme. This form 
of interviewing implies an ongoing ‘on-the-line 
interpretation’ with the possibility of an ‘on-the-
spot’ confirmation or disconfirmation of the 
interviewee’s interpretations. The result can then be 
a ‘self-correcting’ interview. (p.189) 
 
Finally, participants were told that the study was 
interested in looking at whether different types of 
people experienced wearing a mask differently, and were 
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therefore asked to complete the individual difference 
questionnaire. 
 
In order two, participants similarly talked about 
students’ social lives in the first condition and 
financial matters in the second, but wore a mask for the 
first trial and did not wear a mask for the second. In 
order three, participants were non-masked in the first 
condition but talked about students’ financial matters, 
and in the second condition were masked and talked about 
students’ social lives. In order four, participants were 
masked in the first condition and talked about students’ 
financial matters, and were unmasked in the second 
condition and talked about students’ social lives.  
4.2.5 Methods of Analysis 
4.2.5.1 Quantitative 
To analyse the participants’ prose and the ‘Who am I...’ 
statements, each of these responses were transcribed from 
the videotape by a colleague of the researcher. These 
were then given independently to two Sussex University 
undergraduates judges, blind to the aims of the study, 
for coding and rating
7
. 
 
To rate the prose data (on student’s social lives and 
financial matters), judges were asked to rate on a nine-
point scale how positive or negative they felt that each 
of the statements that participants made were towards 
full-time university undergraduate students (where one 
equals extremely negative, five equals neither positive 
nor negative, and nine equals extremely positive). 
Instructions to the judges are in appendix 4f, and an 
example of the prose is in appendix 4g. It was emphasised 
to the judges that they should be rating these statements 
in terms of how positive or negative they were towards 
students (i.e. how sympathetic or antipathetic they 
were), rather than on how positive or negative the 
                     
7
 Initially, as stated to the participants, it had been 
intended that these videotapes would be watched and coded 
by two groups of Sussex Undergraduate students. It soon 
became apparent, however, that such a process would be 
problematic, as the judges would then be aware of whether 
the participants were masked or non-masked. An 
alternative, to have the groups of Sussex students listen 
to the videotapes only, might also have been problematic, 
as the masks may have muffled or distorted the 
participants’ responses, and again, therefore, led to 
biases in the coding process. Therefore, it was decided 
to work from transcripts alone.  
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participants were about students (e.g. whether they 
thought that students were fortunate or unfortunate in 
their financial matters).  
 
Inter-rater reliability on the 88 items of prose was 
relatively low, with an alpha coefficient of .64. Given, 
however, that this was a first attempt to rate 
participants’ responses in this way, this was considered 
of borderline acceptability (although normally only an 
alpha coefficient of .70 or higher would be considered 
acceptable). However, any results from these ratings 
would need to be treated with substantial caution. Total 
scores of ‘positive or negative feelings towards the 
students’ were calculated by averaging the two judges’ 
ratings.  
 
In analysing the ‘I am...’ statements, it was apparent 
from the transcripts that many participants had simply 
repeated the first set of statements when asked to 
describe who they were the second time around. Because of 
this, only the first set of each participants’ ‘I am...’ 
statements were used. This meant that the ‘I am...’ 
statements could be analysed between-participants --- 
comparing masked and non-masked conditions for each of 
the first set of ‘I am...’ statements --- rather than 
within-participants. 
 
For the ‘I am...’ statements, judges were told that: ‘In 
each of the following sentences, Open University 
psychology undergraduates, whilst attending summer school 
at Sussex University, were asked to say something about 
themselves by making statements in the form of “I 
am..."’. Instructions to the judges are in appendix 4h 
and 4i. Samples of the participants’ statements are in 
appendix 4j. Judges were asked to perform both a rating 
and a coding on each of the ‘I am’ statements.  
 
First, they were asked to code each of the ‘I am...’ 
statements into one or more of the thirty categories 
developed by Gordon (1968). This system of categorisation 
consists of eight superordinate categories --- ‘ascribed 
characteristics’, ‘roles and membership’, ‘abstract 
identifications’, ‘interests and activities’, ‘four 
systemic sense of self’, ‘personal characteristics’, and 
‘external meanings’ --- each broken down into further 
subordinate categories (see appendix 4i). The aim of this 
coding was to see if there were any general differences 
in the responses that participants gave in the masked, as 
opposed to non-masked conditions. 
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In terms of inter-judge reliability, there was something 
of a discrepancy in the way that the judges had 
categorised these statements. One of the judges had 
tended to put the statements in as many categories as 
possible, whilst the other judge had tended to put the 
statements in just one category. In 82.5 percent of the 
‘I am...’ statements, however, there was agreement 
between the latter judge’s coding and at least one of the 
former judge’s codings. This was taken as an agreed 
coding. In the 17.5 percent of the statements where there 
was a discrepancy between the two judges, a third judge 
was asked to decide which of the codes they thought was 
most appropriate.  
 
To get a more specific measure of the intimacy of the 
self-disclosures, participants were asked to rate each of 
the ‘I am...’ statements on a nine-point scale of 
‘disclosure intimacy’, where one equals ‘little 
information given’ and nine equals ‘extremely intimate 
information’. This nine-point ‘disclosure intimacy’ scale 
was taken from Chaikin, Derlega, Bayma and Shaw (1975). 
As with the Chaikin et al study, coders were asked to 
rate the intimacy of the disclosures according to two 
major criteria: first, the uniqueness of the material 
disclosed; and second, how guarded an individual might be 
in disclosing this information.  
 
The inter-rater reliability on disclosure intimacy was 
unacceptably low, with an alpha coefficient of just .35. 
To improve this, one possibility might have been to bring 
in a third or fourth judge to re-rate the levels of 
disclosure. However, given the very low reliability 
between the two judges, it did not seem particularly 
likely that further judges would bring the reliability up 
to an acceptable level. Furthermore, an initial 
calculation of both judges’ ratings found virtually no 
difference between ratings of disclosure intimacy in the 
masked condition (M = 3.01 and 4.72) as compared with the 
non-masked condition (M = 3.08 and 4.66). For these 
reasons, it was decided not to pursue these ratings of 
disclosure intimacy further, and to drop them from the 
analysis.  
 
To assess the reliability of the dependent measures, 
inter-item reliability on the post-task questionnaire was 
calculated for the combined items. For measures of public 
self-awareness, there was an acceptably high alpha 
coefficient of .84 between the two items attempting to 
measure this variable. The scores from these two items 
were therefore averaged to form a total public self-
awareness score. However, the alpha coefficient between 
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the items ‘anonymity’ and ‘identifiability’ was just .64, 
and for this reason, these two items were treated as 
separate variables. Also, the inter-item reliability for 
the two items intended to measure private self-awareness 
was very low, with an alpha coefficient of -.03. Again, 
therefore, these two items were treated as separate 
dependent variables.  
 
Bar charts of the frequency distribution on the dependent 
variables showed acceptable levels of normality. All 
scores from the self-report measures (with the public 
self-awareness scores combined) and the ratings of 
participants’ prose were therefore analysed using a 
repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance on 
version seven of SPSS. The one within-participants 
independent variable was masking (masked vs. non-masked 
conditions). Two between-participants independent 
variables were also introduced into the analysis: 
‘sequence’ (masked first, non-masked second vs. non-
masked first, masked second) and ‘topic’ (masked 
financial, non-masked social vs. masked social, non-
masked financial).  
 
Inter-item reliabilities on all three individual 
difference measures were high, with alpha coefficients of 
.83, .88, and .86 on the measures of public self-
consciousness, desire for individuation, and self-esteem 
respectively.  
 
To see whether there was a correlation between levels of 
public self-consciousness and reduction in public self-
awareness, a ‘reduction in public self-awareness’ score 
was calculated for each participant by subtracting 
participants’ public self-awareness score in the masked 
condition from their score in the non-masked condition.  
 
To see whether there was a correlation between levels of 
self-esteem and enjoyment of wearing the mask, an 
‘increase in pleasure’ score was calculated by 
subtracting participants’ pleasure score in the non-
masked condition from their score in the masked 
condition. 
 
To see whether individuals’ desire for individuation and 
levels of self-esteem were related to their experience of 
wearing a mask, participants were coded as being either 
‘high’ or ‘low’ on these two measures, depending on 
whether their scores fell above or below the medians of 
45.5 and 32 respectively (the four scores on the latter 
median were randomly distributed between ‘high’ and 
‘low’). These codings were then used to see whether 
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participants high in desire for individuation and self 
esteem would be more likely to experience an increase in 
inhibitions when wearing a mask (as assessed by the 
qualitative data) as compared with participants coded low 
on these measures.  
 
To see whether there was any difference between the 
scores of those participants aware of the experimental 
hypotheses and those participants not aware of the 
experimental hypotheses, participants were coded as being 
either ‘aware’ or ‘non-aware’ of the identifiability-, 
PBSA-, and inhibition-hypothesis (identifiability-aware 
codings were used for both identifiability and anonymity 
scores). Participants were coded as being ‘aware’ if they 
either said that they thought the study was looking at 
whether masks decreased identifiability/PBSA/inhibitions, 
or if they said that they thought this might be one of 
the consequences of wearing a mask.  
4.2.5.2 Qualitative 
Audio tapes from the qualitative interviews were 
transcribed into Microsoft Word (version six) by the 
researcher and by two paid assistants. In transcribing 
the interviews, the assistants were instructed --- and 
the researcher attempted --- to transcribe the statements 
verbatim, including repetition, laughter, ‘hmms’, and 
interruptions (Kvale, 1996). However, transcribers were 
not asked to record length of pauses, in- and out-
breaths, or overlapping speech. 
 
Once all the transcriptions had been completed, their 
reliability was checked by comparing the text with the 
audio recordings, and any errors were corrected. At this 
point, the format of the transcriptions were also 
standardised, along the lines suggested by Silverman 
(1993):  
 
• em dashes with no space before (--- ): 
interruptions and sudden changes in flow of statement 
(e.g. ‘I thought the mask--- the thing about sitting 
in the room was’). 
 
• ellipses (...): pauses. 
 
• square brackets ([]): used to insert observations, 
or brief interjections from other person (e.g. ‘So it 
sounds like you felt really [‘mmm’] hot in the 
mask.’) 
 
• round brackets ((...)) where material is not 
discernible. 
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• hyphens at beginning of text unit(-): denotes when 
interviewer is talking.  
 
Each of the interviews was then broken down into text 
units (by placing a paragraph mark at the end of each 
unit). It was decided to use sentences as the basic text 
unit, on the basis that such text segments retain meaning 
‘even when they are encountered outside of their context’ 
(Tedsch, 1990, p.117). Using sentences also created a 
more manageable number of text units than lines or words. 
 
Text units from the qualitative interviews were then 
thematically analysed using the NUD•IST (Non-numerical 
Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising) 
computer program. NUD•IST does not provide assistance in 
the theoretical aspects of qualitative analysis: e.g. the 
development of codes and categories. However, what the 
program does do is to make the processes of coding and 
re-coding, categorising and re-categorising, searching, 
analysing and printing out the data more efficient. In 
contrast to manual qualitative analysis, for instance, 
the NUD•IST program can quickly re-assign data from one 
category to another, search for all instances of a 
particular phrase, or print-out all data where there is 
an ‘intersection’ of two categories.  
 
In working with NUD•IST, the basic analytical process 
intrinsic to the program is one of thematic analysis or 
‘meaning categorization’ (Kvale, 1996), in which the data 
is coded into a hierarchy of superordinate and 
subordinate categories --- or what NUD•IST refers to as 
‘nodes’. This process is not unlike Grounded Theory’s 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) development of ‘concepts’ and 
superordinate ‘categories’. However, in contrast to a 
grounded approach, NUD•IST does not stipulate whether the 
coding process should be ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’. This 
is important for the present study because there are 
several pre-defined hypotheses, which means that the 
analysis can not be wholly inductive.  
 
Top-level categories in this qualitative analysis were 
therefore chosen prior to the analysis of the data. These 
were based on the central experimental concepts 
(identifiability, public self-awareness, inhibition), 
issues of possible relevance to the experimental 
hypotheses (experimental conditions, ‘no difference’), 
and other areas of interest in this thesis 
(transformation, miscellaneous). To ensure that the 
research directly addressed the experimental hypotheses, 
second-level categories for the key dependent variables 
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were also pre-defined. These broke the qualitative data 
down into: reduction in the specified effect (e.g. 
feeling less identifiable), increase in the specified 
effect, non-presence of the effect, and intervening 
variables that participants felt may have increased, 
reduced, or negated this effect. Categories for the 
reduction and increases in the effect were then further 
subcategorised into explanations that participants gave 
for the effect, and the consequences that participants 
experienced as a result of that effect. Below this level, 
however, there was an attempt to be as open as possible 
to whatever categories might emerge from the data.  
 
The process of coding consisted of converting each of the 
transcribed interviews into ASCII format, ‘introducing’ 
them into the NUD•IST program as separate ‘documents’, 
and then scrolling and reading through each of these 
documents a number of time to get a preliminary feel for 
the data. A sample transcribed interview can be seen in 
appendix 4k. Each of the text units was then coded into 
one or more of the third or second level categories (i.e. 
non-exclusively). Each of these categories was then 
examined in detail, and from them subordinate categories 
were developed. Where appropriate, these categories were 
then broken down into sub- and sub- sub- categories.  
 
At this point, all the coding for each of the 
participants was printed out (see sample of coded 
interview in appendix 4l). The coding of each text unit 
for each participant was then re-examined, and any 
necessary re-codings, re-categorisings or the development 
of new categories were made. To cross-check, all the data 
was then printed out again, but this time by node rather 
than by participant (see sample of text units at single 
node in appendix 4m). Again, there was a process of re-
coding and re-categorising the text units.  
 
When this was completed, the entire data was printed out 
by node, and it was then given to a colleague to 
critically examine. This colleague was asked to look 
through the text units at each of the nodes, and to see 
whether she felt that these had been coded most 
appropriately or whether they should be placed at other 
nodes or new nodes should be developed. The feedback from 
this colleague led to a number of major and minor changes 
in the coding. For instance, many physical factors that 
had been coded at ‘inhibition/increased’ were removed 
from this node as the colleague felt that there was 
insufficient evidence that the participants did actually 
feel inhibited by these factors.  
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Once the text units had been re-coded, the data in each 
category was then transferred to Microsoft Word documents 
for the process of writing-up. As this proceeded, 
however, it became clear that there were still some 
inconsistencies in the coding. As the data was being 
transferred into a thematic narrative, therefore, there 
was an on-going process of re-coding and re-organising a 
small number of text units, in an attempt to attain 
categories that were as consistent and as meaningful as 
possible.  
4.3  RESULTS 
4.3.1  Quantitative 
Multivariate tests using Wilks’ lambda found a 
significant
8
 main effect for the within-participants 
factor of masking, and a significant interaction effect 
for masking  topic (see table 4.1). No other effects 
were significant. A more detailed print out of the SPSS 
data analyses can be seen in appendix 4n.  
 
 
                     
8
 Throughout this thesis, a significance level of 0.05 
will be used. For descriptive purposes, however, exact p 
values (to two significant figures) will also be 
presented. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Multivariate tests for between-participant and within-
participant variables 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
F 
 
Hyp. 
df 
 
 
Error 
df 
 
 
p 
 
Between-
participants 
    
 
Sequence 
 
 
1.48 
 
 
11 
 
29 
 
.19 
Topic 
 
1.21 11 29 .32 
Sequence  Topic 
 
 
Within-participants 
 
1.36 11 29 .24 
Masking 
 
4.88 11 29 .00030 
Masking  Sequence 
 
1.53 11 29 .17 
Masking  Topic 
 
2.45 11 29 .027 
Masking  Sequence  
Topic 
 
0.48 11 29 .90 
 
 
Univariate tests on the masking factor found significant 
differences for four of the items: identifiability, 
anonymity, public self-awareness, and awareness of 
personal and individual identity. All of these were in 
the predicted direction (see table 4.2).  
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TABLE 4.2 
Means, standard deviation, univariate F ratios and p 
values for masked and non-masked conditions 
 
 
 
Masked 
 
 
Non-masked 
  
 
Measures 
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
F(1, 
39) 
 
 
p 
 
Identifi-
ability 
 
 
3.50 
 
2.64 
 
6.57 
 
2.41 
 
30.50 
 
 
.000002 
Anonymity 
 
5.98 3.07 2.98 2.23 34.35 <.000001 
PBSA 
 
4.86 2.60 6.00 2.50 8.58 .0056 
PRSA 1 (mind 
on what’s 
around me) 
 
4.73 3.10 4.34 2.72 0.40 .53 
PRSA 2 
(aware of 
myself) 
 
7.11 2.17 7.55 2.17 1.2 .28 
Altered 
experience 
 
5.14 2.79 4.34 2.68 4.04 .051 
Aware of 
personal 
identity 
 
5.73 2.86 7.77 1.78 16.28 .00024 
Desire for 
individua-
tion 
 
5.11 2.58 5.16 2.68 0.03 .86 
Conspicuous-
ness 
 
5.02 3.11 6.30 3.12 3.27 .078 
Pleasure 4.75 2.52 5.32 2.73 
 
2.27 .14 
Prose ‘pos-
itiveness’ 
 
5.79 1.25 5.45 1.13 1.54 .22 
 
 
Univariate tests on the interaction between topic and 
masking found significant effects on two of the items: 
desire for individuation (F[1, 39] = 6.07, p = .018), and 
prose ‘positiveness’ (F[1, 39] = 7.96, p = .007). An 
analysis of the means suggests that the first of these 
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interaction came about because participants in both 
‘topic’ conditions tended to rate themselves as having a 
greater desire to emphasise their uniqueness in the 
‘social lives’ conditions (M = 5.66) as compared with the 
‘financial matters’ conditions (M = 4.62). Similarly, the 
latter interaction effect seems to have come about 
because participants’ prose were rated as more positive 
when discussing the students’ financial matters (M = 
5.96) as compared with their social lives (M = 5.28).  
 
Contrary to predictions, the correlation between 
participants’ scores on the public self-consciousness 
scales and the extent to which they experienced a 
reduction in public self-awareness when wearing the mask 
was not significant (r = .08, p = .62). 
 
Contrary to predictions, the correlation between 
participants’ scores on the self-esteem inventory and the 
extent to which they experienced an increase in pleasure 
when wearing the mask was not significant (r = -.065, p = 
.68). Other individual difference findings will be 
discussed in section 4.3.2.3. 
 
The coding for the ‘Who am I?’ statements can be seen in 
appendix 4o. As this graph shows, there is very little 
difference in the coding of statements in the masked and 
non-masked conditions. The only exception to this is that 
twice as many statements in the non-masked condition were 
categorised under 29 (‘immediate situation references’). 
 
Table 4.3 presents a comparison of the responses from 
hypothesis-aware and hypothesis-unaware participants for 
ratings of identifiability, anonymity, public self-
awareness and inhibition. This shows that, for self-
ratings of identifiability and public self-awareness, 
hypothesis-aware participants showed somewhat less change 
in the predicted direction than hypothesis-unaware 
participants. For ratings of anonymity and positiveness 
of prose, on the other hand, hypothesis-aware 
participants showed a very slightly greater change in the 
predicted direction than hypothesis-unaware participants.  
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TABLE 4.3 
Mean differences between masked and non-masked conditions 
for aware and non-aware participants 
 Aware Non-aware 
 
Measures 
mask 
M 
n-m 
M 
diff 
M 
 
mask 
M 
n-m 
M 
diff 
M 
 
Identifiability 
(n[aware] = 25) 
 
3.96 
 
6.16 
 
-2.20 
 
2.89 
 
7.11 
 
-4.22 
 
Anonymity 
(n[aware] = 25) 
 
 
6.48 
 
3.40 
 
3.08 
 
5.32 
 
2.42 
 
2.90 
PBSA 
(n[aware] = 24) 
 
4.67 5.54 -0.87 5.10 6.55 -1.45 
Prose ‘positivity’ 
(n[aware] = 33) 
 
5.84 5.54 0.30 5.64 5.20 0.44 
 
Note: ‘mask’ = masked condition, ‘n-m’ = non-masked 
condition, ‘diff’ = masked condition - non-masked 
condition 
 
 
Finally, for descriptive purposes, the correlations 
between the dependent variables can be seen in Table 4.4. 
Exact p values (to the fourth decimal place) can be seen 
in the SPSS print-out in appendix 4n. 
 
 
  
106 
 
TABLE 4.4 
Pearson correlations for dependent measures (n = 88) 
 
 
 
IDENT
. 
 
A 
 
PB 
 
PR1 
 
PR2 
 
AE 
 
PI 
 
IND 
 
CS 
 
PL 
 
Anon 
 
 
-.47* 
 
         
PBSA 
 
.30* 
 
-.21*         
PRSA 1: 
what’s 
around me 
 
-.00 
 
.19 .24*        
PRSA 2: 
aware of 
myself 
 
.25* 
 
-.15 .33* .01       
Altered 
exp. 
 
.23* .22* .28* .15 -.06      
Aware of 
personal 
id.  
 
.58* -.36* .02 -.30* .28* -.40*     
Desire for 
ind. 
 
.18 -.06 -.34* .12 -.11 -.32* .16    
Conspic. 
 
.24* -.32* .42* -.05 .49* .14 .00 -.09   
Pleasure 
 
.20 .05 -.35* -.24* -.03 -.42* .42* .25 -.26*  
Prose 
positive 
 
-.11 -.04 -.08 -.02 .09 .00 .00 .34* .04 -.05 
 
Note: *p < 0.05. 
4.3.2 Qualitative 
A table of nodes, with numbers of participants with one 
or more text units addressed at each node, can be seen in 
appendix 4p. Appendix 4q presents a NUD•IST tree diagram 
of the nodal hierarchy. 
4.3.2.1 Identifiability 
Overall, ten of the participants (23 percent) were coded 
as saying that they felt less identifiable (6:1; 16:15; 
17:6) --- or ‘hidden’ (5:23; 11:7; 36:8), unrecognisable 
(7:1; 8:8), more anonymous (29:11), or beyond being 
attributed responsibility (38:10) --- in the masked 
condition. (Numbers before the colon are the participant 
number [unless it has already been stated], numbers after 
the colon are the text units). Three of these 
respondents, however, qualified this by saying that they 
felt only a little bit more anonymous (8:10), slightly 
more anonymous (29:11), or slightly hidden (11:7) in the 
masked condition. None of the participants said that they 
felt more identifiable when wearing the mask.  
 
In terms of the consequences of this reduced 
identifiability, three of the participants were coded as 
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saying that they felt it led to a reduced concern with 
their public self. Participant five, for instance, who 
felt hidden behind the mask, went on to say that, when 
she couldn’t think of anything else to say to the camera, 
she suddenly thought: ‘They’re not seeing me, they’re 
seeing the mask,’ (24) so she didn’t feel so ‘bothered’ 
about not saying anything (24). Similarly, participant 
seventeen said that she felt less self-conscious when she 
was wearing the mask because she felt less identifiable. 
Participant 38 said that she felt that she could 
‘relinquish responsibility’ (9) for what she was saying 
in the masked condition because there was no way of it 
being attributed to her.  
 
Feelings of reduced public self-awareness, however, were 
not the only consequence of anonymity that the 
participants described. 
 
Participant six said that she felt more inhibited (36) as 
a consequence of the masked-anonymity. She explained this 
in terms of the anonymity-to-others making her feel ‘less 
like a person’: i.e. that part of her identity --- ‘that 
bit of you which other people see first and quite often 
recognise you by’ --- had been taken away (19). The 
consequence of this was that she felt less free to talk 
about herself because there was an incongruence between 
who she felt like and who she really was: 
  
It doesn’t quite fit, because it’s almost as though--
- because you’ve got the mask on you’re not really 
you; you’re a stranger, you’re somebody else, 
somebody anonymous, which--- I guess for some people 
the anonymity might make them feel freer to express 
themselves rather than less free. 
 
-But for you--- 
 
For me, it didn’t. (43-45) 
 
Along somewhat similar lines, participant 36 said that 
being hidden behind the mask felt worse because she 
prefers actually being, ‘honest and really... talking to 
people face-to-face’ (8). When she was wearing the mask, 
therefore, she described feeling a sense of: ‘I shouldn’t 
need to speak through it’ (10).  
 
Three of the participants said that feeling anonymous in 
the masked condition made no difference to how they 
subsequently behaved or felt.  
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Along with describing the extent to which they felt 
anonymous and its consequences, five participants talked 
about different intervening variables which may have 
affected their level of felt-anonymity. 
 
Three of the participants said that they did not feel 
more anonymous in the masked condition because they did 
not consider themselves identifiable to the Sussex 
University undergraduates in the first place. Participant 
21, for instance, said: 
 
you say that it’s only going to be seen by the... O. 
U.--- I mean by the students, and there is a degree 
of anonymity involved in that anyhow. I’m very 
unlikely to come across any of these... and say, ‘Ah 
look at him, he’s the one who...’. So I don’t think 
that the actual mask had any effect in that respect. 
(18-19) 
 
By way of contrast, participant sixteen said that she did 
feel more identifiable in the non-masked condition (6), 
and specifically attributed this to the fact that she 
didn’t live that far away from the Sussex University 
campus (6): 
 
-[S]o does ‘identifiable’ means that you might meet 
some of the people that you were talking to? 
 
It’s possible, yes. 
 
-Right, and they might be able to identify you? 
 
‘So look at that woman there is someone who took part 
in our survey and she thinks that we’re not 
disadvantaged’. (22-24) 
 
Two other intervening variables related to 
identifiability were mentioned by the participants. 
Participant one said that, in the masked condition, she 
felt particularly anonymous once she had stopped talking: 
i.e., that when the observers could still hear her voice, 
she was still identifiable to some extent; but once she 
was silent, the mask removed any possibility of 
identification (28). Participant fifteen said that in the 
second, masked condition, the observers would know that 
she was the same person because they could recognise her 
by her clothes --- a comment which suggests that she had 
not fully understood that the video tapes would be 
watched by two different groups of students.  
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4.3.2.2 Public self-awareness 
Overall, sixteen of the participants (36 percent) were 
coded as saying that they felt less concerned with their 
public self in the masked condition. This includes 
participants who said that they felt less concerned with 
how they presented themselves (9:7), less concerned with 
their facial appearance (2:27; 19:12; 23:14; 25:8; 37:25; 
39:14; 42:14), less self-conscious and ‘on the spot’ 
(17:6-7), less conscious of ‘what the camera might be 
picking up’ (13:6), less concerned with people’s reaction 
to them (1:18; 5:5; 37:27), or less concerned with being 
attributed responsibility for what they said (38:9).  
 
As stated earlier, however, in only three cases was this 
reduction in public self-awareness attributed to feelings 
of anonymity. Four other reasons --- related to more 
specific aspects of the public self --- were given by the 
participants for why they felt less concerned with how 
they presented themselves in the masked condition.  
 
The first of these reasons, given by nine of the 
participants (20 percent), was to do with the fact that 
their facial expressions were hidden when wearing the 
mask. This, in itself, could be broken down into three 
sub-categories. 
 
The first of these sub-categories was coded as ‘non-
verbal facial leakage minimised’. Under this sub-category 
were those participants --- five in total --- who 
described feeling less concerned with how they presented 
themselves when their face was masked because they were 
less worried about ‘giving themselves away’ through 
involuntary facial expressions (5:10; 37:16; 42:11). This 
includes participants who said that they were less 
worried about ‘betraying’ their feelings (39:14), letting 
others see what they were really thinking (2:27), 
revealing to others when they were being deceitful 
(42:14), or giving the observers a ‘complete picture of 
what was going on’ (39:24). 
 
As a second sub-category of facial expressions, two 
participants said that they felt less concerned with how 
they were presenting themselves when their face was 
covered by a mask because they no longer needed to worry 
about ‘face-work’: specifically, smiling (19:11) and 
grinning (25:8) at the camera. As participant nineteen 
described: ‘I remember it flashed through my mind... “It 
doesn’t matter now, I don’t have to smile". Not that I 
was smiling in the first case, but it still went through 
my mind, it went through my--- “I don’t have to worry 
about smiling”’ (11-12). 
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As a third sub-category of facial expressions, six 
participants said that they were less concerned with 
their public self when masked because they were less 
worried about their face looking awkward. This included 
participants who said that they were less worried about 
looking ‘embarrassed’ (5:11; 39:27), ‘silly’ (5:11), 
‘foolish’ (5:12), ‘tense’ (19:7; 39:27), or ‘stupid’ 
(28:9). Participant two said ‘there was a security in 
knowing that if you did start giggling or making funny 
faces--- Nobody would know’ (8-9). Two of the 
participants said that the wearing of a mask also meant 
that there was less need to worry about embarrassing 
physiological facial responses such as blushing (5:14; 
19:18) and sweating (19:18).  
 
For three of these participants (1; 5; 39), the 
particular situation in which the mask most reduced 
concerns about facial awkwardness was during the 
silences, both at the end of the statements about 
students’ financial matters/social lives and during the 
‘who am I?’ responses. Participant 39 describes this as 
follows: ‘you can just imagine yourself just getting more 
and more embarrassed, and sort of uptight, and--- that 
didn’t happen so much [with the mask on] because I didn’t 
feel that they were watching me while I was waiting to 
think of something else to say’ (27). 
 
Two of the participants who spoke of feeling less 
concerned with appearing facially awkward specifically 
related this to their own individual characteristics. 
Participant two said that she was aware of being someone 
who tended to screw up her face a lot when she talked, 
and participant five talked about being someone who was 
very self-conscious.  
 
For two of the participants, a reduction in public self-
awareness in the masked condition was related to the 
occlusion of more permanent facial characteristics: age 
cues. However, this was in somewhat different ways. For 
participant thirteen, it was related to facial 
attractiveness: ‘It might be because as I’ve been getting 
older, I’m more aware that I’m not very nice to look at 
visually. So, you know I’d feel... "Somebody’s videoing 
my face and it’s not very nice to look at". So as soon as 
I put the mask on I haven’t got to worry about that’ (12-
14). For participant seven, on the other hand, the 
greater concern with how he appeared in the non-masked 
condition was related to a feeling that the students 
would see him as a ‘typical older person telling us what 
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[to do]’ (12), and therefore categorise (28) and 
immediately reject (6) him.  
 
With respect to feeling less publicly self-aware in the 
masked condition, three of the participants seemed to 
attribute this to a sense of feeling more ‘detached’ 
(1:6) from the observers. Two participants described this 
as feeling like there was a ‘wall’ (23:20; 42:24) between 
themselves and the people they were talking to. Whilst 
this was related to the knowledge that the observers 
could not see their face, the participants, here, did not 
seem to be talking about feeling less identifiable, per 
se. Rather, it seemed to be a sense of feeling ‘enclosed’ 
(42:28) within the mask and cut off from what was going 
on (1:19) such that there was less concern or interest 
with what the observers thought of them. Participant one 
said that ‘it was almost like sitting in another room’ 
(2). She also said that this sense of detachment was 
particularly prominent when the other means of 
communicating herself --- her voice --- was no longer 
present. ‘It was almost as if once I’d finished talking 
I’d switched off and that was the end of it.... It’s just 
that me as me, as far as the cameras were concerned, 
wasn’t here any more, because there wasn’t any voice 
coming out’ (7, 28). 
 
For three of the participants, a reduced concern with how 
they presented themselves was related to the fact that 
the mask reduced their awareness of being ‘watched’ 
(33:16) by the video camera. This was primarily due to 
the mask’s small eye-holes (33:14), or the fact that the 
mask covered up the eyes.  
 
Finally, one participant explained her reduced concern 
with what the participants thought of her in terms 
similar to the ‘dramatic license’ hypothesis described in 
2.1.2. That is, when not wearing the mask, she had a 
sense of having to present herself to her observers in 
her normal role. This is as a teacher (31): someone with 
‘quite high’ self-presentational standards. However, once 
behind the mask, where the audience could not identify 
her (but more in terms of her role than her specific 
identity), she felt that she no longer needed to take on 
that role, and therefore could relax her self-
presentational standards. 
 
What were the consequences of this reduction in public 
self-awareness? For four of the participants, the reduced 
concern with how they presented themselves seemed to lead 
to a reduced feeling of inhibitedness: i.e. they felt 
freer to behave in the way they wanted to. However, this 
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was not so much expressed as a ‘global’ feeling of 
disinhibitedness. Rather, the behaviours that the 
participants felt more able to enact in the masked 
condition tended to be closely related to the particular 
aspect of their public self that they felt less concerned 
about. 
 
Hence, two of the participants who felt less concerned 
with ‘non-verbal facial leakage’ in the masked condition 
went on to say that they felt more able to behave in ways 
that they might otherwise inhibit for fear of what others 
would see in their involuntary facial expressions. For 
participant 39, this reduced concern with others seeing 
the ‘complete picture’ (39:24) meant a greater freedom to 
self-disclose:  
 
Um... I noticed myself making more comments about, I 
think, my own feelings with the mask on, rather than 
about, sort of, objective comments about who I was. 
Um... With a mask on... you can just--- you’ve just 
got the mask on and you can say something and still 
feel as though you’re not revealing anything. So I 
was like able to reveal more through what I was 
saying, because I wasn’t really revealing as much 
through my body language. (12, 16-17)  
 
For participant 42, on the other hand, a reduced concern 
in the masked condition with ‘giving away’ the fact that 
she didn’t really believe what she was saying (11) meant 
that she felt braver to speak sarcastically (7), ‘bend 
the truth’ (10), or be ‘corny’ (36): 
 
I could have said as one of the ten ‘I am’ statement 
‘I love my husband,’ but I could say that--- almost 
as I said it I thought, ‘that’s quite corny’; but if 
I’d have said that I’d have caught a--- this was like 
a [flicks her eyes up] look past my face, I would 
have regretted saying it [-’yeah’], and so I chose 
not say it [-’yeah’], rather than look like that, so 
I didn’t say it [-’right’]. (36-37) 
 
Similarly, two of the three participants who said that, 
in the masked condition, they were less concerned with 
their face looking awkward in the silences, went on to 
say that, in the masked condition, they felt freer to 
remain silent. For participant one, this was after 
talking about the students’ social lives/financial 
matters: ‘I think if I hadn’t worn a mask for the second 
one [the masked condition] I might have gabbled on, or 
rabbitted on a bit longer’ (1:4). For participant 39, 
this was during the ‘I am’ statements: ‘the big 
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difference was about the fact--- I just noticed in the “I 
am” statements again was about the time that I could take 
over them’ (39:27). 
 
Similarly, participant seven, who became less concerned 
with being seen as ‘old’ and categorised in the masked 
condition, went on to say that he felt freer to say 
things when masked (33). This included being more able to 
relate to the students (6) and understand their 
difficulties (9), rather than giving them a ‘lecture’ 
(4). 
 
Finally, two of the three participants who had said that 
they felt less publicly self-aware in the masked 
condition as a consequence of feeling more detached also 
said that they felt more able to behave in the way that 
they wanted to. With participant one, this was again 
specifically related to feeling less self-conscious in 
the silences: ‘with the mask on...I felt as if I wasn’t 
talking I wasn’t there, so it didn’t matter when I 
stopped talking because I wasn’t there any more’ (25). 
With participant 42, on the other hand, the detachment 
was disinhibiting more in the sense of feeling like she 
wasn’t really communicating to anybody (42):  
 
I was able to act like you would on a telephone.... 
So therefore you’re really just talking to a voice on 
the other end of the phone, and that’s how I felt. I 
felt I could say what I wanted to say, but felt quite 
safe about saying it. It was just enough of a... a 
wall, enough of a partition, not to feel that I owed 
them to acknowledge that they were there. (20, 23-24) 
 
However, both of these participants attributed their 
feelings of reduced public self-awareness both to a 
feeling of being detached from the observers, and to the 
fact that their facial expressions were hidden. Hence, it 
was not exactly clear to what extent the reduction in 
inhibitions was due to the former factor and how much due 
to the latter.  
 
Participants described two other consequences of reduced 
public self-awareness. Participant 37 said that, in being 
less bothered about people seeing her in the masked 
condition, she felt she was ‘very much more focused’ (21) 
on the experimental task of verbalising (16). Participant 
nine, on the other hand, said that a consequence of being 
less concerned with his public self was that he no longer 
exercised self-control over his facial twitch, in the way 
that he would normally do in public circumstances. The 
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consequence of this was that he actually twitched more, 
and thereby became more aware of his public self (24).  
 
Five of the participants were coded as saying that they 
felt more aware of their public selves in the masked 
condition. Three reasons were given for this. 
 
First, two participants said that they felt more 
concerned with how they appeared in the masked condition 
because they were aware of looking ‘strange’ (22:19), 
‘unusual’ (22:12), or ‘weird’ (18:5). For participant 22, 
this was simply a case of feeling more conscious of the 
way she would look to the group that was seeing her in 
the mask, because of the unusualness of her appearance 
(22:12). Participant eighteen’s experience was a slight 
variation on this. It was not so much a concern that 
those seeing her in a mask would think her weird, but 
that those seeing her masked might find it somewhat 
incongruous (8) --- if not ‘quite scary’ (13) --- 
watching a ‘weird’ (5), inanimate ‘face’ expressing 
personal, human details. 
 
For two participants, on the other hand, a greater 
concern with aspects of their public self when masked was 
related to the fact that, by covering their facial 
characteristics and facial expressions, the wearing of 
the mask made them more conscious of what it was that 
they were verbalising. For participant fourteen, this 
feeling of greater conspicuousness was related to a sense 
that the observers would take more notice of what she was 
saying without ‘looking at me to try to take other 
pointers about what sort of person I might be’ (17). 
Along somewhat similar lines, participant five said that 
she suddenly started thinking ‘do I sound silly?’ in the 
masked condition because there was no facial movements to 
accompany her communication (37).  
 
Finally, as mentioned above, participant nine said that 
he felt more aware of his public self when masked because 
the initial reduction in public self-awareness led to a 
relaxation of his facial self-control, such that his 
twitching ‘became an issue and it started happening more’ 
(27). 
 
Two participants were coded as specifically stating that 
the wearing of the mask made no difference to their 
public self-awareness: ‘I can’t say that anytime I was 
too worried about the cameras’ (3:9); ‘I didn’t actually 
worry what people felt--- thought of me’ (12:36).  
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As with the issue of identifiability, ten participants 
talked about intervening variables that may have 
influenced their levels of public self-awareness. 
 
In five cases, this was related to specific individual 
differences. Two of the participants who had said that 
they felt less publicly self-conscious when masked talked 
about this in terms of being people who tended to 
experience relatively high levels of public self-
consciousness in everyday life. Participant two said: ‘I 
don’t like being videoed anyway, so that didn’t help, 
some people don’t mind--- if it’s got to be done it’s got 
to be done, but, um, yes I think I felt much more 
comfortable with the mask than without’ (4). Participant 
five said: ‘I’m quite self-conscious, and at least when I 
had the mask on--- when I was saying things that I felt 
were a bit prattish, I didn’t mind so much’ (5:2).  
 
In contrast, however, three participants seemed to 
suggest that they did not become any less concerned with 
their public self in the masked condition because they 
were the kind of person who was not particularly bothered 
by how other people saw them. Interestingly, one of these 
was participant two, who was also coded under ‘high 
PBSC’. She said that, apart from the anxiety over how her 
facial expressions might be seen, she really didn’t care 
what the students thought of her either masked or 
unmasked (15). She said that this was because she’s ‘old 
enough’ (16), and used to being up in front of people and 
making a fool of herself (22). Similar to this latter 
statement, participant twelve said that he didn’t 
actually worry what people thought about him because, ‘in 
a sense I’m solid, you know’ (36). Participant 21 said 
that she’s the kind of person who’s quite happy to stand 
up and present and doesn’t feel the least bit awkward 
about it (21).  
 
Participant nine specifically related the increase in his 
facial self-awareness to his twitch (see above). 
 
In terms of situational factors, two of the participants 
seemed to suggest that they may not have felt 
particularly concerned with their public selves in either 
condition because they did not feel that they would be 
being judged for the specific activity they were engaged 
in. Participant eight said that she may have experienced 
more difference if she had known that the people watching 
her were going to judge her (18). Participant sixteen, on 
the other hand, said that she was not particularly 
bothered what the observers thought of her (26) because 
the subject was not particularly personal (21).  
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With respect to specific situational factors, as noted 
earlier, three participants also specifically related 
their feeling of increased awareness of their public self 
to a situation in which their face might look awkward: 
the silences. 
 
Finally, participant eight suggested that she may have 
experienced a ceiling effect, in that she said that she 
felt, ‘a bit embarrassed anyway, with the mask or without 
it because the situation is strange’ (7). 
4.3.2.3 Inhibition 
Overall, nine participants (20 percent) were coded as 
saying that they felt less inhibited when wearing the 
mask: i.e. they felt more able to behave in ways that 
they might otherwise restrict. This included those 
participants who said that, in the masked condition, they 
felt ‘less inhibited’ (6:1), ‘slightly less inhibited’ 
(38:7), liberated (1:49), or ‘freer to say things’ 
(7:33). It also included those participants who said that 
they felt more able to be self-revealing (15:14; 39:12; 
43:5), more able to remain silent when they no longer 
wished to talk (1:1; 39:27), more able to express 
emotions (13:41; 39:14), or more able to ‘bend the truth’ 
(42:10) when wearing the mask. 
 
As has been seen however, with only four participants was 
this reduced feeling of inhibition specifically 
attributed to feeling less concerned with self-
presentational standards. Two other reasons were given. 
 
For two participants, the reduction in inhibition in the 
masked condition was attributed to a sense of 
‘protection’. Participant 38 said that she felt slightly 
less inhibited behind the mask because it was like a 
‘protective shield’; and participant 42 said that she 
felt ‘braver’ (33) and ‘almost invincible’ (28) when 
‘protected’ (33) by the mask. In neither of these cases, 
however, is it clear whether the participants are talking 
about a sense of physical protection becoming 
psychologised (as suggested in section 2.1.8), or a more 
direct sense of interpersonal protection. If the latter, 
this sense of protection would more appropriately come 
under the superordinate category of reduced public self-
awareness.  
 
Participant thirteen provided the only other reason for 
feeling less inhibited when wearing the mask 
(participants 6, 15, and 14 did not provide an 
explanation). She said that she felt more able to express 
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‘other aspects’ of her ‘personality’ (26) in the masked 
condition --- aspects of her personality that she might 
otherwise suppress or ‘control’ (40) such as emotions 
(41) --- because she felt transformed by the mask:  
 
The very nature of wearing a mask almost gives you 
another... not another person, but this is now 
changing you, that you are another person now. 
 
-And therefore in some ways it’s easier to express 
different parts of you that you might not express, 
because you are someone different. 
 
Yes. (44-46) 
 
In contrast to the nine participants who said they felt 
less inhibited with the mask on, however, almost 50 
percent more participants (thirteen, or 30 percent in 
total) said that they felt more inhibited when they were 
wearing the mask. In other words, when wearing the mask, 
they felt more restricted in being able to behave in the 
way that they wanted to behave. Participant 40, for 
instance, said: ‘I felt that I could be more free when I 
was... y’know... without the mask’ (10). Similarly, 
participant 27 said: ‘Um... If anything I felt more 
restricted with the mask on, I didn’t feel that the mask 
made me want to be more open and--- you know--- say 
things perhaps a bit more enthusiastically than I would 
normally say them. If anything I found it restricted me 
slightly’ (5-6). 
 
Participants gave five different types of reasons for why 
they felt more inhibited when wearing a mask.  
 
Most frequently, seven of the participants, or sixteen 
percent of the sample as a whole, said that they felt 
more restricted when wearing the mask because it 
interfered with their ability to communicate through 
facial expressions. Thus they could not convey the ‘whole 
message’ (10:12) or ‘the full meaning’ (27:8) of what it 
was they wanted to communicate. As participant eleven 
explained: ‘I felt like I couldn’t put over quite so much 
what I wanted to say because it’s not only my voice that 
says things, I feel I need facial expressions and 
movements’ (10). 
 
Four of these participants related this to their own 
particular style of communication --- specifically, their 
tendency to rely heavily on facial expression. 
Participant four said: ‘It’s all to do with the eyes--- 
I’m very much a facial expressions--- I don’t talk a lot 
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which is probably why I found it [communicating with a 
mask on] quite difficult’ (4:14). Similarly, participant 
27 said, ‘I use my facial expression quite a lot in 
helping me to express what I’m saying, and I think I’m 
aware that people can’t see that [when I’m masked]; 
therefore they’re probably not going to get... the full 
meaning’ (8). 
 
A second reason that five of the participants gave for 
why they felt more inhibited in the masked condition was 
that the mask felt like a ‘barrier’ between them and 
their audience. This was not so much that they could not 
communicate facially, but that it felt like they were 
talking to ‘a wall’ (23:20; 40:20) or ‘a piece of 
plastic’ (10:7) rather than actually ‘delivering anything 
to anybody’ (10:7). Participant 40 describes this 
experience as follows: 
 
with the mask I felt as though I was speaking to a 
wall. You know... so... er... perhaps like a 
sensation that there’s--- the actual communications 
coming back to you [-‘right’]. It’s not going to an 
audience, it’s... um... it’s not actually--- it’s 
sort of ricocheting back to you. (21-22) 
 
A third reason that two participants gave for feeling 
more inhibited when wearing the mask was to do with a 
sense of not being themselves: of being transformed. For 
participant six, as discussed earlier, this feeling of 
having a different identity --- of being ‘a stranger’, 
‘someone anonymous’, ‘not really you’ (43) --- meant that 
she felt less free to talk about how she really felt. 
This was because there was a sense of the masked not-self 
and the self being somewhat incongruent: ‘it doesn’t 
quite fit’ (42).  
 
As well as this transformation being inhibiting at the 
level of self-reflection, participant six also talked 
about this transformation being inhibiting in terms of 
how others would see her. She said that she was aware 
that she would appear strange to other people (10). 
Similarly, participant twelve said that he felt more 
inhibited about expressing himself when wearing a mask 
because of the incongruence between who he really was and 
who he had now become in the eyes of the observers. He 
said:  
 
How can I answer ‘I’ questions when they are actually 
not looking at my face? It’s quite... it got to that 
point where I thought ‘Yeah... this is a bit 
difficult’: the man in the mask, it sort of trying to 
  
119 
 
talk to Batman and asking him about his business 
affairs. (24-25)  
 
Two participants said that they were inhibited from 
focusing on the experimental task because they were 
distracted by the knowledge that the mask was on their 
face.  
 
Finally, one participant described a number of physical 
reasons why she felt more restricted (3:8) and inhibited 
(18) in the masked condition. These included the heat and 
the tendency for the mask to stick to her face (8); a 
restricted field of vision (12); an inability to move her 
eyes properly (13); the distraction of seeing the mask 
when she ‘looked up’ to think (14-15); and not being able 
to focus properly on the camera because she didn’t have 
her glasses on (6).  
 
Along with talking about whether they had felt more or 
less inhibited, nine of the participants talked about the 
kinds of factors that may have influenced their level of 
inhibition. In each case, this was related to a sense of 
not feeling any great desire to inhibit themselves in 
either masked or non-masked condition (what might be 
considered a ‘floor effect’). Five of the participants 
said that this was because they did not find the 
questions they were asked to speak on particularly 
personal (6:7; 41:21), ‘emotive’ (13:41), ‘contentious’ 
(41:21), or revealing (14:8), but fairly ‘neutral topics’ 
(22:5). This was similar to the response given by 
participant sixteen under ‘PBSA/intervening variable/not 
feeling judged’. However, for these five participants 
there was no mention of feeling less concerned with what 
the observers would think of them as a result of the non-
personal nature of the questions.  
 
Three of the participants said that there was little 
scope to feel particularly inhibited in either condition 
because the subject they were talking about was simply 
them. Hence, they said that there was little room to 
change what they were saying: ‘I’m only talking about 
myself anyway’ (25:6), ‘in either case it was me’ (32:3), 
‘I tried to be as open and honest on both’ (21:14).  
 
One participant said that she was the kind of person who 
did not get inhibited particularly easily: ‘If I have to 
say what I am I say it, with or without a mask’ (8:21). 
 
One participant said that he was so focused on trying to 
sort out what it was that he was saying (41:15) that the 
issue of feeling inhibited was of little significance. 
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Finally, increases or reductions in levels of felt-
inhibition did not seem notably related to participants’ 
scores on the individual difference measures of desire 
for individuation and self-esteem (see table 4.5). 
 
 
TABLE 4.5 
Number of participants coded as experiencing an increase 
or reduction in feelings of inhibition by self-esteem and 
desire for individuation 
  
Desire for 
individuation 
 
 
Self-esteem 
 high low high 
 
low 
 
inhibition/reduced 
 
6 
 
3 
 
5 
 
5 
 
inhibition/increased 
 
 
6 
 
6 
 
7 
 
4 
4.3.2.4 Transformation 
Overall, five participants (eleven percent) were coded as 
saying that they experienced some sense of self-
transformation when wearing the mask: i.e. they 
experienced a change in their subjectively-experienced 
sense of self. This included those participants who said 
that, in the masked condition, they felt less themselves: 
e.g. less like a person (4:25; 6:19), felt that there was 
no ‘me’ (10:11), felt that they had lost part of their 
identity (4:6; 6:19; 12:33), or felt that their 
personality had changed (12:19; 13:36). It also includes 
two participants who talked about this transformation 
more in terms of becoming an-other: i.e. they felt like 
they had a different identity (6:39), like they were ‘a 
little bit alien’ (6:10), like they had become ‘a 
stranger..., somebody else, somebody anonymous’ (6:43), 
or like they were ‘someone different’ (13:45). 
 
None of these participants gave particularly clear 
accounts of how they had come to feel transformed when 
wearing the mask. However, two of the participants did 
seem to link an ‘internal’ sense of transformation with a 
sense of being transformed in the eyes of the observers. 
Participant four, for instance, said that when she was 
talking to the camera she could visualise the people 
seeing her image; and because, when she was wearing a 
white mask, she had felt like ‘there’s nothing there’, 
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she had a sense of losing her identity (6). Along 
somewhat similar lines, participant six said:  
 
...you do feel a little bit alien, because you know 
that you appear strange to other people.... It made 
you feel less like a person, that you haven’t got a 
face, you haven’t got that bit of you which other 
people see first and quite often recognise you by, so 
it sort of takes away a bit of your identity, and--- 
I dunno [...].(10-19) 
 
None of the participants stated that they felt more 
transformed in the non-masked condition. However, two 
participants specifically stated in the interviews that 
they did not feel more transformed when wearing the mask: 
‘it still felt quite ‘me’ all the time’ (5:5), ‘I didn’t 
feel any less myself’ (29:16).  
 
Five participants spoke about different intervening 
variables that may have affected the extent to which they 
felt transformed by the mask. Three participants were 
coded as saying that the mask may not have had much 
effect on them because it was ‘plain’ (25:12; 44:40), 
‘white’ (25:13; 44:40), and ‘deliberately anonymous’ 
(6:13) --- hence, they did not feel that they were 
‘putting on’ (44:42) a particular ‘role’ (6:13; 25:12) or 
character (44:35). Along somewhat similar lines, three 
participants said that they did not feel the mask had 
much ‘influence’ (32:4) because they were not asked to 
play the role of the mask (25:12; 32:4; 44:36). Finally, 
one participant who said that she did feel transformed by 
the mask related this to a very acute awareness of 
wearing the mask, as a consequence of the heat (4:27). 
4.3.2.5 Miscellaneous Effects 
Along with the main psychological effects of interest, 27 
participants (61 percent) were coded as talking about 
other differences between the masked and non-masked 
conditions. Nodes and response-frequencies can be seen in 
appendix 4p.  
 
As this table shows, just one participant talked about 
the mask facilitating the expression of aspects of the 
self: ‘putting the mask on, it almost felt like there 
were other aspects of my personality wanting to come out’ 
(13: 26). However, as this participant seemed to account 
for this process in terms of feeling that ‘you are 
someone different’ (45), it may be that this text unit 
should come under ‘transformation’ rather than 
‘expressing aspects of the self’ (see section 2.3). 
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This table also shows that 24 participants talked about 
various psycho-somatic changes that the wearing of a mask 
brought about. These seemed to be mainly ‘negative’ 
experiences, such as: ‘claustrophobic’, ‘smells plastic’, 
‘stuffy’, and ‘uncomfortable’. As discussed in section 
4.2.5.2, these experiences were initially coded under 
‘inhibition/increased’, but were moved because it was 
felt that there was no direct evidence in these text 
units that participants were feeling unable to behave in 
the way that they wanted to behave. However, these 
psycho-somatic effects of wearing a mask do hint at the 
possibility that the participants were feeling more 
restricted or constricted when wearing the mask. 
4.3.2.6 Not much difference 
Fourteen participants (32 percent) were coded as saying 
that they did not experience much difference between the 
masked and non-masked conditions. This includes 
participants who, when asked if they experienced any 
differences between these two conditions, said that they 
did not feel much of a difference (3:1; 15:11; 20:4; 
22:9; 32:6; 41:3; 43:6), did not feel a ‘particular 
difference’ (8:6), or felt ‘it was the same’ (25:4). 
4.3.2.7 Experimental design 
Nineteen participants overall (43 percent) were coded as 
talking about specific aspects of the experimental design 
--- including (and primarily) those participants who 
talked about the design without specific reference to the 
main dependent variables. Two participants said that they 
found it easier to talk about the financial matters than 
the student’s social lives. Twelve participants talked 
about order effects, eleven saying that they found it 
easier or less anxiety-provoking when it was the second 
time round, and one (13) wondering whether she should be 
changing her ‘I am’ statements in the second trial 
because she had already said them once. One participant 
(3) said that she thought it was a shame that the mask 
was so firm and plastic rather than rubbery (24), but did 
not elaborate on this. One participant (4) talked about 
the experimental situation being ‘so unreal’ (31) and 
‘weird’ (34), particularly with the knowledge that 
someone would be watching it (32). Finally, seven 
participants talked about various distractors that had 
made it difficult for them to focus on the experimental 
tasks as a whole (see appendix 4p).  
4.3.2.8 Expectations 
The final superordinate category into which different 
responses were coded was that of ‘expectations’. This 
includes both participants responses to the question: 
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‘What did you think the aims of the study might be?’ and 
also participants’ prior expectations as to the 
psychological effects of wearing a mask.  
 
Twenty-eight, or 64 percent of the sample as a whole, 
expected the study to be looking at whether masks brought 
about an increase in feelings of anonymity. Participant 
nineteen, for instance, said, ‘I expect the aims were 
something to do with being able to feel anonymous behind 
some sort of barrier, in this case a mask’ (1).  
 
Of these participants, twenty-four (or 55 percent of the 
sample as a whole) went on to say that they thought the 
study might be looking at whether being anonymous behind 
a mask would lead to an increase in disinhibited 
behaviour, as a consequence of being unrecognisable by 
others. Many participants were quite articulate about 
this predicted link between anonymity, reduced concern 
with evaluation by others, and a reduction in 
inhibitions, for example:  
 
I think one can feel much more anonymous and can do 
things [when wearing a mask] that you would not 
normally do because of probably shame or something 
that can... person can’t judge you, because they 
can’t see your face and recognise you. (8:4) 
 
If you’re not identifiable then there’s freedom to--- 
you can make any statements you wish because it’s not 
going to come back to you. If you’re recognisable 
then you have a certain responsibility for what you 
say, and how people--- the consequences of what you 
say. (28:3-4) 
 
Overall, twenty-four participants were coded as saying 
that they thought the study was interested in looking at 
whether wearing a mask reduced one’s ‘public self-
awareness’: e.g. one’s self-consciousness (17:1), or 
‘what other people might think’ (13:1). As has been seen, 
in all of these cases this was attributed to a reduction 
in identifiability, and in all of these cases the result 
was seen as an increase in disinhibited behaviour. 
However, whilst all participants who talked about an 
expectation that the anonymity of the mask would bring 
about a reduction in inhibition were coded under this 
category of reduced self-awareness, this intermediate 
variable was generally not as explicit as either 
‘anonymity’ or ‘disinhibition’. Indeed, in roughly half 
of these twenty-four cases, it seemed that the 
participants were making a direct link between anonymity 
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and disinhibition without specific reference to a 
reduction in public self-awareness, e.g.: 
 
Well I would imagine that you’re--- with a mask on 
one might feel more anonymous and therefore wouldn’t 
have as many reservations about the way they behave. 
(30:1) 
 
Possibly you might feel able to say things behind the 
mask that you wouldn’t have said: maybe be more 
honest. Because you couldn’t be identified. (35:3-4) 
 
Along with the 24 participants who thought that the 
wearing of a mask would reduce inhibitions as a 
consequence of reduced identifiability, two participants 
thought that the wearing of a mask might reduce 
inhibitions because an individual’s facial expressions 
would be hidden. Two participants also said that they 
thought that they would feel more inhibited behind the 
mask.  
 
Six participants thought the study might be about --- or 
expected the wearing of masks to bring about --- some 
kind of change in roles. 
 
Other expectations as to the aims of the study or the 
predicted effects of wearing a mask can be seen in 
appendix 4p. 
4.4  DISCUSSION 
4.4.1 Hypothesis one: The wearing of a mask, under 
conditions in which an individual’s identifiability is 
dependent on ‘immediate’ facial recognition, will lead to 
a reduction in feelings of identifiability 
Both the quantitative and qualitative data strongly 
support this hypothesis. This does not seem to be a 
consequence of demand characteristics, as ‘aware’ 
participants showed a substantially smaller reduction in 
feelings of identifiability than non-aware participants. 
Experimenter-expectancy effects may have played some part 
in producing these results. However, given that, at a 
descriptive level, the mean scores in the masked 
conditions are very different from the mean scores in the 
non-masked conditions, and that these differences are 
triangulated with the qualitative data, it seems very 
unlikely that the entire difference between the two 
conditions can be attributed to experimenter-expectancy 
effects alone. 
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It is significant to note, however, that the correlation 
between the measures of anonymity and measures of 
identifiability was just -.47. This suggests that one 
should be cautious in using the term ‘anonymity’ to refer 
to the opposite of ‘identifiability’, as, to some extent, 
these two terms do not seem to be uni-dimensional. From 
the qualitative interviews, there was a sense in which 
this may have arisen because participants sometimes used 
‘anonymous’ to refer to ‘un-identifiable’, and sometimes 
to refer to something more akin to ‘identity-less’. These 
are quite different meanings. For instance, one could 
feel like a very identity-less, face-less human being --- 
a ‘no-one’ in a crowd --- whilst still having a sense 
that people could know who you were and recognise you. In 
this respect, anonymity has an element of 
‘transformation’ to it, and, as such, should probably not 
be used as an item to counterbalance measures of 
identifiability. Instead, measures of ‘non-
identifiability’ or ‘unidentifiability’ would probably 
provide a more veridical counterbalance. 
 
From the qualitative data, it would seem that many 
participants did not experience a notable reduction in 
feelings of identifiability when wearing the mask. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that there was some 
initial concerns that the mask might not bring about any 
reduction in feelings of identifiability at all, as the 
Open University students might feel totally un-
identifiable to their observers in the first place. This 
did not happen; and, indeed, the mean of 7.3 on the 
combined identifiability score in the non-masked 
condition suggests that participants did feel relatively 
identifiable. This suggests three things.  
 
First, that in a context where individuals could actually 
be recognised the reduction in feelings of 
identifiability that a mask might bring about would 
probably be greater than in the present study. Such a 
prediction is supported by the fact that three 
participants were coded as saying that they did not feel 
any less identifiable in the masked condition because 
they did not identifiable in the first place. It is also 
somewhat supported by the fact that the one participant 
who could have been recognised because she lived close to 
the campus experienced a more marked reduction in 
feelings of identifiability when masked. 
 
Second, the fact that participants did experience a felt-
reduction in identifiability even though most of them 
were ‘objectively’ unidentifiable in either condition 
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highlights the importance of distinguishing between 
actual-identifiability and felt-identifiability.  
 
Third, the fact that participants felt identifiable in 
the non-masked condition suggests that the present 
experimental paradigm may be a useful and economic means 
of invoking feelings of identifiability for subsequent 
research. 
 
As predicted, the qualitative data also shows that 
immediate facial identifiability is not the only factor 
in determining how identifiable an individual feels. From 
the qualitative data, it would seem that voice and 
clothes were also identified by participants as possible 
means of recognition.  
4.4.2 Hypothesis two: The wearing of a mask, under 
conditions in which it reduces an individual’s 
identifiability, and under conditions in which positive 
external events are not forthcoming, will contribute to a 
reduction in feelings of public self-awareness 
The qualitative and quantitative data in this study also 
strongly support this hypothesis. Again, this does not 
seem to be a consequence of demand characteristics, as 
‘aware’ participants showed a smaller reduction in public 
self awareness than ‘non-aware’ participants. Again, 
there is the possibility that it is due to experimenter-
expectancy effects, but the triangulation between the 
qualitative and quantitative data suggest that this is 
unlikely to be the primary cause of this effect. 
Furthermore, given that the concept of ‘public self-
awareness’ is somewhat more complex than that of 
‘identifiability’ or ‘inhibition’, it seems less likely 
that ‘unconscious’ messages could have been transmitted 
to the participants, encouraging them to respond in a 
hypothesis-confirming way.  
 
The ecological validity of this finding is strengthened 
by the fact that the experimental conditions are likely 
to have maximised the possibility that participants would 
actually feel more publicly self-aware when wearing a 
mask rather than less. Participants were tested alone: a 
context in which, as Diener (1980), Zimbardo (1969) and 
others have argued, manipulations of anonymity may 
heighten public self-awareness rather than reduce it. 
Participants were also wearing masks in an academic, 
classroom environment: one in which the wearing of masks 
would not be considered a particular normal or everyday 
activity. Nevertheless, only five of the participants 
indicated that they felt more aware of their public 
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selves when wearing a mask, and only two of these 
actually said that they thought that they looked 
‘strange’ or ‘weird’ in the masked condition. 
Furthermore, contrary to predictions, participants did 
not feel significantly more conspicuous in the masked 
conditions. 
 
What was much less expected, however, was the type of 
reduction in public self-awareness that the participants 
seemed to experience. From the discussion in section 
3.2.2, there was an expectation that participants would 
experience something of a global reduction in public 
self-awareness. In fact, from the qualitative data, it 
would seem that this reduction in public self-awareness 
tended to be much more specific: e.g. ‘I felt less 
concerned with grimacing,’ or ‘I felt less concerned with 
“giving myself away” through my eye movements’. 
 
This finding has substantial implications for the 
question of why it is that masked individuals might 
experience a reduced concern with their public self. In 
section 3.2.2, two possible pathways were identified: a 
motivational pathway and an attentional pathway. Given 
that there was a significant positive correlation of .30 
between feelings of identifiability and feelings of 
public self-awareness, it seems possible that these 
identifiability-mediated pathways may have partly 
contributed to reduced feelings of public self-awareness. 
However, with respect to the motivational pathway, only a 
small proportion of the participants seemed to feel less 
publicly self-aware in the masked condition because the 
reduced identifiability made them less concerned with 
being retaliated against or censured by their observers. 
Furthermore, none of the participants talked of a global 
reduction in public self-awareness as a consequence of 
the masked-anonymity drawing their attention away from 
how they appeared to others.  
 
Instead, what the qualitative data seems to suggest is 
that the wearing of a mask primarily reduced the wearer’s 
concerns with ‘mask-able’ facets of their public self. 
That is, when a number of the participants knew that 
their faces were being watched in the non-masked 
condition, they became concerned with how they were 
appearing to the observers: for instance, a concern with 
looking awkward, or a concern with being seen as 
unattractive. Thus, when these facets of the public self 
were covered with a mask, these concerns were reduced. 
But this reduction in public self-concerns did not seem 
particularly related to a reduced concern with being 
identified. For instance, when participant 42 likens the 
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experience of wearing of a mask to feeling braver when 
talking to someone on the telephone, there is no 
suggestion here that this comes about because the other 
person is less likely to know her identity. Clearly, the 
other person at the end of the telephone will know 
exactly who she is. Rather, the reduced public self 
concern comes about because that other person is less 
able to see her facial expressions. 
 
To some extent, then, these findings do support the 
prediction by Buss (1980) and Carver and Scheier (1981) 
that anonymity-invoking conditions --- such as the 
wearing of a mask --- will reduce an individual’s public 
self-concerns. However, contrary to Prentice-Dunn and 
Rogers (1989), the findings from this study suggest that 
this is not so much because the individual is less 
concerned with being identified, but because, under 
conditions of anonymity, an individual is less likely to 
feel that their public selves are under scrutiny by 
others. Hence, they are less likely to turn their 
attention towards their public self themselves. 
Furthermore, whilst Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1987) 
criticise Carver and Scheier for attempting to break the 
self down into increasingly fragmented parts, the 
findings from the present study suggest that it is 
important to specify exactly what parts of the public 
self --- let alone the self --- are being talked about. 
Whilst the findings from this study show that the wearing 
of a mask reduced concerns with mask-able facets of the 
public self, there is no evidence to suggest that it 
concomitantly reduced more global public self concerns, 
such as being seen as intelligent or friendly.  
 
Hence, whilst anonymous conditions may take an 
individual’s attention off facets of their public self, 
exactly which facets they reduce a concern over may be 
dependent on exactly which public self facets can still 
be ‘seen’ by others. For instance, an anonymous 
individual sending mail over the internet may experience 
little concern with how they dress because no-one is 
looking at this facet of their public self. But they may 
still be concerned with the quality of their prose 
because they are aware that this public self facet will 
be scrutinised by others.  
 
With respect to specific factors, it is also significant 
to note that individuals’ concerns with how they 
presented themselves at a global level (PBSC) did not 
correlate with their reduction in public self-awareness 
when wearing a mask. Rather, as the qualitative data 
suggests, it seemed only to be those individuals with 
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very specific concerns about mask-able public self facets 
(such as blushing or looking awkward) that experienced a 
reduction in public self-awareness when wearing a mask. 
In this respect, it would be very interesting to develop 
a more specific ‘facial self-consciousness’ scale, and to 
see if this relates to reductions in public self-
awareness as a consequence of wearing a mask. Items on 
such a scale could include statements such as: ‘I worry 
about people seeing me blush’, or ‘I’m concerned about 
“giving myself away” through non-verbal facial 
expressions’. 
 
The findings from this study, however, do not in any way 
negate the possibility that a reduction in 
identifiability may reduce public self-awareness at a 
more global level, as a consequence of a reduced concern 
with censure or punishment. One notable example where 
this did happen was with the participant who lived close 
to Sussex University, and thereby was genuinely concerned 
that others might recognise her and criticise her for 
what she said. This shows that reduced identifiability 
clearly can reduce public self-concerns. However, this 
occurred in a context in which the individual was not 
just identifiable, but also concerned about the 
consequences of this identifiability. This suggests that, 
for a reduction in identifiability to reduce feelings of 
public self concern, the individual must actually be 
concerned about what might happen if they are identified.  
 
This may explain why feelings of reduced identifiability, 
in the present study, did not seem to be one of the main 
reasons why participants felt less concerned with how 
they presented themselves. Although many of the 
participants felt less identifiable in the masked 
condition, it seems likely that they may also have felt 
far beyond the reach of any ‘retaliations’ that the 
Sussex students might have had in store for them. Hence, 
the fact that they were less identifiable did not make 
them less concerned about how they presented themselves, 
as they may not have been particularly concerned with 
their public self-presentation in the first place.  
 
As a general summary, then, one might state the 
following. If an individual is concerned with a 
particular mask-able facet of their public self --- 
either for situational or individual reasons --- then the 
wearing of a mask has the potential to reduce this public 
self concern. Where the facet of the public self that the 
individual is concerned with is their facial identity, 
then the wearing of a mask may bring about a more global 
reduction in public self concerns.  
  
130 
 
 
It should be noted, however, that there are two further 
reasons for a reduction in public self-awareness as a 
consequence of wearing a mask that do not fit easily into 
this hypothesis. The first of these was that the mask 
brings about a sense of interpersonal detachment, such 
that the individual feels separated off from their 
observers. Thus, there is a feeling that they are almost 
alone. The other reason was that participants can 
actually see the camera --- or whatever else is watching 
them --- less easily, and therefore they feel less aware 
of being watched. With both these factors, it might be 
interesting to look at whether changing the type of mask 
worn can further decrease feelings of public self-
awareness. For instance, it might be that a very thick 
mask could increase a sense of being ‘walled off’ from 
others, or that a mask with only pin-holes for eyes could 
further decrease the sense of being watched. 
 
In terms of situational generalisability, the findings 
from this study raise some important questions about when 
and where a mask is likely to reduce feelings of public 
self-awareness. Whilst masked-anonymity may reduce public 
self-awareness as a consequence of reduced concern with 
punishment, for such a situation to occur, two things 
would seem to need to happen. First, the individual must 
actually feel that she can be identified; and, second, 
she must feel that there is the possibility of 
‘retaliation’ as a direct consequence of this 
identification. Given these necessary pre-conditions, it 
seems likely that, in many situations, a masked reduction 
in identifiability will not contribute much to a 
reduction in public self-awareness. For instance, in a 
carnival situation, an individual may well feel that no-
one can see her in the crowd anyway; and, even if she 
feels that they can, she may feel that there is no way 
that they can ‘reach’ her to punish her for her 
behaviour. It may well be, then, that reductions in 
identifiability will only really contribute to reductions 
in public self-awareness in very specific situations. For 
instance, a political protester on a demonstration might 
feel that she is identifiable to the police, and that, if 
they do identify her, she might face imprisonment. Under 
these conditions, it would be predicted that the wearing 
of a mask could substantially reduce her concerns about 
how she behaves.  
 
On the other hand, based on this research, there may be a 
number of situations, not specifically related to 
identifiability, in which an individual may have very 
specific concerns about how her face appears. For 
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instance, a public speaker may worry about looking 
nervous, a psychotherapeutic client may be very anxious 
other group members ‘reading’ her facial expressions, or 
an adolescent may feel that no-one wants to know him 
because of his oily or spotty face. Under these 
conditions, it would be predicted that the mask would 
bring about a substantial reduction in public self-
awareness. Clearly, these are not everyday situations in 
which individuals wear masks. Given, however, that one of 
the aims of this study is to understand how the mask 
might be used in a therapeutic environment, the fact that 
the wearing of a mask might have an effect in these kinds 
of situations may be of substantial importance. 
 
In developing this research, therefore, it could be very 
productive to investigate the kinds of situations in 
which individuals might be concerned about mask-able 
aspects of their public self. One way to do this would be 
to carry out a questionnaire study in which respondents 
were asked: ‘In what situations are you concerned with 
how your face appears?’ Based on the responses to this 
questionnaire, one could then test whether the mask 
brought about a greater reduction in public self-
awareness in ‘high facial concern’ contexts (e.g. public 
speaking), as opposed to ‘low facial concern’ contexts 
(e.g. working at a computer).  
4.4.3 Hypothesis three: The wearing of a mask, under 
conditions in which it reduces an individual’s public 
self-awareness, and under conditions in which an 
individual wishes to behave in ways that are contrary to 
their public self-standard, will have a disinhibiting 
effect 
In contrast to the two previous hypotheses, the findings 
from this study do not provide strong support for this 
hypothesis. To some extent, the non-significance of the 
quantitative results might be attributed to a number of 
methodological problems. For instance, the poor 
reliability of the coding; or the presence of self-
presentational concerns, such that the participants did 
not want to be seen as antipathetic to the students (by 
the experimenter) in either condition. However, the 
findings from the qualitative interviews strongly 
triangulate with the quantitative findings, and suggest 
that, overall, the participants in this study did not 
experience a general disinhibition of feeling or 
behaviour. 
 
This, then, leaves two possibilities. Either hypothesis 
three is incorrect, or else the quantitative measures 
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failed to adequately test it. From the qualitative data, 
the latter explanation seems more likely. Hypothesis 
three states that for a disinhibition of behaviour to 
occur, the mask-wearer must want to behave in a way that 
is discrepant from their public self-standard. However, 
from the qualitative data, there is no evidence that 
participants did want to behave in the predicted public 
self-standard-discrepant ways: i.e. expressing antipathy 
to the Sussex University students or disclosing intimate 
details to them. Hence, the finding that participants in 
the masked condition did not behave more antipathetically 
or more intimately does not necessarily contradict 
hypothesis three. Furthermore, where participants did 
seem to want to behave in ways that were discrepant with 
their public self standard --- for instance, talk 
sarcastically or remain silent --- then the wearing of a 
mask did seem to have a disinhibiting effect.  
 
This would seem to reinforce the point made in section 
3.2.2.3.2 that, for a mask to disinhibit its wearer, the 
wearer must want to behave in a way that is discrepant 
from her public self-standard. Moreover, given that the 
wearing of a mask seems to reduce particular, rather than 
global, public self-concerns, it would follow that the 
wearing of a mask is only likely to disinhibit those 
particular behaviours which are discrepant with the 
particular public self-standard over which the mask-
wearer has reduced concern. Such a prediction is verified 
by the qualitative data. Participant 42, for instance, 
felt less concerned about being seen to lie when wearing 
a mask. Therefore, she felt more able to ‘bend the truth’ 
when she was speaking. But there is no evidence that she 
also felt more able to behave in an aggressive manner or 
disclose more personal information about herself. 
 
Given that, in most cases, the mask brought about a 
reduction in public self-concern because it hid the 
wearer’s facial expressions, it would seem that MacGowan 
and Rosse’s (1924) account of masked-disinhibition (see 
section 2.1.6) actually comes closest to explaining why 
some participants in the present study felt less 
inhibited when wearing a mask. However, this does not 
discount the possibility that masked-anonymity will lead 
to a more global disinhibition of behaviour if an 
individual feels that she is less likely to be punished 
for her behaviour. If, for instance, an individual is 
concerned with being facially identified, and wants to 
behave in a way that she would normally inhibit for fear 
of being identified, then the wearing of a mask may 
disinhibit this action.  
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With respect to disinhibition, perhaps one of the most 
unexpected findings of this study was that around a third 
of the participants actually felt more inhibited when 
wearing a mask. The internal validity of this finding is 
all the more robust given that this outcome was not 
expected, and therefore can not be attributed to 
experimenter-expectancy effects. Moreover, in terms of 
demand characteristics, it should be noted that nine out 
of the thirteen participants who were coded as saying 
they felt more inhibited when wearing a mask had, 
themselves, expected to feel less inhibited in the masked 
condition.  
 
This finding, although unexpected, supports the critique 
of differential self-awareness theory made in 3.2.2.3.2, 
that not every human ‘instinct’ is in a direction counter 
to the public self ideal. In fact, in the present study, 
the participants’ ‘instincts’ frequently seemed to be 
towards highly pro-social behaviour. For instance, 
several of the participants wanted to make close 
‘contact’ with their observers, or to communicate clearly 
what it was that they were trying to say. From reading 
the transcripts of the participants’ prose, there was 
also a sense that many of the participants wanted to give 
‘useful’ advice to the Sussex undergraduates on how to 
make the most of their college years. In not all of these 
cases was the mask experienced as inhibiting. However, 
where participants wanted to act in ways for which their 
faces needed to be seen --- for instance, conveying the 
non-verbal elements of the ‘whole message’ --- then the 
mask was experienced as an inhibitor.  
 
What these results strongly suggest, then, is that the 
wearing of a mask can be experienced as both inhibiting 
and disinhibiting, depending on what it is that the 
wearer wants to do. If an individual has a desire to 
behave in a particular way, but inhibits that behaviour 
out of a concern for mask-able facets of their public 
self, then the wearing of a mask, under conditions in 
which it reduces those concerns, can be predicted to have 
a disinhibiting effect. However, if an individual wishes 
to behave in a way for which they ‘require’ mask-able 
facets of their public self, then the wearing of a mask 
can be predicted to have an inhibiting effect. 
 
It should also be noted that the same person may 
experience the wearing of a mask as both inhibiting and 
disinhibiting, depending on what it is that they want to 
do. In fact, two participants in this study had text 
units coded under both ‘inhibition/reduced’ and 
‘inhibition/increased’. This is somewhat similar to the 
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findings of Pollackzek and Homefield (1954), that 
although their clients initially found the masks 
liberating, once they had got used to them and wanted to 
develop their characters, they were experienced as 
stultifying and inhibiting.  
 
In terms of situational generalisability, the discussion 
here suggests that the disinhibiting effects of wearing a 
mask may be very specific. Not only does the mask-wearer 
need to be less concerned with a particular facet of 
their public self, but they also need to want to behave 
in a way that they would normally inhibit out of a 
concern for that particular facet of the public self. 
Given the specificity of these parameters, it seems 
unlikely that the wearing of a mask, particularly as a 
spontaneous or un-planned act, will bring about much of a 
reduction in inhibitions. However, it should be borne in 
mind that, in most cases, the wearing of a mask is not 
something that an individual does spontaneously, but 
deliberately, with reference to a particular time and 
situation. Hence, along the lines suggested by Ottenberg 
(1975), it may be that when an individual actively wants 
to behave in a way that they would normally inhibit out 
of a concern for a particular facet of their public self, 
then the wearing of a mask may be something that they 
turn towards.  
 
Paradoxically, however, the reverse might be true in 
terms of the mask’s inhibiting effect. At a level of 
conscious deliberation, it seems unlikely that many 
people would choose to wear a mask to inhibit themselves. 
However, given that individuals frequently use mask-able 
aspects of their public self in everyday activities, if a 
mask were worn spontaneously or in an un-planned way, 
then there is a good chance that it would be experienced 
as inhibiting. This means, then, that the effects of 
wearing a mask may be very much related to whether this 
is something chosen or imposed; and given that in the 
present study it was primarily imposed, one might expect 
the wearing of a mask in the ‘real world’ to have a more 
disinhibiting, and less inhibiting, effect, than in the 
present study.  
 
To investigate this further, however, one would need to 
identify the kinds of situations in which participants 
wanted to do things but inhibited them out of concerns 
for their mask-able public self, and situations in which 
participants wanted to do things which required the use 
of their mask-able public self. Again, this could be done 
through a very straightforward questionnaire, asking 
questions like: ‘Describe something you would really like 
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to do but would/would not want your face to be seen while 
doing it’. Those situations in which there was a general 
desire to be seen, and those in which there was a general 
desire not to be seen, could then be used as the basis 
for an experimental study: either field- or laboratory-
based. The prediction here would be that participants 
would feel less inhibited in the masked condition of the 
‘low desire to be seen’ situation, but more inhibited in 
the masked condition of the ‘high desire to be seen’ 
situation. Given the low reliability of observer ratings 
on disinhibition in the present study, it might also be a 
very good idea in such a study to ask participants to 
rate their own levels of inhibition or disinhibition.  
 
Alternatively, a less intrusive study could be conducted 
along the lines of Mathes and Guest (1976). Participants 
could simply be presented with a list of ‘high desire to 
be seen’ and ‘low desire to be seen’ situations, and then 
asked to rate how willing they would be to undertake each 
of the behaviours in masked and non-masked conditions. 
Again, the prediction would be that participants would be 
more willing to undertake the ‘low desire to be seen’ 
behaviours when wearing a mask, but less willing to 
undertake the ‘high desire to be seen’ behaviours.  
4.4.4 Other Findings 
Along with the three main hypotheses, there were also a 
number of subsidiary questions that this study was 
interested in exploring, some of which have already been 
addressed (e.g. PBSC). 
 
One of the questions raised was whether masked-anonymity 
would lead to a greater desire for individuation. From 
the self-report measures, there is no evidence that this 
was the case, and there was no significant negative 
correlation between desire for individuation and feelings 
of identifiability. Also, individuals with a higher 
desire for individuation did not feel any more inhibited 
when wearing the mask. However, this study did not 
provide a fair test of the individuation hypothesis 
because, as Maslach (1974) argues, this desire is only 
likely to be present if an individual expects positive 
forthcoming events, and the study was specifically 
designed to minimise this possibility. Furthermore, from 
the qualitative data, two of the participants did seem to 
feel undesirably de-individuated when anonymous behind 
the mask. From the qualitative data, there is no evidence 
that they did try and re-individuate themselves, but this 
may have been the case if they had been expecting 
something positive to be forthcoming.  
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This study also did not in any way provide an adequate 
test of the hypothesis that the wearing of a mask 
increases an individual’s sense of social identity. The 
participants were masked, alone, and hence from a 
Reichian position there was no reason for any of them to 
feel any less aware of their personal, individual 
identity when wearing the mask. The finding that they 
did, then, was somewhat unexpected, as was the fact that 
scores on measures of ‘awareness of personal and 
individual identity’ correlated extremely highly with 
scores on measures of identifiability (Pearson 
correlation = 0.58, p < .000001). This finding, then, is 
probably more related to the question of whether an 
individual feels transformed when wearing a mask; and, 
along with the fact that eleven percent of the 
participants were coded under transformation/not-self, 
provides some firm grounds from which to go on to explore 
the hypothesis that the mask transforms its wearer. 
 
As predicted by differential self-awareness theory, the 
wearing of a mask did not bring about a significant 
reduction in levels of private self-awareness or a 
significant increase in levels of ‘altered experience’. 
It is somewhat worrying, however, to note the very low 
inter-item reliability on the former measure. 
Interestingly, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) do not 
report the inter-item reliability that they found for 
these two measures, and it may be that better measures 
will need to be developed to assess this dimension more 
reliably.  
 
As a final pre-experimental prediction, there was very 
little evidence to show that individuals high in self-
esteem felt more inhibited when wearing a mask, or found 
the wearing of a mask less pleasurable. Again, this may 
be because the mask disinhibits and inhibits in very 
specific ways, and more global measures are less able to 
pick up on the specific areas of the public self over 
which an individual may have high self-esteem.  
 
Finally, with respect to the psychological effects of 
wearing a mask, it was interesting to note how similar 
many of the ‘lay-hypotheses’ were to the kind of 
hypotheses found in the psychological literature. For the 
majority of the participants, there was an assumption 
that a mask would disinhibit its wearer, and that this 
disinhibition would come about as a consequence of 
reduced identifiability. Again, this raises the question 
of social representations (Moscovici, 1984) of the mask’s 
psychological effect.  
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4.4.5 General Methodological Issues 
What is the general reliability of these findings? With 
respect to synchronic reliability, there would seem to be 
a high degree of agreement between the qualitative and 
quantitative data. The only area in which synchronic 
reliability was weak was with respect to the coding of 
disinhibited behaviours. Here, it may make sense in 
future to use self-report measures or strictly 
behavioural measures, as raters would seem to vary quite 
markedly in what they consider disinhibited. With respect 
to diachronic reliability, there is also less certainty, 
and further studies --- with the kinds of developments 
discussed --- would be a useful means of testing the 
reliability of these findings across time. 
 
With respect to the internal validity of the study, 
Reason (1994) suggests that this is dependent on the 
quality of awareness of the participants; and, in this 
respect, the respondents in this study seemed very able 
to articulate and communicate their experiences of 
wearing a mask. However, because the frequencies of 
coding reflected only how many participants said ‘what’ 
rather than how much of ‘what’ they had said, the 
analysis may have failed to pick up on the intensity of 
different feelings. Also, in using the NUD•IST program, a 
very hierarchical structure was imposed on the 
qualitative data, which sometimes felt limiting and not 
entirely true to the data itself. A less rigid structure, 
such as the causal network used in appendix 2a, may have 
represented the data in a more veridical way. 
 
With respect to internal validity, perhaps the greatest 
possible source of error was the presence of the 
experimenter and the possible confounding effects of 
experimenter expectancy: both during the experiment and 
during the post-experimental interview. Some of the 
findings, however, can not be explained in this way --- 
for instance, that some participants felt more inhibited 
when wearing a mask --- as the experimenter was genuinely 
not expecting these responses. Nevertheless, in future 
studies, it would seem ideal to try and take the 
researcher out of the experimental environment as much as 
is possible.  
 
One way to achieve this might be to have the participant 
facing away from the researcher instead of towards him. 
It should also be possible to reduce the contact between 
researcher and participants by automating the 
experimental tasks as far as possible. This would not 
require the experimenter to be outside the room, and 
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would ensure that the possibility of interference was 
kept to a minimum. 
 
With respect to the post-experimental interviews, there 
would also be an argument for having this conducted by 
someone other than the researcher. This could minimise 
the possible confounding effects of ‘leading questions’, 
and reduce the ‘obligation’ that participants might feel 
to give the researcher the answers he wanted. At the same 
time, as Kvale (1996) argues, there is substantial value 
in an interviewer being informed about her subject, and 
having an awareness of the kinds of questions that are 
being asked. The solution, therefore, might be an 
informed interviewer other than the researcher, himself. 
However, to find such a person --- and to ask them to 
conduct interviews every twenty minutes or so --- would 
require substantial financial and time resources. 
 
A similar issue emerges in terms of the internal validity 
of the coding process. By coding the interview himself, 
there is the danger that the researcher will introduce a 
substantial degree of bias into the structuring and 
categorising of the data. Ideally, this would be done by 
colleagues who were informed but not ‘committed’ to 
achieving particular outcomes. Again, however, there is 
the practical problem of finding someone who knows this 
theoretical area well, and is prepared to spend at least 
a week coding and categorising the data. The compromise 
used in this research was to have a colleague check 
through the analysis and to question any inconsistencies. 
If, however, it were possible to reduce the complexities 
of the unit of analysis --- e.g. by using words or short 
phrases rather than whole sentences --- then the length 
of time required for the coding processes could be 
considerably reduced. 
 
If, then, it is the researcher who carries out the 
interview and analysis --- as in the present study --- 
what would seem important is that there is a degree of 
‘reflexive validity’ (Kvale, 1996). This means that the 
researcher can be open about his own aims and biases and 
consider how this may have influenced the findings. 
 
How did I experience the interviewing process? On the 
whole, I think that I was relatively able to bracket the 
main hypotheses and be open to the participants’ actual 
lived-experiences. Evidence for this mainly comes from 
the fact that so many findings emerged that fundamentally 
contradicted what had been expected.  
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Where the biases may have occurred, however, is in 
encouraging participants to talk about experiences that 
were only at the fringes of reflective awareness. During 
the interviews, I feel that perhaps I adopted a somewhat 
‘dogged’ stance, encouraging participants to get at the 
essence of their phenomenological experiencing. The 
consequence of this may have been that participants 
described experiences or drew connections as a means of 
‘obliging’ me, rather than because these were experiences 
that they had a clear sense of. 
 
Similar issues arose in the coding. On reflection, I do 
not think that my main aim here was to put as many text 
units as possible into the ‘reduced identifiability’ or 
‘reduced inhibition’ categories. What I think I may have 
done, however, is to create new categories and highlight 
differences where, perhaps, it was not particularly clear 
that differences did exist. During the coding process I 
certainly experienced a need to be able to create some 
kind of coherent structure out of the mass of data. In 
this respect, it may have been that I ‘lumped together’ 
certain text units that, in reality, were actually saying 
somewhat different things. Miles and Huberman (1994) call 
this desire to be making too much sense of data the 
‘holistic fallacy’.  
 
With respect to population validity, it is clear that the 
findings from this study can only be generalised out to a 
wider population with the utmost caution. Participants in 
this study tended to be relatively well-educated, the 
majority came from lower middle class backgrounds, and 
they were mainly women. Furthermore, because a self-
selection sampling procedure was used in this study, the 
participants who took part were likely to be more 
intellectual, more sociable, less conventional, less 
authoritarian, and have a greater need for social 
approval than the general population as a whole 
(Rosenthal, 1970). It is uncertain, however, how any of 
these factors might interact with the treatment effect --
- if at all.  
 
What might have been more likely to interact with the 
treatment effect is the fact that participants who 
volunteered for this study probably did so on the basis 
that they were interested in masks and their 
psychological effects. Participants who had no interest 
in masks, on the other hand, may have been unlikely to 
volunteer. The former participants may have been more 
open to the possibility that the mask had some kind of 
psychological effect, and less cynical about what 
actually happened when they wore a mask. This may not 
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have predisposed the results towards one or other 
hypothesis, but it does seem likely that the effects of 
wearing a mask on the population as a whole would be 
somewhat less than what was reported in this study.  
 
There is also a very important question about ecological 
validity. Clearly, the situation in the laboratory was a 
very specific one. However, as Miles and Huberman (1994) 
write, there is something ‘undeniable’ about the 
qualitative data, giving it a sense of being able to 
travel outside of the immediate experimental environment. 
This seems to be particularly the case when participants 
talked about particular mechanisms by which the mask came 
to have an effect. Where participants, for instance, said 
that they felt more inhibited when wearing a mask because 
they could not use their face to communicate, it would be 
difficult to see how this might not also occur in non-
laboratory settings. 
 
At the same time, the kinds of effects and concerns that 
emerged in the study are probably very much related to 
the kind of experimental set-up. Issues around 
communication may have taken on substantial importance 
because participants were talking directly to a video 
camera. Had the participants been in a different 
situation --- such as in a group where there was no 
particular need to communicate --- then the kinds of 
issues that participants experienced may have been very 
different.  
 
There is also the question of the specific type of mask 
used in this study, and whether the results with this 
mask would generalise to the experience of wearing other 
masks. Given that only one mask was used, this is 
impossible to say, and it would be important in 
subsequent studies to use more than one mask to get some 
assessment of how the ‘facial appearance’ of the mask 
affects its wearer. However, where participants did 
describe the mask, they talked about it as being a 
somewhat blank face, and it is not easy to see how this, 
in itself, would have cued participants to feel less 
identifiable or less aware of their public selves. Also, 
when participants talked about feeling more or less 
inhibited when wearing the mask, this did not seem at all 
related to the mask’s appearance. The two findings that 
may have been somewhat related to the mask’s appearance, 
though, were the findings that participants felt more 
anonymous and also that some participants felt more 
identity-less when wearing the mask. Given that it is not 
possible to have a ‘face’-less mask, the possible biasing 
effect of a mask’s appearance would appear unavoidable. 
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However, in future studies, if more than one mask was 
used, then it would be possible to assess how much an 
individual’s responses are determined by a mask’s 
particular appearance. 
 
As a final methodological point, it seems that the 
combined use of qualitative and quantitative data has 
worked very well in this study. The quantitative data has 
been able to provide a clear sense of how individuals 
responded to the wearing of a mask at a general level and 
has been able to collect data on some predefined areas of 
interest. The qualitative data, on the other hand, has 
been able to identify the processes by which these 
changes occur. Both have provided important sources of 
clarification and triangulation for the other. Without 
the qualitative data, for instance, the possibility that 
the mask reduced feelings of public self-awareness for 
reasons other than reduced identifiability may never have 
emerged. Equally, without the quantitative data, it would 
not have emerged that participants felt significantly 
less aware of their personal and individual identity when 
wearing the mask.  
 
Just over twenty percent of the participants said that 
they felt uncomfortable wearing a mask. This raises some 
ethical cause for concern. However, overall, participants 
rated the masked condition as only slightly less 
pleasurable than the non-masked condition, and both 
seemed at relatively acceptable levels --- close to the 
midpoint of the scale. Nevertheless, what this highlights 
is the importance in future studies of emphasising to 
participants that they can terminate their participation 
in the study if they wish to.  
 
This relates to another ethical issues which subsequent 
studies need to deal with on a more formal basis: that of 
informed consent. In the present study, the process was 
relatively informal, but in future, it would be 
preferable to give participants something actually 
written down, which they can then sign if they are 
agreeable to. As Christensen (1997) states, this should 
particularly state that participants are under no 
obligation to continue with the study if they do not wish 
to.  
 
Finally, the debriefing process in the present study 
addressed any misconceptions that participants might have 
had about the experiment, but it did not specifically 
explain to them exactly what the study was about. In 
terms of catalytic validity, then, in future studies it 
would seem important to explicitly go through with 
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participants the aims of the study, such that they can 
gain a clearer insight into the experimental research. 
4.5  SUMMARY 
In summary, the main findings of this study are that the 
wearing of a mask has the capacity to reduce an 
individuals’ feelings of identifiability and their 
awareness of their public self. However, whilst there is 
some evidence that the latter may be a consequence of the 
former, it would seem that there are a number of other 
mechanisms by which the mask has the capacity to reduce 
its wearer’s public self-awareness. This is primarily 
through covering those aspects of the public self --- 
such as facial expressions or facial characteristics --- 
that the wearer may be concerned about.  
 
With respect to inhibitions, it seems fairly clear from 
this study that the mask has the potential to both 
inhibit and disinhibit its wearer, depending on what it 
is that the wearer wants to do. If an individual wants to 
do something but inhibits it out of a concern for mask-
able aspects of the public self, then the mask would seem 
to have the capacity to play a disinhibitory role. 
However, if they want to do something for which they 
require mask-able aspects of the public self, then the 
wearing of a mask is more likely to be experienced as 
inhibitory.  
 
There is also some evidence from this study that the 
wearing of a mask has the capacity to bring about changes 
in how an individual perceives themselves, and certainly 
strong evidence that they become less aware of their 
personal and individual identity.  
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CHAPTER FIVE. MASKING, INHIBITION AND DISINHIBITION: A 
WORKSHOP STUDY 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
5.1.1 Aims 
The study reported in this chapter was initially 
conducted as a means of exploring the hypothesis that the 
wearing of the mask would facilitate the expression of a 
particular aspect of the Self: subpersonalities
9
. However, 
because of the problematic empirical and theoretical 
foundations of this concept, this line of research was 
not included in this thesis. Nevertheless, some of the 
data that emerged from this study provides a useful means 
of triangulating the findings from the previous study, 
particularly looking at the question of whether or not a 
mask inhibits/disinhibits its wearer, and the processes 
by which this might come about. Furthermore, because this 
study took place in a workshop context rather than an 
experimental one, there is an opportunity to assess the 
ecological validity of the previous findings. Hence, this 
chapter will present a brief re-examination of the 
findings from this study, specifically in relation to the 
dis-/inhibition hypothesis that was developed in the 
previous chapter. This is as follows:  
 
If an individual has a desire to behave in a particular 
way, but inhibits that behaviour out of a concern for 
mask-able facets of their public self, then the wearing 
of a mask, under conditions in which it reduces those 
concerns, can be predicted to have a disinhibiting 
effect. However, if an individual wishes to behave in a 
way for which they ‘require’ mask-able facets of their 
public self, then the wearing of a mask can be predicted 
to have an inhibiting effect. 
                     
9
 Defined as ‘semi-permanent and semi-autonomous regions 
of the personality capable of acting as a person’ (Rowan, 
1990, p.8). 
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5.2  METHOD 
5.2.1 Design 
The experiment used a repeated measures design, with one 
independent variable of interest: masking. For the 
purposes of this chapter, the main dependent variable of 
interest is self-report ratings on a measure of 
‘uninhibitedness’. However, as part of the initial study, 
the following items were also used as dependent measures: 
‘self-conscious’, ‘immersed in the character’ , ‘similar 
to normal waking consciousness’, ‘“fixed” in the 
character’, ‘detached from the character’, ‘trance-like’, 
‘difficult to stay “in character”’, and ‘like a 
subpersonality’. Focused group interviews were also 
conducted to obtain qualitative data about the 
participants’ experience of wearing a mask. For the 
purposes of this re-examination, the prediction is that 
the wearing of a mask will bring about both an inhibiting 
and disinhibiting effect depending on the kinds of 
factors outlined in section 5.1.1. 
5.2.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited for the study by advertising 
a ‘Mask and Movement’ research workshop at a local 
dance/personal growth group, which the researcher 
intermittently attended (the advertising flyer for this 
workshop can be seen in appendix 5a). The decision not to 
advertise the workshop to a wider population was taken 
primarily because of the exploratory nature of the study, 
and a concern that participants without any experience of 
‘personal growth’ activities might find the experience 
somewhat difficult. Around 40 percent of the participants 
were known to the researcher prior the study. The 
implications of this will be explored in the discussion. 
 
A total of twenty-six participants completed the study. 
The first workshop was attended by eighteen participants. 
Two of these participants, however, left after the first 
two improvisations, and their responses have been deleted 
from the analysis. A follow-up workshop was attended by a 
further ten participants. In both workshops, there was an 
approximately equal mix of males and females. 
5.2.3 Apparatus and Materials 
Sixteen masks were used for this study. These were all 
modified ‘neutral’ masks (see chapter four) with lumps of 
a moulding material somewhat randomly ‘thrown’ onto them. 
The masks had a somewhat disfigured and deformed 
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appearance (see illustration 5.1). Half of the masks were 
painted with a mixture of colours and half were painted 
entirely white
10
.  
 
 
ILLUSTRATION 5.1 
Masks used for study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of everyday objects were also used in this study 
as ‘props’ for the participants to improvise with. These 
included plastic toys, musical instruments (for instance, 
tambourines, drums, a triangle), and clothing (for 
instance, scarves, hats, jumpers).  
 
There were two types of questionnaires used for this 
study. The first was a ‘character questionnaire’ (see 
appendix 5b) which was given to the participants at the 
end of each improvisation. This gave participants 
approximately half a side of blank, A4 paper to describe, 
in as much detail as possible, their masked character. 
The second half of this character questionnaire asked 
participants to circle a number on eight different seven-
point Likert-type scales, to describe how strongly they 
                     
10
 The masks were designed in this way in an attempt to 
create ambiguous, ‘Rorschach-like’ masks. However, it is 
clear that the ‘faces’ of these masks are not ambiguous, 
and the possible effects of the mask’s appearance will be 
explored in the discussion. The reason for making both 
coloured and white masks was to see whether increasing 
the ambiguity of the masks (with the coloured masks 
considered more ambiguous) would alter their 
psychological effect. For the purposes of this re-
examination, however, the differences between the white 
and coloured masks will not be explored.  
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felt on the following items: ‘Self-conscious’, ‘Immersed 
in the character’, ‘Similar to normal waking 
consciousness’, ‘“Fixed” in the character’, 
‘Uninhibited’, ‘Detached from the character’, ‘Trance-
like’, ‘Difficult to stay “in character”’. The scales 
were anchored at ‘not at all’ (one) and ‘extremely’ 
(seven).   
 
The second questionnaire was a ‘subpersonality 
questionnaire’ (see appendix 5c), and asked participants 
to rate on a seven-point Likert-type scale the extent to 
which they felt that were expressing a subpersonality, 
from ‘Definitely not a subpersonality’ (one) to 
‘Definitely a subpersonality’ (seven). Participants were 
also asked to explain the reason for their response.  
5.2.4 Procedure 
After a brief introduction to the workshop (in which 
participants were told that it was a research workshop on 
the therapeutic application of masks), personal 
introductions, ‘ground rules’ (e.g. ‘Don’t do anything 
you don’t want to do’) and a brief ‘warm up’, 
participants were asked to enact four experimental 
improvisations: two of which were masked, and two, 
unmasked. This was counterbalanced, such that half the 
participants were wearing masks in the first and third 
improvisations, and half were wearing masks in the second 
and fourth improvisations. Furthermore, of those wearing 
masks in improvisations one and three, seven wore white 
masks in improvisation one and coloured masks in 
improvisation three, and six wore the white and coloured 
masks the other way around. A similar division occurred 
for those wearing masks in improvisations two and four. 
Hence, there were four different sequences (see table 
5.1), which led to a relatively counterbalanced design.  
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TABLE 5.1 
Experimental sequences 
 
Impro. 1 Impro. 2 Impro. 3 Impro. 4 
 
Sequence one  
(n = 7) 
white 
mask 
no mask coloured 
mask 
no mask 
Sequence two 
(n = 6) 
coloured 
mask 
no mask white 
mask 
no mask 
Sequence three 
(n = 7) 
no mask white 
mask 
no mask coloured 
mask 
Sequence four 
(n = 6) 
no mask coloured 
mask 
no mask white 
mask 
 
 
Each improvisation lasted approximately six minutes. In 
the masked improvisations, participants were randomly 
assigned one of the five coloured or five white masks, 
and then asked to look into it until they could identify 
a face. They were then asked to make their face into the 
shape of the ‘face’ they perceived in the mask, and put 
the mask on. In the non-masked condition, participants 
were simply asked to think of a character or a 
personality they might like to improvise. In both masked 
and non-masked conditions, participants were then asked 
to put their various body parts (feet, knees, hips, etc.) 
into the shape of the character, and then to turn around.  
 
Participants were then asked to spend some time exploring 
the room, and to ‘notice’ that some objects had been 
placed in the corner of the room. They were then asked to 
take one or more of the objects, and to use it/them in 
whatever way they desired.  
 
In improvisations one and two, participants were asked 
not to interact with the other mask-characters in the 
room. In improvisations three and four, these 
instructions were slightly modified. Participants were 
asked to also be aware of the other characters in the 
room, to find a partner, and to ‘show’ their object to 
that partner. They were then given an opportunity to 
interact more freely with the other characters and 
objects. After each improvisation, the participants were 
asked to spend about ten minutes completing the character 
questionnaire. At the end of all four improvisations, 
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participants were asked to complete the subpersonality 
questionnaire.  
 
Finally, participants were asked to come into the centre 
of the hall to form a circle, and a focused group 
interview (Merton, Fiske and Kendall, 1956), of around 
fifteen minutes duration, was conducted. The main 
question here was what differences the participants had 
experienced between the masked and non-masked conditions. 
Probes and follow-up questions were also used by the 
researcher. 
5.2.5 Method of Analysis 
5.2.5.1 Quantitative 
There was fifteen instances of missing data on the 
dependent measures. These were all given a midpoint value 
of four. Frequency charts showed an acceptably normal 
distribution of scores on all dependent variables. The 
quantitative data was therefore analysed using a repeated 
measures multivariate analysis of variance on version 
seven of SPSS. This had two within-participant factors: 
masking, and individual (first and second improvisation) 
versus interacting (third and fourth improvisation) 
conditions. One between-participants factor was also 
introduced into the analysis: sequence (sequence one 
versus sequence two versus sequence three versus sequence 
four).  
5.2.5.2 Qualitative 
Data from the qualitative interviews was transcribed by 
the researcher and then broken down into sentence-based 
text units. The text units were then coded using NUD•IST 
into the node hierarchy developed in the previous study 
(transcribed and coded group interview from the second 
experimental workshop [1/7/95] can be seen in appendix 
5d). Where appropriate, the nodal hierarchy was modified 
or new nodes were added. 
5.3  RESULTS 
5.3.1 Quantitative 
Multivariate tests using Wilk’s lambda found significant 
effects only for the individual (first and second 
improvisations) versus interacting (third and fourth 
improvisation) conditions (see table 5.2). A more 
detailed print-out of the SPSS analyses can be seen in 
appendix 5e. 
 
 
  
149 
 
TABLE 5.2 
Multivariate tests for between-participant and within-
participant variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
F 
 
Hyp. 
df 
 
 
Error 
df 
 
 
p 
 
Between-
participants 
    
 
Sequence 
 
2.00 
 
27 
 
41.53 
 
.29 
 
 
Within-participants 
    
 
Masking 
 
.97 
 
9 
 
14 
 
.50 
 
Masking  Sequence 
 
1.07 
 
27 
 
41.53 
 
.41 
 
I/I 
 
4.06 
 
9 
 
14 
 
.010 
 
I/I  Sequence 
 
.93 
 
27 
 
41.53 
 
.57 
 
Masking  I/I 
 
.74 
 
9 
 
14 
 
.67 
 
Masking  I/I  
Sequence 
 
 
.85 
 
27 
 
41.53 
 
.67 
 
Note: I/I = individual (first and second improvisations) 
versus interacting (third and fourth improvisation) 
conditions 
 
 
Univariate tests on the I/I factor found just one 
significant difference, with participants significantly 
more trance-like in the individual (first and second) 
improvisations, as compared with the interacting (third 
and fourth) improvisations (F[1, 22] = 18.21, p = 
.00031).  
 
For descriptive purposes, table 5.3 shows the mean scores 
and standard deviations for all the dependent measures in 
the masked and non-masked conditions. Table 5.4 presents 
a table of correlations for the dependent measures.  
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TABLE 5.3 
Mean scores and standard deviations on dependent measures 
 Masked Non-masked 
 
Measures 
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
Uninhibited 
 
 
4.48 
 
1.38 
 
4.25 
 
1.23 
Self-conscious 
 
2.65 1.29 2.69 1.26 
Immersed in the 
character  
 
4.46 1.41 4.46 1.21 
Detached from the 
character  
 
3.52 1.31 3.04 1.20 
Trance-like 
 
2.77 1.32 2.40 1.01 
Similar to normal 
waking 
consciousness 
 
3.15 1.13 3.44 1.40 
‘Fixed’ in the 
character  
 
4.35 1.17 4.12 1.41 
Difficult to stay 
‘in character’  
 
2.90 1.10 3.27 1.30 
 
Like a 
subpersonality 
 
4.96 1.16 5.27 1.20 
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TABLE 5.4 
Pearson correlations for dependent measures (n = 104) 
 
 
 
UNINH
IBIT. 
 
S-C 
 
IMM 
 
DET 
 
TR 
 
NORM 
 
FIXED 
 
DIFF 
 
Self-conscious 
 
 
-.38* 
       
Immersed in character 
 
.14 -.40*       
Detached from character  
 
-.08 .39* -.19      
Trance-like 
 
.14 -.09 -.08 -.15     
Similar to normal waking 
consciousness 
 
.14 .05 .02 .17 -.28*    
Fixed in character  
 
.23* -.21* .35 -.12 .12 -.11   
Difficult to stay ‘in 
character’ 
 
-.23* .46* -.48 .35* -.29* .23* -.45  
Expressing subpersonality 
 
.21* -.01 -.01 -.34* .06 .17 -.19 -.05 
 
Note: *p < 0.05. Exact p values can be seen in appendix 
5e. 
5.3.2 Qualitative 
A final table of nodes and the number of text units coded 
at each node can be seen in appendix 5f.  
5.3.2.1 Inhibition 
Overall, 35 text units, or nineteen percent of the text 
units in total, were coded under the node address of 
‘inhibition/reduced’. This includes participants who said 
that they felt ‘liberated’ when wearing the mask (2:23), 
more confident (2:29), or that it opened up ‘enormous 
possibilities’ (2:27) for them. It also includes 
participants who said that they felt more able to take 
risks when wearing the mask (1:2; 2:46) or that the mask 
gave them ‘license’ to do something (2:25). Other text 
units categorised under this title referred more 
specifically to the disinhibition of antisocial behaviour 
(1:86), with participants stating that they felt that the 
mask gave them permission to be ‘naughty’ or ‘rude’ 
(2:40), or that they found it easier to be horrible to 
somebody when wearing a mask (1:92). Finally, included 
under this category were text units in which participants 
said that the characters they enacted when wearing a mask 
were more ‘negative’ (1:6, 2:31), ‘darker’ (1:2), nastier 
(1:23), less rosy (2:34), or deeper (1:2; 1:48; 1:51), or 
that they felt safer playing more exaggerated characters 
(2:29). 
 
In terms of reasons why participants felt less inhibited 
in the masked condition, in three text units there was a 
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connection drawn between disinhibition and reduced 
identifiability. In only one of these, however, was this 
expressed as a direct causal relationship from latter to 
former: ‘A mask to hide behind, to bring out the negative 
sides of myself more’ (1:6). In contrast, text unit 2:29 
simply talks about anonymity and greater confidence as 
co-consequences of wearing a mask, and text units 2:91 to 
2:92 state that disguise is not the only reason why 
someone might choose to wear a mask if they were 
committing atrocities. Hence, in only one of these text 
units was a specific connection between reduced 
identifiability and reduced inhibitions made, and in all 
the role of reduced public self-awareness was somewhat 
unclear. 
 
Another reason for feeling greater license to be 
antisocial when wearing the mask, as given in two 
consecutive text units (2: 40-41), seemed to be that a 
mask restricts how much a wearer can see of those she is 
interacting with. Hence, because the other can not be 
seen as well, there may be a tendency to worry less about 
their well-being. The consequence of this is that it may 
be easier to then treat them in a more depersonalised 
manner.  
 
A third reason given in four of the text units as to why 
participants became less inhibited when wearing a mask 
was to do with the specific cues inherent in the mask. In 
three consecutive text units (2:31-33), this was to do 
with the mask as mask, per se; in that, when developing a 
character, the participant thought to himself, ‘“Well who 
would wear a disguise?”’ (2:31), and subsequently 
developed a character that was ‘a rather furtive 
suspicious person who was kind of snooping around’ 
(2:32). In text unit 1:2, a participant tied this down to 
the more specific appearance of the masks used in this 
study, saying that the development of darker and more 
riskier characters may partly have been due to the way 
that the mask looked.  
 
In contrast, fourteen text units, or around seven percent 
of the text units in total, were coded under the category 
‘inhibition/increased’. This included participants who 
said that, in the masked condition, they felt more 
inhibited (2:17), more restricted in their character-
development (2:38; 1:76-80), less free (1:52), more 
frustrated (1:34), or found it more difficult to interact 
in the way that they wanted to (2: 29-30). 
 
In terms of reasons why participants felt more inhibited 
when wearing a mask, three text units referred to the 
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difficulties that arose as a consequence of not being 
able to use facial expressions to communicate (2:29-30; 
1:34). Text units 2:29-30 also referred to the fact that, 
without the mask, communication was easier because there 
wasn’t a ‘wall’ between people.  
 
In ten of the text units coded under increased 
inhibition, this increased sense of restrictedness was 
related to a sense of the mask imposing (1:52) a 
particular inflexibility of character on to the mask-
wearer such that there wasn’t the freedom to develop or 
expand the character in a way that seemed desirable. One 
participant, for instance, talked about getting ‘pulled’ 
by something and wanting to laugh, but then feeling that 
that was out of character with the mask (1:77-78). The 
consequence was a feeling of then having to stop and ‘get 
back in to the “thingy”’ (1:74).  
 
Finally, one text unit (2:30) referred to the fact that 
the limited vision beneath the mask made it more 
difficult to ‘read the whole message that you’re getting’ 
from others, such that communication was impaired. 
 
Two text units specifically referred to the fact that 
participants felt neither more nor less inhibited when 
wearing a mask: ‘I was equally in to them with or without 
the mask --- some were nasty and some were nice’ (1:15), 
‘I didn’t feel able to break out... with or without the 
mask’ (1:108).  
 
With respect to levels of inhibition, the only 
intervening variable of interest that emerged, in two 
consecutive text units, was that one participant felt 
more able to be ‘horrible’ to those people who were 
wearing a mask because he, ‘couldn’t see what they felt 
really’ (1:93). ‘So when I was unmasked I could do things 
to people who had a mask, which I don’t think I did to 
people who didn’t have a mask on’ (1:94). 
5.3.2.2 Transformation 
Thirteen text units, or seven percent of the text units 
in total, were coded as expressing an increased 
experience of transformation in the masked conditions. 
This includes those text units in which participants said 
that they could ‘get into’ the characters more easily 
with a mask (1:2; 1:4; 2:20), that they experienced more 
license to be somebody when wearing a mask (2:25) (as 
opposed to more license, per se), or that the characters 
they enacted when wearing a mask were more extreme and 
less like themselves (1:7-13). It also includes two text 
units in which participants talked about ‘immediately’ 
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becoming a different sort of character (2:27) or 
‘immediately’ changing (2:52) when wearing the mask.  
 
Only one participant hinted at a reason for feeling a 
greater sense of transformation in the masked condition. 
This was based on the change in physical appearance. She 
said it was ‘As if somebody just said, “OK you can be 
this person now because you look like that”’. 
 
In contrast, nine text units, or five percent of the text 
units in total, were coded as expressing a reduced sense 
of transformation in the masked conditions. This included 
participants who said that, in the masked conditions, 
they couldn’t get into characters as well (1:33; 2:15), 
found it more difficult to stay in character (1:77; 
2:16), or more difficult to identify with the mask 
character (2:36). It also includes a text unit in which a 
participant said that she felt the characters in the mask 
were closest to herself (1:33). 
 
Two reasons were given for why participants experienced 
less of a sense of transformation when wearing the mask. 
In two consecutive text units, one participant described 
how there wasn’t ‘...much to grasp on to...’ (2:16) with 
the features of the mask, and this contrasted with the 
non-masked condition, in which she could choose to enact 
characters that she knew well.  
 
For another participant, the main reason why it was more 
difficult to remain in character when wearing the mask 
was because, as categorised under 
inhibition/increased/why?/character restricted, there was 
a sense of not being able to naturally develop the 
character because certain expressions or gestures were 
‘out of character with the mask’ (1:76-78). Indeed, in 
some respects, all those text units in which participants 
said that they felt more inhibited in the development of 
their character when masked could have been categorised 
here under transformation/reduced/why?/character 
restricted. However, apart from in the case of text units 
1:76-78, participants were not generally saying that, in 
the masked conditions, they felt less transformed, but 
that they felt less transformed in the direction that 
they wanted to be transformed, and more transformed in 
the direction that they did not want to be transformed. 
Indeed, in some of these cases it may have been 
appropriate to actually code these text units under 
greater transformation, where participants, for instance, 
were saying that they felt the mask ‘imposed’ a character 
on them (2:52), or that they ‘couldn’t’ move out of the 
character of the mask (1:73).  
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Other text units coded under ‘transformation’ were more 
related to the specific masks that the participants were 
wearing, and the difficulties that the participants had 
finding characters in these masks. These can be seen in 
appendix 5f. 
5.3.3.3 Other Findings 
Of the 37 text units coded under miscellaneous, 34 were 
coded under the node of ‘expressing self-aspects’. 
However, no text units were coded as saying either that 
there was an increased or decreased expression of 
subpersonalities in the masked conditions. However, 
participants did talk about the kinds of subpersonalities 
expressed. In three separate text units, participants 
talked about the mask bringing out more ‘negative’ (1:6; 
2:31) or less ‘acceptable’ (1:39) sides. In seven text 
units, participants said that the parts of themselves 
expressed in the masked condition were ‘deeper’ (1:51) --
- i.e. parts they were not very ‘in touch with’ (1:39). 
In comparison, those aspects of themselves expressed in 
the non-masked conditions were described as being more 
‘superficial’ (1:48) --- such as ‘personas’ (1:48) and 
possible selves (1:50) --- parts that were quite close to 
themselves (1:7), or parts of themselves that they ‘could 
see’ (1:38). Finally, in two consecutive text units, one 
participant talked about expressing a ‘mask’ 
subpersonality in the masked condition:  
 
It may be that some of us have a subpersonality that 
is about wearing a mask, so that when you talk about 
being alienated or cut off from people, then that 
might be actually a character to explore... the part 
of you that feels anonymous and you can go to a big 
gig or something and behave how you want --- that 
there might be an anonymous character in itself. 
(2:53-54) 
 
The other text units coded under ‘expressing aspects of 
Self’ were primarily related to the difficulties 
participants had in responding to the questions about 
subpersonalities (see appendix 5f), such as what was and 
what wasn’t a ‘subpersonality’.  
5.4  DISCUSSION 
5.4.1 Hypothesis one: If an individual has a desire 
to behave in a particular way, but inhibits that 
behaviour out of a concern for mask-able facets of their 
public self, then the wearing of a mask, under conditions 
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in which it reduces those concerns, can be predicted to 
have a disinhibiting effect. However, if an individual 
wishes to behave in a way for which they ‘require’ mask-
able facets of their public self, then the wearing of a 
mask can be predicted to have an inhibiting effect 
As with the study in chapter four, the qualitative data 
from this study clearly indicates that a mask can serve 
to both inhibit and disinhibit its wearer. At a 
descriptive level, the quantitative data from this study 
also suggests that the wearing of a mask does not bring 
about an overall disinhibiting effect. Rather, it has the 
potential to both inhibit and disinhibit its wearer. 
Given that this study was conducted in a workshop 
setting, one that is closer to a ‘real world’ mask-
wearing environment than the setting of the chapter four 
study, the findings from this study enhance the 
ecological validity of the chapter four findings.  
 
From the qualitative data, it is not entirely clear why 
several participants felt less inhibited when wearing a 
mask. As with the chapter four study, reduced 
identifiability does not seem to have been a major 
factor. Most likely, this was because mask-wearing 
participants knew that others could easily identify them, 
either because those others had seen them prior to 
putting on the mask, or because those others could 
identify them once their masks had been taken off. Hence, 
identifiability was not particularly dependent on 
immediate facial recognition. Again, however, this 
finding does raise the question of how much of a 
disinhibiting effect masked anonymity is likely to have 
in a ‘real world’ situation. If masked participants in 
the present setting experienced little anonymity-based 
disinhibition, it seems unlikely that individuals in a 
therapy or drama group would experience that much more, 
unless the situation was very specifically contrived for 
this purpose (e.g. participants were not allowed to meet 
before wearing masks).  
 
Contrary to the findings of chapter four, a reduction in 
public self-awareness did not seem to be a particularly 
prevalent reason why participants in the present study 
felt less inhibited. This was probably because the design 
of the workshop --- particularly in the non-interacting 
conditions --- did not invoke in the participants a 
concern with mask-able aspects of their face. In contrast 
to the study in chapter four, where the participants were 
acutely aware that people were looking at their facial 
expressions, facial awkwardnesses, etc., participants in 
the present study were frequently acting alone, and 
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therefore had less reason to concern themselves with how 
their faces might look. The fact that mean ratings across 
the conditions for ‘self-conscious’ was only 2.67 on a 
seven-point scale somewhat supports this interpretation.  
 
However, this raises the question of how ecologically 
valid the findings from the previous study are likely to 
be. If an individual is not particularly concerned with 
mask-able aspects of their face in the present setting, 
how concerned are they likely to be in a carnival 
context, or in a therapy group? As suggested in section 
4.4.2, it seems likely that this concern with mask-able 
aspects of the face --- and its subsequent reduction 
through the wearing of a mask --- will only come about in 
quite specific circumstances. Again, questionnaire 
research of the kind discussed in that section would be a 
very useful means of identifying exactly the kinds of 
situations in which the mask might be expected to recued 
public self concerns.  
 
One of the most interesting things that emerged from the 
qualitative data was two further reasons as to why a mask 
might disinhibit its wearer, neither of which were to do 
with a reduction in public self-awareness. The first of 
these seemed to be that, because the mask-wearer could 
not see others so well through the mask’s eye-holes, it 
was easier to treat the other in a more depersonalised 
way. To explore this further, it might be very 
interesting to compare the effects of small-eye holed 
masks and large eye-holed masks on how prepared 
individuals would be to behave in a way contrary to their 
public self ideal (a study which would, of course, raise 
numerous ethical problems).  
 
The other reason given why the mask might disinhibit its 
wearer was because the wearer might use the wearing of a 
mask itself as a character-cue, and hence develop a 
‘disguise-wearing’ character. This might be a furtive, 
snooping and somewhat anti-social character, as one of 
the participants in the present study developed; but it 
might also be the kind of character that has a love of 
danger: for instance, someone like the Lone Ranger, 
Batman or Zorro. This disinhibition-pathway is 
particularly interesting because it suggests that the 
relationship between the experience of wearing a mask and 
the social representations of wearing a mask is not just 
uni-directional but bi-directional. That is, cultural 
representations of who wears a mask, or what it is like 
to wear a mask, may somewhat determine how individuals 
respond to the experience of mask-wearing.  
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In terms of disinhibition, it was also interesting to 
note that one of the non-masked participants talked about 
finding it easier to be ‘horrible’ to those people 
wearing a mask because he couldn’t see their faces. This 
raises the possibility that the mask-wearer may become 
less inhibited as part of an on-going intersubjective 
dialectic: they are treated by others in a less inhibited 
manner, and therefore behave to others with less 
reservations. Indeed, at an anecdotal level, it is 
tempting to suggest that such a process may be an 
important factor in the disinhibition of mask-wearers in 
ritual, carnival and fiesta contexts. There, mask-wearers 
do not act alone, they are always fundamentally in 
relation to a non-masked audience, and the relation of 
the audience to the mask-wearer is frequently one of 
goading, teasing, laughing, ridiculing, or hostility 
(see, for instance, Mead, 1970). Hence, it would be very 
interesting to look at how people view individuals 
wearing a mask. Do they find it easier to be ‘nasty’ to 
them because they can’t see how they are feeling? If so, 
then this may have substantial implications for how an 
individual experiences wearing a mask.  
 
In terms of disinhibition, it also seems likely that this 
was partly brought about by the specific appearance of 
the mask that the participants were asked to wear. It is 
easy to see how ‘darker’, ‘nastier’, ‘ruder’ or ‘less 
rosy’ characters may have emerged as a direct response to 
the fragmented, disfigured, alien appearances of the 
masks. On the other hand, one could not go so far as to 
say that all the responses coded under inhibition/reduced 
can be attributed to the mask’s appearance: for instance, 
it is difficult to see how feelings of ‘greater 
confidence’, ‘liberation’ or enormous possibilities could 
be attributed to these particular appearances.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the clear design faults in this 
study is that the act of looking at a mask was confounded 
with the act of wearing a mask, such that it is not clear 
whether the effects are due to the actual wearing of the 
mask, or whether they are due to the different ways in 
which participants were asked to ‘find’ a character. In 
future studies looking at the effects of wearing a mask, 
therefore, it would seem essential that the only 
difference between experimental and control groups is 
that the former wear a mask whilst the latter do not. In 
the present study, this means that a much more 
appropriate control condition would have been to have the 
participants look at the same masks, find a character in 
the mask, but then not wear it.  
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In terms of the mask’s ability to inhibit its wearer, the 
findings from this study triangulate well with the 
findings from the previous study, that if an individual 
wishes to behave in a way for which they ‘require’ mask-
able facets of their public self, then the wearing of a 
mask can be predicted to have an inhibiting effect. As 
with the previous study, one of the main reasons why this 
seems to have occurred was because it interfered with 
participants’ ability to communicate through their face. 
The sense of having a ‘wall’ between self and others also 
emerged as one of the main reasons why the wearing of a 
mask was experienced as inhibiting. One of the 
participants also said that the limited vision beneath 
the mask made it more difficult to read what others were 
saying or gesturing.  
 
However, in contrast to the chapter four study, the most 
frequent reason that participants gave in the present 
study for feeling more inhibited in the masked condition 
was because it stopped them using their face to develop 
their characters in the way they wanted to. That is, they 
wanted to smile or laugh or make some facial expression, 
but were inhibited from doing so because it was 
incongruent with their ‘face’. This finding is of some 
relevance in terms of the use of masks in drama. As can 
be seen in section 2.1, drama teachers like Appel (1982) 
often talk about the way in which the mask can liberate 
their students, but what is less frequently mentioned is 
the possibility that the wearing of a mask can also 
inhibit their students from developing their characters 
in the way that they want to: specifically when that 
character requires particular facial expressions that are 
incongruent with the mask. 
5.4.2 Transformation 
The qualitative findings from this study suggest that the 
wearing of a mask has the potential to both increase and 
decrease the extent to which an individual feels 
transformed into another character. This is somewhat 
corroborated by the quantitative data which, at a 
descriptive level, shows that there is no overall 
increases in feeling fixed or immersed in a character 
when wearing a mask, and no overall decreases in feelings 
of detachment from the character or difficulty staying in 
character. 
 
However, because the experimental and control conditions 
differed on more than just the wearing or not wearing of 
a mask, it is very difficult to infer from these findings 
what the transformative effects of wearing a mask, per 
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se, might be. It may have been, for instance, that 
participants found it easier to develop into a character 
in the non-masked condition because they could think of 
any character they wanted to, as opposed to having to 
‘find’ a character in the somewhat fragmented and 
disfigured masks. Certainly, a number of participants 
said that they found it very difficult to find a 
character in the masks used in this study (see appendix 
5f). Again, then, for future studies along these lines, 
it would seem essential that a control condition is one 
in which an individual has to find a character in a mask, 
but then does not wear the mask.  
 
Furthermore, in the present study, both the qualitative 
and the quantitative measures assessed the extent to 
which an individual felt transformed into a character, 
which may not be the best means of assessing the 
transformative effect of wearing a mask. This is because, 
as was found in the present study, if an individual very 
much wants to develop one character, but the mask is 
pulling them in another direction, then the net effect of 
wearing a mask might be to reduce the desired 
transformation, even though the mask is actually having a 
very strong transformative effect of its own. In this 
respect, in future studies, it might be more informative 
to ask people, ‘How much they feel transformed in the 
direction represented by the mask’, rather than how much 
they feel transformed, per se. This should give a better 
indication of how much a mask ‘pulls’ its wearer in a 
particular direction, and avoid a confusion between the 
transformation that the mask-wearer desires, and the 
transformation that the mask actually brings about.  
5.4.3 Other Findings 
From both the qualitative and quantitative data, there 
was no support for the hypothesis that the mask 
facilitates the expression of aspects of its wearer’s 
Self. Participants did talk about the mask bringing out 
different aspects of the Self, but apart from ‘deeper’ 
aspects and ‘anonymous’ aspects, this can be accounted 
for in terms of the particular appearances of the masks 
that were worn. Furthermore, from the qualitative 
responses, it was evident that asking questions about 
subpersonalities raised a number of fundamental 
methodological and epistemological difficulties --- such 
as what is, and what isn’t, a ‘subpersonality’ --- 
problems that would need to be overcome before further 
research into this aspect of the mask’s psychological 
effect was examined. 
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5.4.4 General Methodological Issues 
With respect to internal validity, there was no attempt 
at the time of conducting this study to assess, or 
minimise, the possible impact of demand characteristics 
or experimenter-expectancy effects. The latter may have 
been particularly problematic, given that a number of the 
participants knew the researcher, and that it was the 
researcher who conducted both of the workshops. Given, 
however, that the primary agenda at the time of 
conducting the study was to explore whether the wearing 
of a mask facilitated the expression of subpersonalities, 
it seems unlikely that the findings regarding 
inhibition/disinhibition and transformation were 
particularly influenced by these experimental artefacts. 
 
With respect to diachronic reliability, the findings in 
this study triangulate relatively well with the findings 
from the study in chapter four, particularly in relation 
to the issue of when participants might feel inhibited 
when wearing a mask. The findings from this study also 
suggest that the nodal hierarchy developed in chapter 
four has a degree of situational generalisability, and is 
a framework that could be extended beyond these two 
particular studies.  
 
On reflection, there are numerous ways in which this 
study could have been improved methodologically. First, 
as already stated, the control condition could have been 
more exactly matched to the experimental condition: 
participants could have been asked to find a character in 
the mask, but then not wear it. Second, the effects of 
wearing a mask in individual and interacting conditions 
could have been isolated from order effects, perhaps by 
randomising when participants were asked to act alone, 
and when with others. Third, given the highly interactive 
nature of facilitating this workshop, it would have been 
much better if it had been run by someone other than the 
researcher; or, if the researcher had facilitated it, it 
would have been an idea to have a co-researcher give out 
the questionnaires and conduct the interviews. Fourth, 
the dependent measures should have been much more 
specific to the hypotheses being tested. There are a 
number of items that it would have been very interesting 
to introduce into the character questionnaire, such as 
measures of identifiability, public self-awareness, and 
the extent to which the participants felt ‘transformed 
into the character represented by the mask’, and it was 
unfortunate that these items were not used. In terms of 
the focused interviews, it would have been an idea to 
record which participants said what, so that the numbers 
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of participants coded at each node could have been 
assessed. Also, given the richness of material that 
emerged from these interviews, they could have been much 
longer, and with a more structured series of questions.  
 
With respect to catalytic validity, there was a somewhat 
mixed response from participants at these workshops. To 
some extent, there was a sense that some participants got 
a bit bored or frustrated having to do similar 
improvisations four times. Also, there was a sense in 
which many of the participants did not find the 
‘ambiguous’ masks particularly stimulating or 
interesting, because they were so difficult to see a 
character in. At the same time, quite a few participants 
found the workshops useful, interesting and memorable, in 
that it helped them identify new ‘aspects’ of themselves 
(both in the masked and non-masked conditions), and that 
they had developed some understanding of what it was like 
to work with masks. 
5.5  SUMMARY 
The findings from this study triangulate relatively well 
with the findings from the previous study, and replicate 
the finding that individuals can feel both disinhibited 
and inhibited when wearing a mask. In terms of reduced 
inhibition, there was little evidence to suggest that 
this was a consequence of reduced concerns with facets of 
the public self. However, this was probably more a 
failure of the experimental design to adequately test 
this hypothesis than a failure of the hypothesis itself. 
Three other reasons, though, did emerge as to why an 
individual might feel more disinhibited when wearing a 
mask. First, she may see others less easily and therefore 
find it easier to treat them in a depersonalised way. 
Second, she may develop a less inhibited character on the 
basis of thinking, ‘Well, what kind of person would wear 
a mask’. Third, she may behave in a more disinhibited way 
as a reaction to her observers behaving towards her with 
less inhibitions.  
 
In terms of increased inhibition, these studies support 
the prediction that this is likely to occur if an 
individual wishes to behave in a way for which she 
requires mask-able facets of her public self. As well as 
requiring these facets for communication, however, this 
study has also found that these facets may be required 
for the development of a dramatic character.  
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Finally, this study suggests that the mask may be able to 
both increase and decrease the extent to which its wearer 
is transformed into a character. However, to effectively 
test the transformative effect of wearing a mask, per se, 
it would seem necessary to look at how much the mask 
transforms its wearer in the direction represented by the 
mask.  
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CHAPTER SIX: TRANSFORMATION AND SELF-PERCEPTION 
6.1 TRANSFORMATION 
As the review in chapter two indicates, along with 
disinhibition, the most frequently hypothesised 
psychological effect of a mask is that it ‘transforms’ 
its wearer. This chapter will examine the empirical 
evidence in support of this general hypothesis, and then 
go on to look in more detail at one particular mechanism 
by which it has been hypothesised that this 
transformative effect comes about. This is the 
hypothesis, outlined in 2.2.1, that a mask transforms its 
wearer psychologically because it transforms the way in 
which she perceives herself physically.  
6.1.1 Direct Empirical Support 
What empirical evidence is there that the wearer of a 
mask experiences some form of transformation? As Honigman 
(1977) notes, very little. He writes, ‘Few psychologists 
or anthropologists have gone far into the psychological 
concomitants of facial disguises with the result that 
evidence supporting the claim that masks act on the sense 
of personal identity is scarce and largely indirect’ 
(p.273). This scarce and indirect evidence tends to fall 
into two camps.  
 
The first of these is observational data, presented by 
such authors as Caillois (1962) and Honigman (1977), 
which is used to suggest that masked individuals 
experience some form of behavioural or dispositional 
transformation. Napier (1986) also states that, ‘The 
ethnographic literature is filled with instances...of 
people “actually becoming” the spirits, the dead, or 
whatever the mask was meant to give life to’ (p.27).  
 
However, such observational data --- anecdotal and 
unsystematic as it is --- encounters many of the same 
difficulties as the ethnographic data used to support the 
hypothesis that the mask disinhibits its wearer. First, 
one must be extremely cautious in attempting to interpret 
non-western phenomenon in terms of western discourses. 
Second, observational data can only inform the theorist 
about the mask-wearer’s behaviour, and not aspects of his 
private self such as affect or self-concept. Third, 
anecdotal observation of behaviour under one mask can not 
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legitimately be generalised to all masks. Fourth, and 
perhaps most importantly, a co-variance between the 
presence of a mask and the phenomenon of transformation 
can not be taken to imply a causal relationship from the 
former to the latter both due to the third factor 
problem, and the problem of establishing the direction of 
causality.  
 
A second line of empirical evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that the mask transforms its wearer, however, 
would seem somewhat more valid. These are 
phenomenological self-reports, in which the mask-wearers 
themselves describe a subjective sense of transformation 
when wearing a mask. Honigman (1977), for instance, 
quotes a Trinidadian masquerader who states that, when 
masked, he becomes, ‘“a different being entirely”’ 
(p.273); and details a similar level of subjectively-
experienced transformation in a Hopi Indian. Ray and Shaw 
(1987) also present an account of subjectively-
experienced transformation as a consequence of wearing a 
mask. This is by John Nwamba, bearer of the Onumonu 
Ezeugwuorie mask during the 1984 Nsukka Igbo masquerade:  
 
If I carry it [i.e. wear the mask], what I see other 
people do not see. And the character I display, other 
people do not, because if a gallon of palm wine is 
brought and put into my mouth, I can finish it, and 
another person cannot. And if you bring a tin of oil; 
I can take it and drink it, and another person cannot 
drink it. And there is nothing it will do to me. That 
is how I am different when I am in it. I understand 
people differently because when I look at them, my 
eyes will be spirit eyes (enya ma), not like people’s 
eyes (enya mmadu). (p.659) 
 
Phenomenological self-reports from western mask-wearers -
-- using the masks primarily in a dramatic context --- 
also demonstrate a possible link between mask-wearing and 
transformation. Johnson (1980) reports his wife, for 
instance, as stating: 
 
I get very high on Mask work --- it’s like stepping 
out of my skin and experiencing something much more 
fluid and dynamic --- sometimes when the Mask is 
turned on there is a part of me sitting in a distant 
corner of my mind that watches and notices changed 
body sensations, emotions, etc. But it’s very 
passive, this watcher --- does nothing that 
criticises or interferes --- and sometimes its not 
there at all. Then it’s like the “I” blanks out and 
“something else” steps in and experiences. (p.175) 
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Such phenomenological self-reports have the advantage 
over observational data in that a clearer link is being 
made --- and by the mask-wearers themselves --- between 
the act of wearing a mask and a particular 
transformation. These self-reports also give a clearer 
insight into subjectively-experienced transformation, as 
opposed to changes at the purely behavioural level. The 
problem with these self-reports, however, is that they 
are still effectively correlational. Johnson’s wife, for 
instance, states that it is the Mask-work --- which 
includes many other activities apart from the wearing of 
a mask --- which gives her a sense of stepping out of her 
skin. Hence, such self-reports can not be used to support 
the hypothesis that the wearing of a mask brings about a 
transformation, because the transformation may be due to 
a third variable, or the experience of transformation may 
necessitate the wearing of a mask. In addition, such 
self-reports have the problem of generalisability: both 
from one mask to masks in general, and from one person to 
the population as a whole.  
 
Whilst these self-reports demonstrate, therefore, that an 
individual may feel transformed when wearing a particular 
mask, they do not really show that it is the wearing of a 
mask which is responsible for this felt-transformation. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence for this at present is the 
findings from the previous studies in this thesis, 
particularly the study in chapter four, which showed that 
around ten percent of a sample of individuals did report 
a subjectively-experienced loss of identity as a direct 
result of wearing a mask.  
 
Furthermore, there are a number of studies in the 
psychological literature which show that masking-like 
changes in appearance can bring about changes at a 
subjectively-experienced level. This chapter will now 
review these studies. 
6.1.2 Facial Coverings 
Perhaps the phenomenon that is closest to that of wearing 
a mask is the covering of the face with such non-mask 
objects as spectacles, monocles, eye-patches, beards, 
moustaches, tattoos, make-up and face-paints. 
Structurally, this process of facial covering is similar 
to that of wearing a mask, differing only in the fact 
that these objects either cover a smaller area of the 
face, or that they are worn on the face rather than over 
the face. With respect to the first of these differences, 
one might therefore infer that, whatever the effect of 
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wearing these objects is, the effect of wearing a mask is 
going to be similar but magnified. With respect to the 
second difference, given that the ‘wearing’ of these 
objects, like that of the mask, is unlikely to involve 
major physiological processes (apart from at the time of 
application), there is unlikely to be a great deal of 
difference between the psychological effect of wearing 
something over the face versus the psychological effect 
of wearing something on the face. 
 
Perhaps the most empirically rigorous and relevant study 
is by Kellerman and Laird (1982), investigating the 
psychological effects of spectacle-wearing. Under the 
cover story of testing the perceptual effects of a new 
plastic, the experimenters asked participants to complete 
two simple tasks in front of a mirror, either wearing or 
not wearing a pair of spectacles containing clear, non-
corrective lenses. In actuality, participants did no 
better at the tasks in the spectacle-wearing condition 
than in the non-spectacle wearing condition. However, in 
the former condition, Kellerman and Laird found that 
participants rated their performance as superior; and 
also rated themselves as more stable, competent, 
scholarly, humorous, rigid and less seductive. Kellerman 
and Laird argue that these changes in self-perception 
that the wearing of spectacles brought about are 
veridical to cultural conceptions of spectacle-wearers: 
i.e. that they are more intelligent (Argyle and McHenry, 
1971), industrious and honest (e.g. Manz and Luek, 1968).  
 
This finding may have substantial implications for the 
possible psychological effects of wearing a mask. 
However, there are a number of reasons why the findings 
from this study must be treated with some caution.  
 
First, there is a methodological weakness in this study, 
in that participants in the experimental condition --- 
but not in the control condition --- were told that the 
spectacles might interfere with their performance. This 
was a means of attempting to compensate for any possible 
demand characteristics that might have arisen through the 
wearing of the spectacles. However, there is a small 
possibility that it may have produced a reactance effect: 
in that participants in the experimental condition may 
have said that they did better as a means of compensating 
for the expected interference.  
 
Second, in terms of ecological validity, it is important 
to note that participants in this study were sitting 
directly in front of a mirror, and therefore were acutely 
aware of their transformed appearance. This means that 
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the findings from this study can not really be 
generalised out to all spectacle- or mask-wearing 
contexts, because often the wearer will not be 
particularly aware of how they look.  
 
Third, the results from this study show that only some 
individuals respond to this experimental manipulation. 
Kellerman and Laird (1982) hypothesised, and found, that 
this transformation in self-perception only held for 
participants who were more responsive to ‘self-produced 
cues’. These are cues that, ‘arise from the individual’s 
own actions and personal properties, including visceral 
responses, expressive behaviours, overt actions, and the 
consequences of those actions’ (p.298). On the other 
hand, participants who were more responsive to 
‘situationally produced cues’ --- ‘normative or 
conventional definitions of how most people will or 
should feel, believe, and so on, in that particular 
situation’ (p.298) --- were found to be either unaffected 
by the glasses or showed an opposite reaction. 
 
Some support for the findings of Kellerman and Laird 
(1982) comes from two other studies. Terry (1990) found 
that long-term spectacle-wearers considered themselves 
less affectionate, brave, domineering, or stubborn than 
either contact-lens wearers, or a visually non-corrected 
control group. Again, this suggests that facial coverings 
may affect the way an individual perceives themselves, 
though the correlational nature of these findings means 
that the results are more open to interpretation. 
Adopting a more experimental design, Gording and Match 
(1968) found that 70% of patients showed a ‘positive 
change’ --- on the House-Tree-Person projective test --- 
when switching from spectacles to contact lenses. 
However, because no control group was employed in this 
study, there may be numerous other explanations for this 
change in a positive direction.  
 
A more carefully controlled study was conducted by Wood 
(1986), who looked at the psychological effects of 
wearing a beard. Twenty male participants were given a 
coloured theatrical beard to wear, twenty male 
participants were given a black bandanna ‘outlaw-style’ 
to wear, and twenty male participants did not have their 
faces manipulated in any way. All participants were then 
asked to look at themselves in a mirror for one minute, 
and then to complete a Bem’s sex-role inventory. Based on 
the reported finding that, ‘Men tend to perceive a beard 
as adding power, maturity and emotional distance to the 
wearer’ (p.769), Wood hypothesised that the bearded men 
would perceive themselves as more masculine that the 
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control group. This prediction was confirmed by his 
findings. Moreover, to show that this increase was not 
the result of the beard acting as a disguise, Wood 
pointed to the fact that there was no significant 
difference between the bandanna and control groups.  
 
Such results, like the findings of Kellerman and Laird 
(1982), suggest that a mask-like facial covering may 
transform an individual’ sense of self. However, there 
are three limitations to this study. First, Wood (1986) 
does not develop a strategy for identifying the possible 
role of demand characteristics. Hence, it may be that 
participants wearing the beard were simply more aware of 
the aims of the study, and therefore tended towards 
confirming the experimental hypothesis in their 
responses. Second, as with Kellerman and Laird, there is 
the problem of ecological validity. Bearded men are 
unlikely to spend large amounts of time in front of a 
mirror looking at themselves, and therefore the results 
may be highly situation-specific. Third, the finding that 
the bandanna-wearing participants did not rate themselves 
as more masculine than the control participants somewhat 
questions the hypothesis that a mask can transform its 
wearer. Assuming the outlaw-style bandanna had a somewhat 
macho appearance, then it should have also transformed 
the wearers’ self-perceptions in the masculine direction. 
Why it didn’t is difficult to explain.  
 
Along with spectacles and beards, there is also some 
evidence that the wearing of make-up can transform how an 
individual feels about themselves. Graham and Klingman 
(1985) found that elderly subjects, after a one-hour 
make-over, rated themselves as more socially confident 
and having a more positive outlook on life. 
Unfortunately, without a comparable control group who 
experienced equal levels of attention without being made 
up, and with the problem of demand characteristics, these 
findings are difficult to interpret. However, Jouhar and 
Graham (1985) found that female subjects across an 18-60 
age range would frequently and directly express such 
statements as, ‘I feel more confident with make-up on’, 
or ‘I feel better about myself with make-up on’.  
 
Each of the studies discussed in this section have their 
limitations. Triangulated together, however, they do seem 
to provide some strong support for the hypothesis that 
wearing a mask-like object over one’s face can bring 
about a change in one’s self-perception. This is 
provided, however, that the individual is very aware of 
how their face is looking. Also, there is some evidence 
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to suggest that some individuals may be more responsive 
to this change in facial appearance than others.  
6.1.3 Transformations of the Face Which do not 
Directly Involve Physiological Feedback 
Covering the face with non-mask objects is, perhaps, the 
closest one can get to the phenomenon of masking. 
However, transformations of the face which do not 
directly involve immediate physiological feedback --- 
such as facial disfigurements --- also share a central 
feature of masking. This is, that the face --- or part of 
it --- is changed and replaced by another face. 
Furthermore, unlike facial coverings, these 
transformations do not, by definition, involve less of 
the face than a mask.  
 
In looking at these changes, however, one has to be more 
cautious in extrapolating to masks than with facial 
coverings. This is because the individual’s face is not 
just replaced by a face-like object, but is replaced by 
the individual’s actual face. This means that the 
individual may be much more identified with their new 
‘face’ than they would be with a mask. Also, the face is 
likely to have the appearance of a real face, which may 
make its effect very different to that of an artificial 
mask. 
 
One source of data which shows the effects of facial 
transformation (which do not involve immediate 
physiological feedback) comes from self-reports of 
individuals who have directly experienced facial 
disfiguration. Partridge (1990, 1991, 1993) --- who 
suffered severe burns and extensive reconstructive 
surgery around the age of twenty --- is one of the most 
widely published authors. He states that facial 
disfiguration can bring about ‘inner scars’, changing the 
way an individual feels about themselves, severely 
denting their self-esteem, and threatening their sense of 
self-worth, self-respect and self-liking (1993).  
 
Partridge (1990) clearly relates this ‘inner scarring’ to 
the effects of seeing one’s facial appearance 
transformed. On seeing one’s new face for the first time 
in a mirror, he writes, ‘It is at once a shattering, 
awful, sad second. You will be horrified. It will take 
your breath away. It will send a shiver down your spine’ 
(1990, p.12). Partridge (1993) also notes that surgery 
which reduces the level of facial deformity can have 
dramatic effects on the way the individual feels about 
herself.  
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It might be argued that the experience of wearing a mask 
will be fundamentally different to the experience of 
‘facial transformation’ that Partridge and others have 
experienced, on the grounds that, when wearing a mask, 
one knows that one’s real face is still the same. 
However, one case of facial transformation without 
immediate physiological feedback, in which the ‘wearer’ 
knew that the new face was not ‘his’, is that of John 
Howard Griffin, author of Black Like Me (1961). Griffin, 
a white American journalist, decided to get a truly 
‘inside’ understanding of racism by temporarily 
‘becoming’ a black man himself. He did this through weeks 
of ultra-violet treatment and pigmentation medication. On 
seeing his new ‘face’ for the first time in a mirror, 
Griffin, like Patridge, experienced a marked 
transformation in the way that he saw himself.  
 
In the flood of light against white tile, the face 
and the shoulders of the stranger --- a fierce, bald, 
very dark negro --- glared at me from the glass. He 
in no way resembled me. 
 
The transformation was total and shocking. I had 
expected to see myself disguised but this was 
something else. I was imprisoned in the flesh of an 
utter stranger, an unsympathetic one with whom I felt 
no kinship. All traces of the John Griffin I had been 
were wiped from existence. 
 
Even the senses underwent a change so profound it 
filled me with distress.... 
 
The completeness of this transformation appalled me. 
It was unlike anything I had imagined. I became two 
men, the observing one and the one who panicked, who 
felt negroid even into the depths of his entrails. 
(pp.15-16) 
 
This data suggests that alterations of an individual’s 
facial appearance which do not involve immediate 
physiological feedback have the potential to evoke fairly 
substantial changes in self-perception. This provides 
some further support for the prediction that a mask may 
be able to transform its wearer’s self-perception. 
However, as in the previous section, the strongest 
evidence for this effect (from Partridge [1990] and 
Griffin [1961]) occurs in a context in which the 
individual is directly looking at their transformed 
appearance in a mirror. Again, therefore, there is the 
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question of how far these findings would generalise to a 
more everyday context. 
6.1.4 Clothes 
A third body of psychological research that relates to 
the potential transformational effect of wearing a mask 
is research into the psychological effects of wearing 
clothes. This is a phenomenon which a number of the 
theorists discussed in chapter two (e.g. Eliade, 1964; 
Osbourne, 1971) have closely associated with masking. 
Osbourne, for instance, says that the transformation 
experienced by an individual wearing a mask is like the 
transformation experienced by a judge when he puts on his 
wig, a policeman his uniform, or a soldier his gas mask 
and rifle. Like masking, clothing involves the covering 
of the physical form with an ‘artificial’ object in a way 
that does not invoke direct physiological feedback.  
 
Unlike the wearing of a mask, however, clothing covers 
the body rather than the face and covers a greater area 
of the individual’s physical form. With respect to the 
first, and perhaps most obvious, of these differences, 
there seems no reason to suggest that something placed 
over the body is likely to have a qualitatively different 
impact from something placed over the face. Indeed, given 
that the latter may be a more concentrated focal point 
for psychological expression and communication, it would 
seem possible that facial coverings will have a greater 
psychological effect than bodily ones. With respect to 
the second difference, the greater area of body covered 
by clothes might mean that it would have a greater effect 
than the mask, but this would be a quantitative 
difference rather than a qualitative one.  
 
There is, however, a third difference between the wearing 
of a mask and the wearing of clothes. This is that an 
individual is much more likely to be aware of the 
appearance of the clothes that she is wearing. She can 
look down at her trousers or she might catch sight of the 
colour of her sleeves, in a way that many individuals 
wearing a mask will not be able to do. Hence, if it is 
shown that clothes do affect how an individual feels, it 
may be, again, that this can only be related to 
situations in which an individual is aware of the 
appearance of their mask. In situations in which an 
individual is wearing a mask but is not focused on its 
appearance, then this might be quite different to the 
wearing of particular clothes.  
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Clear evidence for the transformational effects of 
wearing particular clothes --- at least for some 
individuals --- comes from a number of questionnaire 
studies. The first of these, by Ryan (1953) asked 1480 
young students a number of questions regarding their 
relationship to clothing. Of her sample, 641 said that 
their mood was influenced by the colour, texture, or type 
of costume they were wearing, compared with 330 who said 
it wasn’t. Moreover, the mood-transforming effect of 
clothing was related to the specifics of the clothing 
worn: e.g. ‘Dressy clothes, dark clothes, and black were 
mentioned as contributing to feeling sophisticated, or 
lady-like’ (p.20); bright colours, full skirts and 
taffetas tended to contribute to a feeling of gaiety; 
whilst for some of the women, dull or unsaturated colours 
led to feelings of depression or sadness. Quotes from the 
young womens’ questionnaires confirm the finding that the 
direction of ‘causation’ is very much from clothes to 
mood: e.g. ‘Bright colours give me a definite lift’ 
(p.20), ‘Pink and feminine things make me feel young and 
sweet’ (p.21), ‘My white net strapless formal makes me 
feel like a princess’ (p.21) (underline added). 
 
More modest results were found by Miller, Jasper and Hill 
(1991), who looked at the effect of Halloween costumes on 
individuals’ sense of identity and role. The authors 
found that some of their respondents felt they had a new 
identity with their costume on (women = 37%, men = 41%), 
though a larger proportion did not feel that they had a 
new identity (women = 63%, men = 59%). However, when 
asked whether they felt that they could play a different 
role at Halloween with no costume on, 68.7% said ‘no’ 
compared with 31.3% who said ‘yes’. Overall, this 
suggests that, whilst the costumes may have transformed 
the identity of only a minority of the respondents, a 
majority felt that the costumes contributed a necessary 
element to the practice of role-play. 
 
A third study by Kwon (1994) looked at the relationship 
between individuals’ feelings towards their clothes and 
various areas of competency in their lives. Kwon found 
that, ‘positive feelings towards one’s clothes enhances 
self-perception of one’s emotion, sociability, and 
occupational competency, and negative feelings towards 
one’s clothes tends to reduce self-perceptions of these 
attributes’ (p.134). Unfortunately, because her results 
are correlational, there is the possibility that when 
individuals feel competent, they feel good about their 
clothes. Hence, this study shows only a link between 
overall feeling and feeling towards clothes. 
 
  
174 
 
There are also studies which show that clothes can affect 
an individual’s behaviour. The first of these is the 
study by Johnson and Downing (1979), reported in chapter 
three, which showed that wearing a nurse’s outfit --- 
under conditions of anonymity --- led to the expression 
of more pro-social behaviour than the wearing of a Ku 
Klux Klan like uniform. Also, Frank and Gilovich (1988) 
found that professional football and ice hockey teams who 
wore black uniforms --- a colour they argued was 
associated with ‘evil and death’ --- had higher records 
of aggressive behaviour that those teams who wore non-
black uniforms. Although this is a correlational finding, 
they went on to show that teams which switched from non-
black to black uniforms, then went on to behave in a more 
aggressive manner.  
 
With respect to the effects of clothing on how an 
individual feels, there may, again, be a question of 
individual differences. Kwon found a significantly 
greater relationship between clothing and sense of 
competency for women as opposed to men. Miller et al 
(1991), on the other hand, found a trend towards the 
obverse direction: men were more likely than women to 
believe that their costume gave them a new identity. 
6.1.5 Transformations of the Face Which Do Directly 
Involve Physiological Feedback 
A final set of data which might have the potential to 
throw some light on the transformational effects of 
wearing a mask is both the most fully researched and also 
the most difficult to link to masking. This is the 
literature on the ‘facial feedback effect’. Here, there 
are over thirty systematic, carefully designed and 
carefully controlled studies which have shown that 
physiological changes in facial appearance --- such as 
smiling (e.g. Strack, Martin and Stepper, 1988) or 
frowning (e.g. Zajonc, Murphy and Inglehart, 1989) --- 
can lead to significant changes in an individual’s mood. 
Detailed criticisms of this research has been made (e.g. 
Tourangeau and Ellsworth, 1979; Winton, 1986) but recent 
reviews (e.g. Adelman and Zajonc, 1989; Cappella, 1993; 
McIntosh, 1996) have concluded that there is substantial 
evidence in support of both the weak version of the 
facial feedback hypothesis (that facial expressions can 
modulate subjective experiences), and the strong version 
(that facial expressions can initiate subjective 
experiences).  
 
However, because these studies involve facial changes 
which bring about direct physiological feedback, it is 
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very difficult to make any clear inferences from the 
facial feedback literature to the possible psychological 
effects of wearing a mask. Specifically, in the facial 
feedback literature, changes in facial appearance are 
entirely confounded with physiological changes, such that 
it is difficult to conclude anything meaningful about the 
effects of the former alone. For this reason, a detailed 
review of the facial feedback literature will not be 
covered in this thesis. However, specific explanations 
for this process will be discussed in the following 
section, which looks at possible explanations for the 
transformative effect of wearing a mask.  
6.1.6 Summary 
In summary, then, there is little direct empirical 
evidence regarding the transformational effect of wearing 
a mask. However, the empirical evidence from related 
fields provides strong support for the possibility that 
changes in an individual’s ‘facial’ appearance, through 
the wearing of a mask, will transform that individual’s 
self-perception. There is also some evidence to suggest 
that the wearing of a mask-like facial covering will 
transform an individual’s affective state and their 
behaviour. 
 
What also emerges from this review is that this effect is 
likely to be highly dependent on both situational and 
personal variables. Whilst the empirical evidence 
suggests that a transformation in self-perception can 
come about when an individual is aware of their 
transformed appearance, there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that this will also occur in non-appearance-aware 
conditions. Furthermore, it would seem that there are a 
number of individual difference variables which may 
mediate between transformations in appearance and 
transformation in sense of self.  
6.2 TRANSFORMATION AND SELF-PERCEPTION 
How, then, might the wearing of a mask bring about this 
transformation? From the review in chapter two, it would 
seem that the most frequently advocated explanation (see 
section 2.2.1) is the following: When an individual wears 
a mask, their perception of their ‘facial’ appearance 
changes. This, then, changes how they perceive their 
psychological characteristics. This argument is similar 
to the self-attribution hypothesis that Laird (1984) puts 
forward to account for the ‘facial feedback’ effect.  
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6.2.1 Self-attribution and Facial Feedback 
Laird’s (1984) argument is based on Bem’s (1972) theory 
of self-perception. Self-perception theory was originally 
developed as an alternative to cognitive dissonance 
theory (Festinger, 1957), and proposes the following:  
 
Individuals come to ‘know’ their own attitudes, 
emotions, and other internal states partially by 
inferring them from observations of their own overt 
behaviour and/or the circumstances in which the 
behaviour occurs. Thus, to the extent that internal 
cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the 
individual is functionally in the same position as an 
outside observer, an observer who must necessarily 
rely upon those same external cues to infer the 
individual’s inner state. (Bem, 1972, p.2) 
 
In recent years, self-perception theory has appeared 
increasingly inadequate to account for attitude change 
under conditions of forced compliance (e.g. Fazio and 
Cooper, 1983). However, as Fazio (1987) concludes in his 
detailed review, self-perception theory is still 
‘supported by much empirical evidence that is beyond the 
domain of dissonance theory’ (p.130). This includes 
attitude-modifications based on pro-attitudinal advocacy 
(e.g., Kiesler, Nisbett and Zanna, 1969), the foot-in-
the-door phenomenon (Freedman and Fraser, 1966) and pain 
perception (e.g., Bandler, Madras and Bem 1968). 
 
Laird (1974) argues that the facial feedback effect 
occurs because the individual perceives their subjective 
state on the basis of their facial ‘behaviour’. He 
writes: ‘It is as if the subjects had said to themselves, 
“I am frowning (or smiling), and I don’t have any non-
emotional reasons for frowning, so I must be angry’ 
(p.484). As Izard (1990) notes, however, Laird does not 
make it entirely clear how he sees this awareness of 
one’s facial behaviour as coming about: i.e. whether it 
comes about through a physiological awareness of one’s 
face, or whether it comes about because the individual, 
at a more cognitive level, considers how her ‘face’ might 
appear to another. Izard suggests that Laird is probably 
referring to both of these processes, and certainly the 
design of the Kellerman and Laird (1982) study, which 
examines the psychological effects of spectacle-wearing, 
suggests that Laird does not see this awareness as 
arising only through physiological channels.  
 
Kellerman and Laird (1982) conclude from their study the 
following:  
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It appears that to some extent, we redefine ourselves 
each time we attend to our attributes, using whatever 
information is most salient at the moment. This study 
demonstrates that among the sources of this 
information is our appearance.... a seemingly 
innocuous change in our appearance can change what we 
feel about ourselves. (p.312) 
 
However, this conclusion is somewhat premature. Whilst 
the findings of the Kellerman and Laird (1982) and Wood 
(1986) studies can not be accounted for by a more 
physiological account of the facial feedback effect (see 
Izard, 1990), there is the possibility that these 
findings may have been due to a reactance effect or 
demand characteristics (see section 6.1.2). Another means 
of accounting for these findings is that the various 
facial coverings or pieces of clothing may simply have 
acted as cues which directed the wearer’s attention 
towards particular self-perceptions or affective states. 
That is, participants in Kellerman and Laird’s 
‘spectacle’ condition may have rated their performance as 
superior, not because they saw themselves as spectacled 
and therefore more intelligent, but because they were 
simply reminded of intellectualism or hard-work by the 
spectacle-cue in the mirror. Similarly, with respect to 
the Ryan (1953) study, it may have been that the young 
women felt more feminine in pink clothes simply because 
they were surrounded by the colour pink, which reminded 
them of feelings of femininity or sweetness.  
 
Such an account of Kellerman and Laird’s (1982) findings 
can be tentatively rejected on the grounds that it was 
only the participants who responded to self-produced cues 
that changed their self-perception. Had participants been 
responding to non-self cues in the mirror, one would have 
expected participants more responsive to externally-
produced cues to experience the greatest transformation 
in self-concept. However, because Wood (1986) and other 
experimenters do not take individual difference measures, 
nor do they control the experimental condition with a 
condition in which the cues are present but not being 
worn, it is not necessarily possible to conclude that 
these findings come about as the result of a self-
attribution process.  
 
Furthermore, in extending self-perception theory to 
facial appearance --- as opposed to facial expressions --
- it should be noted that Laird goes beyond the original 
bounds of self-perception theory. This is because he is 
no longer talking about the effects of facial behaviours, 
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but the effects of facial characteristics. Kellerman and 
Laird (1982) justify this on the grounds that the latter 
are only a ‘slightly different kind of information from 
which we might infer our attributes’ (p.297). Kwon (1994) 
interprets self-perception theory in a similar way, 
writing that it ‘suggests that any variable, such as 
appearance or clothing, that affects perceptions of 
others may also affect perceptions of self’ (p.131). 
However, this is something of a mis-representation of 
Bem’s original position, since the whole project of self-
perception theory was to develop a behavioural account of 
attitudinal change. Unless one retains a strictly 
behaviourist perspective, however, there does not seem to 
be any good reason to distinguish between self-
attributions on the basis of behaviour, and self-
attributions on the basis of physical characteristics.   
6.2.2 Facial-feedback and Mask-feedback 
There would seem to be, therefore, some tentative 
empirical grounds for accepting Kellerman and Laird’s 
(1982) hypothesis that changes in an individual’s 
appearance can change the kinds of self-attributions that 
they make. And if, as Kwon (1994) suggests, any variable 
which affects perceptions of others may also affect 
perceptions of self, then there would be some grounds for 
suggesting that the wearing of a mask can also affect the 
kinds of self-attributions that an individual makes. 
However, there is a crucial difference between 
spectacles, beards, clothes, etc. and masks, in that the 
former group has been shown to ‘affect perceptions of 
others’ (see Terry and Krantz [1993], and Kellerman and 
Laird [1982] for reviews), whilst there is currently no 
evidence that masks do the same. It may be, for instance, 
that an individual wearing a mask is simply perceived as 
a face-less, character-less individual, rather than 
someone who has the attributes of the mask that they are 
wearing.  
 
If this were the case, then, in terms of self-attribution 
theory, an individual might still perceives themselves as 
more character-less or identity-less if their face was 
hidden behind a mask --- as was found with some of the 
participants in the chapter four study. However, if 
observers do not perceive a masked individual as more 
like the character represented in the mask, then there 
would be no grounds for predicting that an individual 
will see themselves as more like their masked-character 
as a consequence of a self-attribution process. Indeed, 
if the reason why physical appearance transforms self-
perceptions is wholly due to the self-attribution process 
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outlined by Kellerman and Laird (1982), and if masks do 
not transform the way that others are perceived in the 
way that spectacles, etc. have been shown to, then it may 
be that the findings discussed in sections 6.1.2 to 6.1.4 
have actually very little relevance to the question of 
the mask’s transformative effect. It would seem, then, 
that this question of whether masks affect other-
attributions is one that needs to be addressed with some 
urgency (see chapter eight). 
6.2.3 Situational Variables 
Even if it is shown that the wearing of a mask affects 
other-perception, and that Laird (1984) and Kwon (1994) 
are correct to suggest that we may sometimes see 
ourselves as we see others, there are a number of 
situational variables that may mediate the extent to 
which a mask-wearer perceives her-self as the character 
represented in her mask.  
 
First, there is the question of how aware an individual 
is of her ‘facial’ appearance. Kellerman and Laird (1982) 
write that we redefine ourselves each time we attend to 
our attributes; similarly, Fazio (1987) states that, 
‘There is much evidence to indicate that salience and 
vividness are important in attribution processes’ 
(p.137). Hence, it may be that a mask will only transform 
its wearer when that wearer is directly aware of her 
transformed appearance. If, on the other hand, she is 
wearing a mask but focused on something altogether 
different, it may be that the wearing of a mask will have 
very little transformative effect.  
 
Whether or not an individual is aware of her masked 
appearance is likely to be dependent on a number of 
factors. Some of these factors may be situational. For 
instance, an individual is more likely to be aware of her 
masked ‘face’ is she can see it in a mirror (as was the 
case in the Kellerman and Laird [1982] and Wood [1986] 
studies, and also for Partridge [1993] and Griffin 
[1961]). Other cues which increase public self-awareness 
may also increase the mask-wearer’s awareness of her 
masked appearance (see section 3.2.2.2): for instance, 
being observed by a group. A mask-wearer may also be more 
aware of how she looks if she has spent a long time 
looking at her mask before she puts it on.  
 
The effect of situational cues on public self-awareness 
is of particular interest, because, as the previous study 
has shown, the wearing of a mask in itself may reduce a 
wearer’s awareness of her public self. This means that, 
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contrary to Honigman’s (1977) prediction, there may be 
something of a negative correlation between 
transformative effects and disinhibition effects. If, for 
instance, an individual feels completely anonymous behind 
a mask, then she may not care about how she presents 
herself; but this reduced concern with her self-
presentation may then draw her attention away from her 
‘facial’ appearance. If, on the other hand, a mask-
wearing individual feels highly identifiable and self-
conscious behind a mask, then she may be less inclined to 
behave in an inhibited manner, but her greater attention 
to how she looks may mean that she will experience a 
greater transformational ‘pull’ by the mask’s physical 
appearance.   
 
In discussing situational factors which may affect an 
individual’s awareness of how they look, it may also be 
important to reiterate the distinction made in section 
2.2 between transformation as a loss of self, and 
transformation as a becoming the character represented in 
the mask. This is because an individual may be aware that 
their face is no longer their ‘face’ without necessarily 
being aware of the appearance of this new ‘face’. Indeed, 
whilst factors like public self-awareness are likely to 
determine the extent to which the latter process occurs, 
the factors that determine the former process may be very 
different. For instance, pressure of the mask upon the 
face, small eye-holes, difficulty with breathing may all 
remind the mask-wearer that her face is no longer her 
‘face’, even though she is not particularly aware of what 
her masked ‘face’ now looks like. Hence, under certain 
circumstances, there is the possibility that a mask-
wearer will feel less like her-self and more like an 
anonymous or face-less being, even if she does not feel 
more like the character represented in the mask.  
6.2.4 Individual Difference Variables 
Along with situational variables, there are also 
individual difference variables which are likely to 
mediate between the wearing of a mask and any possible 
self-perceptual inferences.  
 
The first of these, as discussed in section 6.1.2, is 
that of individuals who are responsive to self-produced 
cues, versus individuals who are responsive to 
situationally-produced cues. Laird (e.g. Duncan and 
Laird, 1977) has consistently argued that not all 
individuals are equally responsive to a self-perceptual 
facial feedback effect. Rather, he distinguishes between 
those individuals who rely primarily on self-produced 
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cues to define their subjective state (e.g. a man who 
decides he is happy because he is smiling), and those who 
rely primarily on situationally-produced cues to define 
their subjective state (e.g. a man who decides he is 
happy because he is at a party) (Laird and Crosby, 1974, 
p.46). 
 
Laird and his colleagues have conducted several studies 
which support the validity of this distinction. Laird, 
Alibozak, Davainis, Deignan, Fontanella, Hong, Levy and 
Pacheco (1994), for instance, found that only individuals 
responsive to self-produced cues were more likely to 
experience affective changes as a result of facial 
mimicry. It should be noted, however, that not all 
findings corroborate the findings of Laird. Rutledge and 
Hupka (1985), for instance, found ‘small and large 
feedback effects with both self- and situation-oriented 
subjects across the level of emotion and stimuli’ 
(p.235).  
 
Kellerman and Laird (1982) argue that wearing spectacles 
‘seems quite clearly to fit’ (p.301) into the definition 
of self-produced cues, on the basis that, ‘all aspects of 
an individual’s appearance are parts of his or her 
distinctive manifestation of whatever situation he or she 
may be in’ (p.302). On this basis, masks would also be 
included under the definition of a self-produced cue, and 
the prediction would be that individuals more responsive 
to self-produced cues would experience a greater degree 
of transformation when wearing a mask.  
 
A second individual difference that may be of some 
relevance to the process of self-perception when wearing 
a mask is that of public self-consciousness. As Buss 
(1985) writes: ‘Individual differences in public self-
consciousness play a role in the psychological impact of 
appearance’ (p.130). The reason for this may be that 
individuals high in public self-consciousness are more 
likely to be aware of any changes in their physical 
appearance, and consequently those changes are likely to 
have a greater psychological impact. Such a hypothesis 
was supported in a study by Solomon and Schopler (1982), 
which found that participants’ public self-consciousness 
scores correlated significantly with the extent to which 
their clothing had an effect on their mood. Because these 
findings are correlational, however, they can not be used 
to show that levels of public self-consciousness increase 
appearance-feedback effects. Nevertheless, they do 
suggest that it would be worth exploring in more detail 
the relationship between facial feedback and public self-
consciousness.  
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6.3  SUMMARY 
On the basis of this review, the following general 
hypotheses can be proposed:  
 
1. The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which an 
individual is aware of their ‘facial’ appearance, will 
lead to a transformation in the direction represented by 
the mask. 
 
2. The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which an 
individual is aware that their face is no longer their 
‘face’, will lead to a transformation away from the usual 
‘self’. 
 
In addition, there are five hypotheses which are derived 
from the more specific discussion of self-attribution 
theory. These are as follows: 
 
3. The wearing of a mask will transform how that mask-
wearer is perceived, such that observers will tend 
towards perceiving her in terms of the psychological 
characteristics represented in her mask. 
 
4. The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which an 
individual is aware of their ‘facial’ appearance, will 
lead to a transformation in the direction represented by 
the mask through a self-attributional process. 
 
5. The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which an 
individual is aware that their face is no longer their 
‘face’, will lead to a transformation away from the usual 
‘self’ through a self-attributional process. 
 
6. Individuals reliant on self-produced cues will 
experience a greater degree of transformation when 
wearing a mask than individuals reliant on situationally-
produced cues. 
 
7. Individuals high in public self-consciousness will 
experience a greater degree of transformation when 
wearing a mask than individuals low in public self-
consciousness. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECT OF WEARING A MASK 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
7.1.1 Aims 
The main aim of this study was to empirically test the 
first hypothesis stated in section 6.3.: that the wearing 
of a mask, under conditions in which an individual is 
aware of their ‘facial’ appearance, will bring about a 
transformation in the direction represented by the mask. 
It also aimed to test the second hypothesis: that an 
individual wearing a mask will feel less like their usual 
selves; and hypotheses six and seven, that the extent to 
which an individual is transformed when wearing a mask 
will be dependent on their levels of public self 
awareness and reliance on self-produced cues. As part of 
this examination, this study also aimed to conduct a 
preliminary exploration of hypotheses four and five: that 
the mask will transform its wearer through a self-
attributional process. Finally, as with the study in 
chapter four, this study aimed to develop a more grounded 
insight into the experience of wearing a mask by using a 
series of open-ended qualitative measures.  
7.1.2 Methodological Issues 
The study in chapter four has shown that the combined use 
of qualitative and quantitative measures as part of an 
experimental, laboratory within-participants design can 
be an effective means of investigating the effects of 
wearing a mask. Furthermore, it would seem from this 
study that substantial knowledge of a valid and reliable 
kind can be obtained without the use of deception. The 
basic design of this study, therefore, shares many of the 
same features as the study in chapter four. However, from 
the methodological lessons of that previous study, and 
from the different questions being asked in this study, 
the design was modified in a number of significant ways. 
 
First, this study was not looking at the effects of 
identifiability or inhibition. Hence, there was no need 
to invoke the presence of observers through the use of a 
video camera. Rather, what this study was interested in 
looking at, particularly with respect to hypothesis one, 
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was the effect of manipulating a mask-wearer’s awareness 
of her masked appearance. Hence, this study was developed 
to compare the effects of three different levels of 
masking. The first level was a non-masked control in 
which participants were simply asked to look at a mask 
briefly, and then to put it out of their field of vision. 
At the second level, participants were asked to look at a 
mask briefly, and then to put it on. It was thought that 
at this level participants would have some awareness of 
their masked appearance, and therefore, if hypothesis one 
was correct, would experience a somewhat greater degree 
of transformation in the direction represented by the 
mask than participants in the non-masked condition. The 
third level was similar to the second level, except that 
at this level participants were asked to look at their 
masked face in the mirror, such that they would be highly 
aware of their masked appearance. At this level, it was 
predicted that participants would experience the greatest 
degree of transformation in the direction represented by 
the mask.  
 
If only these three conditions were used, however, it 
would not be possible to distinguish between a 
transformation in the direction represented by the mask, 
and more general effects that the wearing of a mask --- 
or seeing oneself wearing a mask --- might have. Hence, 
to see whether or not participants actually felt 
transformed by the appearance of the mask, two masks with 
very different ‘facial’ appearances were used. These 
masks were a smiling mask and a frowning mask. If a 
mask’s appearance did transform its wearer, it was 
predicted that there would be a significant interaction 
effect between the type of mask worn and the individual’s 
awareness of her masked-appearance. Hypothetically, this 
interaction was expected to look something like graph 
7.1, with little difference between feelings of affect 
when the masks were just looked at briefly, a somewhat 
greater difference when the masks were just worn, and the 
greatest difference when the participants were seeing 
themselves wearing the mask. 
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Graph 7.1 
Predicted relationship between type of mask and level of 
masking 
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In terms of internal validity, one potential weakness of 
the study in chapter four was the possible confounding 
effects of experimenter expectancy. For the present 
study, therefore, there was a desire to try and minimise 
this artefact as much as possible. To do this, the study 
was designed such that there was as little contact 
between the researcher and the participants as possible -
-- without entirely removing the experimenter from the 
experimental environment. In contrast to the study in 
chapter four, therefore, participants in the present 
study were provided with a single list of instructions 
(which included response sheets) and asked to work 
through these. Hence, once the study began, there was no 
contact between the researcher and the participants.  
 
In terms of the collection of qualitative data and its 
analysis, there was also a desire to try and reduce the 
involvement of the researcher --- along with his 
expectations and assumptions. For this reasons, rather 
than obtaining the qualitative data through post-
experimental interviews, this time the data was collected 
by asking participants simply to write down what it was 
that they were experiencing in the different conditions. 
Participants were also asked to do this in short ‘I 
feel...’ statements rather than as extended prose. The 
advantage of this was that the coding could then be done 
by others as well as the researcher, as such short 
responses would be quicker to code, and could be done by 
someone who had little knowledge of the area under 
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investigation. It also meant that the coder could be kept 
blind to the aims of the study. To take the researcher 
further out of the picture, it was also decided to code 
and analyse the qualitative data from a data-driven, 
rather than a theory-driven, perspective. 
 
Another difference between this study and the study in 
chapter four was that participants in the present study 
were not asked to undertake any task (such as talking 
about student financial matters), but simply to reflect 
on what it was like in the different conditions. This was 
for three main reasons.  
 
First, given that each participant was taking part in six 
different conditions, the amount of time that each 
condition took needed to be as brief as possible. Hence, 
any task which took more than a few minutes (and the task 
of completing the ‘I feel...’ statements took several 
minutes in itself) would have made the study 
impractically long.  
 
Second, in contrast to the study in chapter four, this 
study was not focused on behavioural changes, and 
therefore did not need to assess how participants 
performed in a particular task. Rather, it was interested 
in participants’ phenomenological experiencing, and, in 
this respect, simply asking participants how they felt 
seemed the most direct way of acquiring this information.  
 
Third, as discussed in section 4.1.2.6, there was a 
general desire to avoid as much deception in these 
experiments as possible. Therefore, if the goal was to 
see whether participants felt differently when looking at 
or relating to the masks in different ways, it seemed 
that the most honest and straightforward approach would 
simply be to ask them to try out the different 
combinations and report back on what they felt. 
 
Related to this, a final difference between this and the 
initial study is that the amount of time that 
participants could spend in each of the conditions was 
not pre-determined. This was for two reasons. First, 
given that some participants in the chapter four study 
had said that they felt uncomfortable wearing the masks, 
it seemed important to ensure that the participants could 
take off the masks relatively quickly if they wished to. 
Second, to ensure that the participants took exactly the 
same amount of time in each condition would have required 
the researcher to have more contact with the participants 
(i.e. telling them when to start and finish each trial). 
Given that there was a desire to keep the researcher out 
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of the way as much as possible, it was decided just to 
let the participants try out the different conditions in 
their own time. 
7.2  METHOD 
7.2.1 Design 
This study used a 2  3 within-subjects design to examine 
the hypotheses outlined in 7.1.1. The first independent 
variable was type of mask: ‘smiling’ mask vs. ‘frowning’ 
mask. The second independent variable was the ‘level’ of 
masking, with three levels: non-masked, masked, and 
masked+mirror.  
 
To assess the effect of these manipulations, the study 
incorporated features from both quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies. Quantitatively, the 
dependent measure was the degree to which participants 
felt ‘positive’ in each of the conditions. It was 
predicted that there would be an interaction between 
mask-type and level of masking, such that the smiling 
mask would lead to substantially more positive feelings 
than the frowning mask when participants could actually 
see themselves wearing the masks, and somewhat more 
positive feelings when the participants were wearing the 
masks but could not see themselves doing so. It was also 
predicted that there would be a correlation between how 
much individuals experienced a transformation in the 
direction represented by the masks, and their reliance on 
self-produced cues and levels of public self-
consciousness.  
 
Qualitatively, open-ended measures were used to 
triangulate the quantitative findings, and also to gain a 
deeper insight into the processes by which any 
transformative effect might come about. Qualitative 
measures were also used in the hope that they might 
provide some answers to the question of whether or not 
individuals who wore masks and knew that their face was 
not their ‘face’ would feel less like themselves. Open-
ended qualitative measures were also used as a means of 
gaining a more grounded understanding of the experience 
of wearing a mask.  
7.2.2 Participants 
Sixty individuals took part in the study, all of whom 
were Open University undergraduate psychology students 
attending summer school at Sussex University (a year 
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after the participants in the chapter four study). Fifty 
of these participants were women (83.3%) and ten (16.7%) 
were men. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 
58, with a mean of 34.7. The participants’ occupations 
varied broadly, with a predominance of ‘white collar’ 
professionals: e.g. librarian, nurses, teachers, 
policemen. 
 
To recruit participants for the study, a brief talk about 
the experiment was given to the Open University 
psychology undergraduates, by the researcher, during 
their initial induction session (see appendix 7a). This 
was similar to the talk given for the study in chapter 
four, except that students were told that the experiment 
involved ‘trying out a couple of masks in a couple of 
different ways, and then describing how it feels’. Also, 
to reduce the possible volunteer biases described in 
section 4.4.5, participants were not told that the study 
was looking at the ‘effects’ of wearing a mask. The main 
points were reiterated again on the sign-up sheet.  
 
However, in contrast to the previous study, the students 
were also informed that the researcher would be ‘around’ 
on the two afternoons when the Open University students 
had their own participant pool; and that, if any of the 
participants were interested in taking part in the study 
then, they would be very welcome to do so. Possibly as a 
consequence of this --- knowing that they could take part 
in the study without having to sign themselves up --- a 
smaller number of students actually wrote their names 
down in the specific slots than for the previous study 
(around twenty participants). Hence, around two-thirds of 
the participants in this study were Open University 
students who had been asked if they wanted to participate 
in ‘the mask study’ whilst waiting in the participant 
pool, and had agreed to.  
7.2.3 Apparatus and Materials 
The study took part in the same classroom as previously. 
The participants sat at a table at one end of the room, 
facing a table and a blackboard behind it. Slightly to 
the left of the participant was a figure-length mirror, 
out of their direct line of vision, and positioned such 
that they needed to move their chair to see their face 
fully in it.  
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DIAGRAM 7.1 
Design of the experimental room 
 
 
 
The researcher sat throughout the study at a table behind 
the participant, and was involved in private studies. At 
no time was he observing the participants once they began 
to work through the instructions (a feature of the 
experiment that participants were informed of in the 
informed consent form). 
 
As part of the experimental set-up, a ‘smiling mask’ and 
a ‘frowning mask’ were also placed on the floor, just to 
the left of the participants’ desk (see illustration 
7.1). These masks were bought from a theatrical/’fancy 
dress’ shop, and were both approximately 18cm high by 
17cm wide, made of a fairly thin, almost transparent 
plastic. The two masks had the appearance of the 
‘archetypal’ smiling/frowning masks frequently used as 
the symbol for drama. The ‘smiling’ mask was silver in 
colour, with a wide-smiling mouth, and ‘laugh-lines’ 
around the cheeks. By comparison, the ‘frowning’ mask was 
gold in colour, with a down-turned mouth and eyebrows in 
the shape of a frown. 
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ILLUSTRATION 7.1 
Masks used for Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A single instructions/response booklet was used for this 
study (see appendix 7b), and was placed on the table in 
front of the participants when they entered the 
laboratory. The booklet consisted of four parts. 
 
The first page was an informed consent form, which was 
considered essential given that some participants in the 
chapter four study had experienced the wearing of the 
mask as unpleasant. This form particularly emphasised the 
participants’ right to withdraw from the study at any 
point or to decline from responding to particular 
instructions/questions, and that such choices would not 
in any way adversely effect the study as a whole. If 
participants signed this informed consent form (and no 
prospective participants declined to sign it) then these 
forms (with the participant’s signature on) were kept 
separate from their other responses.  
 
The second page gave participants the following 
instructions for taking part in the study:  
 
In a moment, you will be asked to try out six 
different conditions. For each condition, you will be 
asked to describe how you feel, by completing a 
maximum of six sentences that begin, ‘I 
feel........’: e.g. ‘I feel... quite normal’, ‘I 
feel... sleepy’. Please limit your descriptions to 
how you feel, rather than what you think, what you 
see, or what you are doing, etc. However, if you feel 
‘nothing’, ‘the same as usual’, or if you feel 
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exactly the same in each of the conditions, then it 
is quite legitimate to respond in this way.  
 
Please try to be as honest as possible in your 
descriptions of how you feel --- even if you think 
that this will go against the experimenter’s 
hypotheses or ‘ruin’ the study. There are no ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ answers to these conditions, only your own 
experiences; but the more accurate you can be about 
how you feel, the more insight it will provide into 
what actually happens --- or doesn’t happen --- when 
people wear masks.  
 
Finally, participants were asked in the booklet to try 
not to describe their feelings in terms relative to the 
other conditions but in absolute terms (so that they 
could be coded independently). They were also reminded 
that they could choose to withdraw from the study at any 
point. If they had no questions they were then asked to 
proceed.  
 
In the third part of the booklet, participants were given 
six different sets of instructions for each of the six 
different conditions.  
 
Each of the sets of instructions first asked participants 
to face forward, and then to look at the gold/silver mask 
until they were familiar with the facial features. For 
the non-masked conditions, the participants were then 
instructed to put the mask back on the table. In the 
masked and masked+mirror conditions, participants were 
instructed to put the gold/silver mask over their face. 
In the masked+mirror conditions, they were then asked to 
look at themselves in the mirror. For all conditions, 
participants were then instructed to describe how they 
felt, and were presented with six unfinished sentence 
beginning with ‘I feel....’ In the masked and 
masked+mirror conditions, they were then instructed to 
take the mask off.  
 
At the end of the six specific sets of instructions, 
participants were then asked to go back to each of the 
previous conditions, and to put a number from one to 
eleven in a box to the left of that condition, indicating 
the overall extent to which they felt positive or 
negative in that condition (one equalling extremely 
negative, and eleven equalling extremely positive). This 
one to eleven scale was used rather than a one to ten 
scale (as in chapter four), so that participants had a 
midpoint of six which they could score if they had 
experienced very little affect in either direction when 
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wearing the masks. It was also used so that the scale 
would be consistent with that used in the final part of 
the response booklet. 
 
This final part of the booklet presented participants 
with nineteen different statements, and asked them to 
indicate on eleven point Likert-type scales, the extent 
to which the statements were like them (one equalling 
‘not at all like me’, eleven equalling ‘a lot like me’). 
These nineteen statements were intended to measure three 
different individual difference variables.  
 
Items one, four, six, nine, eleven, fifteen and nineteen 
were the public self-consciousness items taken from the 
revised self-consciousness scale (Scheier and Carver, 
1985). Total public self-consciousness scores consisted 
of the tallied totals of all items. This inventory was 
identical to that reported in chapter four, except that a 
one to eleven scale was used instead of Scheier and 
Carver’s one to four scale. This was done so that the 
PBSC items could be comparable with the items from the 
self-cued/situationally-cued scale. 
 
Items three, eight, twelve, thirteen, seventeen and 
eighteen were attempts to measure the extent to which 
participants were reliant on self-produced cues or 
situation-produced cues. These items were adapted from 
Rutledge and Hupka’s (1985) shortened versions of the 
questions originally used by Laird and Crosby (1974). All 
six statements were the same as used by Rutledge and 
Hupka, but a ‘not at all like me’ to ‘a lot like me’ 
scale was used rather than a scale based on frequency, so 
that the cue-orientated items could be comparable with 
the public self-consciousness items. One item was also 
reversed (seventeen), such that the scale was fully 
counterbalanced, with three items in the direction of 
self-cued, and three in the direction of situationally-
cued. Finally, Laird and Crosby’s original eleven point 
scale was retained rather than Rutledge and Hupka’s five-
point version. Assuming inter-item reliability, total 
cue-orientation would be calculated by adding together 
the scores on items three, twelve, and eighteen, and the 
reversed scores on items eight, thirteen and seventeen. 
Higher scores would indicate a greater reliance on self-
produced cues, and lower scores indicate a greater 
reliance on situationally-produced cues.  
 
Items two, five, seven, ten, fourteen, and sixteen were 
not directly related to the present study, but were 
incorporated to explore one of the individual difference 
dimensions that had seemed to emerge in the chapter four 
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study. In that study, it seemed that some individuals 
were particularly concerned with how their face appeared. 
Hence, these items were a preliminary attempt to 
construct a ‘facial self-consciousness’ scale, with items 
two, five and sixteen reversed in the final tallying. The 
aim was to see whether items which, in terms of face 
validity, all seemed to assess ‘facial self-
consciousness’, would also show a degree of inter-item 
reliability.  
 
Finally, the questionnaire asked participants for their 
age, gender and occupation.  
 
To counterbalance for order effects there were six 
different versions of the booklet, each of which were 
identical except that the six tasks were sequenced in 
different ways according to a Latin square design. This 
means that each of the different conditions was at a 
particular point in the order an equal number of times, 
and that each directly followed and preceded each other 
an equal number of times. However, as with all Latin 
square designs, the order effects in this study are not 
entirely counterbalanced, as not all of the 6! --- or 720 
--- possible sequences could be run. 
7.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were welcomed into the room, seated in front 
of the table (such that they could not see themselves in 
the mirror), and then told that they should follow the 
self-explanatory instructions in the booklet. The booklet 
was placed on the table in such a way that the researcher 
was blind to which of the six sequences the participant 
had been assigned to. The participants were told that the 
researcher would be present in the event that they had 
any questions or ran into any difficulties, but that he 
would be involved in his own work, and would not be 
surreptitiously observing them (this promise was 
meticulously implemented).  
 
The participants were also told that, when they were 
instructed to put the mask back down on the table, they 
should make sure that it was outside of their direct line 
of vision. This was to ensure that the non-masked 
condition would be matched with the masked condition, in 
which the participants could not see the appearance of 
their mask.  
 
Participants were then asked to work their way through 
the experimental instructions and questionnaires until 
they informed the experimenter that they had finished. 
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At this point, the experimenter then debriefed the 
participants along the lines suggested by Mills (1976). 
This primarily involved ascertaining the extent to which 
participants were aware of the experimental hypotheses 
through a series of ‘laddered’ questions, informing 
participants about the exact nature of the study (which 
participants were asked to keep to themselves until all 
studies had been run), and ensuring that participants 
were not left with any unresolved emotional difficulties 
as a consequence of participating in the study.  
7.2.5 Methods of Analysis 
7.2.5.1 Quantitative 
Frequency charts showed a relatively normal distribution 
of scores across the six treatment conditions. The 
quantitative self-report data was therefore analysed 
using a mixed model analysis of variance on version seven 
of SPSS. Two within-participants factors were used: type 
of mask (smiling versus frowning) and level of masking 
(non-masked versus masked vs. masked+mirror). One 
between-participant factor was also introduced into the 
analysis: sequence (sequence one vs. sequence two... vs. 
sequence six).  
 
Mauchly’s test did not find a significant lack of 
sphericity for either level of masking (2 [2] = 4.30, p = 
.12) or for the level of masking  type of mask 
interaction (2 [2] = 3.56, p = .17). All tests were 
therefore conducted with sphericity assumed (see print-
out of SPSS analyses in appendix 7e).  
 
With respect to the reliability of the individual 
difference measures, the alpha coefficient of the public 
self-consciousness scale was again high, at .86.  
 
However, the reliability of the self-cued/situationally-
cued scale was unacceptably low, with an alpha 
coefficient of just .40. Even with removing the two items 
with the lowest item-total correlation, this coefficient 
could only be raised to .54. For this reason, it was 
decided to treat each of these items as separate 
measures.  
 
The six items which attempted to measure ‘facial self-
consciousness’ showed an alpha coefficient of .54. 
However, if item fourteen was removed (‘I enjoy looking 
at my face in the mirror), this coefficient went up to 
.64. If items seven and ten were then also removed (‘I 
much prefer talking to people face to face than over the 
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telephone’) and (‘I’m someone who uses non-verbal facial 
expressions a lot when I communicate’), this alpha 
coefficient rose to .80. This was between the three 
remaining items ‘I sometimes get self-conscious about my 
facial expressions’, ‘I sometimes worry about my face 
behaving in ways that I can’t control, like blushing or 
twitching’, and ‘I sometimes find myself covering my face 
when I interact with others.’ No further analyses were 
conducted with the scores from these items.  
 
To see whether the measures of public self-consciousness 
and self-cued/situationally-cued correlated with 
participants’ feelings of transformation, two 
‘transformation’ scores were calculated for each of the 
participants. These measured the extent to which 
participants moved in the direction represented by the 
mask in the masked and the masked+mirror conditions, as 
compared with the non-masked conditions. The calculation 
for the ‘masked transformation’ score was therefore as 
follows: (SW - SN) - (FW - FN). The calculation for the 
‘masked+mirror transformation’ score was as follows: (SM 
- SN) - (FM - FN) (S = smiling mask, F = frowning mask; N 
= non-masked, W = masked, M = masked+mirror).  
 
Participants were coded as hypothesis-aware if they 
stated an awareness of any of the experimental 
hypotheses. 
7.2.5.2 Qualitative 
To analyse the qualitative data from the sixty 
participants, all 913 written responses were first typed 
out on to a word processor (without details of which 
condition they came from), and then read through by the 
researcher a number of times to get a ‘feel’ for the 
data. The responses from just the first ten participants 
were then focused on in detail (see appendix 7c), and 
from this a number of categories were developed by the 
researcher which seemed to represent this subset of 
responses (as suggested by Boyatzis [1998]). All the 
responses were then read through again, and those 
responses which seemed to fall into these initial 
categories were ‘marked off’. New categories were then 
developed for the remaining data, until a near-exhaustive 
set of around forty categories was developed.  
 
Such a large number of categories felt somewhat unwieldy. 
However, it was noted that there were a number of 
polarities between the categories that emerged: for 
instance, happy and sad, comfortable and uncomfortable, 
anxious and calm. It was decided, therefore, to reduce 
the number of categories by bringing together these polar 
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opposites, and coding them as ‘+’ or ‘-’ poles of a 
single dimension. This would then allow a single, 
combined count to be calculated from both of these scores 
by deducting the ‘-’ frequency count from the ‘+’ 
frequency count. To maintain consistency, opposite poles 
were also created for those categories in which an 
opposite category had not emerged. The only exception to 
this was where a category clearly did not have an 
opposite (e.g. miscellaneous), or where it seemed useful 
to differentiate between different opposites on a 
singular dimension (e.g. ‘not self: other’, ‘not self: 
detached’). As a result of this, around twenty-five 
category-dimensions remained. All of the data was then 
formally coded by the researcher into each of these 
dimensions. Those categories in which ten or less 
responses had been coded were then removed, leaving just 
twenty bipolar categories. These were as follows: 
 
1.  Usualness of feelings 
2.  Usualness of identity 
  2-(a): Not the same person as I usually am 
  2-(b): A different person from who I usually am 
  2-(c): Expressing a different part of myself 
  2-(d): Detached from who I usually am 
3.  Hiddenness 
4.  Deceptiveness 
5.  Comfortableness (non-physical) 
6.  Comfortableness (physical) 
7.  Positive affect 
8.  Empowerment 
9.  Silliness 
10.  Mischieviousness 
11.  Amusement 
12.  Liking 
13.  Anxiety 
14.  Threat or fear 
15.  Threatening or frightening 
16.  Interest or alertness 
17.  Confusion 
18.  Attractiveness 
19.  Miscellaneous physical feelings 
20.  Uncodable responses 
 
A complete list of the bi-polar categories, with each of 
the poles, and examples of what might be included under 
these poles, can be seen in appendix 7d. This list was 
then given to two independent judges --- who knew that 
the study was interested in masks but were blind to the 
specific hypotheses or design of the study --- and the 
judges were asked to code each of the 913 responses into 
one, and only one, of the 43 poles. If the judges felt 
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that the response could go into more than one pole they 
were asked to choose the one that seemed most 
appropriate. Judges were blind at all times to which of 
the conditions each of the responses had come from. The 
judges agreed on 77.2 percent of the 913 codings, which 
was considered a respectable level of reliability. On 
this basis, the two judges were asked to meet, and decide 
on poles for those responses where there was not 
agreement. Following this meeting, poles were agreed for 
all responses. 
7.3  RESULTS 
7.3.1 Quantitative 
Table 7.1 shows the results of the analysis of variance 
(print out of the SPSS analyses can be seen in appendix 
7e). As predicted, there was a significant interaction 
between type of mask and level of masking, and 
significant main effects for both type of mask and level 
of masking. There was no main effect for sequence, nor 
for interactions between sequence and the two within-
participant factors.  
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TABLE 7.1 
Tests of between- and within-participant effects 
 
 
 
 
Source 
 
Type 
III Sum 
of 
Squares 
 
 
 
 
 
df 
 
 
 
Mean 
Square 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Between-
participants 
 
     
Sequence 
 
4.83 5 0.97 0.27 .93 
Error (seq.) 
 
193.17 54 3.58   
 
Within-
participants 
 
     
Type of mask 
 
295.21 1 295.21 51.10 <.000001 
Type of mask  
Sequence 
 
59.49 5 11.90 2.06 .085 
Error (type) 
 
311.97 54 5.78   
Level of 
masking 
 
256.74 2 128.37 20.77 <.000001 
Level of 
masking  
Sequence 
 
48.09 10 4.81 0.78 .65 
Error (level) 
 
667.50 108 6.18   
Type of mask  
Level of 
masking 
 
43.17 2 21.59 5.43 .0057 
Type of mask   
Level of 
masking  
Sequence 
 
51.93 10 5.19 1.31 .24 
Error (type  
level) 
 
429.23 108 3.97   
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Simple within-participant contrasts were carried out, 
using the first, non-masked level as the reference 
category (see full details in appendix 7e). For the type 
of mask  level of masking interaction, there was a 
significant interaction effect between the masked+mirror 
level and the non-masked level (F[1, 54] = 4.17, p = 
.046), but not between the masked level and the non-
masked level (F[1, 54] = .90, p = .35). This can be seen 
in graph 7.2. For the level of masking main effect, there 
was a significant difference between both the 
masked+mirror level and the non-masked level (F[1, 54] = 
30.83, p < .000001), and the masked level and the non-
masked level (F[1, 54] = 23.38, p = .000011). Means for 
all six conditions and mean totals can be seen in table 
7.2. 
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TABLE 7.2 
Mean scores on positivity of affect and mean totals 
 Non-
masked 
Masked Masked 
+Mirror 
Mean 
total 
 M 
 
M M M 
Frowning Mask 5.67 4.25 3.18 4.37 
Smiling Mask 7.25 5.35 5.93 6.18 
Mean total  6.46 4.8 4.56 5.27 
 
 
Nine participants were coded as being hypothesis-aware. 
All these participants stated an awareness that the study 
might have something to do with whether people felt like 
the mask that they are wearing. None of the participants 
stated an awareness that the study might be interested in 
the relationship between responses to wearing a mask and 
individual differences. Graph 7.3 presents the responses 
of participants coded ‘hypothesis-aware’ and ‘hypothesis-
unaware’. As can be seen from this, the small number of 
hypothesis-aware participants were less likely to respond 
in the predicted direction than non-aware participants.  
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GRAPH 7.3 
Mean scores on positivity of affect for hypothesis-aware, 
and hypothesis-unaware participants 
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Table 7.3 shows the correlations between the individual 
difference measures and the ‘wearing-transformation’ and 
‘mirror-transformation’ scores. As can be seen, the 
hypothesis that individuals high in public self-
consciousness will experience a greater transformation 
when wearing a mask was not supported. However, because 
there was a correlation of .17 between public self-
consciousness scores and masked+mirror transformation, it 
was decided to conduct a post hoc comparison between the 
responses of high public self-consciousness participants 
(those who scored higher than the sample median of 52) 
and participants low in public self-consciousness (those 
who scored lower than the sample median of 52) 
(participants on the median score were randomly 
distributed). The results can be seen in graph 7.3, and 
show that the predicted interaction effect was notably 
larger for participants high in public self-
consciousness. 
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TABLE 7.3 
Pearson correlations between transformation scores and 
individual difference measures 
  
masked 
transformation 
scores 
 
masked+mirror 
transformation 
scores 
 
scales/items 
 
r p r p 
 
Public self-consciousness 
 
 
.00 
 
.99 
 
.17 
 
.21 
emotion like sensation 
(item 3, self-) 
 
-.28 .03 -.11 .41 
emotion changes with 
situation (item 8, sitn-) 
 
-.10 .46 -.08 .54 
no reason for feelings 
(item 12, self-) 
 
-.15 .27 -.05 .71 
emotions like judgement 
(item 13, sitn-) 
 
-.13 .32 .04 .74 
feel same as others (item 
17, sitn-) 
 
.30 .02 .13 .31 
others misjudge my 
feelings (item 18, self-) 
 
-.00 .99 .03 .84 
 
Note: Details in brackets are number of item on 
questionnaire, and whether high scores are taken to 
indicate self-cued or situationally-cued disposition 
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GRAPH 7.4 
Mean Scores on positivity of affect for participants high 
and low in public self-consciousness 
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As can be seen from table 7.3, there is also no evidence 
to support the prediction that self-cued individuals tend 
to experience a greater degree of transformation when 
wearing a mask as compared with individuals reliant on 
situational cues. In fact, the only significant results 
emerging from this data contradict this hypothesis. 
Individuals who experienced a greater degree of 
transformation in the masked condition tended to be less 
likely to feel that their ‘experience of emotion is 
immediate and strong like a sensation’, and more likely 
to feel that they often feel the same as those around 
them.  
7.3.2 Qualitative 
In total, 121 responses were given in the frowning mask 
(non-masked) condition, 127 in the smiling mask (non-
masked) condition, 155 in the frowning mask (masked) 
condition, 152 in the smiling mask (masked) condition, 
176 in the frowning mask (masked+mirror) condition, and 
182 in the smiling mask (masked+mirror) condition.  
 
Graph 7.5 shows the combined frequency counts where the 
number of responses at the ‘-’ pole of a dimension have 
been deducted from the number of responses at the ‘+’ 
pole of the dimension. Both ‘-’, ‘+’ and total frequency 
counts can be seen in appendix 7f.  
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7.4  DISCUSSION 
7.4.1 Hypothesis one: The wearing of a mask, under 
conditions in which an individual is aware of their 
‘facial’ appearance, will lead to a transformation in the 
direction represented by the mask 
The results of this study provide mixed support for the 
above hypothesis. On the one hand, there is evidence that 
when an individual is acutely aware of their masked 
‘face’, they will experience a transformation in the 
direction represented by the mask. This is most clearly 
shown in the significant interaction between the type of 
mask worn and the level of masking, when comparing the 
non-masked level with the masked+mirror level. Analysis 
of the responses from hypothesis-aware and hypothesis-
unaware participants strongly suggest that this is not a 
consequence of demand characteristics. Furthermore, 
frequency counts of the qualitative responses coded under 
dimension seven (positive affect) triangulate well with 
the above findings. Participants who saw themselves 
wearing the smiling mask had a combined count of 24 more 
responses coded under ‘happy...’ and 19 fewer responses 
coded under ‘sad...’ than participants who saw themselves 
wearing the frowning mask. This compares with 18 more and 
10 fewer responses in the non-masked condition, 
respectively.  
 
Along with transformations in affect, frequency counts of 
the qualitative responses coded under category 2-(b) also 
suggest that the wearing of a mask --- under conditions 
in which an individual is acutely aware of their masked-
appearance --- may increase the extent to which an 
individual’s sense of self is transformed. In the 
masked+mirror condition, fourteen responses were coded 
under ‘I feel... “a different person from who I usually 
am”’, as compared with none in the non-masked condition. 
Responses coded under this category include: ‘I feel like 
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a different person’ (41: frowning mask), ‘I feel taken 
over (slightly)’ (48: frowning mask), ‘I feel as if I’m 
someone else’ (54: frowning mask) (numbers before colon 
are participant number). It should be noted, however, 
that this is only around four percent of the total 
responses in the masked+mirror conditions. 
 
One other set of qualitative data tentatively suggests 
that the wearing of a mask, under high appearance-
awareness conditions, led to a transformation of ‘self’ 
in the direction represented by the mask. Thirty-two 
responses from the masked+mirror conditions were coded 
under category 15+ (‘Threatening or Frightening’) as 
opposed to none in the non-masked conditions. This 
includes such responses as: ‘I feel fearsome’ (19: 
smiling mask), ‘I feel sinister’ (33: smiling mask), and 
‘I feel “evil” malevolent’ (39: frowning mask). Assuming 
that these are not terms that the participants would 
normally use to describe themselves, this finding again 
suggests that participants in the masked+mirror condition 
may have been more likely to take on a different sense of 
identity. 
 
On the other hand, it would seem that when an individual 
is wearing a mask but is not made acutely aware of their 
masked appearance, then transformation in the direction 
represented by the mask does not take place. Indeed, 
contrary to predictions, the data from the quantitative 
measures shows that participants in the masked conditions 
rated less of an increase in feelings of positivity from 
the frowning mask to the smiling mask condition (M = 
1.1), as compared with participants in the non-masked 
conditions (M = 1.58). Findings contrary to expectations 
are even more prominent in the qualitative data. In the 
masked conditions, participants wearing the smiling mask 
gave just six more responses coded under ‘happy...’ and 
just five fewer responses coded under ‘sad...’ than when 
they were wearing the frowning mask. As stated above, 
this compares with 18 more and 10 fewer responses in the 
non-masked condition, respectively.  
 
There is one finding, however, which suggests that the 
wearing of a mask, per se, may contribute to the adoption 
of an alternate sense of self. From the masked trials, 
seven responses were coded under category 2-(b) (‘I 
feel... “a different person from who I usually am”’) as 
compared with no responses from the control trials. This 
includes such responses as: ‘I feel like a spy’ (23: 
smiling mask), ‘I feel like a child’ (29: smiling mask), 
‘I feel like someone else is sitting here writing this’ 
(30: smiling mask). It should be noted, however, that 
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this is only around two percent of the total responses 
from the masked conditions. 
 
How, then, can this apparent anomaly in the findings be 
explained? Based on the data, the most likely explanation 
is that it requires a masked individual to be more than 
just ‘aware’ of their ‘facial’ appearance for them to be 
transformed in the direction represented by the mask. 
Rather, it would seem that the mask-wearer needs to be 
actively focused on their appearance for this change to 
be brought about.  
 
Such an explanation, however, raises some important 
questions about the situational generalisability of these 
findings. If an individual needs to be actively focused 
on their masked appearance for that mask to have any 
effect, then the number of situations in which an 
individual will feel transformed by their mask may 
actually be fairly small. Certainly, as the present 
results show, this transformative effect will occur if an 
individual is directly looking at their masked ‘face’ in 
a mirror, but what about other situations, such as being 
masked in a crowd, or being masked on stage? If there is 
no transformative effect just from the wearing of a mask, 
per se, then it seems possible that the transformative 
effect in these kinds of situations will be fairly small.  
 
On the other hand, it may be that individuals in these 
situations would be much more focused on their ‘facial’ 
appearance than participants in this study’s masked 
conditions, who were not being looked at, were looking 
‘out’ at a blackboard, and were primarily focusing on 
their ‘internal’ feelings. The only way to really answer 
this question is through further empirical research, 
which could extend the present research to look at the 
transformative effect of wearing a mask in various, more 
‘real life’ contexts: for instance, in a group/crowd, or 
in front of an audience. 
 
Another question which this piece of research only begins 
to answer is the question of why a masked individual 
might experience a transformation of affect and self-
concept under conditions in which they are focused on 
their ‘facial’ appearance. One possibility, as discussed 
in section 6.2, is that a self-attribution process occurs 
whereby the mask-wearer comes to see themselves as the 
mask character. One participant (50) expressed this very 
directly, stating that when seeing herself wearing the 
smiling mask she felt, ‘a bit evil, the hooked nose makes 
me like the Artful Dodger’. 
 
  
209 
 
However, this is by no means the only possible 
explanation. As discussed in section 6.2.2, one 
alternative explanation for why individuals feel more 
like their ‘face’ when they see that ‘face’ in a mirror 
is that the ‘face’ is simply acting as an external cue: 
either priming the individual towards particular 
affective states, or eliciting in the observer a 
sympathetic response (for instance, feeling happier 
because of looking at a happy face). In terms of the 
present study, then, the greater transformative effect in 
the masked+mirror condition may have simply arisen 
because participants in this condition had more 
opportunity to see the ‘face’ of the mask (in the 
mirror).  
 
This interpretation is supported by the finding that the 
simple act of briefly looking at the masks, in the non-
masked conditions, brought about a substantial 
transformation in the direction represented by the mask. 
This can be seen in the quantitative data, where there is 
a mean difference of 1.58 for ratings of positivity in 
the smiling and frowning non-masked conditions. It can 
also be seen in the qualitative responses coded under 7 
(positive affect), where simply looking at the smiling 
mask brought about 20+ and 0- responses, compared with 0+ 
and 10- responses when participants were looking at the 
frowning mask. The qualitative responses coded under 5 
(comfortableness) also suggest that simply looking at a 
mask can bring about a transformation in the mask’s 
direction, with 31+ and 3- responses in the smiling, non-
masked condition, and 17+ and 6- responses in the 
frowning, non-masked condition. These findings can only 
really be explained in terms of the mask acting as a cue; 
certainly, they can not be explained in terms of a self-
attribution process.  
 
However, it seems unlikely that the greater 
transformative effect in the masked+mirror condition can 
be explained solely in terms of cue-effects. This is 
because, whilst there would be good reason to assume --- 
and, indeed, good evidence to show --- that looking at a 
happy ‘face’ can make you feel happier/more comfortable 
and looking at a sad ‘face’ can make you feel sadder/less 
comfortable, it seems unlikely that looking at a happy or 
sad ‘face’ could make you feel less like your usual self 
(2-[b]). Indeed, if this were the case, one would expect 
at least some of the responses in the non-masked 
conditions to come under this category. The fact that 
none of them do, as compared with thirteen in the 
masked+mirror condition, suggests that some kind of 
transformation is occurring in the masked+mirror 
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condition which can not be attributed entirely to a 
visual cueing effect. Similarly, it is difficult to see 
how looking at a smiling or frowning mask could make you 
feel more threatening or frightening (15+). And, again, 
if it could, then one would expect at least some of the 
responses in the non-masked condition to be coded under 
this category, rather than none. 
 
A third possible explanation for the greater 
transformative effect in the masked+mirror condition 
might be that participants’ responses were not a 
consequence of seeing themselves as the masked character, 
but a consequence of seeing themselves with a different 
appearance. For instance, participants may have found it 
funny to see themselves ‘wearing’ a smiling face, or felt 
saddened to see ‘themselves’ looking ugly or harrowed. In 
other words, participants may not have identified with 
the masked-character, but simply responded to changes in 
their physical appearance. Such an interpretation is 
supported by the fact that twelve of the responses in the 
smiling, masked+mirror condition were coded under 
category 11+ (amusement), with only one response coded in 
this way in the frowning, masked+mirror condition, and 
only three responses when participants were looking at 
the smiling mask alone. Similarly, in the frowning 
masked+mirror condition, 14 responses were coded under 
category 18- (Ugly...), in contrast to half this number 
in the smiling masked+mirror condition, and just one 
where participants were looking at the frowning mask 
alone. Both these sets of responses suggest that 
participants did have particular affective responses to 
seeing themselves look in a particular way, and that 
these were in the direction of the character represented 
in the mask.  
 
Again, however, such an interpretation can not readily 
explain the finding under categories 2-(b) and 15+, where 
participants seem to be describing a real transformation 
in their sense of self in the masked+mirror conditions. 
Possibly, one could account for the greater 15+ findings 
in terms of participants feeling angry about seeing 
themselves wearing a mask, but then one would expect an 
equal number of these responses in the masked conditions, 
where physical uncomfortableness responses (6-) were much 
more frequent. Alternatively, one might argue that when 
participants were describing themselves as more 
threatening, etc., they were only really describing how 
they were looking rather than how they felt at a more 
‘internal’ level. However, this seems unlikely as 
participants were specifically asked to describe how they 
felt rather than what they looked like. 
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A fourth explanation for the findings is that suggested 
in section 2.2.2: ‘transformations of the face 
(physiological)’. According to this line of reasoning, 
participants may have experienced a greater level of 
transformation in the masked+mirror condition because 
they imitated the ‘facial’ features of the mask they saw 
themselves wearing. Consequently, they did not become 
transformed because of the kind of self-perceptual 
process that Kellerman and Laird (1982) outline, but 
through the kinds of physiological facial feedback 
mechanisms that Izard (1990) describes. From the results 
of this study, there is no means of assessing the extent 
to which this contributed to the transformational 
process. However, it seems more likely that this would 
account for changes in affect than the changes in sense 
of self (e.g. 2-[b]). If an individual smiled or frowned 
in imitation of the mask, then there is certainly 
evidence that this could make them feel happier or sadder 
(e.g. Strack, Martin and Stepper, 1988), but it seems 
less likely that this would bring about feelings of being 
a different person. 
 
With respect to the other explanations of the masks’ 
transformative effect presented in chapter two, neither 
‘observer feedback’ (section 2.2.5) or disinhibition 
(section 2.2.6) seem likely sources, given the non-
interpersonal design of the study. The findings also do 
not support the ‘“motors” of the mask’ theory (section 
2.2.4), as if this was brought about the transformation, 
then one would expect approximately equal levels is the 
masked conditions. The other explanation, that of 
‘unconscious transformation’ (section 2.2.3), also seems 
unlikely, as the seated participants were not given the 
opportunity to physically behave in ways that might 
emulate the mask. However, it is just possible that the 
participants in the masked+mirror condition started to 
move their head or neck in ways which felt appropriate to 
the masked character, and therefore experienced a greater 
degree of transformation.  
 
Whilst it would seem, then, that the wearing of a mask, 
under conditions in which an individual is focused on 
their masked appearance, will bring about a 
transformation in the direction represented by that mask, 
it is not clear how this transformation comes about. From 
the qualitative data in this study, it would be tempting 
to conclude that it is probably a consequence of a number 
of different factors: certainly cue-effects, almost 
certainly some self-attribution effects (as this is the 
only explanation which can really account for the changes 
  
212 
 
in ‘self’-perception), probably effects of seeing oneself 
with a particular appearance, and possibly some effects 
of physiological changes in the face.  
 
In order to identify more precisely the role of the self-
attribution process, however, it would seem essential to 
conduct further research. Most importantly, it would seem 
necessary to find a way of controlling for the cue-
effects of looking at a mask --- perhaps by comparing a 
masked+mirror condition with a control condition in which 
participants were looking at the same mask but not 
wearing it. Possible physiological feedback effects could 
be controlled for by using masks which did not differ in 
features that could be physiologically imitated: for 
instance, two identical shaped masks, but one with a 
moustache and longer hair. ‘Unconscious’ tendencies to 
emulate the behaviour of the mask could be somewhat 
controlled for by giving participants tasks in which they 
would not be trying to behave as the mask-character. 
 
Responses to seeing oneself in a mask are likely to be 
more difficult to control for, as it would seem 
impossible to create a situation in which an individual 
can see themselves in a mask, but in which there would be 
no possibility of them having a particular reaction to 
it. However, at a subjectively-experiencing level, 
participants should be able to distinguish between 
feeling like the mask as a consequence of identifying 
with it, and experiencing a particular feeling as a 
response to seeing themselves in a mask. Hence, if 
participants were asked a very direct questions like, ‘To 
what extent did you feel like the person represented in 
the mask?’ then this should ‘filter out’ some of those 
feelings which are more associated with amusement, 
sadness or other responses to seeing oneself in a mask. 
Such a question would also have the advantage of 
filtering out those feelings which are associated with 
looking at the mask, per se. Thus, a question like the 
above should provide a more internally valid measure of 
the extent to which an individual actually experiences 
herself as the character represented in their mask. 
7.4.2 Hypothesis two: The wearing of a mask, under 
conditions in which an individual is aware that their 
face is no longer their ‘face’, will lead to a 
transformation away from the usual ‘self’ 
Because the data from the quantitative measures looked at 
specific affects, it can not really be used to assess 
this hypothesis. However, there is some data from the 
qualitative responses which provide some support for this 
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hypothesis. From the responses coded under dimension one 
(usualness of feelings), it is clear that participants 
felt less like usual in the masked+mirror conditions and 
in the masked conditions than in the non-masked 
conditions. Combined differences between positive and 
negative counts in these three conditions were minus 17, 
seven, and 43 respectively. Whether it would be 
appropriate to use the term ‘transformation’ for this 
change, however, is questionable. As discussed in section 
2.2, transformation refers to a change in the 
distinguishing attributes or characteristics of the mask-
wearer, and simply feeling ‘strange’ (1: frowning, 
masked) or ‘different from normal’ (16: frowning, 
masked+mirror) would seem a little too vague and ‘non-
essential’ to come under the definition of ‘transformed’.   
 
Evidence which does relate to thorough changes in the 
form of the mask-wearer, however, come from those 
responses coded under category 2-(a) (not the same person 
as I usually am), which indicate a specific loss in the 
sense of self. Whilst none of the responses from the non-
masked conditions was coded under these categories, six 
responses from the masked conditions were coded under 
this category, and seven responses from the masked+mirror 
conditions were coded under this category. Examples of 
these responses are: ‘I feel that I am not myself’ (23: 
frowning, masked+mirror), ‘I feel depersonalised’ (42: 
frowning, masked), ‘I feel faceless’ (55: smiling, 
masked+mirror).  
 
As with those responses coded under 2-(b), this is only 
around two percent of the total responses in the masked 
and masked+mirror conditions. However, what is 
interesting is that participants in the masked conditions 
were as likely to give responses coded under this pole as 
participants in the masked+mirror conditions. This is 
very much in line with the hypothesis that it is the 
participants’ awareness that their face is no longer 
their ‘face’, rather than their awareness of their new 
‘face’s’ appearance, that will determine how much they 
feel unlike their usual selves. In the present study, 
participants in the masked conditions may not have been 
quite as aware as participants in the masked+mirror 
conditions that their face was no longer their ‘face’, 
but they should still have had considerable awareness of 
this fact. For instance, they would have been able to 
feel the mask on their face, and their vision would have 
been limited by the mask’s eye-holes. Hence the fact that 
a small percentage of participants felt more 
depersonalised or faceless in this condition, even though 
they did not feel more like the mask that they were 
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wearing, suggests that the factors which determine how 
much an individual feels like themselves, and how much 
they feel like the character in the mask, may be somewhat 
independent.  
 
As with the question of why participants felt more like 
the mask, there are several different ways of explaining 
why participants were less likely to feel like their 
usual selves when wearing the mask. It may have been due 
to a self-perceptual process, but it may also have been 
due to other factors: particularly the physical effect of 
the mask on the face. If, for instance, the individuals 
felt hotter than usual or found it more difficult to see, 
then they may have given responses like, ‘I didn’t feel 
like my usual self’. Also, participants may have simply 
described themselves as feeling less like themselves 
because the wearing of a mask is a less than usual 
activity. Having said that, the kinds of responses that 
were coded under 2-(a) suggested a transformation in self 
which was more than just physical: for instance, feeling 
‘depersonalised’ or ‘faceless’. This suggests that these 
responses may be more to do with a self-attribution 
process. But to explore this possibility more directly, 
it might be useful in subsequent studies to ask more 
direct questions, like ‘To what extent do you feel like 
the person that you usually are?’ 
7.4.3 Hypothesis three: Individuals reliant on self-
produced cues will experience a greater degree of 
transformation when wearing a mask than individuals 
reliant on situationally-produced cues 
Unfortunately, the very poor inter-item reliability of 
the self-cued/situationally-cued scale makes it very 
difficult to say anything meaningful regarding this 
hypothesis. As with the measures of private self-
awareness, it is worth noting that none of the authors 
who have developed or used these items report their 
inter-item reliability, and it may be that a more 
reliable self-report measure of self-/situationally-cued 
will need to be developed. On the basis of the individual 
items alone, however, what significant findings there are 
somewhat question the above hypothesis, and suggest that 
it may be individuals reliant on situationally-produced 
who are more responsive to wearing a mask cues. However, 
given that this significant effect occurred only in the 
masked conditions, and not in the masked-mirror 
conditions, where one might expect the mask to be a more 
prominent situational cue, it is very difficult to 
interpret the meaning of these correlations.  
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In subsequent studies, it might be worthwhile using a 
less self-report-based method of measuring the extent to 
which individuals are reliant on self- or situationally-
based cues. It may be, for instance, that individuals’ 
reliance on self- or situational-cues is only at the 
fringes of awareness, and therefore not something that 
will emerge on self-report items. In some studies, Laird 
has used more behavioural measures, such as scores on the 
Embedded Figures Test (e.g. Laird and Berglas, 1975). In 
subsequent studies, such an approach might prove a more 
reliable means of testing this hypothesis.  
7.4.4 Hypothesis four: Individuals high in public 
self-consciousness will experience a greater degree of 
transformation when wearing a mask than individuals low 
in public self-consciousness 
There are no significant findings to support this 
hypothesis, but the post hoc finding that the predicted 
interaction effect only occurred in participants high in 
public self-consciousness suggests that this might be an 
area which warrants further investigation. However, it 
should be noted that as this is a correlational finding, 
there could be any number of reasons why only 
participants high in PBSC showed the predicted 
interaction effect. One possibility, as suggested in 
6.2.4, is that individuals high in PBSC may be more aware 
of changes in their public self appearance. However, 
another explanation might be that individuals high in 
PBSC find it easier to take on social roles, and 
therefore are more likely to take on the character of 
different masks. 
 
Statistically, there is also the problem with a post hoc 
median split in that there is unlikely to be an even 
distribution of the between-participant factor (in this 
case, sequence) across the ‘highs’ and ‘lows’. In the 
present study, for instance, six of the high PBSC 
participants were in sequence one and three were in 
sequence four, whilst three of the low PBSC participants 
were in sequence one and six in sequence four. This, 
clearly, has the possibility of biasing the results. In 
future studies, therefore, it would be imperative to 
divide the participants into ‘highs’ and ‘lows’ before 
randomly allocating them to the between-participant 
conditions, to ensure that the between-participant 
factors are equivalent across ‘highs’ and ‘lows’.  
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7.4.5 Other Findings 
With respect to the hypothesis that the mask reduces its 
wearer’s feelings of identifiability, it is interesting 
to note that thirteen of the responses in the masked 
conditions, and three of the responses in the 
masked+mirror conditions, were coded under the category 
13+ (hiddenness). This compares with none in the non-
masked conditions. Whilst this is only three and one 
percent of the total responses for the masked and 
masked+mirror conditions, respectively, it is still quite 
substantial given that the participants were, 
‘objectively’, no less identifiable when wearing the 
mask. That is, no-one was looking at them in the first 
place, and they were turned away from the researcher. 
This supports the argument, made in section 3.2.1, that 
it may be important to distinguish between experienced-
identifiability and ‘actual’-identifiability, and that 
the mask may reduce the former even if it does not reduce 
the latter. 
 
The responses coded under category 2-(d) (detached or cut 
off from the person that I usually am) are also of some 
theoretical interest. None of the responses from the non-
masked conditions were coded under this category, eleven 
from the masked conditions were, and seven from the 
masked+mirror conditions were. Examples of responses in 
this category are: ‘I feel detached --- I look at my 
eyes’ (8: smiling, masked+mirror), ‘I feel still an 
observer’ (30: frowning, masked+mirror), I feel like a 
“hidden watcher” (a bit)’ (37: smiling, masked). These 
frequency counts could be taken as support for the 
hypothesis that the wearing of a mask brings about a 
transformation in which the wearer feels less like 
themselves. As discussed in section 2.2.2, however, there 
is something of a distinction between the hypothesis that 
the mask brings about a diachronic split between past and 
present self-concepts (e.g. Honigman 1977), and the 
hypothesis that the mask brings about a synchronic split 
between self-concept and behaviour or public self (e.g. 
Jennings, 1990). Responses categorised under 2-(d) seem 
to fall more clearly under the latter, in that 
participants are describing more of a ‘detachment from 
self’ than a ‘loss of self’. In this respect, these 
findings lend some tentative support to the theory that 
the wearing of a mask creates a dramatic distance between 
the individual’s sense of self and their public self or 
behaviours. In subsequent research, it would be 
interesting to explore this process further; again, 
perhaps, by simply asking direct questions like: ‘To what 
extent do you feel “cut off” from your external 
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appearance?’ or ‘‘To what extent do you feel detached 
from your behaviour?’ 
 
With respect to the hypothesis that the mask facilitates 
the expression of aspects of the Self, there was only one 
response coded under category 2-(c) (expressing a 
different ‘part’ of myself). This was ‘I feel like an 
alter ego has surfaced’ (30: frowning, masked+mirror). 
With just one response coded in this way, it is very 
difficult to come to any conclusion regarding this 
effect, except to say that it does not appear to be a 
particularly prevalent one. 
7.4.4 General Methodological Issues 
As with the previous study, there has been a high degree 
of agreement between the quantitative and qualitative 
findings of this study, showing a strong degree of 
synchronic reliability. Diachronic reliability, again, is 
uncertain, though some of the findings in this study do 
seem to build on findings in the previous study: that the 
wearing of a mask does lead some individuals to feel less 
like themselves, less identifiable, and possibly more 
inhibited.  
 
With respect to internal validity, as with the previous 
study, demand characteristics do not seem to have had 
much effect. Indeed, in the present study, they seem to 
have brought about a notable reactance effect. It also 
seems unlikely that experimenter expectancy affected the 
results, given the minimal contact between experimenter 
and participants, particularly whilst the participants 
were engaged in the various conditions.  
 
As a consequence of only minimal contact between 
participant and experimenter, however, one possible 
source of bias may have been the fact that the amount of 
time participants spent in each condition was not 
standardised. It is not clear how this would have 
interacted with the various experimental conditions. 
However, in future studies it may be useful to ask 
participants to wear/look at the masks for a 
standardised, short, period of time, to see if this makes 
any difference to the degree of transformation.  
 
Another question of internal validity is the extent to 
which the quantitative --- and indeed, the qualitative --
- measures of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ affect actually 
assessed how much individuals felt like the character 
they saw in the mask. It was assumed that the smiling 
mask would be associated with ‘positiveness’ and the 
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frowning mask with ‘negativeness’, but it would probably 
have been better to conduct a pilot survey to ensure that 
this was actually the case. Also, as much of the more 
recent mood research now shows (e.g. Warr, Barter and 
Brownbridge, 1983), positive and negative feelings are 
not two ends of a bipolar continuum but somewhat 
independent variables. Hence, to increase the internal 
validity of this study, it may have been better to have 
two independent measures of ‘positive affect’ and 
‘negative affect’, or, even better, two independent 
measures of ‘happiness’ and ‘sadness’.  
 
With respect to internal validity, the use of blind, 
external coders has clearly been advantageous, as it 
reduces the likelihood that the more significant 
qualitative findings are a result of experimenter bias. A 
more open-coding procedure has also ensured that the 
categorised data reflects more accurately the way in 
which participants actually experienced the different 
conditions. The disadvantage of using such a ‘bottom-up’ 
coding process, however, is that it then becomes that 
much more difficult to interpret the findings in terms of 
the specific hypotheses that are being tested. Also, it 
means that a body of ‘superfluous’ findings may emerge 
which are difficult to interpret in terms of the specific 
hypothesis being tested. 
 
Because shorter response units were used in this study, 
it was also more difficult to identify the exact process 
by which the various effects had come about. The absence 
of post-experimental interviews also meant that a 
respondent validation process did not take place, which 
might have been able to clarify how the participants came 
to feel in the way that they did.  
 
Another question regarding the internal validity of this 
study was whether it was better to count the qualitative 
responses by text units (as in the present study) or by 
persons (as in the previous study). This is really very 
difficult to gauge, as counting by text units may 
overemphasise the experience of one or two persons, but 
may also convey something of the extent to which the 
participants had a particular experience. As has been 
done in this thesis, perhaps one of the best approaches 
is to use different means of counting in different 
studies and then see how well the findings triangulate. 
Alternatively, it might be best to use both types of 
measures in each study, so that the qualitative data can 
answer the question ‘how many’ as well as ‘how much’.  
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A final point regarding internal validity is that the 
categories were dimensionalised in terms of face 
validity, rather than in terms of any more rigorous 
process. Hence, it may have been more valid to treat 
responses like ‘anxious’ and ‘calm’ as independent 
variables, rather than as two ends of a polarity that 
could be combined. On reflection, however, the 
dimensionalising of the categories did make the 
qualitative data much more manageable. Also, if one 
treated the ‘+’ and ‘-’ frequency counts independently 
(see appendix 7f), the conclusions that one would come to 
would not be dissimilar from those using a combined 
score.  
 
With respect to validity, perhaps the most significant 
general methodological concern regarding the findings of 
this study is that of ecological validity. Not only was 
the study conducted in an experimental laboratory 
environment, but participants were primarily asked to do 
something that very few people wearing masks would 
actually do: reflect on what it is like to wear a mask. 
The consequence of this is probably that the experiences 
reported will be more exaggerated than they would 
otherwise be. This is for two reasons. First, 
participants will be more focused on the kinds of 
feelings that they may be experiencing. Second, 
participants will have some expectancy that they ‘should’ 
be feeling something, and therefore may be more inclined 
to report feeling that exist only on the fringes of 
awareness. Also, because of the within-participants 
design of the study, participants are likely to feel that 
they ‘should’ be feeling different things in the 
different conditions, and therefore may exaggerate the 
reported differences in feelings between the conditions.  
 
But the key question is whether this effect will interact 
with the different conditions, such that the findings 
will not only be quantitatively different, but that they 
will be qualitatively different from those that would be 
found in another environment. This seems less likely, as 
is it difficult to see a reason --- apart from demand 
characteristics, which have been ruled out --- why the 
laboratory conditions in this study would bring about 
feelings that would not exist outside of it, albeit in a 
lesser form. Given, for instance, that participants in 
this study seemed to feel less like themselves when 
seeing themselves wearing a mask, it seems possible that 
this effect may be less noticeable if they saw themselves 
wearing a mask in a drama class or in preparation for a 
fancy-dress party. But, if the effect is present in the 
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former situation, there seems no good reason to conclude 
that it will be entirely absent in the latter. 
 
Furthermore, it might be argued that the effects found in 
this study are less than what might be expected in a 
‘real world’ environment, for two reasons. First, the 
paradigm used in this experiment is equivalent to what is 
termed in the facial feedback research a ‘static facial 
pose paradigm’ (as compared with a ‘dynamic facial pose 
paradigm’). That is, the current study tested whether the 
wearing of a mask could initiate a subjective experience, 
as opposed to testing whether the wearing of a mask was 
able to modulate a subjective experience. From the facial 
feedback research, it is evident that the former is much 
more difficult to achieve than the latter (see, for 
instance, Rutledge et al, 1987). Given, then, that in 
most real world contexts the wearing of a mask will take 
place within a dynamic context --- i.e. an individual 
will not simply put on a mask and expect to feel 
something but will put on a mask as part of an on-going 
affective dynamic --- then it may be that there the 
effect will be substantially greater. 
 
A final general point regarding the methodology of this 
study is one of ethics. It is a point of concern that a 
number of participants did report feeling uncomfortable 
when wearing a mask; and that the average ratings of 
affect, particularly when participants were seeing 
themselves wearing the frowning mask, was quite close to 
the ‘extremely negative’ end of the affect scale. At the 
same time, it was made very clear to participants that 
they had every right to choose not to continue with the 
study if they did not want to, and none of the 
participants opted to exercise this choice, nor to say 
that they regretted taking part in the study in the post-
experimental inquiry. Of course, this may be because 
participants did not want to ‘offend’ the experimenter or 
to ‘upset’ the experiment, but to assume that 
participants were not able to take responsibility for 
their own activities would not seem to be a particularly 
ethical stance either.  
 
In future studies, however, it would seem important to 
further emphasise to participants that they really can 
withdraw from the study, and that this is not in any way 
a problem to the experiment as a whole. Furthermore, with 
participants who said that they found the wearing of a 
mask uncomfortable or unpleasant, it might be useful to 
find out why they then did not choose to withdraw from 
the study. This would be a way of ensuring that 
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participants do feel during the study that they have the 
choice to opt out.  
7.4.5 SUMMARY 
To summarise, the findings from this study strongly 
indicate that the wearing of a mask can bring about a 
transformation in the direction that it represents. 
However, for this to happen, it would seem that the mask-
wearer needs to be more than just aware of her 
appearance; rather, she needs to be directly focused on 
it. The findings from this study also provide some 
initial support for the hypothesis that this 
transformation can come about through a self-attribution 
process. However, the findings indicate that there may be 
a number of other reasons why individuals tend to feel 
like a mask that they see themselves wearing: cueing 
effects, and also the effects of seeing themselves with a 
particular appearance.  
 
The findings from this study also suggest that some 
individuals will feel less like their usual selves when 
wearing a mask, and that the factors which bring about 
this effect differ from the factors which lead people to 
feel like the character represented in the mask.  
 
However, with respect to individual difference, there is 
no evidence that individuals who are more reliant on 
self-produced cues experience a greater transformation 
when wearing a mask than individuals who are reliant on 
situationally-produced cues. There is some indication 
that individuals high in public self-consciousness 
experience a greater transformation when wearing a mask, 
but this is a finding that requires substantially greater 
exploration.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CHANGES IN OTHER-PERCEPTION AS A FUNCTION 
OF THE OTHER WEARING A MASK 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having established that the mask has the potential to 
transform its wearer, this and the following chapter will 
now look in more detail at the question of whether this 
can occur through the kind of self-attribution process 
outlined by Laird (1974) and his colleagues. As argued in 
section 6.2.2, however, logically prior to the question 
of whether the self is perceived differently in a mask is 
the question of whether another is perceived differently 
in a mask. If this is the case, then the mask can be 
added to those entities --- such as dress style, 
neckties, spectacles (see Kellerman and Laird, 1982) --- 
which have the potential to affect the attributes 
ascribed to oneself. Hence, the aim of this study is to 
directly test the fourth hypothesis developed in chapter 
six:  
 
The wearing of a mask will transform how that mask-wearer 
is perceived, such that observers will tend towards 
perceiving her in terms of the psychological 
characteristics represented in her mask. 
8.2 METHOD 
8.2.1 Design 
The study used a between-participants design, with half 
the participants asked to rate pictures of an individual 
wearing a smiling mask, and half asked to rate identical 
pictures, except that the individual was wearing a 
frowning mask instead of a smiling mask. The dependent 
measure was ratings of how positive or negative the 
participants thought the feelings expressed by the 
masked-individual were
11
. It was hypothesised that 
                     
11
 As noted in the previous study, ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ affect do not seem to be two opposite poles on 
a single dimension, but somewhat different dimensions. 
However, a positive-negative polarity was used in the 
present study so that participants had only one scale to 
respond to. 
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participants would rate the expressed-feelings more 
positively in the smiling-mask condition as opposed to 
the frowning-mask condition.  
8.2.2 Participants 
Forty participants in total took part in the study, 
twenty in the smiling-mask condition and twenty in the 
frowning-mask condition. Participants were recruited by 
the researcher in various refreshment areas of the 
University of Sussex. Twenty-three of the participants 
were female (eleven in the frowning mask condition, 
twelve in the smiling mask condition), and seventeen of 
the participants were male (nine in the frowning mask 
condition, eight in the smiling mask condition). Twenty-
nine of the participants were undergraduate students 
(fourteen in the frowning mask condition, fifteen in the 
smiling mask condition), and eleven were postgraduate 
students (six in the frowning mask condition, five in the 
smiling mask condition). The participants came from a 
range of arts and science schools across the University 
campus, such as the School of Biological Sciences, School 
of African and Asian Studies, and the School of Social 
Sciences. 
8.2.3 Materials 
The five-page questionnaire presented to the participants 
consisted of instructions, and eight photographs (smiling 
or frowning mask) with Likert-type scales underneath. 
Copies of both questionnaires can be seen in appendix 8a. 
 
The masks used for this study were identical to the 
smiling and frowning masks used in the previous study. 
However, when an initial set of black and white 
photographs of the masks were made, it was noted that the 
gold mask appeared much darker than the silver mask. This 
was undesirable, as there was the possibility that 
‘brightness of mask’ might serve to confound the 
experimental findings. Hence, both masks were painted in 
‘flesh tint’ before being used to produce the final set 
of photographs, such that they would appear of equal 
brightness.  
 
To create the two sets of photographs, a colleague of the 
researcher’s was asked to create a number of different 
poses, with the instruction that the poses should vary 
somewhat along a scale of expressions of positive or 
negative affects. When the colleague had found a suitable 
pose, and the researcher felt that the pose was not 
overly ‘unnatural’, the colleague was asked to hold that 
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pose by keeping very still. She was then photographed in 
this pose twice, once wearing the smiling mask, and once 
wearing the frowning mask. As part of this process, it 
was ensured that the colleague was not aware which of the 
masks were over her face, such that she would not 
‘unconsciously’ change her body posture in accord with 
the mask’s expression. Also, in some cases the colleague 
wore the frowning mask first and the smiling mask second, 
and in others vice-versa, to ensure that any general 
postural changes over time would be balanced out.  
 
Around twenty different pairs of photographs were taken. 
Once these were processed, each pair was examined in 
detail, and those where there was any noticeable degree 
of difference between the two images (e.g. where the eyes 
in one photograph could be seen better than in the other, 
or where the hands were higher in one than the other) 
were discarded. This left eight pairs of near-identical 
photographs, which were used for the experimental 
questionnaires.  
 
The first page of the questionnaire contained 
instructions, and asked participants to ‘try to estimate 
the extent to which you think the actor is expressing a 
positive or negative feeling in each of the images’. They 
were asked to do this by, ‘circling a number from 1 to 11 
on the scale underneath each image, where 1 = the 
expression of an extremely negative feeling, and 11 = the 
expression of an extremely positive feeling.’ To provide 
a rationale for why the actor might be wearing a mask --- 
such that the participants would not immediately assume 
that it was a study of the effects of seeing a mask --- 
participants were told that the actors’ face was being 
kept anonymous. To minimise the extent to which they 
focused on the mask’s appearance, participants were also 
specifically instructed to base their judgements on the 
actor’s postures and gestures.  
 
Underneath each of the eight subsequent photographs was 
an eleven-point Likert-type scale, anchored at ‘extremely 
negative’ for one and ‘extremely positive’ for eleven. 
8.2.4 Procedure 
Prospective participants were approached and asked if 
they wanted to take part in a psychology study. If they 
agreed to participate, one of the questionnaires was 
randomly selected, and given to the participant, where 
they were sitting. Participants were told that the 
questionnaire was ‘fairly self-explanatory’ but if they 
had any questions they should ask the researcher. No 
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participants had any questions. The researcher then 
withdrew from close proximity to the participant to 
minimise possible experimenter-expectancy effects.  
 
When the participant looked like she had completed the 
questionnaire (on average, this took about ten minutes), 
and confirmed that she or her had done so, details of 
undergraduate/graduate status and School were asked for. 
A laddered debriefing process was then conducted, whereby 
participants were then asked if they had thought at all 
about the aims of the study, and, if so, what they 
thought those aims might be. Once the extent of the 
participants’ awareness of the experimental hypothesis 
had been ascertained, a more general discussion was 
entered into about the study, and the exact purpose of it 
was explained to the participants. This often involved 
showing participants the questionnaires with both sets of 
photographs. Finally, participants were thanked for their 
time, and asked, because of the nature of the research, 
not to talk to others around campus about the specific 
experimental hypothesis that was being tested. All 
participants agreed to this.  
8.3 RESULTS 
Frequency distribution charts of the dependent measures 
showed acceptably normal distributions on all measures. 
T-tests were therefore conducted on the participants’ 
mean ratings across all eight photographs, as well as on 
each of the specific photographs. The t-tests showed 
that, on average, participants estimated the actor as 
expressing a significantly more positive feeling in the 
smiling mask condition as compared with the frowning mask 
condition (see table 8.1, full details of analyses are in 
appendix 8b). With respect to the specific pictures, 
significant differences in the predicted direction were 
found in four of the pictures: one, two, five, and six. 
With only one of the pictures did participants in the 
frowning-mask condition rate the expressed feeling as 
more positive than in the smiling-mask condition: seven. 
 
From the post-experimental debriefing, no participants 
demonstrated an awareness of the experimental hypothesis.  
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TABLE 8.1 
Mean ratings of positivity, standard deviations, t-values 
and p-values 
 
 
 
Smiling 
Mask 
 
 
Frowning 
Mask 
  
Photographs 
 
M SD M SD t(38) P 
 
Picture one 
 
 
5.25 
 
1.89 
 
3.35 
 
1.04 
 
3.94 
 
.00034 
Picture two 
 
8.35 2.11 6.90 2.22 2.12 .041 
Picture three 
 
5.80 1.40 5.55 1.93 0.47 .64 
Picture four 
 
6.80 2.44 6.35 2.28 0.60 .55 
Picture five 
 
6.40 2.39 4.30 2.30 2.83 .0074 
Picture six 
 
5.90 2.49 2.85 1.50 4.70 .000034 
Picture seven 
 
5.90 1.59 6.00 1.17 0.23 .82 
Picture eight 6.00 2.22 5.45 2.65 
 
0.71 .48 
Mean total 6.30 0.74 5.09 0.69 5.32 .000005 
8.4 DISCUSSION 
8.4.1 Hypothesis one: The wearing of a mask will 
transform how that mask-wearer is perceived, such that 
observers will tend towards perceiving her in terms of 
the psychological characteristics represented in her mask 
The findings from this study provide strong support for 
this hypothesis. The validity of this finding is 
strengthened by three further aspects of this study.  
 
First, in contrast to previous studies on the effects of 
physical perceptions on psychological perceptions, 
participants in this study were specifically instructed 
not to include the experimental manipulation as one of 
the bases on which to judge the target individuals. 
Hence, even though participants were instructed to focus 
away from the masks, it seems that it still had a 
significant effect on how the participants perceived the 
mask-wearer. 
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Second, in looking at the mean scores for each of the 
individual photographs, the differences between the two 
conditions seems to be very much related to the relative 
prominence of the mask’s facial expressions in each of 
the photographs. Due to some technical difficulties, the 
expression of the masks on the fourth and seventh 
photograph are somewhat difficult to see (see appendix 
8a), and it is here that one finds two of the smallest 
differences between the two conditions. Indeed, the one 
condition where the mask’s expression is most difficult 
to see (photograph seven) is also the one condition where 
the actor was rated as more positive in the frowning mask 
condition. In contrast, the greatest difference in 
ratings of affect between the two conditions is with 
photograph six, and this is the one photograph where 
there are no hand or arm gestures, simply the mask at a 
slight facial tilt. Again, this suggests that the more 
salient the ‘facial’ appearance of the mask, the greater 
its effect on how its wearer is perceived.  
 
Third, many of the participants’ responses in the post-
experimental debriefing indicated that the mask did, 
indeed, affect how they perceived the mask-wearer. First, 
around half of the participants who were shown the two 
sets of photographs side-by-side after the study, even 
though fully aware of the experimental hypothesis, still 
said that they thought the feelings expressed in the 
‘smiling mask’ photographs were more positive than those 
in the ‘frowning mask’ photographs. Indeed, many were 
quite struck --- and amused --- by the extent to which 
the mask changed how they perceived the actor’s 
expressions. Second, in the post-experimental debriefing, 
around fifteen percent of the participants said that they 
found it difficult to focus just on the postures and 
gestures because it was so difficult not to be ‘biased’ 
by the mask’s expression. Indeed, one participant went so 
far as to cover up the mask with her hand whilst she was 
completing the questionnaire so that it wouldn’t affect 
her responses! 
 
Furthermore, it would be difficult to explain this effect 
in terms of demand characteristics, as none of the 
participants expressed an awareness of the experimental 
hypothesis: i.e. that the study was interested in looking 
at the effect of the ‘facial’ expression of a mask on how 
others are perceived. The majority of participants 
thought that the study was something to do with 
perception of others as a consequence of the position of 
their hands, or as a consequence of their facial 
expression being hidden.  
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What this study does not entirely rule out, however, is 
the possibility that the difference in ratings between 
the two conditions was a consequence of the two different 
masks acting as cues or reminders of different feelings. 
For instance, participants looking at the photographs of 
the smiling mask may not have directly perceived the 
mask-wearer as being more positive. Rather, seeing the 
happy mask may have made them feel more positive, and 
then they may have ‘projected’ this feeling onto the 
mask-wearer. Whilst this explanation can not be ruled 
out, however, it seems unlikely. This is because, as 
discussed earlier, the ratings of the actor’s expressions 
seems to be very specifically related to the relative 
prominence of the mask’s expression in each photograph, 
as opposed to being a more global rating. If it were the 
case, for instance, that the participants simply felt 
happier seeing a happy face, then one might expect this 
effect to be spread out over the whole task, rather than 
in a very photograph-specific way. Furthermore, 
participants were very clearly asked to estimate the 
extent to which the actor was expressing positive or 
negative feeling. Even if, then, this estimation was 
affected by cueing effects, the fact remains that the way 
in which the mask-wearer was perceived was altered by 
their mask’s expression.  
 
Another possible criticism of this study is the fact that 
participants were asked to rate what an actor was 
‘deliberately’ trying to express through different poses, 
rather than actual characteristics of ‘real’ people. In 
this respect, it might be argued that this study shows 
that the mask affected how participants decoded an 
artificial behavioural ‘signal’, but not that it affects 
how they really perceive individuals’ characteristics in 
a real world situation. Given such a limitation, it would 
be interesting to develop this line of research using 
more ‘everyday’ examples. For instance, participants 
could be shown photographs of masked individuals at a 
party, in one condition wearing ‘happy’ masks, and in 
another ‘sad’ masks. The participants could then be asked 
to rate the party-goers on personality traits or 
affective states. However, given that the mask’s 
expression did have a very clear effect on how the 
actor’s postures and gestures were perceived, it seems 
unlikely that this effect would be entirely nullified in 
a ‘real world’ situation. 
 
The findings from this study also raise the question of 
why it was that the participants’ perception of the mask-
wearer was affected by the mask’s appearance. Rationally, 
there is no reason why the participants should have 
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partly based their judgement on the mask’s appearance. 
Indeed, on a logical basis, they should have simply 
concluded that, ‘I can not see the mask-wearer’s face, so 
her “facial” expression can not tell me anything about 
what she is feeling.’ Furthermore, in contrast to seeing 
someone wear spectacles or a beard, the effect of the 
mask’s appearance can not be explained in terms of 
stereotyping, as the participants are unlikely to have 
pre-conceived ideas about what kind of people would wear 
smiling or frowning masks (though this might be an 
interesting idea to test empirically).  
 
Two alternative explanations, however, may account for 
the mask’s effect. The first is that some form of 
‘perceptual illusion’ occurs, whereby the observer 
perceives the mask-wearer’s ‘face’ as her actual face, 
and thereby makes attributions based on this facial 
appearance (e.g. Secord and Muthard, 1955). For example, 
even though the participants in the present study would 
have ‘known’ that the actor’s smiling mask was just a 
mask, they may have still tended to perceive this smiling 
‘facial’ appearance as the mask-wearer’s actual facial 
appearance. Affective attributions may then have been 
made on the basis of this smile. 
 
An alternative explanation, more in line with Bem’s 
(1972) self-perception theory, is that a masked 
individual is not so much judged on their ‘facial’ 
appearance, as on their act of choosing a particular 
‘facial’ appearance. According to self-perception theory, 
the kind of question that an observer asks is, ‘What kind 
of person would behave in this way?’ Faced with an 
individual wearing a happy mask, therefore, an observer 
may ask herself, ‘What kind of person chooses to wear a 
happy mask?’. She may then come to the conclusion that 
such a person must be happy, playful, immature, etc. 
 
Both these explanations seem possible. However, on the 
basis of both the research design and the post-
experimental responses in the present study, it is 
tempting to tend towards the former explanation. This is 
for two reasons. First, for the participants in this 
study, there would be little basis from which to assume 
that the actor has actively chosen to wear her particular 
mask. Indeed, they had been told that the actors’ face 
has been ‘kept anonymous’ --- a passive sentence 
construction which suggests that this was something done 
to the actor rather than an active choice on the actors’ 
behalf. Second, whilst a number of participants, in the 
post-experimental discussions, said that they found it 
difficult to judge the postures accurately because the 
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facial expression was ‘getting in the way’, there were no 
post-experimental comments from the participants which 
referred to the actors’ choices of behaviour: e.g. ‘I was 
wondering why she chose to wear a happy mask’, or, ‘I 
found it difficult to rate the pictures as positive 
because it was so incongruent with the mask she had 
picked.’ 
8.4.2 Other Findings 
Along with self-attribution theory, the findings from 
this study throw some light on two other theories of the 
mask’s psychological effect discussed in chapter two. In 
section 2.2.5, Maude-Roxby (1994) suggests that the mask 
may transform its wearer because ‘the person looking at 
you sees you differently’. The present study confirms 
that this latter change in perception is, indeed, the 
case. There is no evidence from this study to show that 
this then leads on to specific behavioural responses from 
the observers and the shaping of the mask-wearer’s 
behaviour. However, if the way in which the mask-wearer 
is perceived by her audience changes, it seems very 
likely that this will have some kind of impact on the 
interpersonal dynamic between mask-wearer and audience. 
Again, this is an area that would be very interesting to 
investigate further.  
 
The findings from this study also throw some light on the 
question of whether a masked individual will believe that 
their audience ‘sees’ them as their masked character 
(section 2.1.2). The findings here do not directly show 
that this takes place, but it does show that observers 
tend to see the mask-wearer as her character. The 
question now is whether the mask-wearer actually knows 
this: either at a reflective or pre-reflective level. If 
so --- and this might be something that would be 
relatively easy to test empirically, with such a question 
as: ‘To what extent do you think that the observers think 
that you are the mask character?’ --- then this would add 
considerable weight to the hypothesis that a mask-wearer 
may feel more able to ‘come out of their shell’ because 
they know that the person who is looking at them doesn’t 
think it’s them. 
8.5  SUMMARY 
The findings from this study provide strong support for 
the hypothesis that the wearing of a mask will transform 
how that mask-wearer is perceived, such that others will 
attribute to her the characteristics represented in her 
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mask. This is a finding of considerable significance, 
because it puts the mask ‘on a par’ with other physical 
coverings --- such as spectacles and clothes --- which 
have been shown to affect how other individuals are 
perceived. Given that there is some evidence to show that 
physical coverings which affect other-perceptions can 
also affect self-perceptions, it would be logically 
consistent to conclude that the mask may be able to do 
the same.  
 
Furthermore, the findings from this study provide some 
initial support for the hypothesis that a mask may 
transform its wearer because of the differential feedback 
she receives from her observers. The findings from this 
study also lay the foundations for the hypothesis that a 
mask-wearer feels less inhibited because she knows that 
others see her ‘as her mask’.  
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CHAPTER NINE: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECT OF MASK-WEARING ON SELF-
ATTRIBUTIONS 
9.1  INTRODUCTION 
9.1.1 Aims 
The main aims of this study were to build on the previous 
two studies by directly testing the fourth and fifth 
hypotheses developed in chapter six. Given the findings 
of the chapter seven study, however, the wording of the 
first of these hypotheses were slightly modified to the 
following:  
 
The wearing of a mask, under conditions in which an 
individual is focused on their ‘facial’ appearance, 
will lead to a transformation in the direction 
represented by the mask through a self-attributional 
process. 
 
 
This study also provided an opportunity to re-test the 
seventh hypothesis developed in chapter six, that 
individuals high in public self-consciousness will 
experience a greater degree of transformation when 
wearing a mask than individuals low in public self-
consciousness. 
9.1.2 Methodological Issues 
To test whether a mask does, indeed, transform its wearer 
as a consequence of self-attributional processes, the 
main aim in designing this study was to replicate the 
findings of the chapter seven study --- that individuals 
seeing themselves wearing a mask would feel more like the 
mask than individuals not wearing a mask --- but in such 
a way that alternative explanations for this 
transformative effect could be ruled out.  
 
From the chapter seven study, the main alternative 
explanation to why participants experienced a greater 
degree of transformation in the masked+mirror conditions 
was because the mask’s facial expression --- as seen in 
the mirror --- served as an external cue. Hence, in this 
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study, a masked+mirror condition was not compared with a 
non-masked or masked (non-mirror) condition, but, as 
suggested in section 7.4.1, with a condition in which 
participants looked at a mask but did not wear it. In 
doing so, any differences between these two conditions 
could not be attributed to the fact that the mask served 
as an external cue. 
 
In the chapter seven study, a second alternative was the 
possibility that the transformation had come about 
because participants in the masked+mirror condition had 
imitated the facial expressions of the mask, such that 
the transformation in affect was a consequence of 
physiological feedback rather than cognitive self-
perceptions. Hence, in this study, rather than using two 
masks which differed in their ‘physiological 
constitution’, the current study used two masks which 
were absolutely identical in their physical make-up, 
differing only in that one was painted as a ‘male’ mask, 
and the other as a ‘female’ mask. Any differences between 
the effects that these two masks produced, therefore, 
could not be accounted for in terms of the different ways 
in which the participants physiologically imitated the 
masks’ ‘faces’.  
 
As well as narrowing down the possible factors that might 
account for the transformative effect, there was also an 
attempt in this study to narrow down the dependent 
variables, such that they specifically measured any 
changes in self-attributions. This was done so that the 
possible effects of seeing oneself with a different 
appearance could be eliminated. Whereas the study in 
chapter seven, therefore, used relatively open-ended 
measures, the two main measures used in this study were 
much more direct, specifically asking participants to 
rate how much they felt like the person represented in 
the mask, and how much they felt like the person that 
they normally felt like.  
 
Furthermore, whereas the study in chapter seven assumed 
that a smiling mask would be seen as representing 
positive feelings and a frowning mask seen as 
representing negative feelings, this study made no such 
assumptions about how the masks would be perceived. 
Rather, characteristics associated with each of the masks 
were identified by first conducting a pilot study in 
which judges were asked to rate each of the masks on a 
variety of characteristics. Those characteristics in 
which there were significant differences between the two 
masks could then be used as dependent measures, in the 
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hope that this would provide a more veridical measure of 
the ‘personality represented by the mask.  
 
A number of other significant modifications were also 
incorporated into the design for this new study. To 
lessen the demand on participants to feel ‘something’, to 
increase the external validity of the study by making it 
less ‘internally’-focused, and to reduce the extent to 
which participants might ‘unconsciously’ behave like the 
mask character, participants were given a simple task to 
perform. This was to draw the mask. This task also had 
the advantage that it kept the participants’ attention on 
their ‘facial’ appearance throughout. Dependent measures 
were then taken once this task had been completed. To 
reduce demand characteristics further, a mixed-, rather 
than wholly within-participants design was used.  
 
The present study also returned to standardising the 
amount of time participants had for each condition, as a 
means of triangulating with the less time-standardised 
conditions in the chapter seven study. To compensate for 
the fact that this might mean that participants were 
wearing the mask for longer than they wanted to, the 
informed consent form put a greater emphasis on the 
participants’ right to choose not to continue with the 
study. Also, in the post-experimental interview, the 
participants who said that they had felt uncomfortable 
wearing the mask were asked whether they had felt that 
they could withdraw, to ensure that participants had 
understood and ‘believed’ what was said on the informed 
consent form. To compensate for the fact that 
standardised time would mean greater contact with the 
researcher, every attempt was made to ensure that there 
was no eye-to-eye contact once the experiment had 
started, and that the researcher was looking away from 
the participants at all times. 
 
Finally, in contrast to the study in chapter seven, the 
present study divided participants into ‘highs’ and 
‘lows’ on public self-consciousness prior to the 
allocation of participants into the between-participant 
conditions. This was to ensure that any differences 
between these two groups could not be attributed to 
sequence effects.  
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9.2  METHOD 
9.2.1 Design 
This study used a mixed design, with one within-
participants independent variable: masking; and one 
between-participants independent variable of interest: 
type of mask. The dependent variables were participants’ 
self-reported ratings of how much they felt like 
themselves, how much they felt like the person 
represented in the mask, and how much they felt like 
items which had been previously associated with the male 
mask and items which had previously been associated with 
the female mask. It was predicted that participants would 
rate themselves as more like the person represented in 
the mask, and less like themselves, in the masked+mirror 
conditions as opposed to the non-masked control 
conditions. It was also predicted that there would be a 
significant interaction effect between masking and type 
of mask on the ‘male’ and ‘female’ items (see graph 9.1). 
However, it was predicted that these main and interaction 
effects would only occur for participants high in public 
self-consciousness.  
 
 
GRAPH 9.1 
Predicted interaction between masking and type of mask 
for scores on ‘male’ and ‘female’ items 
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9.2.2 Participants 
Fifty-six female participants were recruited for this 
study, all of whom were Open University students taking 
an introductory psychology summer school module (the year 
after the chapter seven study). Only female participants 
were recruited for this study because the dependent 
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measures were assessing feelings of ‘masculinity’ and 
‘femininity’, for which men and women would almost 
certainly have very different baselines. Hence, if both 
men and women were used, it would be necessary to ensure 
that they were evenly spread amongst the different 
conditions. With the psychology summer school students, 
this would not have been practical, as only a few men 
attended this module each week. The participants came 
from similar professional backgrounds as those in the 
chapter seven study. The mean age of the participants was 
34. 
 
Recruitment of the participants followed a very similar 
procedure to the chapter seven study: with a very short 
talk, identical to the one in chapter seven (see appendix 
7a), being given to the summer school students at their 
introductory briefing. The only difference in recruitment 
procedure in this study is that participants were not 
asked to sign up (as this had produced a relatively low 
response in the chapter seven study) and were simply 
approached during the students’ own participant-pools and 
asked if they ‘would be interested in’ taking part in the 
‘mask study’.  
9.2.3 Apparatus and Materials 
The design of the room was similar to the design in the 
chapter seven study. However, in this study, the full 
length mirror was placed directly in front of the table, 
such that participants were looking straight into it from 
the moment that they sat down. Also, in the present 
study, the masks were not placed on the table when the 
participants entered the experimental room. Instead, on 
the far left-hand corner of the table was a set of 
twelve, fibre-tipped Crayola colouring pens in a 
transparent pencil case, and a pad of W. H. Smith’s A4 
Graph Paper, ruled at 2, 10, and 20mm.  
 
Two masks were used for this study (see illustration 
9.1). These masks were structurally identical to each 
other --- both starting off as a ‘neutral’ mask, as used 
in the study in chapter four. However, a colleague of the 
researcher was asked to try to and make one of these 
masks as ‘male’ as possible, and the other as ‘female’ as 
possible, without adding any characteristics that might 
be physiologically ‘imitate-able’ (e.g. a raised eyebrow 
or pouting lips). The male mask was thus painted in dark 
skin tone, with a full beard and moustache. In strong 
contrast, the female mask was painted with a pink-ish 
skin tone, lipstick, blusher, eye-liner and eyeshadow. 
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ILLUSTRATION 9.1 
Male and female masks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The informed consent form used for this study was similar 
to that used in the chapter seven study (see appendix 
9a). However, because the dependent measures were 
somewhat more nested in this study, the line informing 
participants that they would not be ‘surprised at the end 
of the study by being told what the study is really 
about’ was taken out. Given the ethical concerns of the 
chapter seven study, it was also decided to extend the 
paragraph about possible adverse experiences when wearing 
the mask, such that participants felt as free as possible 
to choose to terminate their participation in the study. 
The informed consent form also asked participants to 
write down their age and occupation, so that this 
information could be kept separate from their other 
responses. 
 
The Public Self-consciousness Scale used in this study 
was identical to the one used in the chapter four study -
-- with a four point scale from ‘a lot like me’ to ‘not 
at all like me’ --- except that it was not embedded 
within the fifteen other items of the self-consciousness 
scale (see appendix 9b). Instead, just two ‘filler’ items 
were added to the beginning of the scale and one to the 
end of the scale --- all three concerned with how the 
individual might judges others --- as a means of somewhat 
nesting the exact variable that this scale was measuring.  
 
A post-task questionnaire, presented to the participants 
after each task, consisted of fourteen randomly organised 
self-report items, which asked them to indicate on each 
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of the seven-point Likert-type scales beneath these items 
the extent to which the items described how they were 
currently feeling (one = ‘not at all’, seven = ‘totally’) 
(see appendix 9c). A seven-point scale was used rather 
than an eleven-point scale, as, in the previous study, it 
was noted that some participants tended to mark the end-
points for all their responses. The idea of a shorter 
scale was therefore to minimise the ‘weight’ of this 
response set. Also, in contrast to the previous 
questionnaire, it was decided to ask participants ‘how do 
you feel now’ rather than how they felt during the task, 
so that they would not need to reflect back, but could 
quickly report on their immediate feelings.  
 
The fourteen items measured five sets of variables. 
 
To measure the extent to which participants felt that 
their sense of self was the same as it usually was, two 
items were developed: ‘I feel exactly like the same 
person as I normally do’ (item ten), and ‘I feel like a 
somewhat different person to my usual self’ (item three). 
‘Exactly like’ and ‘somewhat different’ were used to try 
and avoid ceiling and floor effects respectively, as it 
was expected that the degree of transformation would be 
relatively small. Assuming inter-item reliability, total 
‘like self’ scores would be calculated from the average 
scores of these two items, with the scores from item 
three reversed.  
 
To measure the extent to which participants felt that 
they had become the ‘person’ represented in the mask, two 
items were developed: ‘I feel somewhat like I am the 
“person” represented in the mask’ (item five) and ‘I feel 
like an entirely different person to the “person” 
represented in the mask’ (item thirteen). Assuming inter-
item reliability, total ‘like mask’ scores would consist 
of the average of these two scores, with the score from 
item thirteen reversed. 
 
The third and fourth sets of measures, four items for 
each, were designed to assess the extent to which 
participants felt ‘male’ and ‘female’. To obtain these 
items, a convenience sample of twelve women, of roughly 
the same age as the expected Open University sample, were 
shown the male and female masks, and asked to imagine how 
well forty different personality items described each of 
the mask’s ‘personalities’ (see questionnaire in appendix 
9d). These items were taken from the male and female 
scales on Bem’s (1974) sex role inventory. 
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Once these inventories had been completed, those of the 
forty items which would not have been appropriate to the 
post-task questionnaire --- e.g. ‘No harsh language’ --- 
were discarded. Of those remaining items, eight were then 
used in the post-task questionnaire. Four of these were 
the items rated as best describing the male mask’s 
personality as compared with the female mask’s 
personality: ‘aggressive’ (t[11] = 2.77, p = .018) (item 
four), ‘analytical’ (t[11] = 1.96, p = .076) (item 
seven), ‘masculine’ (t[11] = 6.01, p = .000088) (item 
eleven), and ‘assertive’ (t[11] = 2.33, p = .040) (item 
fourteen). The other four were the items described as 
best rating the female mask’s personality as compared to 
the male mask’s personality: ‘childlike’ (t[11] = -2.6, p 
= .025) (item two), ‘feminine’ (t[11] = -4.66, p = 
.00069) (item six), ‘sympathetic’ (t[11] = -2.53, p = 
.028) (item eight)
12, and ‘affectionate’ (t[11] = -2.88, p 
= .015) (item twelve). 
 
A final two measures were added to the post-task 
questionnaire to check for the possibility that 
participants felt more like the ‘person’ in the mask --- 
and less like themselves --- in the masked+mirror 
condition, as a consequence of a reduction in private 
self-awareness. This was because, although participants 
in the non-masked condition were asked to look directly 
at their mask so that they could not see their face in 
the mirror, there was the possibility that they might 
have been able to see something of their face. As has 
been shown, this might then lead to an increase in 
private self-awareness (e.g. Buss, 1980). The result of 
this might be that participants in the non-masked 
conditions would then become less responsive to external 
cues (e.g. Johnson and Downing, 1979), and would 
therefore feel less like the character represented in the 
mask. To test for this possibility, the two measures of 
private self-awareness used in the chapter four study 
were included in the questionnaire (modified to the 
present tense): ‘I feel very aware of myself’ (item 
nine), and ‘Rather than thinking about myself, my mind is 
concentrated on what is going on around me’ (item one). 
As was shown in that study, the reliability of these 
items is highly questionable. However, as no other items 
have been developed to measure private self-awareness, it 
was decided to use these two items again. If there was 
                     
12
 Following pilot tests of this questionnaire, 
‘sympathetic’ was slightly modified to ‘sympathetic (to 
others in general)’, as a handful of pilot participants 
were unsure who it was they were supposed to be feeling 
sympathetic to. 
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any inter-item reliability between these two items, total 
private self-awareness scores would consist of the 
average of these two scores, with the scores from item 
one reversed.  
9.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were welcomed into the room and seated in 
front of the mirror. They were presented with the 
informed consent form, and asked to ‘have a read through 
it’, and sign it if they were willing to continue with 
the study. They were also told that it was ‘absolutely 
OK’ if they did not wish to continue with the study. 
 
When participants indicated that they had completed this 
form, they were then given the public self-consciousness 
questionnaire. When they had indicated that they had 
completed this, their scores was quickly calculated (this 
could usually be done in a matter of seconds), and 
participants with a PBSC score greater than eleven (the 
median score in the chapter four study) were randomly 
allocated to one of four high PBSC conditions, whilst 
participants with a PBSC score of eleven or less were 
randomly allocated to one of four low PBSC conditions.  
 
The four conditions for both high and low PBSC 
participant were: 
 
• non-masked (male mask) followed by masked+mirror 
(male mask). 
 
• masked+mirror (male mask) followed by non-masked 
(male mask). 
 
• non-masked (female mask) followed by masked+mirror 
(female mask). 
 
• masked+mirror (female mask) followed by non-masked 
(female mask). 
 
Hence, overall, the participants could be allocated to 
one of eight possible treatment conditions. 
 
Participants in the first of these conditions were handed 
the male mask (it had been previously kept out of sight 
behind a chair), and asked to put it on. They were then 
asked to take two minutes to draw the mask that they were 
wearing, using the pens and paper that were on the table. 
They were told that they would be informed when the two 
minutes were up. The participant was also asked to keep 
the mask on once they had completed the two minutes. 
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The researcher then sat down away from the participant 
and timed the two minutes. When the time was up, the 
participant was handed a post-task questionnaire, and was 
asked to ‘fill in the scales to describe how you’re 
feeling now’.  
 
When they had completed this, the participant was asked 
to take the mask off, and the male mask was then placed 
over a small hook on the top of the mirror. To ensure 
participants were not looking directly at their faces in 
the mirror (and hence heightening their private self-
awareness), the participant was asked if they could see 
their eyes through the eyes of the mask. If participants 
said that they could not, they were asked to move until 
they could. This was a way of ensuring that they were 
looking at the mask ‘face-on’, such that they could not 
see their reflection because it was covered by the mask. 
Once participants could see their eyes, they were told 
that they did not need to be looking at their eyes any 
more (they would not have been able to draw the mask if 
they had held this different point of focus), but that 
they should stay in roughly that position for the 
following task.  
 
The participants were then asked to draw the mask again, 
‘but this time with it on the mirror rather than on your 
face.’ Again, they were given two minutes, and when the 
time was up they were handed a second post-task 
questionnaire.  
 
When the study was complete, they were then thanked for 
their time, and asked if they would mind answering a 
couple of further questions. These were recorded as hand-
written notes by the researcher. The participants were 
first asked the general question, ‘How did you find 
that?’, which led in to a more specific debriefing along 
the lines suggested by Mills (1976), to ascertain the 
extent to which participants were aware of the 
experimental hypotheses. This often led on to a more 
general discussion about the study, its aims and 
hypotheses; masks in general; or the participant’s own 
individual responses to the mask.  
 
Finally participants were given a debriefing sheet 
(appendix 9e), which they were told that they could take 
away and read in their own time. It was explained to 
participants, however, that because the study was being 
run with their colleagues, it was important that they 
‘kept the debriefing sheet and the purpose of the study 
to themselves’. All participants agreed to this.  
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The procedure was identical for participants in all other 
sequences, apart from the type of mask worn, and whether 
the mask was worn first or placed on the mirror first. 
9.2.5 Method of Analysis 
Inter-item reliability tests were carried out on the 
combined questionnaire measures.  
 
Inter-item reliability on the public self-consciousness 
scale items was again high, with an alpha coefficient of 
.87. 
 
For the two items measuring ‘like self’ (‘I feel like 
exactly the same person as I normally do’, and ‘I feel 
like a somewhat different person to my usual 
self’[reversed]) the alpha coefficient was .75. This was 
considered a sufficient degree of inter-item reliability 
and these two items were combined.  
 
For the two items measuring ‘like mask’ (‘I feel somewhat 
like I am the “person” represented in the mask’, and ‘I 
feel like an entirely different person to the “person” 
represented in the mask’ [reversed]) the alpha 
coefficient was .48. This was not considered a sufficient 
level of inter-item reliability, and these items were 
therefore analysed independently. These items will 
subsequently be referred to as ‘like mask’ and ‘different 
to mask’ respectively.  
 
As with the study in chapter four, the two items intended 
to measure private self-awareness showed a low level of 
inter-item reliability, with an alpha coefficient of .31. 
These items were also therefore treated as separate 
dependent variables.  
 
Participants were coded as hypothesis-aware if they 
expressed an awareness of any or all of the experimental 
hypotheses.  
 
Frequency distribution charts on the post-task 
questionnaire items showed a non-normal, skewed 
distribution on a number of the items. Floor effects were 
clearly noticeable on the measures of ‘like mask’, 
‘masculine’, ‘aggressive’, ‘childlike’, and 
‘affectionate’; and ceiling effects were clearly 
noticeable on the measures of ‘different to mask’. For 
the measure of ‘like self’, there was a noticeable 
ceiling effect in the non-masked condition. Given this 
non-normal distribution pattern, it would have been 
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appropriate to analyse this data using a non-parametric 
test. However, because of the complex nature of the 
analysis required for this data, no such non-parametric 
tests are available. Hence, the dependent measures were 
analysed using a mixed model multivariate analysis of 
variance on version seven of SPSS, with one within-
participants factor: masking; and two between-
participants factors: type of mask and sequence 
(masked+mirror then non-masked versus non-masked then 
masked+mirror). Because of the non-normal distribution of 
parts of the data, however, any findings of ‘borderline’ 
significance must be treated with substantial caution.  
9.3  RESULTS 
Results of the multivariate analysis, using Wilks’ 
lambda, can be seen in table 9.1. (A more detailed 
analysis of the total data is presented in appendix 9f). 
As predicted, this shows a significant main effect for 
masking, and a significant masking  gender of mask 
interaction. There is also a significant masking  
sequence interaction.  
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TABLE 9.1 
Multivariate tests for between-participant and within-
participant factors 
 
 
Factor 
 
 
F 
 
Hyp. 
df 
 
 
Error 
df 
 
 
p 
 
Between-
participants 
    
 
Sequence 
 
1.3 
 
13 
 
40 
 
.25 
 
Type of mask 
 
1.78 
 
13 
 
40 
 
.081 
 
Sequence  Type of 
mask 
 
1.06 
 
13 
 
40 
 
.42 
 
 
Within-participants 
    
 
Masking 
 
4.66 
 
13 
 
40 
 
.000081 
 
Masking  Sequence 
 
2.17 
 
13 
 
40 
 
.031 
 
Masking  Type of 
mask 
 
2.29 
 
13 
 
40 
 
.022 
 
Masking  Type of 
mask  Sequence 
 
 
0.95 
 
 
13 
 
40 
 
.51 
 
 
Univariate analysis of the dependent variables on the 
masking dimension are shown in table 9.2. As predicted, 
participants in the masked+mirror conditions felt 
significantly more like the character represented in the 
mask, less unlike the character represented in the mask, 
and less like themselves than in the non-masked 
condition. Contrary to expectations, however, 
participants in the masked+mirror condition felt 
significantly less concentrated on what was going on 
around them, and significantly more aware of themselves. 
Also, participants in the masked+mirror condition felt 
significantly more aggressive, masculine and childlike, 
and significantly less assertive, feminine, sympathetic 
and affectionate, than in the non-masked condition.  
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TABLE 9.2 
Means on dependent measures, standard deviation, 
univariate F ratios and p values for masked+mirror and 
non-masked conditions 
 
 
 
Masked+ 
mirror 
 
 
 
Non-masked 
  
 
Measures 
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
F(1, 
52) 
 
 
p 
 
Like mask 
 
 
2.75 
 
 
1.97 
 
1.64 
 
1.34 
 
20.26 
 
 
.000038 
Different to 
mask 
 
4.34 2.26 5.59 2.15 9.41 .0034 
Like self 
 
3.89 2.01 5.82 1.18 52.35 <.000001 
PRSA 1 (mind 
on what’s 
around me) 
 
4.04 2.34 4.96 1.97 12.26 .00098 
PRSA 2 (aware 
of myself) 
 
4.59 1.91 3.43 2.02 19.97 .000043 
Aggressive 
 
1.52 1.26 1.13 0.57 6.76 .012 
Analytical 
 
3.23 2.06 3.57 1.92 1.69 .20 
Masculine 
 
1.86 1.65 1.21 0.53 9.11 .0039 
Assertive 
 
3.07 1.98 3.66 1.79 9.44 .0034 
Childlike 
 
2.79 1.94 2.32 1.62 4.62 .036 
Feminine 
 
3.13 2.13 4.04 1.92 8.28 .0060 
Sympathetic 
 
3.59 1.93 4.20 1.85 9.93 .0027 
Affectionate 
 
2.20 1.55 3.04 1.86 16.03 .00020 
 
 
Univariate tests on the masking  type of mask 
interaction found significant effects for just two of the 
dependent variables: aware of myself (F[1,52] = 9.57, p = 
.0032), and masculine (F[1,52] = 4.75, p = .034). Mean 
scores on these two items can be seen in graph 9.2. This 
shows that, as predicted, participants wearing the male 
  
246 
 
mask experienced a greater increase in feelings of 
masculinity from the non-masked to masked+mirror 
condition, as compared with participants wearing the 
female mask. This graph also shows that participants 
wearing the female mask experienced a greater reduction 
in awareness of themselves from the masked+mirror to non-
masked condition, as compared with participants wearing 
the male mask.   
 
 
GRAPH 9.2 
Mean scores on ‘I feel masculine’ and ‘I feel very aware 
of myself’ in masked+mirror and non-masked conditions, by 
type of mask 
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No significant interaction effect --- between masking and 
type of mask --- were found for the seven other ‘gender’ 
items. 
 
Univariate tests on the masking  sequence interaction 
found significant effects for two of the variables: ‘like 
mask’ (F[1, 52] = 4.13, p = .047), and ‘like self’ (F[1, 
52] = 7.55, p = .0082). Mean scores on these two items 
can be seen in graph 9.3. This shows that participants 
who looked at the mask first and then wore it experienced 
a greater change in the predicted direction than 
participants who wore the mask first and then looked at 
it.  
 
 
GRAPH 9.3 
Mean scores on ‘like mask’ and ‘like myself’ in masked 
and non-masked conditions by sequence 
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Twenty of the participants (five for each condition) 
scored eleven or less on the PBSC scale and were coded as 
‘low PBSC’, whilst 36 of the participants scored more 
than eleven and were coded as ‘high PBSC’. Separate mixed 
model multivariate analyses of variance were conducted 
for both ‘highs’ (see appendix 9g) and ‘lows’ (see 
appendix 9h). As predicted, there was a significant main 
effect for masking for the high PBSC participants (F[13, 
20] = 4.27, p = .0020), but not for the low PBSC 
participants (F[13, 4] = .93, p = .59). Univariate tests 
on the masking factor for high PBSC participants showed 
significant differences in the predicted direction for 
‘like mask’ (F[1, 32] = 20.22, p = .000085), ‘different 
from mask’ (F[1, 32] = 6.28, p = .018), and ‘like self’ 
(F[1, 32] = 38.63, p < 0.000001). The interaction between 
masking and type of mask was not significant for either 
high or low PBSC participants. The only other 
multivariate test that reached significance was a masking 
 sequence effect for the high PBSC participants (F[13, 
20] = 2.34, p = .04).  
 
TAble 9.3 shows the mean masked+mirror and non-masked 
scores for participants high and low on PBSC for the 
three main dependent variables, and the mean difference 
between the two within-participant conditions (i.e. 
masked+mirror scores - non-masked scores). This shows 
that participants high in public self-consciousness, as 
compared with participants low in public self-
consciousness, did not experience a notably greater 
change in ‘like mask’ feelings, ‘different to mask’ 
feelings, or ‘like self’ feelings from the masked+mirror 
to non-masked conditions.  
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TABLE 9.3 
Mean scores on main dependent variables for participants 
high and low in public self-consciousness 
 
 
 
 
 
like mask 
 
different from 
mask 
 
 
 
like self 
 
PBSC 
mask 
M 
non- 
M 
diff 
M 
mask 
M 
non- 
M 
diff 
M 
mask 
M 
non- 
M 
 
diff 
M 
 
High  
 
 
2.69 
 
1.53 
 
1.17 
 
4.25 
 
5.47 
 
-1.2 
 
3.88 
 
5.88 
 
-2.0 
Low  2.85 
 
1.85 1.00 4.50 5.80 -1.3 3.93 5.73 -1.8 
 
Note: ‘mask’ = masked+mirror condition, ‘non-’ = non-
masked condition, ‘different’ = difference between 
conditions 
 
 
Following the post-experimental interview, sixteen of the 
participants were coded as being hypothesis-aware. In all 
cases, this was an awareness that the study might be 
something to do with feeling like the mask when wearing 
it. Comparisons of the means for the aware and non-aware 
participants on three of the main dependent measures that 
had reached significance --- ‘like mask’, ‘different from 
mask’ and ‘like self’ --- show that hypothesis-aware 
participants tended to give responses that were more in 
the predicted direction than non-aware participants (see 
graph 9.4). Aware participants also showed a greater 
interaction between masking and type of mask on measures 
of masculinity as compared with non-aware participants 
(see graph 9.5). 
 
 
GRAPH 9.4 
Mean scores on central dependent measures in 
masked+mirror and non-masked conditions by hypothesis-
awareness 
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GRAPH 9.5 
Mean scores on ‘I feel masculine’ in masked+mirror and 
non-masked conditions by gender of mask by hypothesis-
awareness 
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For these reasons, it was decided to repeat the repeated 
measures analysis of multivariance, using only the data 
from the 47 participants who were coded as hypothesis-
unaware. Again, multivariate tests found a significant 
main effect for masking (F[13, 24] = 2.56, p = .022), but 
not for any other main or interaction effects (see full 
analysis in appendix 9i). Univariate tests on this 
variable showed significant differences in the predicted 
direction for ‘like mask’ (F[1, 36] = 11.33, p = .0018), 
‘different to mask’ (F[1, 36] = 5.2, p = .029), and ‘like 
self’ (F[1, 36] = 27.48, p = .0000073).  
 
For descriptive purposes, correlations between the 
dependent measures can be seen in table 9.4. 
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TABLE 9.4 
Pearson correlations for dependent measures (n = 112) 
 
 
Measure 
 
Like 
mask 
 
 
 
DM 
 
 
LS 
 
 
PRSA
1 
 
 
PRSA
2 
 
 
AGG 
 
 
ANAL 
 
 
MASC 
 
 
ASS 
 
 
CHIL
D 
 
 
FEM 
 
 
SYMP 
 
Diff. to mask 
 
 
-
.33* 
           
Like self 
 
-
.55* 
.37*           
PRSA1 
 
-.14 .01 .22*          
PRSA2 
 
.26* -.15 -
.52* 
-.19         
Aggressive 
 
.45* -
.32* 
-
.43* 
.06 .23*        
Analytical 
 
.14 .13 .06 .05 .08 .06       
Masculine 
 
.40* -.14 -.42 .03 .20* .51 .00      
Assertive 
 
-.03 .09 .17 .10 .11 .13 .37 .07     
Childlike 
 
.14 .04 -
.24* 
-
.22* 
.12 .07 -.22 .02 -.12    
Feminine 
 
-
.25* 
.14 .31* .02 .08 -.13 .10 -
.26* 
.29* -.09   
Sympathetic 
 
-.03 .16 .11 .02 .17 -.03 .28* -.08 .33* -.01 .37*  
Affectionate 
 
-.16 .18 .18 .04 -.06 -.09 .16 -
.20* 
.37* .07 .34* .51* 
 
Note: *p < 0.05. Exact p values can be seen in appendix 
9f. 
9.4  DISCUSSION 
9.4.1 Hypothesis one: The wearing of a mask, under 
conditions in which an individual is focused on their 
‘facial’ appearance, will lead to a transformation in the 
direction represented by the mask through a self-
attributional process 
The findings of this study would seem to provide 
relatively strong support for this hypothesis. 
Participants in the masked+mirror conditions, compared 
with participants in the non-masked conditions, rated 
themselves as both significantly more like, and 
significantly less different to, the ‘person’ represented 
in the mask. Given that the p values in both of these 
cases were less than 0.005, it seems unlikely that this 
is a false positive result as a consequence of the non-
normal, skewed distribution.  
 
However, the fact that there was a low alpha coefficient 
between the ‘like mask’ and ‘different to mask’ items 
does raise some concerns about the reliability of these 
measures. If they were not measuring the same variable, 
what was it that they were measuring? Possibly, the low 
inter-item reliability was a result of the floor and 
ceiling effects, with many of the scores ‘tightly packed’ 
at either end of the scales. Also, the semantic 
difference between the two items --- ‘somewhat...’ and 
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‘entirely different...’ --- may have contributed to the 
low reliability. But, at the same time, the ‘different to 
mask’ item was a fairly straightforward reversal of the 
‘like mask’ item, and the fact that scores on these two 
items did not closely correlate suggests that the 
respondents may not have been scoring these items too 
carefully. In future studies, it would be advisable to 
use counterbalanced measures that were an even more 
direct reversal of one another: for instance, ‘I feel 
like the person in the mask,’ and ‘I do not feel like the 
person in the mask.’ Also, it would be advisable to 
instruct participants to read the items carefully before 
they respond to them, and to get them to check over their 
responses to make sure they are correct. The fact that, 
in the present study, the ‘like mask’ and ‘different from 
mask’ items did not correlate closely does not take away 
from the significance of the findings. However, if a more 
reliable measure could be develop, then the exact 
dimension along which this significant difference was 
occurring would be clearer.  
 
The data from the gender-related items, however, shows 
less support for hypothesis one. The interaction between 
masking and type of mask was significant for only one of 
these items (feeling masculine), though for three-
quarters of the items, the difference was in the 
predicted direction. This finding is particularly 
surprising, given that participants in both male and 
female masks described themselves as feeling more like 
the masks that they were wearing. How, then, can this 
apparent anomaly be explained?  
 
One strong possibility is that the participants who wore 
the masks may have seen very different things in the 
‘faces’ to those judges who rated the masks in the pilot 
study. This could have been because the judges were not 
from the same population as the participants. A more 
likely explanation however, is that the characteristics 
of the masks looked very different when the participants 
were wearing them, as compared with when the judges were 
rating them. A couple of participants in the post-
experimental interview, for instance, pointed out how 
aggressive and frightening the female mask looked when 
they could see their eyes behind it. If this is the case, 
then in subsequent studies it might be useful for the 
judges to rate the characteristics of the mask whilst 
they are seeing themselves wearing them. To obtain even 
greater internal validity, it might be advisable to have 
the participants, themselves, rate the kinds of 
psychological characteristics that they see in the masks. 
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Another possibility is that participants may have reacted 
in a compensatory way to seeing themselves wearing a 
particular type of ‘face’. One of the participants in the 
male mask condition, for instance, said that she wanted 
to feel more feminine when wearing the mask to compensate 
for how she looked. If this reactance effect was more 
generalisable, however, then one would not have expected 
to find that participants overall rated themselves as 
more like the character represented in the mask when they 
were wearing it. 
 
A third possibility might be that the constancy of the 
facial expressions between the masks meant that 
participants did not experience any strong differences in 
affective feedback between the two. Whilst judges did 
rate the masks as different on levels of sympathy, 
aggression, assertiveness, etc., it may have been that 
these differences were dwarfed by the physiological 
feelings that participants were experiencing at the time 
of wearing the masks. 
 
However, it may be that this finding is not so much a 
consequence of the particular masks used in this study, 
as a consequence of the transformative potential of the 
mask, per se. In other words, it may be that the mask is 
less effective at bringing a transformation about at the 
level of affect than it is at the level of 
cognition/self-perception. This would make sense in terms 
of self-perception theory, as what is being most 
immediately transformed here are the cognitions through 
which an individual perceives themselves, rather than 
more physiological affects. Clearly, further research is 
needed here, but whilst the results of this study confirm 
the fact that seeing oneself wearing a mask can transform 
how one perceives oneself, they provide less support for 
the hypothesis that the wearing of a mask transforms an 
individual at an affective level.  
 
There is also a fourth means of explaining why 
participants said that they had experienced a change in 
self-concept and ‘masculinity’ when wearing a mask, but 
not in affect. As suggested in section 7.4.1, it may be 
that the wearing of a mask does not bring about changes 
in self-perception at a psychological level, but simply 
affects the way in which an individual perceives their 
external physical appearance. In other words, when 
participants, in the masked+mirror conditions, rated 
themselves as feeling more like the person in the mask or 
more masculine, they may have simply been saying that 
they saw themselves as looking more like the person in 
the mask or more masculine. This would also explain why 
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there is a significant interaction on the masculinity 
items but not the more affective ones: because, of all 
the items, ‘masculinity’ is probably the one which is 
closest to a physical descriptor.  
 
However, whilst such an explanation is feasible, it was 
not generally the way in which participants described 
their experience in the post-experimental debriefing (see 
sample of transcribed notes in appendix 9j). Few 
participants made a point of saying that they were struck 
by how different they looked physically. When 
participants talked about feeling different, they talked 
about something that was not just at the level of the 
physical appearance, but at the level of ‘personality’ 
and ‘identity’. Nevertheless, given that this is only 
anecdotal, in subsequent studies it may be useful to 
clarify that when participants say they feel like the 
‘person’ in the mask, they are not just talking about 
change in physical appearance. One way of doing this 
might be to ask a question like, ‘To what extent has your 
sense of identity/personality changed?’ Such a question 
could also be asked as part of a more in depth, 
qualitative interview --- as in the chapter four study.  
 
In terms of internal validity, the data also shows that, 
for the ‘like mask’ item and the masculinity interaction, 
the difference was considerably greater for hypothesis-
aware participants. This raises the possibility that 
these findings were to some extent an artefact of the 
demand characteristics of the experiment. Given that both 
the ‘like mask’ item and the ‘different from mask’ item 
were significant for the non-aware participants alone, it 
seems unlikely that demand characteristics can entirely 
account for the overall significance. Furthermore, as 
Kruglanski (1975) has argued, the relationship between 
responses on the dependent variables and awareness of the 
experimental hypothesis --- as assessed post-
experimentally --- is a fundamentally correlational one. 
 
In support of the demand characteristics explanation, 
however, is the finding that participants’ ‘like mask’ 
responses were significantly more in the predicted 
direction in the second condition than in the first 
condition (i.e. the significant masking  sequence 
interaction). From this, it might be argued that the 
significant differences emerged because participants, 
when filling in their responses the second time, became 
aware of the purpose of the study, and therefore 
responded accordingly.   
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Such an explanation of the significant interaction, 
however, can not explain why there was a substantially 
greater increase in ‘like mask’ rating when participants 
went from the non-masked condition to the masked+mirror 
condition (M = 1.68), as compared with the decrease in 
ratings when participants went from the masked+mirror 
condition to the non-masked condition (M = 0.67) (see 
graph 9.3). A more likely explanation for this, and for 
the significant interaction between masking and sequence, 
would be in terms of floor effects. This can be outlined 
as follows. Participants who wore the mask first did not 
feel much like the character in the mask (mean of 2.55 on 
a seven-point scale), but felt even less so when they 
were looking at the mask on the mirror. However, as 
around half of them had already rated their feelings of 
‘like mask’ at two or less, there was not much further 
lower down the scale they could go. On the other hand, 
participants who did the non-masked condition first rated 
themselves almost entirely unlike the mask-character 
(mean of 2.18 on a seven-point scale), but then, in 
feeling a bit more like the mask character in the 
masked+mirror condition, had the whole upper part of the 
scale into which they could indicate their greater sense 
of being like the mask character. Hence, they would be 
likely to show a greater increase from non-masked to 
masked+mirror conditions than participants in the first 
sequence.  
 
Another explanation for the different ratings from the 
first to second condition might be that participants felt 
more relaxed after the second task, and therefore more 
responsive to the experimental manipulations. This is 
indeed what one participant said in the post-experimental 
interview. Having spent longer with the mask by the time 
of the second task, they may also have then been more 
familiar and therefore more responsive to it. If this is 
the case, then in future studies it may make sense to use 
some kind of warming-up exercise so that people relax and 
develop a familiarity with the experimental situation.  
 
What seems to emerge from this discussion, then, is that 
the wearing of a mask does increase the extent to which 
an individual sees themselves as the ‘person’ represented 
in the mask, but that this increase is relatively small. 
This is indicated particularly by the mean difference of 
less than 0.40 on ratings of ‘like mask’ between the 
masked+mirror and non-masked conditions on the first 
condition. Given that an attempt was made to rule out all 
other explanations, it seems probable that this 
transformation is due to the kind of self-attribution 
process outlined by Laird (1974). 
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Such a conclusion is supported by the anecdotal evidence 
from the post-experimental interviews. Of the 56 
individuals who took part in the study, around a quarter 
(n = 14) said that they did feel like they were becoming 
the mask-character when they saw their masked-reflection 
in the mirror. One participant (participant 29), for 
instance, said that when she was looking at herself in 
the mask she felt that she was taking on the persona that 
the mask represented. Another participant (41) talked 
about expecting to see herself when looking in the mirror 
but seeing someone else instead. A third participant (52) 
talked about becoming the person in the mask because she 
could still see their body, and therefore there was a 
part of her ‘in’ the mask-character. A fourth participant 
(30) talked about feeling a change of identity, and that 
wearing a mask brought about the same kind of effect as 
wearing make-up: increasing her sense of confidence. A 
fifth participant (34) said that she had a definite sense 
of being a different person when wearing the mask.  
 
Re-examining the data from the study in chapter six, it 
is interesting to note that this figure of 25 percent is 
not dissimilar from the percentage of participants in the 
previous study who gave one or more responses categorised 
under 2-(b) (a different person from who I usually am): 
21.7 percent. This may be sheer coincidence, but it does 
suggest that there is some diachronic reliability in the 
assertion that a small but significant proportion of 
individuals do experience a noticeable transformation in 
their sense of self when seeing themselves masked. In the 
first study, this figure was somewhat smaller, with 
eleven percent of the participants having one or more 
text units coded under transformation/not-self. Given, 
however, that the mask used for this study was 
particularly character-less, and that participants were 
not seeing their masked appearance in a mirror, one would 
expect a lower frequency in these conditions. 
 
With respect to the situational generalisability of these 
findings, it could be argued that the degree of 
transformation experienced by those participants wearing 
the mask in this study was so small --- particularly if 
one just looks at the difference between experimental 
group and control group on the first trial --- that it is 
unlikely to have any effect except under the most 
‘“facially”-aware’ conditions. There are four reasons, 
however, why the degree of transformation experienced in 
this study may have been lower than one might find in 
other contexts.  
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First, participants were only wearing the mask for a very 
short period of time: two minutes at maximum. By 
contrast, individuals who wear masks in carnival or 
theatrical contexts can be wearing them for hours on end, 
and this is likely to have a far greater impact. In the 
post-experimental interview, two of the participants made 
this point, saying that they may have felt a greater 
degree of transformation if they were wearing the mask 
for longer. This is not to suggest, however, that there 
will be a linear relationship between degree of 
transformation and length of time that the mask is worn. 
Based on the post-experimental discussions conducted in 
this thesis, it is tempting to suggest that the 
relationship may be more like an inverse ‘U’, with quite 
a marked feeling of difference at the beginning, a 
levelling-off as the individual gets used to being the 
mask-character, and finally a tailing away as the mask-
wearer can no longer sustain --- or is no longer 
interested in being --- the character represented by the 
mask. Another possibility, however, is the kind of 
exponential relationship suggested by Caillois (1962), in 
which there is very little initial transformation, but 
with the beginnings of change comes a snowballing process 
that rapidly gathers momentum. Qualitative interviews 
with individuals who wear masks might be an effective 
means of developing a further understanding of the way in 
which the degree of masked-transformation changes over 
time. 
 
A second reason why the degree of transformation may have 
been artificially low in this study is because, as with 
the study in chapter seven, it was based on a ‘static 
facial pose’ paradigm rather than a dynamic one. What was 
being looked at was whether the mask could initiate 
feelings of being like the mask character rather than 
modifying feelings that may have been more or less like 
the mask character; and, as the facial feedback research 
suggests, the latter is probably more likely to occur 
than the former. If similar masks were being used for 
subsequent studies, therefore, it might make sense to 
start with the participants doing something that was 
‘typically male’ or ‘typically female’ --- for instance, 
acting in an aggressive manner --- and then seeing 
whether the different masks had different modifying 
effects. 
 
This relates to a point made by Caillois (1962), and 
discussed in section 2.2, that masked-transformation in 
the ‘real world’ is probably a fundamentally dialectical 
process. The mask-wearer, for instance, starts to act out 
the mask-character, feels encouraged or aided in this 
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because they actually see themselves as that character, 
acts the character more, identifies more with the mask’s 
facial appearance, etc. Hence, if one just looks at the 
effects of changes in the facial appearance in isolation, 
then the degree of transformation may be far less than if 
it was within the context of an on-going dialectic. This, 
again, though, is something that would require further 
empirical investigation. 
 
A third reason why the actual transformation experienced 
when wearing a mask may be greater in the ‘real world’ is 
the fact that participants in this study actually felt 
more privately self-aware when wearing a mask, as 
compared with the non-masked condition. This seems likely 
to have happened because the experimental design was 
effective at stopping participants looking at their faces 
in the latter condition, whilst participants in the 
experimental condition could see what they looked like. 
However, from the self-awareness theory literature, it 
has been argued --- and shown (e.g. Johnson and Downing, 
1979) --- that the lower an individual’s private self-
awareness, the more likely they are to be respondent to 
external stimuli: such as the mask they are looking at. 
Hence, the greater private self-awareness in the masked 
condition is likely to have reduced the participants’ 
responsiveness to such cues as the mask’s appearance. 
 
However, given that participants in the masked+mirror 
condition were significantly more aware of their private 
selves than participants in the non-masked condition, 
there is the possibility that this may have increased the 
degree of transformation in some unspecified way. In 
future studies, it may be advisable to control for this 
by comparing a masked+mirror condition with a non-
masked+mirror condition, to see whether the act of seeing 
oneself in a mirror was is in any way responsible for the 
greater transformative effect. The problem with such a 
comparison, however, is that participants in the non-
masked+mirror condition, in contrast to participants in 
the masked+mirror condition, would be seeing the whole of 
their face. This could then bring in a host of other 
confounding factors: such as increased private self-
awareness. There is also the problem of where one puts 
the mask in the non-masked condition: on the mirror to 
one side, or beside the participants’ head such that they 
can see it in the mirror? Either way, this is again going 
to bring in confounding factors such that the control 
condition is not an exact match to the experimental 
condition. 
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A fourth reason why the transformative effect in the 
present study may have been artificially low is to do 
with an aspect of self-perception theory that Laird does 
not seem to address. This is the fact that, according to 
Bem (1972), a self-perception process will only occur to 
the extent that ‘internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or 
uninterpretable’ (Bem, 1972, p.2), and, ‘the 
contingencies of reinforcement for engaging in the 
behaviour are made more subtle or less discriminable’ 
(p.8). This is because, if internal or external cues are 
sufficient to account for a particular behaviour or 
physical appearance, then there is no reason for the 
individual to turn towards this behaviour or appearance 
as a source of evidence for self-attributions.  
 
In the present study, therefore, where participants were 
clearly instructed to wear a mask, they may have 
attributed their transformed appearance entirely to this 
instruction rather than to anything specifically about 
themselves. By contrast, if the reasons why an individual 
wearing a mask were more ambiguous, then the extent to 
which they might make self-inferences on the basis of 
their masked appearance could be substantially greater. 
Exactly what this ambiguous situation might be is not 
easy to say: as clear internal cues would need to be 
avoided as well. However, it might be the kind of 
situation in which an individual ‘just happens’ to try on 
a mask and then catches sight of themselves wearing it.  
 
Finally, with respect to corroborating the present 
findings, there is just one more alternative explanation 
that would be useful to rule out. In the present study, 
the experience of seeing a masked face was compared with 
the experience of seeing a mask with ‘nothing’ behind it. 
This leaves open the possibility, then, that the mask in 
the masked+mirror condition might have acted as a 
stronger visual cue. For instance, seeing the eyes behind 
the mask may have brought the mask to ‘life’, whilst the 
non-faced mask may have been experienced as inanimate and 
dead. Although this seems unlikely, given that the 
dependent measures very specifically assessed changes in 
self-perceptions [see section 7.4.1], in future studies 
it might be advisable to try and control for this effect. 
To do this, it would be necessary to compare a 
masked+mirror condition with a condition in which the 
participant was looking at an ‘inhabited’ mask: say a 
life-size photograph or a video of a masked individual. 
Again, however, such a comparison would bring with it a 
whole host of other confounding variable: for instance, 
seeing another face might raise the participants’ levels 
of public self-awareness. 
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9.4.2 Hypothesis two: The wearing of a mask, under 
conditions in which an individual is aware that their 
face is no longer their ‘face’, will lead to a 
transformation away from the usual ‘self’ through a self-
attributional process 
The findings from this study showed that the wearing of a 
mask significantly reduced participants’ ratings of how 
much they felt like their usual or normal self. Given the 
extremely low probability of this finding emerging by 
chance, it is unlikely that this was a false positive 
result as a consequence of the skewed distribution. 
However, as with transforming into the character 
represented by the mask, it seems likely that this 
finding was partially --- though not wholly --- due to 
demand characteristics. This is supported by the fact 
that a mean difference of just one point was found when 
only the first experimental and control conditions were 
compared.  
 
In contrast to the findings that participants felt more 
like the character represented in the mask, however, the 
finding that participants felt less like themselves is 
more difficult to interpret in terms of self-perception 
theory. Although the measures specifically asked 
participants to talk about changes in their self-concept, 
participants may still have responded to these questions 
in terms of how usual or unusual they generally felt. 
This could have been brought on by numerous factors in 
the masked+mirror condition, such as the physical effects 
of wearing a mask, seeing oneself in a mirror, or seeing 
a face that was more ‘alive’ when it was being worn. 
 
It is difficult to see how this problem can be overcome, 
other than developing even more direct question --- 
questions which would be in increasing danger of being 
over-complex. One might ask, for instance, ‘In terms of 
how you perceive yourself, to what extent do you feel 
that your identity is the same as it usually is?’ But 
such a question could easily confuse many respondents, 
and there is still no guarantee that participants who 
simply felt differently because they were wearing a mask 
would respond in the affirmative. Perhaps the best 
approach would, again, be to use a qualitative 
interviewing technique, in which these questions could be 
explored in more detail.  
 
From the anecdotal data of the post-experimental 
interviews, however, there is some support for the fact 
that some participants did experience a more profound 
change in their usual sense of self when wearing a mask. 
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This is implicit in what a number of those participants 
quoted earlier said: for instance, experiencing a change 
of identity. One participant (44), however, talked more 
specifically about losing her sense of self completely 
when wearing the mask, and another (54) talked about 
feeling depersonalised and a bit anonymous. In contrast, 
though, one participant (33) talked about feeling more 
like herself in the masked+mirror condition, on the 
grounds that the male mask, which she perceived as a 
black mask, corresponded with her cultural identity.  
 
Something else of interest that emerged from the post-
experimental interviews was the ambivalence with which 
the masked-transformation --- both towards the mask and 
away from the self --- was talked about. No participants 
simply said, ‘I didn’t feel like myself’ or ‘I felt like 
the mask’ when wearing the mask. Rather, some of them 
talked about knowing that what they were looking at 
wasn’t them, and yet it ‘was’. Or they talked about 
feeling ‘strange’ or ‘confused’ by seeing themselves in 
the mask: ‘Is it me or isn’t it?’ This seems to be an 
important avenue for further research, because the sense 
of ambivalence or a feeling of being pulled in different 
directions seems most accurately to capture what many of 
the participants experienced when wearing a mask. 
Probably the best way to explore this would be through in 
depth qualitative interviews with individual who have 
worn masks in ‘everyday settings’, or even something akin 
to verbal protocol analysis in which individuals would be 
asked to talk about what they were feeling as they were 
actually looking at themselves wearing a mask.  
9.4.3 Hypothesis three: Individuals high in public 
self-consciousness will experience a greater degree of 
transformation when wearing a mask than individuals low 
in public self-consciousness 
The evidence in support of this hypothesis is somewhat 
mixed. On the one hand, significant transformations 
occurred only for participants high in public self-
consciousness. However, this may well have been because 
the sample size for the high PBSC participants was almost 
twice that of the low PBSC participants. This uneven 
distribution almost certainly came about because 
participants were filling in their public self-
consciousness scale whilst sitting in front of a mirror, 
and therefore would be likely to be more aware of their 
public selves than participants in the chapter four study 
(from where the median cut-off point was used). The fact 
that participants were filling in this scale soon after 
arriving in the experimental environment, rather than at 
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the end of a study, may also have meant that they felt 
more self-conscious and aware of how they were appearing. 
 
Furthermore, a comparison of the means shows that there 
was not a notable difference in the degrees of 
transformation experienced by participants high and low 
in PBSC. Indeed, with the ‘different from mask’ variable, 
participants low in PBSC experienced a greater change in 
the predicted direction than participants high in PBSC. 
This makes it very difficult to conclude that 
participants high in public self-consciousness are more 
likely to experience a transformation when wearing a mask 
than participants low in public self-consciousness. What 
might be more appropriate to conclude is that there is 
evidence that participants high in public self-
consciousness experience a transformation when wearing a 
mask, whilst there is not yet evidence that this is also 
the case for participants low in public self-
consciousness.  
 
In future studies, it would be advisable to include 
public self-consciousness as a between-participants 
factor in the analysis of variance or as a covariant. 
This would provide a more unified and powerful analysis 
of the role of public self-consciousness; and, as a 
between-participants factor, it would also be possible to 
look at the interaction between public self-consciousness 
and other independent variables. The strength of such an 
approach, however, is also its weakness: with an 
increasing number of between-participants factors, the 
results become increasingly difficult to interpret. 
Indeed, such is the complexity of this kind of analysis 
that, when attempts were made to introduce PBSC as a 
between-participants factor into the current analysis, 
SPSS consistently crashed! If PBSC was introduced as a 
between-participants factor in future studies, therefore, 
it would be useful to minimise the number of other 
dependent and independent variables.  
9.4.4 Other Findings 
If levels of public self-consciousness can not really 
explain why some individuals experienced a transformation 
when wearing a mask whilst others did not, what can? This 
was a question that became of increasing interest as this 
study progressed. What was perhaps most striking from 
talking to the participants in the post-experimental 
debriefing was the diversity of experiences that they 
reported as a consequence of seeing themselves in the 
mask. Whilst some talked about feeling totally different, 
others would simply say: ‘Well, I was just wearing a 
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mask, wasn’t I!’ and would be quite incredulous at the 
possibility that some people might actually feel 
different as a consequence of ‘just’ putting a mask over 
their face. 
 
Aside from PBSC and the self-/situationally-cued 
dimension, there are a number of other individual 
difference variables that might relate to the effects of 
wearing a mask. One possibility, as suggested by Jennings 
(1990), is that those with higher ego strength are more 
able to allow themselves to ‘transform’ when wearing a 
mask. Alternatively, the degree to which an individual 
feels transforms when wearing a mask might be related to 
how easily she finds it to shift from one sense of self 
to another, and it might be very interesting to see 
whether individuals high on ‘self-pluralism’ (Altrocchi, 
1999) experience a greater degree of transformation when 
wearing a mask than those who are low on self-pluralism. 
A final possibility is that some individuals may make 
greater inferences about their private self on the basis 
of their public self (i.e. ‘I am what I look like’ versus 
‘What I look like is irrelevant to who I am’), such that 
they will experience a greater degree of transformation 
when wearing a mask.  
 
Alternatively, the different degrees of transformation 
may not be so much due to individual differences as the 
relationship between an individual and a particular mask. 
If, for instance, an individual feels an affinity with a 
particular mask character, then they may be more inclined 
to take on its identity. How an individual feels in a 
particular situation is also likely to make a difference: 
if they feel relaxed, for instance, then they may feel 
more able to let themselves ‘go with’ the character. 
 
From talking to the participants in the previous three 
experimental studies, however, what seems to characterise 
‘transformed’ participants as compared with ‘non-
transformed’ participants is that the former group tend 
to ‘see’ the mask as their ‘face’, whilst the latter 
group tend to see the mask as something quite separate or 
distinct from them. This did not seem to be a deliberate 
or conscious interpretation of what they were looking at, 
but an almost immediate reaction to seeing their masked 
‘face’: some responding with ‘Whoa... that’s a totally 
different person’, and others with simply ‘That’s me in a 
mask.’ Why these differences in perception should come 
about is not clear. Perhaps it is something to do with 
imaginativeness or creativity, or perhaps it is something 
to do with how well-acquainted individuals are with their 
facial appearance.  
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Finally, it should be noted that there are some 
significant findings from this study which had not been 
anticipated. Wearing a mask seemed to make participants 
feel more aggressive, masculine, and childlike, and also 
less assertive, feminine, sympathetic, and affectionate. 
Whether these findings are related to the specific masks 
used in this study, or whether they can be extended to 
masks in general is not clear, but it might be 
interesting to follow up these findings. Also, 
participants looking at the female mask seemed to be much 
less aware of themselves than participants looking at the 
male mask. This may have come about because the female 
participants felt more self-conscious feeling ‘watched’ 
by a male face. 
9.4.5 General Methodological Issues 
With respect to synchronic reliability, it is unfortunate 
that a more formalised method of obtaining qualitative 
data was not used in this study. Although the aim of this 
study was to ask a small number of very specific 
questions, the post-experimental interviews show that, 
even here, qualitative data would have been a useful 
means of triangulating the findings and gaining a deeper 
understanding of the processes that were going on. In 
terms of further research, all the questions raised in 
this discussion point towards the need to conduct more 
in-depth, qualitative interviews as a means of developing 
an understanding of how and why individuals feel 
different when they wear a mask. This could be part of an 
experimental research program, as in chapter four. 
Alternatively, it might be appropriate at this point to 
broaden out the research base by conducting qualitative 
interviews in more naturalistic, non-experimental 
settings.  
 
In terms of diachronic reliability, the findings from 
this study triangulate well with the findings from 
studies four and seven: showing that an individual’s 
sense of self can be transformed through the wearing of a 
mask. Furthermore, there does seem to be some diachronic 
reliability to the finding that it is only a certain 
proportion of individuals who experience a change in how 
they perceive themselves as a consequence of mask-
wearing. 
 
However, with the findings from this study, the 
possibility exists that they have been contaminated by 
experimenter-expectancy effects. Every attempt was made 
in this study to reduce face-to-face contact between 
  
264 
 
experimenter and participants and to allocate 
participants to between-participant conditions at the 
last moment, but there is still the danger that some 
contamination may have occurred. What effect this had is 
impossible to judge from these data alone. Ideally, more 
than one experimenter could be used, as a means of seeing 
if there are any significant differences attributable to 
experimenter expectancy. However, given that the findings 
from this study triangulate well with the findings from 
chapter seven, in which there was virtually no 
researcher-participant contact, this suggests that the 
transformative effects witnessed in this study can not be 
wholly attributed to an experimenter-expectancy effect.  
 
Another weakness in the internal validity of this study 
may have been to ask participant how they were feeling 
‘now’ rather than how they were feeling when drawing the 
mask. As discussed, this was done to speed up the 
experimental process, so that participants would not have 
to think back on their experiences but respond in the 
immediate moment. However, by responding in the ‘now’, 
there was no guarantee that participants in either 
condition were actually looking at the mask, or that they 
were looking equally in both conditions. Given that 
participants would almost certainly have been looking at 
their masked faces more when drawing their face than when 
filling in the questionnaire, this may have served to 
reduce the degree of transformation that participants 
experienced in both conditions. Also, speeding up the 
scoring process may have back-fired in the sense that 
participants consequently rated their experiences less 
carefully --- thus bringing about the noted loss of 
inter-item reliability. 
 
Another issue is the somewhat pervasive floor and ceiling 
effects in the participants’ responses to the dependent 
variable items. This may partly have been a consequence 
of using a scale with a smaller range than in previous 
studies, but it seems likely that even with a nine-point 
or eleven-point scale there would still be something of 
these effects. Another alternative, then, might be to try 
a ‘slash scale’ from one to hundred, to give participants 
as much scope to respond as possible. Alternatively, 
perhaps some kind of ordinal scale, in which participants 
were asked to say in which of the two conditions they 
felt more like the mask character would have been more 
appropriate. Such an approach could also be used with 
more than two conditions --- for instance, small group, 
large group, mirror, etc. --- in which participants could 
order each of the conditions from ‘most’ to ‘least’ ‘like 
mask’. This could then be analysed non-parametrically. 
  
265 
 
 
With respect to population validity, along with the fact 
that all participants were Open University students, all 
participants in this study were also women. It is 
difficult to assess the extent to which this may have 
interacted with the independent variables, as with the 
previous studies there have been too few male 
participants to identify any differences in the way that 
the different genders respond to wearing masks. However, 
in subsequent studies it would be an idea to try and find 
a sample source in which there are equal numbers of men 
and women, such that any gender differences in responses 
to wearing a mask can be more effectively investigated.  
 
In terms of catalytic validity, it was somewhat 
surprising to find, from the post-experimental interview, 
that participants seemed to enjoy this experimental 
paradigm more than the two previous ones. Around fifty 
percent of the participants said that they found the 
study interesting or very interesting, and a number of 
participants stayed on for fifteen minutes or more to 
talk through the experiment and their thoughts on the 
effect of wearing a mask. Perhaps this was because the 
aims of the study were actually clearer this time, and 
therefore participants found it easier to engage and 
respond to the question regarding the experimental 
hypotheses. The use of a debriefing sheet also probably 
gave participants something more solid from which they 
could share their own thoughts. The greater enjoyment of 
the study might also have been to do with the use of a 
drawing task, which most of the participants seemed to 
enjoy. In fact, this approach proved to be both an 
effective and interesting means of getting participants 
to focus on their ‘facial’ appearance, and is a strategy 
that could be modified for use in other studies looking 
at the effect of appearance on self-concept or affect. 
Finally, the greater ‘warning’ that was given may also 
have given participants a sense of feeling safer, and 
that they were not being asked to do anything they did 
not want to.  
 
At the same time, there is the danger that this ‘warning’ 
may have given participants the expectation that 
something substantial was about to happen when they put 
on the mask. This may then have biased the results. To 
avoid this, the wording, ‘some people don’t like working 
with masks,’ was used, so that this warning could equally 
apply to the condition in which individuals were looking 
at the mask. The possibility still exists that some 
participants may have read ‘working’ as ‘wearing’ rather 
than ‘looking at’, but this potential bias seems 
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unavoidable, unless one were to remove some of the 
ethical safe-guards. 
 
With respect to catalytic validity and ethical issues, it 
also proved valuable in this study to invite those 
participants who described feeling uncomfortable to talk 
about whether or not they had a sense of ‘having’ to 
complete the study. The finding here was that these 
participants were fully aware that they could leave the 
study at any time, but that the feelings of being 
uncomfortable were not at the point where they wanted to 
exercise that option. In future studies, it seems 
essential to include this line of questioning as part of 
the debriefing process.  
9.5  SUMMARY 
The findings from this study show that the wearing of a 
mask, under conditions in which an individual is focused 
on that mask’s appearance, significantly increases the 
extent to which an individual feels like the character 
represented in the mask, and significantly reduces the 
extent to which an individual feels like their usual 
self. This is evident in both the quantitative and 
anecdotal qualitative data. This confirms the findings of 
the chapter seven study: that the wearing of a mask, 
under conditions of high ‘facial’ focus, can have a 
transformative effect.  
 
Furthermore, given that the design of this study 
minimised the possibility that this transformative effect 
was due to the cueing effects of seeing the mask, or due 
to physiological feedback processes, the findings from 
this study strongly suggest that the wearing of a mask 
can bring about a transformative effect through a self-
attributional process. Not only is this finding of 
relevance to an understanding of the psychological 
effects of wearing a mask, but it also provides 
substantial support for Laird’s (1974) self-attributional 
hypothesis.  
 
In terms of individual difference, these findings show 
that a transformative effect is present in individuals 
with high public self-consciousness, but not necessarily 
in those with low public self-consciousness. However, a 
comparison of the means between these two groups suggests 
that further research is required on this individual 
difference measure.  
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CHAPTER TEN: DISCUSSION 
As the final chapter in this thesis, this discussion will 
look at the theoretical and applied implications of the 
present research. It will then go on to consider areas 
for further empirical investigation.  
10.1  THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Theoretically, the research conducted in this thesis has 
substantial implications for both an understanding of the 
psychological effects of wearing a mask, and also for an 
understanding of wider psychological and social 
psychological processes. 
10.1.1 Theories of the Mask’s Psychological Effect 
In terms of the hypotheses mapped out in chapter two, the 
findings of this thesis are of considerable importance. 
At the most general level, what the current research 
shows is that the psychological effects of wearing a mask 
are far more complex than had previously been thought. 
The causal network in appendix 2a --- which is no doubt 
incomplete in itself --- demonstrates just some of this 
complexity.  
 
Within the literature on the mask’s psychological effect 
--- and also within much lay-thinking --- the most 
commonly held assumption is that the mask disinhibits its 
wearer. At a general level, the findings from this study 
strongly challenge this assumption. Not only is there no 
empirical evidence within the literature to support this 
assertion, but the empirical findings from the present 
thesis suggest that the wearing of a mask does not have 
an overall disinhibiting effect. Indeed, there is 
evidence to suggest that the mask is as capable of 
inhibiting its wearer and it is of disinhibiting her. 
 
This is not to suggest that an individual can not feel 
less inhibited when she wears a mask. The present studies 
show that this can occur. But for an individual to feel 
less inhibited when wearing a mask, she must want to 
behave in a way that she would normally inhibit out of a 
concern for some facet of her mask-able public self. 
 
This facet may be the individual’s facial identity. In 
this respect, there would seem to be some truth in the 
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assumption made by numerous authors --- as well as by a 
notable proportion of lay-people --- that the mask can 
reduce its wearer’s inhibitions because it reduces her 
identifiability. However, the findings from this study 
suggest, again, that the relationship between reduced 
identifiability and reduced inhibitions is much more 
complex than has previously been thought. 
 
Within the literature, it is generally assumed that an 
individual simply feels less identifiable when they wear 
a mask. The research in this thesis shows that the 
wearing of a mask can significantly reduce an 
individual’s feelings of identifiability. However, the 
theoretical exploration carried out in this thesis 
suggests that this will primarily occur to the extent 
that the mask-wearer’s identifiability is dependent on 
immediate facial recognition. Hence, there may be many 
situations in which an individual does not feel less 
identifiable when they are wearing a mask. 
 
Even in conditions where an individual does feel less 
identifiable behind a mask, there is no reason to 
conclude from this that they will then behave in a less 
inhibited manner. Not only does the individual need to 
want to behave in a way that they would normally inhibit 
for fear of being identified, but they must also believe 
that some punishment or censure will happen should that 
identification occur. 
 
What this suggests, then, is that the kinds of situations 
in which masked-anonymity has a disinhibiting effect is 
probably much more limited than has been previously 
assumed. If an individual wants to behave in a way for 
which they know they will be socially sanctioned, then 
the wearing of a mask might be one means by which they 
could lessen their concerns. However, in situations in 
which individuals wear masks for reasons other than to 
facilitate disinhibited behaviour --- for instance, as 
part of the ‘dressing up’ for a carnival --- then wearing 
a mask is unlikely to have much of a disinhibiting 
effect. 
 
With respect to the theories of disinhibition reviewed in 
chapter two, the findings from this thesis lend most 
support to the hypothesis advocated by MacGowan and Rosse 
(1924). Some individuals do seem to be concerned with the 
‘sensitive jelly’ of their face --- looking awkward, 
uncomfortable, embarrassed, etc. --- and when their faces 
are covered by a mask, these concerns are lessened. 
Consequently, they can then behave in ways that they 
would normally inhibit out of these public self concerns. 
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However, the findings from this study extend MacGowan and 
Rosse’s analysis by pointing out that it is only 
particular individuals in particular situations who 
experience a reduction in these concerns. Hence, even 
MacGowan and Rosse’s theory has been shown to be somewhat 
over-generalised. 
 
The findings from this study also lend some preliminary 
support to other theories of masked-disinhibition. It 
would seem that some individuals do feel more detached 
from their behaviour and appearance when wearing a mask, 
and this may lead to the kind of dramatic distancing 
processes identified by Jennings (1990) and others. Also, 
the findings from this study show that individuals do 
perceive a target individual differently when that 
individual is wearing a mask. If it is assumed that mask-
wearer’s may sometimes be aware of this fact, then a 
disinhibiting effect may emerge through the dramatic 
licensing process outlined by Brook (1981) and others. 
 
This thesis has also identified three further reasons why 
a mask might disinhibit its wearer, none of which have 
been previously identified in the literature. The first 
of these is that, because the mask limits the wearer’s 
vision, she may not be able to see others as well. 
Consequently she may be find it easier to treat others in 
a less personalised and humane way. Second, it is 
possible that a mask-wearer may develop a character based 
on her conception of the kind of person who might wear a 
mask: i.e. someone who is ‘snooping’, risk-taking, or 
with something to hide. Third, observers may find it 
easier to treat a masked individual in a less inhibited 
way because they can not see that person’s facial 
identity or facial emotions. This might then induce the 
mask-wearer, herself, to behave in a less inhibited way, 
with the possibility of an on-going positive feedback 
cycle. 
 
The findings from this thesis also show that previous 
literature on the psychological effects of wearing a mask 
has been highly imbalanced in that, whilst much has been 
written about the mask’s capacity to disinhibit its 
wearer, there is virtually no mention of the mask’s 
equivalent capacity to inhibit its wearer. This 
inhibiting effects seems to occur primarily when an 
individual wishes to behave in a way for which they 
require mask-able aspects of their public self, and there 
is a substantial degree of diachronic reliability to this 
finding. This may be a situation in which an individual 
wishes to use their face to express emotions or to 
communicate non-verbally, to develop an improvised 
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character, or to establish some intimacy with their 
observers. The findings from this study also show that 
some individuals find the wearing of a mask physically 
uncomfortable or unpleasant. This may, again, lead to 
feelings of inhibitedness. 
 
The findings from this thesis also raise some important 
questions about the hypothesis that the mask can 
transform its wearer. This thesis shows clearly, for the 
first time in the literature, that an individual can 
experience a significant transformation in their sense of 
self when wearing a mask. This is both in terms of 
feeling less like their usual selves, and also feeling 
more like the character represented in the mask. The 
research in this thesis also suggests that a mask will 
primarily bring about a transformation at a cognitive, 
self-perceptual --- rather than affective or behavioural 
--- level.  
 
However, what this thesis shows, which has not been 
stated within the literature, is that the wearing of a 
mask will primarily bring about this transformation into 
the mask character when the mask-wearer is specifically 
focused on their ‘facial’ appearance. Where an individual 
is wearing a mask but is not specifically focused on what 
they look like, on the other hand, the evidence from this 
thesis shows that there is no significant transformation 
in the direction represented by the mask. However, there 
is evidence that they may still feel less like their 
usual selves. 
 
As with the mask’s ability to disinhibit its wearer, this 
finding suggests that the situations in which a mask 
brings about a transformative effect may be more limited 
than has previously been assumed. Certainly, it shows 
that Brook (1981) and others are wrong to suggest that 
the wearing of a mask, in itself, can bring about an 
immediate and dramatic transformation.  
 
The findings from this study, however, do support the 
hypothesis advocated by Honigman (1977) that a mask 
transforms its wearer by transforming her ‘facial’ 
appearance. The findings also lend some initial support 
to Maude-Roxby’s (1994) hypothesis that an individual 
will feel transformed when wearing a mask because it 
changes the way that her audience will respond to her.  
 
From the research conducted in this thesis, two further 
reasons why an individual may feel transformed when 
wearing a mask have been identified, neither of which 
have been previously stated in the literature. The first 
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of these is that the mask may simply act as a visual cue, 
directing the wearer towards the particular affects or 
characteristics that it represents. The other possibility 
is that an individual may have a particular affective 
reaction to seeing themselves wearing a mask --- for 
instance, amusement, or thinking that they look ugly --- 
and this may bring about a transformation in the 
direction that the mask represents. 
 
Finally, whilst there is clear evidence that the wearing 
of a mask has a variety of psycho-somatic effects, there 
is no evidence that it facilitates the expression of 
aspects of the wearer’s Self. Whilst none of the studies 
in this thesis directly tested this hypothesis in an 
adequate way, there was very little evidence from the 
open-ended measures on three studies to suggest that this 
effect was occurring. On this basis, it would seem that, 
in most instances of mask-wearing, this expression of 
aspects of the Self is not a particularly prevalent 
occurrence. 
10.1.2 General Psychological and Social Psychological 
Theories 
Both the theoretical reviews and the empirical research 
conducted in this thesis has implications for a number of 
psychological and social psychological theories: most 
notably, theories of self-awareness and deindividuation 
(e.g. Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1982), and self-
attribution theory (e.g. Laird, 1974). 
 
With respect to the first of these, the present research 
suggests that Buss (1980) and others are correct to 
hypothesise that anonymous conditions can lead to a 
reduction in public self-awareness. Furthermore, contrary 
to the hypothesis put forward by Diener (1980) and 
Zimbardo (1969), this reduction in public self-awareness 
can come about even when the anonymity-manipulation takes 
place in an individual, rather than group, setting.  
 
However, the findings from the present study suggest that 
the wearing of a mask, as an anonymity-manipulation, 
reduces public self-awareness in a way that neither Buss 
(1980) nor Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1989) have entirely 
anticipated.  
 
Like Buss (1980) and Carver and Scheier (1981) suggest, 
it would seem that the anonymity-manipulation of wearing 
a mask reduces an individual’s public self-awareness 
because, by knowing that others can not see her face, the 
individual’s own attention is drawn away from how she 
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looks. However, contrary to what these authors predict, 
it would seem that this reduction in public self-
awareness is not global but related to the very specific 
aspects of the public self that are covered by the mask. 
To some extent, this finding raises questions about how 
global the reduction in public self-awareness is like to 
be under other conditions of anonymity. Contrary to what 
Buss or Carver and Scheier predict, it may be that 
manipulators of anonymity actually reduce public self-
awareness in very specific ways. 
 
The findings from this study also question Prentice-Dunn 
and Rogers’ (1989) hypothesis that the wearing of a mask 
reduces an individual’s concerns with how she presents 
herself because she is less concerned with retaliation or 
retribution from those observing her. The findings from 
this study suggest this process is possible, but that in 
many conditions of anonymity it is unlikely to happen. 
 
The theoretical discussion in this thesis also raises 
some important criticisms of differential self-awareness 
theory, the most important of which does not seem to have 
yet been raised in the social psychological literature. 
This is the point that, by superimposing a motivational 
expectancy-value theory on an attentional theory of self-
awareness, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1989) are in danger 
of disregarding the very attentional processes on which 
they attempt to construct their theory. The discussion in 
this thesis suggests that a reduced concern with 
punishment is just one way in which reduced 
identifiability may lead to a reduced concern with the 
public self. Subsequent research into this area might be 
advised to differentiate between reductions in public 
self-awareness as a consequence of motivational factors, 
and reductions in public self-awareness as a consequence 
of attentional factors. Such a distinction should make it 
easier to identify the conditions in which manipulators 
of anonymity will reduce public self-awareness. 
 
As a final point regarding theories of disinhibition and 
self-awareness, the findings in this study provide an 
alternative explanation for the deindividuation effect 
that Zimbardo (1969) and others have described. It may be 
that the hooded participants in Zimbardo’s study were 
more likely to give electric shocks, not because they 
felt beyond reproach or because they wanted to 
individuate themselves, but because they were less 
concerned with ‘betraying their vulnerabilities’ through 
their facial expressions. That is, hooded participants 
may have thought, ‘No one is going to see me looking 
afraid or uncertain when I push this button, so I am not 
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so bothered about doing it.’ In this respect, it would be 
very interesting to replicate the Zimbardo (1969) or 
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) disinhibition studies, 
but this time with the kind of post-experimental 
qualitative ‘micro-analysis’ that was conducted as part 
of the initial study in this thesis. This might show more 
exactly the processes by which this disinhibition comes 
about. 
 
In terms of general psychological theories, the findings 
from the present study also provide strong support for 
Kellerman and Laird’s (1982) assertion that attending to 
one’s physical appearance can change the way that an 
individual sees herself. Furthermore, in contrast to 
previous self-attribution studies, the final study in 
this thesis controls for visual cueing effects. Hence, it 
shows that the transformation that changes in physical 
appearance bring about can not be attributed solely to 
external cues.  
 
However, the findings from this study do not support 
Laird’s distinction between individuals who are reliant 
on self-produced cues, and individuals who are reliant on 
situationally-produced cues. Indeed, the findings from 
this study suggest that the questionnaire items used to 
measure this dimension lack a significant degree of 
inter-item reliability. This is a difficulty that has not 
be mentioned --- or addressed --- in the literature, but 
one that is of substantial important if this individual 
difference dimension is to be explored further. 
 
The findings from this thesis, and specifically chapter 
eight, also provide additional empirical support for the 
social psychological hypothesis that an individual’s 
physical appearance will influence the kinds of 
psychological characteristics that are attributed to them 
(e.g. Hatfield, 1985). However, the results from the 
chapter eight study are quite unique, in that they show 
that these attributions are made even when it is clear 
that the individual’s ‘facial’ appearance is not their 
real facial appearance. The value of this finding is that 
it then raises questions about how these other-
attributions come about. If, for instance, other-
attributions are made even when an individual’s facial 
attributes are clearly not theirs, then this would 
somewhat challenge the hypothesis that a stereotyping 
process is responsible for these attributions (e.g. 
Synott, 1989). But if it is not stereotyping then how do 
these other-attributions come about? Perhaps further 
investigations of the psychological effects of seeing 
someone wearing a mask could provide some answers.  
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Finally, at the widest possible level, the findings of 
this study may say something significant about the 
relationship between an individual’s internal, 
‘intrapsychic’ world, and their external, physical being. 
As Merleau-Ponty (1962) states, within a mechanistic 
physiology, an individual’s physicality is a mere object 
of consciousness, a shell within which their Cartesian 
‘I’ resides. Yet, the findings from the present study 
suggest that one’s external appearance is not just an 
object of consciousness, but an aspect of being which has 
the potential to fundamentally modify the most 
‘essential’ aspects of one’s ‘inner’ being: the sense of 
self. In this respect, the findings from this study 
highlight the need to move beyond a Cartesian 
internal/external split, and towards an understanding of 
the fundamental interdependency between the internal and 
external worlds. 
10.3  APPLICATIONS 
The findings from this thesis also have a number of 
implications for the practical use of masks, particularly 
within the fields of psychotherapy and personal 
development. 
 
It is evident from this thesis that some individuals have 
concerns about mask-able facets of their public self. 
This includes concerns with looking awkward, looking 
silly, looking ugly, blushing, twitching, feeling that 
one’s face is being ‘read’, or doing the ‘right’ face-
work. It also seems likely that some people will have 
concerns with mask-able facets of the public self that 
did not emerge in the present research: for instance, 
stuttering, facial blemishes, or looking confused. In 
some cases, these concerns may be at a chronic level, 
where they interfere with the individual’s day-to-day 
functioning. Given, then, that the mask has the potential 
to reduce these public self-concerns, there would seem to 
be considerable value in looking at the way in which 
masks might be applied to these difficulties. 
 
Probably the most effective way of using a mask to 
address some of these chronic problems would be as part 
of a cognitive-behavioural desensitisation program. The 
aim here would not just be to get clients to the point 
where they can talk or interact comfortably with a mask 
on. Rather, the aim would be to use the mask as a 
‘stepping stone’, so that clients can become comfortable 
talking or interacting with a mask on, and then gradually 
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move towards interacting without a mask. To make this 
desensitisation process even more gradual, clients could 
progress from full-face masks to half-masks, and then to 
eye-masks or masks that covered only very specific 
features of the face. 
 
An example of this might be the use of masks with 
individuals suffering from social phobias, who had 
specific fears about being seen as facially awkward or 
facially embarrassed in public. Clients would be given 
full face masks to wear, and then encouraged to interact 
or role-play dialogues with other members of a 
therapeutic group. If this reduced the client’s public 
self concerns, then in subsequent sessions the group 
members might be encouraged to continue with this 
activity, or to try it with masks that covered a smaller 
proportion of their faces. As a progression on from this, 
the group members could then be invited to interact mask-
less for short periods of time --- with the proviso that 
they could put their masks back on the moment they felt 
uncomfortable. Finally, participants could be invited to 
interact without the masks for increasingly extended 
periods of time, until they reached a point where they no 
longer required the mask to interact comfortably. 
 
The mask’s ability to reduce specific public self 
concerns could be applied to a wide variety of settings: 
non-clinical as well as clinical. For instance, a men’s 
personal development group which aimed to help 
participants develop their emotional vocabulary (e.g. 
Cooper and Baker, 1996) might note that participants 
tended to inhibit the expression of more ‘negative’ 
affects out of a concern for being seen to cry or look 
vulnerable. If this were the case, then the wearing of a 
mask might again serve as a useful ‘stepping stone’, 
helping the men to feel more comfortable expressing these 
feelings, before going on to express them without the 
mask on. If drama students had concerns about looking 
‘too’ facially emotional, the wearing of a mask might 
also be a very useful means of helping them to express 
the full emotional repertoire of their characters.  
 
The mask’s ability to transforms its wearer’s sense of 
self also indicates some very significant applied 
possibilities. Few other phenomenon have been shown so 
consistently to transform an individual’s self-concept, 
and this suggests that the mask may have a unique place 
in the psychotherapeutic arena. However, for the mask to 
transform its wearer’s sense of self in the direction 
that it represents, it would seem essential that the 
mask-wearer is presented with regular opportunities to 
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reflect on how they look: ideally through mirrors. If 
mirrors are not present and the mask-wearer has no reason 
to focus on their appearance, then the mask’s 
transformative potential is likely to be fairly limited.  
 
One of the therapeutic approaches that might be most 
enhanced through the transformative power of a mask-and-
mirror technique is that of role-plays: for instance, 
personal construct therapy’s ‘fixed role’ technique (e.g. 
Fransella and Dalton, 1996). The aim of such a role-play 
is not to permanently transform the individual into their 
role. Rather, the purpose of the fixed role enactment 
 
is to get over the idea that we can indeed, 
change ourselves; that even the client can 
change, though he seems so stuck at the moment. 
He learns about self-inventiveness; he learns 
what happens when he alters a particular item of 
behaviour, and whether it is useful to explore 
this line of inquiry further or whether he should 
try something else. He discovers how the way we 
construe others and behave towards them 
influences how they behave towards us. (Fransella 
and Dalton, p.160) 
 
Most likely masked fixed role enactment could not be 
conducted outside of the therapeutic environment. 
However, a masked ‘mini’ fixed role could be carried out 
within a therapeutic relationship or therapeutic group, 
as a means of achieving the goals identified by Fransella 
and Dalton (1996). For instance, a client might be asked 
to make a mask of a desired personal quality, or they 
might be asked to make a mask of a quality that is 
orthogonal to their current constructs (e.g. ‘assertive’ 
rather than ‘aggressive’---‘submissive’). Having made the 
mask, they could then be invited to look at themselves in 
the mask, adopt the character of the mask, and then 
interact with those around them. As Fransella and Dalton 
(1996) suggest, not only could this help the client 
realise that they can change (self-concept as well as 
behaviour), they would have an opportunity to see how it 
feels to adopt a particular identity and set of 
behaviours, and also to see how others respond to them 
when they behave in this manner.  
 
Such a masked-experimentation with different roles and 
polarities would also be appropriate to some of the more 
humanistic psychotherapies, such as gestalt psychotherapy 
(e.g. Perls, 1975). With respect to a more person-centred 
approach (e.g. Rogers, 1959), the transformation of self-
concept that the wearing of a mask brings about could 
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also be of substantial value, but in a somewhat different 
way to that of fixed-role play. From a Rogerian 
perspective, the primary barrier between an individual 
and the actuality of their pre-reflective lived 
experience is a ‘sedimented’ self-construct (Spinelli, 
1994). Hence, through reducing the salience of this self-
construct by wearing a mask, a client may have an 
opportunity to experience their lived-world in a more 
open and fluid way. Another Rogerian approach might be to 
ask a client to make a mask of their ‘self’, and then a 
mask of something which is not part of their ‘self’. By 
seeing themselves wearing this ‘not self’ mask, the 
client may then have an opportunity to identify with and 
experience aspects of their lived-world that they would 
normally deny or distort out of an incongruence with the 
sedimented self-construct. 
 
With respect to other humanistic approaches, such as 
transactional analysis (Berne, 1961) or psychosynthesis 
(Assaglioli, 1975), a similar approach could be used to 
help clients embody --- and subsequently reflect upon --- 
less accepted facets of their organismic totality: such 
as ‘ego-states’ or ‘subpersonalities’. Furthermore, 
because of the malleability of the mask, it may be a very 
effective means of helping clients to represent and 
access ‘parts’ of the Self that can not so easily be 
represented through language or drawings. For instance, 
an enormous judge’s mask could be used to represent an 
over-bearing critical parent ego-state (Cooper and 
Cruthers, 1999).  
 
For these approaches to be successful, however, it would 
seem essential that the client’s mask is one that she has 
made --- or at least chosen --- herself. This is because 
there is no evidence from this thesis to suggest that the 
wearing of a mask, in itself, will facilitate the 
expression of aspects of the wearer’s Self. Hence, it is 
only if a client chooses to express a self-aspect in a 
mask, or if she unconsciously ‘projects’ a part of 
herself into a mask that she is making or looking at 
(e.g. Jennings and Minde, 1993), then the wearing of this 
mask may allow her to embody this ‘part’ of her-self. 
 
The findings from this thesis also suggest that mask-work 
may be a very useful means of helping drama students to 
learn to fully ‘enter into’ their characters. However, as 
Johnson (1980) suggests, it may be that, for this to 
occur, the presence of mirrors is required to help the 
students ‘re-charge’ their mask.  
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Along with indications of how mask-work might be applied 
to a therapeutic or dramatic setting, the current 
research suggests that there are some important 
contraindications of mask-work. The wearing of a mask 
would not seem to be particularly useful in contexts 
where individuals will want to use mask-able facets of 
their public self. This might be a drama student who 
wants to use their face to develop a fluid and flexible 
character, or where a therapy clients wants to develop 
closer relationships with their therapist or group 
members.  
 
With respect to psychotherapy, it is also important to 
note that some of the experimental participants found it 
uncomfortable or claustrophobic to wear masks. Hence, it 
would seem important that any practitioner should be 
cautious in inviting clients to wear masks, and it may be 
that a gradual development from eye-masks to half-masks 
to full masks could be the most appropriate way of 
introducing clients to mask-work. Also, given the mask’s 
ability to transform its wearer’s sense of self, it would 
seem essential to be very cautious in using the mask to 
facilitate an individual’s self-transformation. If an 
individual has an uncertain or unbalanced sense of self 
prior to wearing a mask, then prolonged exposure to 
seeing themselves with a new ‘face’ might be experienced 
as somewhat confusing, disturbing, or de-personalising.  
10.4  FURTHER RESEARCH 
The findings from this thesis have opened up numerous 
avenues for further research. Chapter two, in itself, 
should serve as a valuable starting point for a 
psychologist interested in exploring the ways in which a 
mask might affect its wearer. In the theoretical 
discussions, too, a number of questions have come up 
which there has not been sufficient space in the present 
thesis to explore. For instance, there is the question of 
whether the wearing of a mask increases a sense of social 
identity where an in-group and out-group are physically 
separated (section 3.2.2.3.4); or the question of whether 
there are gender differences in how individual’s respond 
to their physical appearance (see section 6.1.4). The 
discussions at the end of each study have also suggested 
several different ways in which this research could be 
taken forward. In this final discussion, therefore, I 
will only identify the avenues in which further research 
would be most warranted.  
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With respect to the question of the mask’s psychological 
effect as a whole, it would be extremely useful to begin 
conducting in-depth qualitative interviews with 
individuals who wore masks in ‘everyday’ contexts --- 
e.g. drama, psychotherapy, fencing --- to see if the 
findings from such a study would triangulate with the 
findings from the more non-naturalistic, experimental 
studies conducted in this thesis. The nodal hierarchy 
developed in chapters four and five could be used to 
structure the resulting data, and to see whether similar 
or very different effects were experienced when 
individuals wore masks in non-laboratory environments. 
This would be particularly important in assessing whether 
a masked transformation can come about in situations 
other than when an individual is directly looking at 
their masked appearance. Not only would such an approach 
be able to assess the ecological validity of the present 
findings, but it would also be a very effective means of 
obtaining a clearer and more in depth understanding of 
how these effects come about. Such an approach might also 
identify other effects of wearing a mask that have not, 
to the present date, emerged. 
 
Two pilot studies along these lines were, in fact, 
conducted. The first of these was with a middle-aged man 
who had just begun to use masks as part of his drama 
training, and the other was with a middle-aged man who 
used masks as an integral part of his sexual practices. 
As predicted, the findings from these two in-depth 
interviews confirmed some of the present findings, but 
also opened up a number of further areas of inquiry. Both 
men, for instance, talked about feeling like a very 
different person when wearing the mask, but the second 
interviewee talked in detail about the ambiguity of this 
transformation: the sense of ‘me-but-not-me’. Also, this 
man talked about the way in which wearing a mask very 
much increased his private self-awareness, and cut 
himself off from the over-stimulation of the external 
world. 
 
With respect to the psychological effects of wearing a 
mask, it would also be very worthwhile to look more 
closely at the question of individual differences, in an 
attempt to understand why it is that individuals respond 
to the wearing of a mask in such markedly different ways. 
With respect to differences in degrees of transformation, 
one way forward would be to repeat the chapter nine 
study, but present participants with a wider range of 
individual difference measures, such as the self-
plurality scale (Altrocchi, 1999). Post-experimental 
qualitative interviews, like those conducted at the end 
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of the chapter four study, might also be an effective way 
of obtaining a deeper understanding of the factors which 
bring about a transformative effect. 
 
To see whether the individual differences come about 
because some people see their ‘face’ as the mask and 
others see it as their face, it would also be useful to 
introduce as a dependent measure an item like, ‘To what 
extent do you think that your facial appearance has 
changed?’ Alternatively, one could compare two groups of 
participants, one of whom would be asked to just wear a 
mask, and one of whom would be asked to wear a mask but 
to think about how they looked to others. Alternatively, 
this second group could be asked to imagine that their 
mask was their ‘real’ face, to see whether it was this 
‘facial’ transformation factor which was the key 
precedent to psychological transformation. 
 
With respect to individual differences, it also seemed 
clear that some individuals have greater concerns about 
mask-able aspects of their public self than others. 
Another very valid area of further research, therefore, 
would be to develop the ‘facial self-consciousness’ 
scale, to see whether it was possible to identify 
individuals who were more concerned about how their face 
appeared, and therefore would be likely to experience a 
greater reduction in public self concerns when wearing a 
mask. In terms of the clinical applications of mask-
wearing, the development and testing of such a 
questionnaire would be very useful in terms of seeing 
what kinds of people, or what kinds of concerns, the 
wearing of a mask might be most effective in treating.  
 
To develop this line of research, the next step could be 
to ‘brainstorm’ as many further ‘facial self-
consciousness’ items as possible, focusing more 
specifically on the kinds of concerns people might have 
about their face. For instance, ‘I worry about people 
“reading” things into my facial expressions’ or ‘I’m 
concerned about looking miserable’. An alternative 
approach might be to conduct a survey asking people 
questions like: ‘What aspects of your facial appearance 
concern you when you are communicating with others’. Once 
a number of items had been developed, a questionnaire 
study could then be conducted to assess the degree of 
inter-item reliability. Those items which demonstrated a 
sufficient degree of reliability could then be used to 
develop a fuller ‘facial self-consciousness scale’. 
 
Another area for further research is the question of how 
situationally generalisable the present findings are 
  
281 
 
regarding the transformative effects of wearing a mask. 
As suggested above, this question could be addressed 
through qualitative interviewing. Alternatively, one 
could use a more experimental method. For instance, one 
could design a number of different conditions ---  for 
instance, wearing a mask in front of a mirror, wearing a 
mask in front of a large/small group, wearing a mask with 
very small eye-holes, looking at a mask for a long period 
of time before putting it on --- and then ask 
participants to rate (or order) how much they felt like 
the character represented in the mask in each of these 
conditions, and how much they felt like their usual 
selves. A series of experiments along these lines would 
be a very useful way of clarifying what situational 
factors were necessary for an individual to feel more 
like the character represented in their mask, and also 
what situational factors were necessary for an individual 
to feel less like their usual selves.  
 
In relation to more established psychological theories, 
the most useful direction for further research would also 
probably be in the area of self-attribution theory. In 
some respects, the wearing of a mask provides a crucial 
test of Laird’s (1974) self-attribution explanation for 
the facial feedback effect, because it is one of the few 
phenomenon which can radically alter an individual’s 
‘facial’ appearance without altering their face. In this 
respect, it is an ideal tool for seeing whether a facial 
feedback effect can occur in the absence of any 
physiological facial feedback. The research in this 
thesis provides good support for Laird’s analysis, but it 
would be useful to triangulate these findings with a 
study that controlled more fully for demand 
characteristics. This could be done through increased 
automisation, using a between-participants design, and 
embedding the dependent measures in some kind of ‘cover 
story’, such that the participants would not be aware 
that the study was looking at transformative effects. 
 
Conducting in-depth qualitative interviews at the end of 
a study similar to the chapter nine study would also be a 
very effective way of assessing the diachronic 
reliability of the present findings. More directly, one 
could simply give participants a number of masks, ask 
them to try them on in front of a mirror and describe 
what they are experiencing. Interestingly, this 
deception-less, straightforward design seems to be the 
direction that Laird, himself, is moving towards (see 
Laird et al, 1994).  
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10.5  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this research shows that a mask can have a 
significant psychological effect on its wearer, and that 
there are many different pathways by which this effect 
can come about. 
 
This thesis shows that, under conditions in which an 
individual’s identifiability is dependent on immediate 
facial recognition, the wearing of a mask can 
significantly reduce feelings of identifiability. It also 
shows that under these conditions, a mask-wearer feels 
significantly less concerned about mask-able aspects of 
her public self. Findings from this study also show that 
a mask can both disinhibit and inhibit its wearer, 
depending on whether the mask-wearer wants to behave in a 
way that she would normally inhibit out a concern for 
mask-able facets of her public self, or in a way for 
which she requires mask-able facets of her public self, 
respectively. 
 
This thesis also provides very clear evidence that, under 
conditions in which a mask-wearer is focused on her 
‘facial’ appearance, the wearing of a mask significantly 
reduces the extent to which she feels like her usual 
selves and significantly increases the extent to which 
she feels like the character represented in the mask. 
There is also strong evidence to suggest that this comes 
about through the self-attribution process proposed by 
Laird (1974) and Kellerman and Laird (1982). Indeed, the 
present studies provide some of the strongest support for 
this hypothesis.  
 
Kellerman and Laird (1982), therefore, would seem to be 
correct to suggest that, ‘we redefine ourselves each time 
we attend to our attributes,’ and that, ‘a seemingly 
innocuous change in our appearance can change the way we 
feel about ourselves’ (p.312). Not only may the 
psychological effects of wearing a mask be the clearest 
demonstration of this, but it may also be one of the most 
effective ways of extending this theory into clinical 
practice. 
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